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INTRODUCTION 
The English Franciscan, William of Ockham, was a central 
and transitional figure among fourteenth century thinkers. By 
the time he entered Oxford University, the academic world was 
largely divided between Thomistic and Scotistic schools of 
thought. Building on the logical studies of William of Sherwood 
(c. 1200-1271) and Peter of Spain (c. 1210-1277), Ockham developed 
a linguistic stance to avoid issues which he considered false and 
to remedy the embarrassment of parallel, yet contradictory, lines 
of explanation which had acquired a semi-official status among 
the Dominican and Franciscan doctors. Apparently, Ockham recog-
nized neither the novelty of his conceptual reorganization nor 
the extremes it suggested. Forced to defend the Catholic ortho-
doxy of his position and tangled in political-ecclesiastical 
disputes, Ockham achieved only the outline of a philosophical 
system. Instead of unifying the Scholastic argument, he repre-
sented a third faction. Now verbal fights erupted between 
"realists" and "nominalists. 11 
Despite the pivotal character of his thought, important 
aspects of Ockham's teaching remain obscure. This is true of his 
moral theory. An abbreviated academic career, a critical and 
abrupt style, many unfinished and not critically edited writings 
--these factors make a clear picture of his accomplishment in 
ethics difficult. His ancient and contemporary sources, and the 
1 
~· 
2 
positive and negative reactions which they evoked, contributed to 
his moral point of view yet are textually hard to identify. This 
study means to delineate the structure of Ockham's moral doctrine 
and indicate the balance and organization of its elements and 
sources. It is precisely the internal consistency of Ockham's 
theory of moral value which is so frequently questioned. 
The Problem 
Looking back on the generations of Scholasticism, Francis 
Suarez attempted a seventeenth century classification of the 
various themes and types of ethical theories developed. In De 
Legibus, he put William of Ockham in the group which attached the 
force and nature of law to the divine will. 1 In both Ockham 
studies and Histories of ethical systems, it is still commonplace 
to read this judgment. 2 This interpretation, known as 
1De Legibus ac de deo legislatore, I, c. 2; Vol. V, 
Suarez. Opera Omnia "'('ed. Carolus Berton; Paris, 1856), p. 18; 
"Est ergo secunda opinio principalis, affirmans legem esse actum 
voluntatis legislatoris ••.• ut Ockham ••• " 
2Typical studies of Ockham's ethics would be, for example, 
Anita Garvens, "Die Grundlagen der Ethik Wilhelms von Ockham," 
Franziskanische Studien XXI (1934), p. 265; "Denn sittlich gut 
und richtig ist in Ockhams Sinn schlechthin das, was der Wille 
Gottes als gut bestimmt, und umgekehrt ist etwas deshalb schlect, 
weil es Gott nicht will." Citing Professor Garvens with approval, 
a Franciscan scholar, Father Elzearius Bonke, concludes that "nemo 
neget Venerabilem Inceptorem revera docuisse characterem positivum 
moralitatis." "Doctrina nominalistica de fundamento ordinis mor-
alis apud Guilielmum de Ockham et Gabrielem Biel," Collectanea 
Franciscana XIV (1944), p.60. Leon Baudry, whose textual and 
doctrinal investigations of the Venerable Inceptor deserve close 
attention, cautions his readers to consider Ockham's notion of 
moral goodness "en rapport avec ce qu'on appel],e son volontarisme. 11 
Lexigue Philosophigue de Guillaume d'Ockham. Etude des Notions 
Fondamentales (Paris: P. Lethiellieux, 1958), p. 33. And 
- 3 
"voluntarism" or "positivism" or "authoritarianism," generally 
holds that Ockham's ethic has no metaphysical basis, that moral 
goodness means divine approval, and that the nature of ethical 
behavior is obedience. The recently published Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy explains the meaning of "theological voluntarism" by 
describing Ockham's ethic. 3 This classification should be con-
sidered the "majority opinion." 
There is also a significant minority opinion. Research 
on Ockham, the political theorist, turns up an emphatic doctrine 
of "natural right." Attempting to balance the claims of papacy 
and emperor, he indicated common limits to authority and 
while searching for the origins of Reformation theology, Erwin 
Iserloh joins the consensus: "Mit Recht konnen wir also vom 
Voluntarismus und Aktualismus bei Ockham sprechen. 11 Gnade und 
Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von 
Ockham (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1956), p. 1. General studies 
maintain similar views. "Moral law is reduced to positive divine 
law, obligation is contingent, and it is doubtful that a valid 
ethics can be constructed apart from theology. Ockhamist ethics, 
then, is truly authoritarian." Vernon J. Bourke, A History of 
Ethics, Vol. I: Graeco-Roman to Early Modern Ethics (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1968), p. 155 .. The same judgment appears in Alasdair 
Mac Intyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 
p. 119; A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law, An Historical Survey (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 69; and Jacques Maritain, Moral 
Philosophy (New York: Scribner's, 1964), p. 91. 
3Richa.rd Taylor, "Voluntarism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Paul Edwards, 8 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 271; "Ockham 
said that the divine will, and not human or divine reason, is the 
ultimate standard of morality, that certain acts are sins because 
they have been forbidden by God, and other acts are meritorious 
only because they have been commanded by God. He denied that God 
forbids certain things because they are sins or commands certain 
things because they are virtues, for it seemed to him that this 
would be a limitation upon God's free will .•• The moral law, 
accordingly, was for Ockham simply a matter of God's free choice." 
4 
jurisdiction in the natures of things--much like a Natural Law 
moralist would. Commenting on Ockham's political thought and its 
corroborating ethic, Ewart Lewis concludes that "within the terms 
set by the data of revelation, Occam's system was one of ration-
alism pushed to the bitter end. 114 Indeed, to enter the domain 
of Ockham's moral theory through the politico-polemical works 
fosters the impression that rational and immutable orders of 
nature support morality. 5 When Ockham is called a "rationalist" 
the category implies that human nature entails certain rights and 
duties, that certain actions are intrinsical_ly good or evil for 
men, and that valid moral laws must respect the "ethical facts" 
of the governed agents. 
The contrast between the majority and minority reports 
is severe. But this problem is historiographical; it shows the 
4Medieval Political Ideas, Vol. II (London: Routledge 
and Kegan, 1954), p. 551. 
5Max A. Shepard, "William of Occam and the Higher Law," 
The American Political Science Review 26 (1932), p. 1009; "We 
constantly find "jus naturale" and "ratio naturalis" linked to-
gether, which shows us that Occam held the time-honored, ancient 
and medieval tradition of eternal, immutable principles of nature, 
discoverable by the use of reason." A recognized Ockham scholar, 
Rev. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., finds the position that "The only 
restriction of the power of the Pope was imposed by the divine law 
and the immutable and indispensable natural law. In other words, 
things which were directly forbidden by God and the natural law to 
all human beings without exception, because they are illicit in 
themselves, could not be commanded by the Pope." Boehner, Collect-
ed Articles, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure: The Francis-
can Institute, 1958), p. 448. Also see the studies of Charles C. 
Bayley, "Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of William of 
Ockham," Journal of the History of Ideas X (1949), p. 200; and E. 
F. Jacob, "Ockham as a Political Thinker," Essays in the Conciliar 
Epoch (re. ed., Manchester: Univ. of Manchester Press, 1953), p. 94. 
5 
difficulties of historians more than those which confronted Ock-
ham. The use of interpretive classifications such as voluntarism 
and rationalism--and there is textual evidence for both--forces 
an either/or conclusion. 6 The issue facing Ockham was fundamental 
to the Scholastic enterprise-~how can revealed and experiential 
data be reconciled systematically? The problem of relating posi-
tive and "natural" law represents one tension among many faced 
by the Medievals who used Aristotle to elucidate the gospels. 
Ockham dramatized this perennial concern by his ambitious portrait 
of God's moral authority and his enthusiasm for the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Like a voice from the patristic age, he seems to enlarge 
the discretionary powers of the Almighty until the paradigm of 
moral response is Abraham, climbing the mountain to sacrifice his 
innocent son. Aristotle would have frowned upon this task, yet 
Ockham :q.ever repudiates "the Philosopher." On the contrary, 
Aristotle remains "the" authority on moral doctrine. The stark 
contrast between God's moral omnipotence and the exigencies of 
"Right Reason" have been noticed by many commentators; 7 some 
6
see my article, "Voluntarism and Rationalism in the 
Ethics of Ockham," Franciscan Studies 31 (1971), pp. 72-87. 
7For example, G. de Lagard says, "Ainsi la morale ock-
hamiste apparait-elle comme un jeu alterne ou le volontarisme et 
le rationalisme se re'pondent curieusement. Au depart, lorsque 
nous analyions la nature de la loi morale promulgu~e par Dieu, 
tout nous paraissait arbitraire et irrationnel pur. En etudiant 
la moralite naturelle et le jeu de l'agir humain, nous avons vu 
la raison prendre une part de plus en plus importante dans la 
definition et l'orientation de la vie morale." Naissance de 
l'Esprit La1gue .?.2:.! Declin ~ Moyen Age, Vol. VI: Ockham, La 
Morale et le Droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), 
p. Francis Oakley also finds "in intimate juxtapos.i tion, the 
6 
think that the contrasting elements are not contradictory. 8 Un-
fortunately, there is no published account of precisely how Ock-
ham can allow God to tamper with concrete obligations without 
·jeopardizing the rational requirements for an ethical "science." 
How can the theologian's belief in an absolute and absolutely free 
norm of good and evil permit any philosophical credibility for 
unchanging principles of morality? Because Ockham magnifies the 
legislative powers of God without excluding the presence of non-
revealed ethical certainties, and because scholars have made 
Ockham the forerunner of the Reformation's theological positivism 
and the Renaissance's "natural" morality, the coherence of his 
moral viewpoint is questionable. 
rationalist and voluntarist theories, and no peace can be found 
to grow between ·these antinomies. 11 "Medieval Theories of Natural 
Law: William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist 
Tradition," Natural Law Forum VI (1961), p. 70. Certain textbooks 
such as Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. III, 
Part I: Ockham to the Speculative Mystics (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1963), p. 120; and Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions 
"'(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 608-609, also speak of 
Ockham's "dualism" in ethical theory. 
8For example, Paul Vignaux in his article, "Nominalisme," 
Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. XI (Paris, 1931), C. 
771, cautions that neither Ockham nor the nominalists in general 
obviate a non-theological ethic. "Une premiere conclusion s'im-
pose: pour le nominalisme, toute morale n'est pas necessaurement 
d'autorite et de revelation; il peut y avoir une ~thique naturelle 
et rationelle. 11 It is the thesis of Father Lucan Freppert, O.F.M. 
that "there is a dual viewpoint to be found in Ockham's ethical 
theory." "The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham," 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, St. 
Bonaventure University, 1966), p. 241. Father Freppert divides 
the elements which belong to the "divine will" and "right reason" 
viewpoints. But the interpretive problem is not so much in 
identifying Ockham's various perspectives as in showing their 
conceptual harmony or inconsistency. 
7 
Ockham was not unaware of the problem. Translating the 
scriptural injunctions to "love God and love your neighbor as 
yourself" into theologically useful information was a common 
Medieval concern. After Aquinas' Summa Theologica, the Scholas-
tics show a marked sensitivity to the nature and frontiers of 
revealed and natural laws. As prima facie evidence that Ockham 
appreciated the difference between revealed and evident moral 
rules, and that he satisfied his own mind at least regarding the 
systematic compatibility of religious beliefs and philosophical 
principles in determining moral duty consider his second Quodlibet, 
question fourteen. 
Whether there can be demonstrative science about morals? 
[Negative] There cannot be since demonstrative science 
cannot pertain to those things subject to the will; but 
morals are such things, therefore, etc. 
[Affirmative] On the contrary, morals are knowable; 
therefore, etc. 
In this question, I shall first clarify one of the 
terms used; secondly, I shall assert one distinction; 
and thirdly, I shall-answer the question. 
Regarding the first point: I claim that "moral" is 
applied loosely to human acts which are controlled by 
the will absolutely and the term is used in this manner 
in the Decretum [of Gratian], distinction one, chapter 
"Mos" - as is clear from the gloss. Otherwise, it is 
applied more strictly to customs or actions subject to 
the power of the will according to the natural dictate 
of reason and the other circumstances. 
Regarding the second: it should be known that moral 
doctrine has many parts of which one is positive and 
the other non-positive. Human positive science is that 
which contains human and divine laws which oblige us to 
accomplish or avoid those actions which are good or evil 
only because they are prohibited or commanded by a 
superior able to establish and decide laws. Non-positive 
moral science is that which directs human actions with-
· out any command of a superior. As principles known per 
se or known through experience, they direct thus, namely, 
'that "everything honest ought to be done," and "every-
thing dishonest ought to be avoided," etc., about which 
Aristotle speaks in moral philosophy. 
Regarding the third: I claim that positive moral 
science is not demonstrative. Thus, legal science is 
non-demonstrative, although it might be governed by 
demonstrative science in many instances, because the 
arguments of lawyers are based upon human positive laws 
which do not include propositions known evidently. How-
ever, the non-positive moral discipline is a demonstra-
tive science. I prove this assertion because a cognition 
deducing conclusions syllogistically from principles known 
per ~ or through experience is demonstrative; moral 
discipline is this kind of thing; therefore, etc. The 
major premise is obvious. The minor is proved since there 
are many principles known per ~ in moral science, for 
example, that "the will ought to be conformed to right 
reason," "all blameworthy evil should be avoided," and 
others like this. Likewise, many principles are known 
through experience as is manifestly clear to one con-
sidering experience. And furthermore, I claim that this 
science is more certain than many others inasmuch as one 
can have a more certain experience about his own actions 
than about the acts of others. Hence, it is clear that 
this science is very subtle, useful and evident. 
To the principal argument I respond that propositions, 
which are true and known per se and which can demon-
strate many conclusions, can be formed about those things 
controlled by the will.9 
9ouodl., II, q. 14 (quoted from Vaticana Lat., 3075, f. 
20vb); Utrum de moralibus potest esse scientiam demonstrativam? 
Quod non: quia de illis quae subjacent voluntati non 
posset esse scientiam demonstrativam; sed moralia sunt huiusmodi, 
ergo, etc .. 
Contra: moralia sunt scibilia, ergo, etc •• 
In ista quaestione, primo exponam unum terminum positum; 
secundo, ponam unam distinctionem; tertio, ad quaestionem. 
8 
Circa primum: dico quod "morale" accipitur largiter pro 
actibus humanis quae subjacent voluntati absolute, et sic acci-
pi tur in Decretis, distinctio prima, c. "Mos, 11 ut patet in glossa. 
Aliter accipitur stricte magis pro moribus sive actibus subjectis 
postestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen rationis et 
secundum alias circumstantias. 
Circa secundum: sciendum quod moralis doctrina habet 
plures partes, quarum una est positiva, alia est non-positiva. 
9 
The Texts 
Doctrinal studies of William of Ockham suffer collectively 
from the sparse information about his life, 10 and the condition 
of his extant writings. Ockham changed his mind about the nature 
Scientia humana positiva est illa quae continent leges humanas 
et divinas quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae 
nee sunt bona nee mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a 
superiore cuius est leges condere seu statuere. Scientia moralis 
non-positiva est quae, sine omni praecepto superioris, dirigit 
actus humanos sicut principia per se nota vel nota per experien-
tiam; sic dirigunt, scilicet, quod "omne honestum est faciendum," 
et "omne inhonestum est fugiendum," etc., de quibus loquitur 
Aristoteles in morali philosophia. 
Circa tertium: dico quod moralis scientia positiva, 
cuiusmodi est scientia juristarum, non est demonstrativa, quamvis 
sit a scientia demonstrativa ut in pluribus regulata, quia ra-
tiones juristarum fundantur super leges positivas humanas quae 
non accipiunt propositiones evidenter notas. Sed disciplina 
moralis non-positiva est scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia 
notitia deducens conclusiones syllogistice ex principiis per se 
notis vel per experientiam scitis, est demonstrativa; huiusmodi 
est disciplina moralis, ergo, etc •. Major est manifesta. Minor 
probatur, quia multa sunt principia per se nota in morali scien-
tia; puta, quod "voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi," 
"omne malum vituperabile est fugiendum," et huiusmodi. Similiter, 
per experientiam sciuntur multa principia sicut manefeste patet 
sequenti experientiam. Et ultra, dico quod illa scientia est 
certior multis aliis, per quanto quilibet posset habere majorem 
experientiam de actibus suis quam de aliis. Ex quo patet, quod 
illa scientia est multum subtilis, utilis et evidens. 
Ad principale, dico quod de illis quae subjacent voluntati 
possunt formari propositiones verae et per se notae, quae multas 
conclusiones possunt demonstrare. 11 
1
°For what little documentation there is about Ockham's 
life, see F. Federhofen, "Ein Beitrag zur Bibliographie und 
Biographie des Wilhelm von Ockham," Philosophisches Jahrbuck 38 
(1925), pp.26-42]Leon Baudry, Guillaume d'Occam. Sa vie, ~ 
oeuvres, ~ idees sociales et politigues, Vol. I, L'Homme et les 
Oeuvres (Paris: J. Vrin, 1950J; and Philotheus Boehner, The 
"Tractatus de Successivis" Attributed to William Ockham (St. 
Bonaventure-,-New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1944), pp. 1-15. 
10 
of universal concepts, 11 and in moral theory, about the question 
12 
of divine commands to hate God. The order of composition thus 
becomes critical in determining his mature position. Yet the 
biographical data is simply lacking for a chronological listing 
of publication dates which marked his academic career. Literary 
evidence, mostly in the form of cross references, makes the fol-
lowing order probable: the Reportatio or unrevised commentary on 
books II-IV of Peter Lombard's Sentences, the Ordinatio or re-
vised commentary on book I of the Sentences, the Summa Logicae 
and the Quodlibeta Septem. 13 These works contain Ockham's major 
treatment of ethical questions; they are the principal sources 
for this research. 
11
ockham first held that a universal was a "fictum" or 
mental contruct having the ideal being (~ objectivum) of 
thought objects. Later, he considered universals as acts of the 
intellect possessing "subjective being" (~ subjectivum)--the 
existential status of real accidents which adhere in a subject. 
For the importance of this doctrinal development in dating Ock-
ham' s works, see Boehner, Collected Articles •.. , pp. 99-107; and 
Gedeon Gal, "Gualteri de Chatten et Guillelmi de Ockham Controver-
sia de Natura Conceptus Universalis," Franciscan Studies XXVII 
(1967), pp. 191-212. 
12Erich Hochstetter noticed this change in "Viator Mundi. 
Einige Bemerkungen zur Situation des Menschen bei Wilhelm von 
Ockham," Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 1-20. 
13we follow the proposals of Father Boehner, Ockham: 
Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. by Philotheus Boehner (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), pp. lii-lvii. C. K. Brampton 
corroborates this order of composition in "The Probable Order of 
Ockham's non-polemical Works," Traditio 19 (1963), pp. 469-483. 
Chapter one of Leon Baudry's Guillaume d'Occam .•. , gives a differ-
ent sequence to the academic writings but not one which affects 
the relationships between the four works on which our study 
depends. 
11 
The absence of a reliable "life" is not a problem peculiar 
to Ockham studies. Judging by the literary remains of the 13th 
and 14th centuries, the Schoolmen seem to be disembodied intel-
lects; their personalities are fabricated from their styles in 
philosophy and theology; their formative years are conformed to 
the institutional history of the university which they attended. 
In determining his final and definitive position, Ockham presents 
a special problem only because his career falls into two parts--
the academic and the polemical periods. Arguments with the popes 
--often about morals--form a considerable portion of Ockham's 
publishing and postdate his university life. But the ethical 
viewpoints advanced by Ockham to refute his opponents are not 
always his own. This study, consequently, looks to the political 
works for certain definitions and examples of applied moral 
theory only when the context shows that the Venerable Inceptor is 
"asserting" rather than "reciting" opinions. 
The scribes who copied and circulated Ockham's work also 
transmitted numerous mistakes. Scholars must live with these 
corruptions, additions and subtractions until the Franciscan 
Institute of St. Bonaventure University completes its critical 
edition of Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Philosophica et Theologica. 
For the present, it is necessary to use the texts readily avail-
able in modern photostats of the fifteenth century incunabula, 
namely, Guillelmus de Occam. Opera Plurima, Vol. III-IV (Lyons,· 
1494-1496)--reprint in London: Gregg Press, 1962; and Quodlibeta 
§eptem ..£!::!!!! ~ Tractatu de Sacramento Altaris (Strasbourg, 1491)--
\ 
\ 
12 
~ep~int at Heverlee-Louvain: Editions de la biblioth~que S. J., 
~961· The Lyons edition of Ockham's Scriptum super Sententias 
has a fair text of the Ordinatio; the important questions on 
ethics from the Ordinatio and the major part of the Summa Logicae 
are critically edited by the Franciscan Institute. The incuna-
bula give a poor text, however, of the Reportatio and Quodlibetal 
Questions. This is most unfortunate because the Scholastic in-
ventory of moral questions, as proposed by Peter Lombard, occurs 
mainly within book three of the Sentences. And the random or 
"guodlibetal'' questions which Ockham handled often concern ethics. 
The problem involves not only those subtle changes of doctrine 
worked by careless scribes, but whole questions added to or 
extracted from Ockham's original.copy. To give a precise warning, 
it should be known that the following questions will be quoted 
frequently as part of Ockham's Reportatio yet they apparently did 
not belong to the original inventory of this work: Scriptum in 
Sententias, book II, question 3; book III, questions 12-15; and 
book IV, Dubitationes Addititiae. 14 These questions were probably 
Ockham's--since no serious objections to their authenticity have 
been raised--and later inserted into his questions on the Sent-
ences by some secretary. For example, question twelve of book 
three (Are the virtues interdependent?) is called a "question on 
the Bible" by Walter of Chatton, a contemporary who pursued 
14Father Boehner indicates that these texts are absent 
from the oldest manuscripts. Collected Articles ... , pp. 293-300. 
13 
Ockham's publications with a critical interest. 15 -This would 
imply that the text had origins other than the lectures on Peter 
Lombard. The dubious policies of Medieval scribes and editors, 
however, have seen this same question printed as part of the 
Lyons edition of the Reportatio and the Strasbourg edition of the 
Quodlibeta Septem. All these textual difficulties cannot be 
eliminated; our modest hope is to minimize the problems by com-
· paring key texts from the Reportatio on the notion of "right 
reason" with codex 16398 of the Biblioth~que Nationale at Paris 
and important Quodlibetal Questions on the "scientific" nature of 
ethics with Vaticana Lat., 3075. 
The following sources and abbreviations will be standard: 
Text Quoted 
A) from the prologue and 
distinctions I-III of the 
Ordinatio 
Printed Source 
A) G. de Ockham Opera Philosoph!-
.£§:. et Theologica, Vols. I-II, 
Scriptum in librum primum Sent-
entiarum: Ordinatio, ed. Gedeon 
G~l et Stephen Brown (St. Bona-
venture, New York: The Franciscan 
Institute, 1967-71). 
15The editors of the Ordinatio call attention to codex 
Paris. Nat. lat. 15,887, f. 13lva, in which Chatton refers to 
this questio'ii"""and, in the margin, the scribe identifies it as 
"Quaestio super Bibliam." This may represent one of Ockham's 
earliest writings since at the time Chatten composed his lec-
tures, he knew only the unrevised and initial "commentary" of 
Ockham. In the normal course of study at Oxford, Ockham would 
have studied the Bible before Lombard. See G. de Ockham Opera 
Philosophica et Theologica, Vol. I, Scriptum in librum primum 
Sententiarum: Ordinatio, ed. Gedeon Gal et Stephen Brown (St. 
Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1967), pp. 36*-
37*, n. 5. 
a) Abbr. e.g., Sent., I, 
d. 1, q. 4 (I, IObT. 
B) from distinctions IV-
XLVIII of the Ordinatio 
and books II-IV of the 
Reportatio. 
b) Abbr. e.g., Sent., II, 
q. 19, o. 
G) from the Quodlibetal 
Questions 
c) Abbr. e.g., Quodl., I, 
q. 20. 
D) from parts I, II and I-
III of the Summa Logicae 
d) Abbr. e.g., Summa Log., 
I, c. 4, p. 15. 
E) from the works of John 
Duns Scotus. 
e) Abbr. e.g., Comm. Ox., 
II, d. 25, q. unica (XIII, 
210). 
a) Scriptum •.. , book one, dis-
tinction one, question four 
(volume one of Qpera Philosophica 
et Theologica, page 106). 
A) Qpera Plurima: Guillelmus de 
Occam, Vols. II-IV, Super Quat-
tuor Libros Sententiarum (Lyons, 
I'Zi'.9Z+-96) • 
b) Super Quattuor .•. , book two, 
question nineteen, marginal 
letter 11 0 11 • 
C) Quodlibeta Septem (Strasbourg, 
1491). 
c) Quodlibet Primi, question 
twenty. 
D) William Ockham. Summa Logicae: 
Pars Prima, ed. Philotheus Boeh-
ner-(st. Bonaventure, New York: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1957); 
Pars Secunda et Tertiae Prima, 
·ecr:-PhilotheUS-Boehner (St. 
Bonaventure, New York: The Fran-
ciscan Institute, 1962). 
d) Summa Logicae, Pars Prima, 
chapter four, page fifteen of 
Boehner's edition. 
E) J. D. Scoti ~Omnia, ed. 
Wadding and Vives~aris: 1891-
95), 26 vols. 
e) Commentaria Oxoniensia super 
Sententias, book two, distinc-
tion twenty-five, question unica 
(volume thirteen of Opera Omnia, 
page 210). 
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CHAPTER I 
'' . , ... , 
THE HUMAN WILL, THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY 
In 1270 and l277, the bishop of Paris condemned certain 
tenets of Greek and Latin Necessitarianism. 1 These Parisian 
statutes prompted an increased sensitivity to the large differ-
ences between Aristotle and Christianity and added motives of 
orthodoxy to the perennial scholastic interest in the nature of 
freedom and the will. In retrospect, John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) 
was a central figure in the theological reaction to the Paris 
correctives; his doctrine of free will moves emphatically away 
from the Aristotelian account of "choice" and "rational appetite." 
Scotus proposed "the more formal characteristic of the will is 
'freedom' rather than 'appetite;' as freedom is the will's form 
of receptivity, so the characteristic of freedom is the more 
constitutive feature of the will. 112 William of Ockham, sharing 
the aims if not the methods of Scotus, also re-examined the 
nature of human freedom. 
1
see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denif-
le and E. Chatelain, 4 vols. (Paris: Delalain, 1889-1897), Vol. 
I, pp. 486-87; pp. 543-588. Etienne Gilson gives a balanced study 
o~ these condemnations in History of Christian Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 402-427 with 
notes. 
210); 
ratio 
sicut 
2scotus,Comm. Ox., II, d. 25, q. unica, n. 6 (XIII, p. 
"Ratio autem formalior voluntatis est magis libera quam 
appetitus, quare est ratio recipiendi inquantum libera, 
ratio libertatis est magis ratio constituendi .•• " 
16 
This chapter considers Ockham's conception of the human 
will, its freedom, and its regulating influence on his moral 
theory. Our study intends to determine the sense in which the 
will is a "sufficient principle" of morality; 3 and why "acts of 
4 
will" alone are moral. The answers require close attention to 
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the psychological evidence, conditions and character of human 
freedom. Many commentators render Ockham's moral theory as a 
function and prerogative of the omnipotent God. The Venerable 
Inceptor's examination of the human will provides a more accurate 
record of his motives as a moralist. But first, some general re-
marks on causality are in order. The will involves a special 
mode of causality and shares features and problems belonging to 
causality in general. 
1. Causality in General 
Ockham gives a descriptive definition of causality; that 
is, he offers a set of criteria by which an instance of causality 
can be recognized. Experiencing an essential order among beings, 
so that the occurrence of the posterior requires the prior, justi-
fies an inference of causality. 5 
3ouodl., II, q. 16; " ••• ad eliciendum actum laudabilem 
concurrit voluntas; igitur nihil aliud a voluntate est sufficiens 
principium ad talem actum." 
4 Cf. Sent., III, q. 10 R; Sent., III, q. 12, F, XX; Quodl., 
I, q. 20; Quodl., III, q. 13. 
5sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (I, 418); "ad secundum, dico quod 
ex tali ordine semper contingit inferre causalitatem in priori 
respectu posterioris, maxime si prius potest esse sine posteriori 
et none converse, naturaliter etiam •.. Ergo si prius exigitur ad 
To the first of these (objections), I answer that 
although there can be many causes of the same effect, 
nevertheless, this should not be asserted without 
necessity. For instance, unless one can be convinced 
through experience that precisely with this thing 
present and the other absent, the effect follows; or 
that with this thing absent and everything else pres-
ent, the effect does not follow. An example of the 
first--one proves that fire is a cause of heat because 
with fire itself present and everything else removed, 
heat follows in a heatable thing which is close. In 
the same way, one proves that the sun is a cause of 
heat because when fire is absent and the sun is brought 
to bear, the production of heat follows. An example of 
the second--one proves that the object is the cause of 
intuitive cognition because with everything else present 
and the object alone removed, the intuitive cognition 
does not follow. Therefore, the object is a cause of 
intuitive cognition. Such an argument is valid by 
means of such a proposition that 'Whatever absolute 
thing, required in real existence for the being of 
another thing, is a cause of that thing in some genus 
of cause.' The first argument is valid through this 
proposition. 'All that, when asserted, is followed 
by another thing, is a cause of the other thing.' 
Otherwise, it could be proved that something is a 
cause of another through reason, without such ex-
perience.6 
esse secundi, quia secundum non potest esse sine priori, prius 
erit causa illius in aliquo genere causae. 11 Also see, Sent. II, 
q. 16, c. 
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6sent., I, d. I, ·q. 3 (I, 416); "Ad primum istorum respon-
deo quod quamvis respectu ejusdem effectus possint esse plures 
causae, hoc tamen non est ponendum sine necessitate, puta: nisi 
per experientiam possit convinci, ita scilicet quod ipso posito, 
alio destructo, sequitur ille effectus, vel quod ipso non posito, 
quocumque alio posito, non sequitur effectus. Exemplum primi: 
probatur quod ignis est causa caloris, quia ipso igne posito--
omnibus aliis amotis--sequitur calor in calefactibili approximato; 
eodem modo probatur de sole quod est causa caloris, quia igne 
amoto et sole approximate sequitur calefactio. Exemplum secundi: 
probatur quod objectum est causa intellectionis intuitivae, quia 
omnibus aliis positis, ipso solo amoto, non sequitur notitia 
intuitiva; ergo objectum est causa notitiae intuitivae. Et tenet 
tale argumentum per talem propositionem quod "quaecumque res 
absoluta requiritur in esse reali ad esse alicuius, est causa 
illius in aliquo genere causae'. Primum argumentum tenet per 
istam propositionem 'omne illud quo posito sequitur aliud, est 
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Ockham's experimental or experiential approach to causal-
ity is manifest. He proves or tests causality by perceiving the 
essential order between two beings. A causal nexus cannot be 
established "through reason" or "through conceptual analysis." 
According to Ockham, "cognition of the cause does not virtually 
contain the notion of its effect. 117 This can be misunderstood 
rather easily. Ockham means that the concept of one absolute 
thing excludes the proper conception of every other absolute 
thing. The metaphysical unity and singularity of being parallels 
the discrete and singular perceptions caused by beings. Hence, 
the notion of "man" does not include any proper understanding of 
the particular, non-human things producible by a man. To be sure, 
the notion of "cause" includes that of "effect." As "correlative" 
terms; cause and effect mutually and simultaneously entail each 
other. 8 "Cause" is a complex or "connotative" notion precisely 
causa illius." Aliter aliquid esse causam alterius potest probari 
sine tali experientia per rationem." See Baudry, Lexigue .•. , pp. 
34-43, for the major type-sand divisions regarding Ockham's doc-
trine of causality. 
7sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 299); also see Idem (I, 241); 
and ~· :--r-; d. 3, q. 8 (II, 528). 
8
sent., I, d. 43, q. 2, F; "Generaliter, omni relative 
correspondet si convenienter assignetur aliquid correlativum. Et 
i('n omnibus relativis qui vocantur relativa secundum propositionem 
activam et passivam vel causam et effectum), semper correlativa 
~unt simul natura; et ideo quia sunt simul natura et mutuo se 
inferant, neutrum est magis causam alterius quam e converso ••• 11 
Because "cause" and "effect" are correlatives, Ockham says, 
"cognoscere causam sub ratione causae praesupponit notitiam illius 
rei quae est effectus. 11 Sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 243). Cf. 
Aristotle, Categories, c.--r3""(14b 24-15a 12) for the source of 
Ockham's notion of "correlatives." 
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t;ecause its significance presupposes an observed priority between 
two distinct beings. No analysis of the proper concept of 11 a 11 
cause, however, permits an~ priori deduction that this thing, 
<e.g., "man," produces this other thing, e.g., a statue. Regarding 
the requirements for a logical proof, Ockham points out that two 
simple and proper concepts lack any intrinsic and necessary rela-
tionship which could serve as the means of demonstration. 9 Thus, 
-Ockham insists that two things be perceived in an immediate, 
!irreversable and essential order of dependence to justify an 
inference of causality. 
Notice that Ockham "inferred" causality from the experi-
~nced dependence between two beings. Strictly speaking, it is 
impossible to demonstrate even ~ posteriori that this created 
object produced this given effect. 10 The dictum that "God can 
produce immediately what He ordinarily produces through secondary 
causes" was true and "well known" for Ockham. This theological 
9cf. Damascene Webering, Theory of Demonstration According 
to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan In-
Stitute, 1953), pp. 104-105; 146-149; for a technical discussion 
of "proof" in Ockham and a more thorough explanation of why actual 
causes cannot be demonstrated ~ priori or a posteriori. Cf. 
Aristotle, Post. Analytics, II, c. 16 (98b 25-48). 
10
sent., qes. 4-5, R; "Ex hoc sequitur quod non potest 
demonstrari quod aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda, quia 
licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad combustibile sequatur 
combustio, hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit ejus causa, 
quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad presentiam ignis passo 
approximate, ipse solus causaret combustionem sicut ordinavit cum 
ecclesia, quod ad prolationem certorum verborum, causetur gratia 
in anima. 11 In a late theological work, Ockham affirms that the 
entire order of natural causes and effects could be changed by 
God. See De Sacramento Altaris, ed. T. Bruce Birch (Burlington, 
Iowa: The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), p. 191. 
axiom was reason to admit the possibility of causal "occasional-
ism." Although combustion always results from the approximation 
of fire and wood, their proximity may be the "occasion" in which 
God directly and totally produces combustion. It seems, there-
fore, that even experience cannot identify causes with absolute 
certitude. 
Ockham's "razor" cuts away any explanation of causation 
as entitative, intrinsic and absolute relationship. Production 
11 is not an entity distinct from producer and produced. But in 
so doing, Ockham ends in modified scepticism about knowing the 
extrinsic causal connections between natural beings. Reliable 
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and evident knowledge of created causes depends upon conditions--
e.g., the autonomy of Nature vis-a-vis the causal prerogatives 
of God12--which cannot be known evidently. As a philosopher, 
11
ouodl., VI, q. 12; 11 ••• si productio activa sit alia res; 
aut ergo est prior natura ipso effectu producto, aut simul natura, 
vel posterior natura. Non primo modo, quia relatio si sit alia 
res essentialiter dependet tam a fundamento quam a termino, et per 
consequens neutro est prius natura ••• Et eodem modo probatur quod 
respectus causae ad effectum non est simul natura cum effectu; nee 
est posterior natura ipso effectu quia tune prior natura esset 
effectus in rerum natura quam produceretur ••. 11 Ockham's argument 
is criptic. He seems to say that "production" or "active causal-
ity" cannot be asserted before or after the cause and effect 
exist. No argument there. Many scholastics, however, would argue 
that the "aspect of causality" is simultaneous with the cause and 
effect, as the foundation of the terms of relationship. Ockham's 
rejoiner is that if cause and effect exist, then a simultaneous 
and entitative relationship of causality need not be asserted. 
His rejection of a single, substantive referent for "causality" 
parallels Ockham's denial of absolute space, time, and motion. 
Cf. Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place According to William 
Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 
1957), pp. 132-144. 
12ockham does not systematically doubt the productiveness 
of natural forces. But to attribute an effective influence to 
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Ockham demands immediate experience as the means of knowing causes 
because the logical analysis of simple concepts never reveals 
their mutual dependence or entailment. Then, as a theologian, he 
admits that divine power can totally replace any effective in-
fluence between the natural beings of experience. Ockham would 
have the same trouble as David Hume in "seeing" that one billiard 
ball "moves" another, albeit for different reasons. 13 Given 
some created beings requires that the normal operation of nature, 
or the usual concurrence of God, be presupposed. Ockham cannot 
distinguish, on the basis of perception, the normal working of 
secondary causes from a "special intervention" of God. Hence, 
causal explanations of the physical world remain only probable 
accounts; the laws of nature rest on hypotheses. The conditional 
potency of natural causes, and the corresponding conditional 
certitude of perceptual experience of natural causes, is called 
"ex suppositione naturae" by Professor Ernest Moody, "Ockham, 
Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt, 11 Franciscan Studies 7 (1947), 
pp. 120-146. William J. Courtenay speaks of causal connections 
being necessary "ex pacto et ex natura rei. 11 "Covenant and Cau-
sality in Pierre d'Ailly," Speculum 46 (1971), pp. 116-119. These 
studies are excellent in describing the historical and theological 
context of Ockham's doctrine of causality. 
13The verbal parallels between Ockham and David Hume have 
been drawn to show Ockham's "scepticism" about natural causality. 
Cf. G. M. Manser, 11 Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im XIV Jahr-
hundert, 11 Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und speculative Theologie 27 
(1912), p. 408; H. Becher, S.J., "Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweis 
bei Wilhelm von Ockham," Scholastik 3 (1912), pp. 390-393; and 
Harry R. Kloeker S.J., "Ockham and Efficient Causality," The · 
Thomist 23 (1960), pp. 112-120. The general complaint is that 
"in all of his analyses, causality means nothing more than associ-
ation, sequence and succession." (Kloeker, p. 120). This criti-
cism is textually refuted by E. Hochstetter, Studien ~ Meta-
£hlsik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms ~ Ockham (Berlin, Leipzig: 
Water de Gruyter, 1927), pp. 139-179, by showing Ockham's use of 
the "causal principle" and his assertion of a "causal influx." 
Ockham accepts the general scholastic position about "what" cau-
sality is; his novelty consists in casting doubts about the 
identification of particular causes. A sequential definition of 
cause permits Ockham to avoid identifying the source of a perfec-
tive transfer or influence when an effect is perceived. He 
modestly wishes to identify only the precedents which govern the 
these problems in knowing the productiveness of causes, Ockham's 
'sequential definition is understandable. By describing "cause" 
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as "an absolute thing required in real existence for the being of 
another thing," he can use the notion of causality in explanations 
without compromising his logical or theological problems. We 
experience regular patterns of priority among natural beings; 
Ockham's definition asserts only this observed order between prior 
end subsequent. Even if God were the only causal being, the 
precedence of natural "occasions" to supernatural effects remains 
constant and reliable. Fire would precede heat in wood even if 
God were the sole cause of the heat. By teaching causality as 
priority rather than productiveness, Ockham gives a working prin-
ciple of discovery and explication.to physical scientists; he 
allows.for generalization and predictability in personal experi-
ence. 
Ockham's empirical treatment of causality entails a re-
interpretation of many "causal laws" proposed by "realistic" 
metaphysicians. That causes "virtually contain" their effects 
effect's occurrence. Ockham's belief extends to angels in human 
form; to physical rituals or sacraments which had supernatural 
effects; to miracles in which mud cures blindness and water heals 
the lame. Scripture and theology suggest Ockham's doubts about 
the perceptual differentiation between supernatural and natural 
causality. And it is the religious conviction in God's "ordained 
laws" and "general influence" which makes perception of natural 
causality ordinarily and generally reliable. Hence, the origin 
and limit of Ockham's alleged "scepticism" rest in theological 
principles which cannot be evidently known. The History of Phi-
losophy must wait for David Hume to hear the notion of causality 
questioned because of an empirical or atomistic theory of per-
ception. 
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means, for Ockham, that causes "can produce" their effects. 14 
That effects "are assimilated" to the form of the cause means that 
the effect and cause are ordered as inferior to superior. 15 Be-
cause causality constitutes an external relationship between 
things, Ockham seriously limits the "class parallel" or "type 
similarity" between cause and effect. For example, the ontologi-
cal similarity between the will-power and will-effect is expressed 
when "real thing" is predicated of both. The freedom, indifference 
and indetermination which belongs to the will cannot be attributed 
to will-acts by warrant of "assimilation" or formal similarity 
between producer and produced. Predicates expressing the will's 
nature are not applicable necessarily to voluntary acts. Any 
methodology, therefore, for examining Ockham's doctrine of the 
14see Sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 229-244), where Ockham 
refutes Duns Scotus regarding the virtual inclusion of accident 
in subject and effect in cause. "Non est proprie dictum quod 
talis una forma includat plures formas virtualiter, quia virtual-
iter includere aliquid est posse producere illud." Sent., I, d. 
3, q. 5 (II, 481). Also see Sent., I, d. 7, q. 1, EE in finem. 
15sent., I, d. 6, q. 1, H; "Sexto, falsum est quid dicit 
vel non est ad propositum, scilicet quod effectus assimilatur 
formae agentis per quam agit, quia quaero; Aut ista assimilatio 
est in genere aut in speciae aut inferiori, sive sit analogum sive 
non. Primo modo non, quia sol agit naturaliter multos effectus 
qui non habent formam ejusdem rationis cum forma solis. Similiter 
nee secundo modo, guia substantia est causa accidentis et simili-
ter, secundum eum (Scotum), e converse accidens est causa sub-
stantiae •.. Si intelligatur tertio modo, ita effectus assimilatur 
formae per quam voluntas agit sicut formae agentis naturalis; quia 
certum est quod tam forma quam voluntas agit quamvis effectus est 
ens reale et ~er se in aliquo genere, saltem quantum ad multos 
effectus ••• (KJ Praeterea, quid dicit (Scotus) quod agens naturale 
facit quale ipsum est, si dicatur secundum formam specificam, hoc 
est simpliciter falsum, quia tune sol non faceret nisi solem. Si 
secundum genus vel secundum aliquid superius, hoc est certum quod 
agens naturale facit rem naturalem. Et hoc potest concedi, sed 
nihil ad propositum quia ita voluntas facit unam rem realem. 
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will ought to respect the distinction of characteristics applied 
to the volitional potency and the volitional effect. To know the 
will as the principle or sufficient cause of morality, and know-
ledge of the positive being of moral effects within the will, re-
quire distinct experiences and studies. 
A thorough study of Ockham's doctrine of causality remains 
unwritten. Our modest contribution to this unwritten mono-
graph, and to the often-debated question of Ockham's "scepticism," 
is to indicate the dual meaning of "experience"--the indispensable 
means of knowing causality. Experience can mean the immediate 
awareness of either external or internal facts. 16 Ockham doubts 
only the infallibility of human perception (of externals). In-
ternal experience or introspection, however, gives evident and 
reliable knowledge about the productiveness of one's own powers. 
Because of the greater certitude regarding inner experience, Ock-
ham feels that his doctrine of the will is based upon better 
evidence than the natural sciences. And moral science "is more 
16sent., III, q. 12, SS; 11 Aliqua talis propositio habet 
cognosci per experientiam acceptam respectu actus alterius homi-
nus; alia non potest evidenter cognosci nisi per experientiam 
acceptam respectu proprii actus. Exemplum primi; 'Iracundus est 
mitigandus per pulchra verba'quando vidi eum sic mitigatum per 
alium vel per me. Notitia evidens istius potest esse sine virtute 
morali quia aliquis potest evidenter illam propositionem cogno-
scere, et tamen nolle eum simpliciter mitigare sicut patet per 
experientiam et probatur haec pars per rationes prius factas pro 
secunda conclusione. Exemplum secundi; aliquis enim eliciendo 
frequenter actum continentiae et temperantiae magis disponitur 
ad Dei cognitionem et dilectionem et ad studendum ••• quae non pos-
sunt evidenter esse verae nee evidenter ab aliquo sciri sine actu 
proprio elicitivo generative virtutis. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, 
q. 1 (I, 40-41) where Ockham appeals to Augustine that experience 
directly concerns "intelligibilia" and "sensibilia. 11 Cf. De 
Trinitate, c. 1, n. 3 (P. L., 42, 1015). ~ 
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g~rtain than many others in so far as one can have a more certain 
· e about his own acts than about others' acts. 1117 •~erienc 
2. The Definition of Will 
Ockham distinguishes clearly between two modes of produc-
c tion; causality is either natural or free. Any agent whose 
~ctivity is determined by its concrete possibilities is a "natural" 
cause. If the approximation of agent and patient results inevit-
~bly in a predeterminable effect, then the agent's production is 
[;1 18 
natural.- Characteristically, non-free or natural causes produce 
~t every moment everything within their power. 19 In every similar 
l7Quodl., II, q. 14; see Introduction, n. 9. 
t 
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sent., II, qes. 4-5, F; "Ad primum oppositum dico, quod 
auctoritas Philosophi et Commentatoris et omnes consimiles intel-
1iguntur de naturalibus causis qui semper eodem tempore producunt 
~osdem effectus nisi sit aliquod impedimentum. Exemplum, sol 
~emper in Autumno producit eosdem effectus et similiter aliis 
temporibus per approximationem et remotionem nisi aliquid impedi-
4t. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 62), for a later and more 
exact description. "Ad tertiam probationem, dico quod Philosophus 
lI De Generatione loquitur de agente naturali, quod manens idem, 
semper facit idem. Quia.scilicet quidquid facit uno tempore, 
!acit alio tempore, nisi sit aliqua variatio ex parte passi vel 
·ex parte agentis vel aliquod aliud impedimentum, ita quod si uno 
tempore facit unum, omni tempore faciet unum, et si uno tempore 
facit centum, alio tempore faciet centum, et ita semper idem." 
Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, II, c. 10 (336a 
28-32). - - -
19ockham's "probable proof" that God acts contingently 
regarding finite beings depends upon the character of natural 
~gents in producing everything within their power at any given 
instant. God is capable of infinite effects; but an infinite num-
ber of finite effects do not exist; hence, God is not a natural 
cause. In Ockham's words: 11 ••• tenendum est quod Deus est causa 
contingenter agens quia si esset causa naturalis vel omnia pro-
duceret simul vel nulla, quorum utrumque probantur esse manifeste 
falsum. Et ideo manifeste falsum est Deum esse causam naturalem 
aliorum·a se." Sent., I, d. 43, q. 1, M. See also Quodl., II, 
situation, "Nature" causes similar effects. On the other hand, 
any agent capable of producing opposite effects within similar 
situations possesses "Will"--the principle of free actions. The 
apprehension of ~egular patterns of prior-posterior among beings 
constitutes the evidence for natural causation. What evidence 
supports Ockham's claim of free causes? 
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate syl-
logistically that an effect is produced freely. Nevertheless, 
man experiences himself as a free agent. 20 Inner experience is 
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evident and infallible evidence for human freedom and renders any 
logical proof superfluous. The evidence remains a personal privi-
lege. To communicate this experiential truth, one can only appeal 
to similar experiences. As described by Ockham, freedom appears 
q. 9. This is the only philosophical defense offered by Ockham 
that God acts contingently; that "potest facere aliqua quae non 
facit. 11 As a theologian, Ockham asserts the "absolute power of 
God" to maintain this precise truth--God can do things which He 
does not do. In Distinction Fourty-Three, Ockham rejects the 
Thomistic proofs for the First Principle's contingency. See the 
study of Anton Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty," The New Scholasti-
~ 15 (1941), pp. 18-45. In Sent., II, qes. 4-5,"""'"iiUtrum Deus 
sit agens naturale vel liberum?", he rejects the Scotistic argu-
ments for God's contingent activity ad extra. By default of the 
reasons of Aquinas and Scotus, Ockhaiilemphasizes the non-selective 
and "total" quality of natural agency to preserve his own "per-
suasion" for divine contingency. This quality of natural causal-
ity is not explicit in the De Generatione et Corruptione text 
which Ockham adduces to support his description. 
. 
20Quodl., I, q. 16, asks "Whether it can be sufficiently 
proved that the will freely causes its acts effectively?" His 
answer: "Non potest probari per aliquam rationem, quia omnis 
ratio probans accipit aequa dubia et aequa ignotum conclusioni 
vel ignotius. Potest tamen evidenter cognosci per experientiam, 
per hoc, quod homo experitur quod quantumcunque ratio dictet 
aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hoc velle vel nolle." Cf. Sent., 
I, d. I, q. 4 (I, 434); and Sent. I, d. I, q. 6 (I, 490).--
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~!thin the awareness that in every practical situation I have the 
f\llldamental option of saying "yes" or "no. 11 In Ockham's words, 
"l can indifferently and contingently cause something," so I am 
able to cause and not cause the same effect without a change made 
21 
within that power." Objects which are simply apprehended (e.g., 
this man, John), or apprehended within a proposition (e.g., 11 I 
should love John"), appear to the will's affection as options to 
be accepted or rejected. No object necessitates the will's love 
or hate by its presence in consciousness. Ockham's doctrine of 
the will, therefore, flows from the experience of indifference 
regarding known objects to the residual capacity to love or hate 
any object. As a residual potency, the ability to cause freely 
is called "will" (voluntas). The experience of indifference to-
wards opposite types of behavior indicates the free power from 
which a person's deliberate actions originate. Ockham's analysis 
of the will's nature revolves around the experience of indeter-
mination and self-determination. Syllogistic proof is out of the 
question. 
The experience of freely causing can be approached in-
directly from other perspectives. First, a person's recognition 
of guilt or moral responsibility entails the ability to avoid 
wrong acts. It is not cogent, Ockham says, to consider actions 
21
auodl., I, q. 16; "Circa primum est sciendum quod voco 
libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter 
effectum ponere; ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non 
causare, nulla diversitate circa illam potentiam facta." Also 
see~., I, d. I, q. 6 (I, 501). 
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either good or bad (imputable) when they occur necessarily. 22 
The realization, therefore, that certain acts are blameworthy 
constitutes a mediate experience that certain acts are done free-
ly. Secondly, accidental or chance happenings would be impossible 
without the presence of free causes. 23 Natural causes inevitably 
produce their determined effects if the conditions of their pro-
duction, i.e., the potency and the object, are given. Natural 
22sent., IV, q. 14, E; "Dico igitur quod libertas et posse 
peccare se habent sicut superius et inferius, sit quod quicunque 
potest peccare habet libertatem et non e contra. Et causa est, 
quia potens peccare habet libertatem et contingentiam respectu 
illorum actuum in quibus consistit peccatum." Quodl., III, q. 16; 
"Ad istam quaestionem dico quod sic, quia homo laudabiliter et 
viciose potest operari et per consequens potest mereri et demereri; 
tum quia homo est agens liberum et omne tale potest mereri et 
demereri; tum quia multi actus sunt imputabiles homini, ergo per 
istos potest mereri et demereri." Also see Opus Nonaginta Dierum 
c. 95, ed. H. S. Offler, Vol. II, Guillelmi de Ockham, ~ 
Politica (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963)~-p---:- 723, 
where Ockham puts this argument into syllogistic form. LHere-
after citations from this three volume edition of Ockham's Opera 
Politica will be abbreviated as "Manchester ed., volume number, 
and page."] Liberty does not entail the ability to sin, accord-
ing to Ockham, because God is free but cannot sin. Furthermore, 
since Anselm's tract De Libertate Arbitrii, the scholastics com-
monly taught that sinconstituted a type of "servitude"--a 
limitation of freedom. Cf. Anselm, De Libertate Arbitrii, c. 3 
(P. L., 158, 500-503.) ~ 
23Quodl., I, q. 17; "In ista quaestione ostendam quod sine 
libertate voluntatis non potest esse casus nee fortuna. Secundo, 
quo modo ista salvantur per libertatem voluntatis. Circa primum 
tune arguo sic: Omne quid inevitabiliter sit, non fit a casu nee 
a fortuna, sed omne quid fit non ab agente libero sed naturali 
inevitabiliter fit, ergo et cetera. Major patet in II Physicorum; 
minor est manifesta. 11 This argument is repeated in the Summulae 
.!.!!. libros Physicorum (Philosophia Naturalis), Pars II, c. 12, ed. 
Bonaventure T. Veliterno (Rome, 1637--reprinted by Gregg Press: 
London, 1963), p. 45. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, c. 6 (197b 
1-14). "Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to 
agents that are capable of good fortune and of moral action gen-
erally." (Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.) 
effects are produced by necessity and in an inevitable manner. 
T.ttUs, the fact that accidents and circumstances occur, which are 
not inevitable, implies the involvement of a free cause. 
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Contrasting acts of knowing with acts of willing high-
lights the precise character of the free power. The intellect is 
a "natural power; 1124 that is, its operation follows the mode of 
,necessity. Just as vision happens when the healthy eye contacts 
color, so knowledge occurs when the intellect contacts the singu-
lar fact. The presence of the object (intelligible) and potency 
(intellect) invariably results in apprehension (intellection) un-
less this operation is impeded by a superior power. Cognitive 
acts, therefore, are experienced as determined by the object. We 
are aware of a proportion between the nature of a given thing and 
the determinate act by which it is known. Ockham asserts that the 
essence of the thing known is the "cause (ratio) of understand-
ing.1125The rational power is passive in the sense that its 
24sent., I, d. 3, q. 5 (II, 473-474); "Contra: Quandocum-
que intellectus habet aliqua requisita ad intellectionem multorum, 
si quodlibet illorum respeciat equaliter omnia illa multa, intel-
lectus, cum sit potentia naturalis, vel intelliget quodlibet 
illorum vel nullum." Also see Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1, F; for a 
general description of a natural potency; and Sent., II, q. 3, 
F-G, for the various meanings of the term "natural." 
25sent~, II, q. 15, U; "His visis, dico and primam ques-
tionem loquendo de cognitione intuitiva naturali quod angelus et 
intellectus noster intelligunt alia a se non per species eorum, 
nee per essentiam propriam, sed per essentiam rerum intellectarum, 
et hoc prout ly 'per' dicit circumstantiam causae efficientis, 
ita quod ratio intelligendi ut distinguitur a potentia est ipsa 
essentia rei cognitae." Intellection, or the cognitive, act of 
the intellect, is caused by the intellectual power and the object 
known; the intellect being a passive cause and the object appre-
hended being the active cause. Cf. Sent., I, d. I, q. 3 (I, 416). 
activity is evoked by the given object and is impedable by 
"superior" powers, e.g., the will or God. Ockham hesitates to 
say that "knowing" or any natural act stands "within our power" 
except in a minimal and mediate sense. 26 True, man normally has 
the power to know, but cognition and assent follow the given ob-
ject automatically if no impediment intervenes. The mind does 
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not control or initiate intuitive cognition because such activity 
happens in the mind by necessity with the knowable object present. ' 
Given the conditions of knowing, therefore, the mind in-
evitably produces cognitive acts. The passive nature of the 
intellect insures the accurate representation of extra-mental 
things within the mind. In contrast, Ockham indicates that the 
presence of every prerequisite for willing does not result neces-
sarily in volitional acts. 27 The conditions for knowledge act 
26sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Contra primum: Impossibile est 
quod de actu nonvirtuoso fiat virtuosus per aliquem actum pure 
naturalem, qui nullo modo est in potestate voluntatis, quia 
propter talem nullus laudatur nee vituperatur, ex quo solum est 
actus naturalis. Sed actus prudentiae secundum eum (Scotum) et 
secundum veritatem est solum actus naturalis, et nullo modo in 
potestate nostra plusquam actus videndi. 11 An act of prudence, 
according to Ockham, is an act of knowing accomplished without 
the cooperation of the will. 
27sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito 
omni sufficienti et necessario requisite ad talem actum, puta ad 
actum voluntatis, si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit concurrere 
cum voluntate ad causandum quando placet voluntati; potest volun-
tas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione actuali vel 
habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel non elicere. 
Et ideo respectu illius actus non oportet in aliquo quod deter-
minetur voluntas nisi a seipsa. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 
(I, 417); where Ockham considers knowing and willing in terms of 
his definition of causality. Cognition is necessarily prior to 
volition and contributes partially to the specific character of 
will-acts. By definition, therefore, cognition is a cause of 
as intellectual determinants while the conditions for volition 
remain mere possibilities or options. 
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The reliability of the experience of freely causing can 
be questioned. Ockham maintains that God could produce intuitive 
cognition within the human mind without the natural object and 
6ause of that intuition. 28 Serious questions have been raised 
~hether the knower could distinguish between naturally caused and 
divinely caused intuitions. 29 In the same way, God could directly 
and solely produce acts of volition within the human will without 
': 
the human will-power. 3° Could the agent distinguish supernatural 
(' 
volition. Not a necessitating cause, however. The Will's capac-
ity to.s~lect or decide its objects qlg causes renders it self-
determ1n1ng. Also see Sent., II, q. , M; and Quodl., I, q. 16. 
28 Cf. Sent., II, q. 15, D-E; Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 
'8-39); Quodl., V, q. 5. 
29The on-going debate regarding Ockham's "scepticism" 
centers around the divinely caused cognition of non-existent ob-
jects. For the opinion that scepticism follows Ockham's position; 
see E. Gilson, The Unity ... , 78-84; Anton Pegis, "Concerning 
William of Ockham," Traditio 11 (1944), pp. 465-480; and "Some 
Recent Interpretations of Ockham, 11 Speculum 23 (1948), pp. 452-
463; Marilyn McCord Adams, "Intuitive Cognition, Certainty and 
Scepticism in William Ockham," Traditio 26 (1970), pp. 389-398. 
Answering the charge of scepticism; see Philotheus Boehner, 
Collected Articles ... , pp. 268-319; and Sebastian Day, Intuitive 
Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics 
(St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1957). The 
state of the question now concerns how Ockham would or could dis-
tinguish intrinsically between supernatural and naturally caused 
intuitions. 
. 
30sent., III, q. 10, R; "Ad aliud dico quod ex hoc quod 
praecise est conformis rationi rectae, non est virtuosus; quia si 
Deus faceret in voluntate mea actum conformem rationi rectae, 
Voluntate vel (read non) agente, non esset ille actus meritorius 
nee virtuosus. Et ideo requiritur ad bonitatem actus quod sit in 
potestate voluntatis habentis talem actum. 11 Also see Sent., II, 
q. 19, N. --
In admitting this possibility, Ockham stimulated a 
effects within his will from volitions which he produced freely? 
Ockham's solution to this question is remarkably unconvincing. 
The problem arises within discussions of morality; Ockham merely 
indicates that moral acts entail the free causality of the human 
agent. Acts produced within the human will supernaturally would 
be beyond the power of the human agent and therefore non-moral 
acts.31 This defense begs the question; if created freedom must 
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controversy which divided many 14th century thinkers. Konstanty 
Michalski has outlined the arguments regarding the created will's 
autonomy and freedom vis-a-vis its dependenc~ upon the Uncreated 
Cause. La Philosophie ~ Xrve Si~cle: Six Etudes, Tome I, 
0puscula Philosophica, ed. by Kurt Flasc'il"TFrankfurt: Minerva 
GMBH; 1969), pp. 281-391. One aspect of this problem regards 
God's ability to place volition within the human soul; another is 
the requirement of God's "general influence" or co-agency for even 
the normal (and free) operation of the will. Neither theological 
truth, according to Ockham, impunes the will's liberty or causal 
efficacy in its intrinsic operation. While the will can be neces-
sitated to receive purely divine effects, it cannot be coerced! 
"Ad aliud dico quod voluntas non cogitur in recipiendo illum actum 
causatum a Deo solo, tamen, bene necessitatur. Primum probatur 
quia tune aliquid proprie cogitur quando facit aut patitur aliquid 
contra naturalem inclinationem suam ..• modo voluntas non recipit 
illum actum contra naturalem inclinationem suam quia posset natu-
rali ter illum causare saltem partialiter .•. Secundum probatur quia 
tune agens vel patiens necessitatur quando non est in potestate 
sua agere vel non agere, pati vel non pati, recipere vel non 
recipere; sed non est in potestate voluntatis illum actum causatum 
a solo Deo recipere vel non recipere, ergo necessitatur." Sent., 
II, q. 19, N. The subtle distinction between "coercion" and 
"necessitation" was not satisfactory to many of Ockham successors. 
Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) reviews many scholastic objections to Ock-
ham' s solution and attempts an "explanation" of Ockham's position 
that the will cannot be "coerced." See Collectorium in guattuor 
libros Sententiarum II, d. 25, q. unica, art. 3 (Tubingen, 1501). 
Cf. James E. Biechler, "Gabriel Biel on Liberum Arbitrium: Prelude 
to Luther's De Servo Arbitrio," The Thomist 34 (1970), pp. 114-127. 
-- --- -------
3lQuodl., V, q. 5; "Et si dicis; Deus potest facere assent-
um evidentem huius contingentis mediante existentia rei sicut 
mediante causa secundaria, ergo potest hoc facere se solo. Re-
spondeo, quod haec est fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut, Deus 
potest facere actum meritorium mediante voluntate creata, ergo 
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be established before asserting moral behavior then the possibil-
ity of moral behavior is itself questionable. A better justifi-
cation of the Will's autonomy and freedom in causing can be given 
ad mentem Ockham. Namely, both the causal power and the effects 
-
of will are manifest to introspection. I am conscious of the 
causal connection between my volitional power and my acts of 
choice. Immediate cognition of the created cause of volition 
precludes the problem of distinguishing personal from supernatural 
effects within the created will. Divine productions within the 
human will are "foreign" because they are not chosen by the 
created agent. 
Based on the evidence of personal experience, Ockham gives 
various definitions of "will." The "nominal definition" (guid 
nominis) indicates what the term signifies. "Will" means "the 
substance of the soul able to wil1. 1132 The name indicates 
directly the unitary and simple substance, soul, and indirectly 
the act of willing. Ockham's grammar, therefore, preserves a 
Franciscan tradition of not treating the will and intellect as 
potest hoc facere se solo." Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 3 
lI, 141). 
32sent., II, q. 24, K; "Sed distinguo de 1potentia' nam 
potentia primo modo accipitur pro tota descriptione exprimente 
quid nominis potentiae. Alio modo pro illo quid denominatur ab 
1110 nomine vel conceptum. Primo modo loquendo de intellectu et 
voluntate; dico quod distinguntur nam diffinitio exprimens quid 
nominis intellectus est ista, quod 'intellectus est substantia 
animae potens intelligere ;' sed descriptio voluntatis est quod 
'est substantia animae potens velle. 1 " Also see Sent., IV, q. 2, K. ~ 
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really distinct powers of the human soul.33 Although "velle" and 
~',intelligere" are numerically and specifically different acts, 
;hey do not involve different powers. The distinction between 
will and intellect is not ontological but terminological. Both 
. !'will" and "intellect" directly signify the soul; they differ in 
@onnoting different acts of the soul. Ockham's semantics render 
!'will" a connotative term; it signifies two i tems--the soul and 
'. 
the act of volition. In contrast absolute terms, e.g., tree, man, 
stand for just one thing and receive "real definitions" (quid 
. ) 34 re1 • 
-
33Bonaventure and Scotus, to name two major Franciscan 
thinkers, follow John of La Rochelle (d. 1245) in denying a real 
distinction between the soul's powers. See texts and study given 
by Vernon Bourke, History of Ethics, pp. 137-140. The "ancient 
authority" for this position is St. Augustine, De Trinitate X, 
c. 11 [P. L., 42, 983]. ~ 
34 Summa Log., I, c. 10, pp. 33-34; Unde sciendum quod 
nominum quaedam sunt mere absoluta, quaedam sunt connotativa. 
Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid prin-
cipali ter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quid-quid significatur 
per idem nomen, aeque primo significatur; sicut patet de hoc 
nomine 'animal, 1 ••• Nomen autem connotativum est illud, quod 
significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. Et tale nomen 
proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et frequenter 
oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in 
obliquo ••• 11 
The difference between absolute and connotative terms is 
crucial to the proper understanding of Ockham's psychology and the 
moral doctrine built upon that psychological theory. Ernest A. 
Moody explains the difference: 11 ••• an absolute term means pre-
cisely the things which it can be used to denote, and hence it 
can be used as a sign of the things which it means without involv-
ing, implicitly or otherwise, the truth of any proposition or the 
existence of any fact, circumstance, or temporal or spatial 
determination such as might be involved in any particular experi-
. ence of such individuals. A connotative term is said to be one 
which signifies one kind of thing primarily, and a different kind 
of thing secondarily or obliquely. It stands for one kind of 
thing by conpoting something distinct from it contingently 
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Ockham also defines the will "properly" as "a.rational 
potency capable of opposites. 1135 This formula indicates the 
soul's ability to appreciate opposite objects and effects. The 
indifference toward opposites, possessed by the soul as a "ra-
tional power," results in contingent operations. The psychologi-
cal evidence of causing freely is formulated to indicate the 
inherent and habitual indifference of the soul towards opposite 
objects. This description originates in Aristotle, 36 it is 
commonplace among Ockham's predecessors. But Ockham's effort to 
conform to these "authorities" can be misleading. The "liberty 
of opposites" was not fundamental to the nature of the will, ac-
cording to Ockham; the emphasis of his doctrine on the will's 
connected with it, or by connoting a determinate part of it as if 
separated or separable from it." The Logic of William of Ockham 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), p. 55. · 
35sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Ad aliud dice quod voluntas pro-
prie est potentia rationalis quia valet ad opposita secundum 
intentionem Philosophi. 11 See the later text in Sent., I, d. 1, 
q. 3 (I, 425), where the will is identified with the "rational 
soul." Leon Baudry, Lexigue •.. , p. 297, maintains that this 
definition should be considered Ockham's fundamental one because 
it also occurs in Quaestiones in libros Physicorum, q. 126 and 
Expositio super Physicam Aristotelis. But Ockham does not seem 
concerned to formulate a favorite or complete definition. A text 
which indicates Ockham's 'nonchalence' pertaining to precise defi-
nition and his caution regarding the distinct characteristics of 
Will-power and will-act comes in the Opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 54 
(Manchester ed., II, 543). "'Voluntas' habet plures significa-
. tiones quam hoc verbum 'velle,' ideo, licet 'voluntas' sic diffini-
retur: 'Voluntas est potentia, quae primo et libere·valet ad 
opposita,' non tamen 'velle' posset sic diffini: 'Velle est ferri 
Primo et libere in opposita;' et licet 'voluntas' sic diffiniretur: 
'Voluntas est potentia incorporalis potens ferri in opposita,' non 
tamen 'velle' posset sic diffinire: 'Velle est actus incorporalis, 
qui fertur in opposita. 11 
36 Metaphysics, IX, c. 5 (104sa 1-24). 
r 
f-
d'reedom rests with the "liberty of contraries"--which will be 
discussed shortly. 
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A preliminary conclusion, however, regarding Ockham's so-
called "Voluntarism" should be drawn now. Within the Thomistic 
and Scotistic debate over whether the intellect or will possesses 
primacy and greater perfection among human powers, Ockham attempts 
a neutral position. 37 The absolute simplicity of the soul--the 
absence of distinct psychic parts or powers--makes the issue of 
1tgreater nobility" a false question. To ask whether the intellect 
or will is more noble reduces to asking whether the same power, 
1.e., the intellective soul, is more noble than itself. 
To the first principle arg'Ument, I concede that 
"enjoyment" is in the most noble potency. And when 
someone says, "The intellect is the most noble 
power," I agree; and likewise when it is said, "The 
will is the most noble power." Because that poten-
cy which is intellect and that which is will are not 
distinguished in reality nor in reason.38 
37This debate has psychological and moral dimensions. 
Thomistic-Aristotelian "intellectualism" makes the intellect pri-
mary within the human psyche, while an act of intellect consti-
tutes man's ultimate perfection. According to the Franciscan-
Augustinian tradition, this psychic primacy resides with the 
will. When Ockham is called a moral "voluntarist, 11 of course, 
the classification has ramifications beyond these historically 
~ell-defined issues of human psychology. For the historical 
context of this aspect of Ockham's thought, see Paul Vignaux, 
"Occam," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholigue, Tome XI, cc. 877-
882; and Justification et PrGdestination au x1ve Siecle: Duns 
. ~' Pierre d 'Auricle, Guillaume d' Occam-,-G~ire de RiiiiTiiI 
\Paris: E. Leroux, 1934), pp. 127-140. Professor Vignaux indi-
cates Ockham's general adherence to the Franciscan School by 
teaching the greater nobility of will-acts. Left unsaid, however, 
by Vignaux and most commentators, is Ockham's re-formulation of 
the question and his attempt at a middle position. 
38sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 402); "Ad primum principale 
concede quod frui est in potentia nobilissima. Et quando dicitur 
38 
Ockharn rephrases the terms of the debate between the "Intellec-
tualists" and "Voluntarists." The proper question, he says, is 
vhether the act of willing or knowing is more perfect. Ockham 
gives the greater nobility to volitional acts, although an act of 
intellect precedes an act of will. 39 Both volition and intellec-
tion are involved, however, in beautitude--man's ultimate and 
perfect happiness. The chief antagonist of this position, Thomas 
Aquinas, was "coerced by the truth" at least once when he admitted 
the greater perfection residing in will-acts! 40 
'intellectus est potentia nobilissima,' concedo; et similiter 
voluntas est potentia nobilissima, quia illa potentia quae est 
intellectus et illa quae est voluntas nullo modo distinguuntur a 
parte rei nee a parte rationis." Also see Sent., II, q. 24, K. 
"Utrum memoria, intellectus et voluntas sint potentiae distinctae 
realiter?" Where Ockham argues the identify of psychic powers, 
Ockham's position became a "strategy" for many Nominalists. For 
example, Adam Wodham (d. 1358) sets Thomas against Scotus and 
offers Ockham's solution: "teneo conclusionem ad viam reductionis, 
cum dico scilicet quod non intellectus est potentia nobilior vol-
untate nee e converso. 11 Sent., I, q. 4 (quoted by Michalski, 
Qpuscula Philosophica ... , p. 313). 
39sent., II, q. 24, P; 11 ••• dico quod accipiendo 'volun-
tatem' pro illo quid denominatur a tali nomine vel conceptu, quid 
est principium elicitivum actus volendi et intellectionis; simi-
liter ut sic voluntas non est intellectu nobilior non plus quam 
intellectus est nobilior voluntate, quia sunt omnino idem. Sed 
accipiendo utrumque quantum ad signatum quid nominis eorum, sic 
potest concedi quod voluntas est nobilior intellectu, quia actus 
diligendi qui connotatur per voluntatem est nobilior actu intelli-
gendi qui connotatur per int~llectum. Isto etiam secundo modo 
potest concedi quod intellectus est prior voluntate; quia actus 
. intelligendi qui connotatur per intellectum est prior actu volendi 
g_ui connotatur per voluntatem." Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 
{I, 402-403). That beatitude resides within the intellect and 
Will, see Ibid., (I, 403). 
40Ibid., (I, 402-403); "Si tamen distinguerentur, dicerem 
quod potentia volitiva esset nobilior. Et hoc dicit Thomas, 
quamvis alibi dixerit oppositum. Unde libero primo, distinctione 
Prima, quaestione prima dicit sic: 'Suprema pars habet intellectum 
39 
In what Konstanty Michalski has called "the battle for the 
$oul" in the 14th century, Ockham's was a moderate voice. 41 His 
writings attempt to reconcile the differences between Aquinas a .d 
scotus which had been institutionalized into opposing schools. 
But Ockham's tools were too radical, his approach too original. 
Instead of resolving the "problem of the will," Ockham became a 
third faction. Ockham's "medicine" of logical precision was use-
iLess and "windy sophistry" against the needs of the Renaissance. 
To the Reformers, his doctrine of man's freedom smacked of Pelagi-
anism. 
3. The Will's Freedom 
Ockham's definition or definitions of the will do not sup-
port the inference that every will-act occurs freely._ .. 'Yfuile every 
et voluntatem, quorum intellectus est altior secundum ordinem et 
voluntas secundum perfectionem. Et similis ordo est in habitibus 
et etiam in actibus, scilicet visione et amore. Fruitio autem 
nominat altissimam operationem quantum ad sui perfectionem.' Et 
ita iste, tamquam a veritate coactus, dicit hie fruitionem, quae 
est actus voluntatis esse nobiliorem actu intellectus." 
4111 La lutte pour 1 1 '8.me, 11 Proceedin s of the Seventh Inter-
national Congress of Philosophy, 1930 Oxford: 1931), pp. 508-515. 
Whereas Michalski indicates clearly the controversies which sur-
round the doctrine of human and divine volition in the first half 
of the 14th century, his evaluation of Ockham's position is 
derogatory and poorly documented. Professor Ernest Moody is one 
of few commentators who notice that amid the extreme voluntarism 
of Holcot, the voluntaristic determinism of Thomas Bradwardine 
and John of Mirecourt, and the epistemological criticism of 
Nicholas of Autrecourt, Ockham proposed a "conservative doctrine." 
Professor Moody's comments, directed toward the doctrine of natu-
ral causality, apply to Ockham's doctrine of the will. See Moody, 
Franciscan Studies, 7, pp. 141-146. 
free act is a volitive effect, the converse is not true. 42 Duns 
scotus and Scotists such as William of Alnwick (d. 1332) con-
structed the evidence for natural and free modes of causality 
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into "Nature" and "Will"--principles with "opposed modes of origi-
nation.1143 But Ockham rejects their construction because both the 
divine and human will produce certain acts of necessity. To know 
the will as a moral principle, and the formal character of all 
moral acts, we must consider the nature and limits of human free-
dom. Only acts which originate in freedom are imputable or moral. 
The description of volitional freedom given by Ockham 
approximates and represents the experiential evidence which estab-
lishes the facts of free causality. Semantically, "freedom" is a 
42sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; "Si autem intelligatur quod 
liberum sit idem quid contingens vel indi.fferens, sicut mihi 
videtur esse de intentione auctorum; sic dico quod si voluntas 
aliquid velit necessario, non vult illud libere. Et ideo Spiritus 
Sanctus non producitur libere sicut non contingenter (licet volun-
tarie) .11 Also see Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1, (II, 34-35), and Sent., 
II, qes. 4-5, D ad tertiam. ~~ 
43The strict division which Scotus places between Nature 
and Will is analyzed by J. R. Cresswell, "Duns Scotus on the 
Will," Franciscan Studies 8 (1953), pp. 147-149; and Etienne Gil-
son, Jean Duns Scot, Introduction a~ positions fondamentales 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 574-578. Ockham quotes this doctrine 
of Scotus (Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6: I, 486-496) and William of Aln-
wich (Sent.~ d. 2, q. 1: II, 8-14) extensively to reject it. 
Ockham will claim that "nature" and "freedom" are opposed princi-
ples; not "nature" and "will." In historical perspective, there-
fore, Ockham reverts more to the position of St. Thomas who also 
asserted that some will-acts originate out of necessity. Unfor-
tunately, Stephen Chak Tornay, Ockham: Studies and Selections (La 
Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1938), p. 175, attributes 
to Ockham the position of Scotus and Alnwick. This mis-quotation 
helps establish Ockham's "insistent voluntarism." In point of 
fact, Ockham means to find a middle position between the Thomistic 
and Scotistic doctrines on the limits of free-will. 
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connotative term "meaning the will itself or the intellectual 
nature while connoting that something can be accomplished contin-
gently by the same (will). 1144 The term, therefore, collects the 
items of inner experience which interject the agent's contingency 
between the recognition and the execution of' practical possibili-
ties. 
Freedom had many dimensions within the theological anthro-
pologies of Scholasticism. Christendom's "great chain of being" 
arranged in hierarchy the Infinite Being, angelic being (beatified 
or damned), human being (beatified, damned or "in via"). Each 
type and division of personal being possessed distinct brands of 
freedom. Ockham attempts to isolate the precise character of the 
"viator's" freedom by contrast .. He reviews the traditional 
dimensions of freedom to explain what the earthling's liberty is 
not. St. Augustine and Peter Lombard assert a three fold liberty 
in men--the liberty of nature, the liberty of grace and the 
liberty of glory. 45 These perspectives on freedom are expressed 
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sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, M; "Unde illa ratio et sequens 
procedunt ex falsa imaginatione. Imaginantur enim ac si libertas 
esset unum aliquid reale distinctum aliquo modo ex natura rei a 
voluntate vel non omnino idem cum voluntate; quid tamen non est 
verum. Sed est unum nomen connotativum importans ipsam voluntatem 
vel naturam intellectualem connotando aliquid contingenter posse 
fieri ab eadem. 11 
45sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Secunda distinctio est 
de libere frui. Quia libertas uno modo distinguitur a coactione, 
et sic accipitur impropriissime, quia isto modo libertas potest 
competere i.ntellectui. Alio modo opponi tur servi tuti creaturae 
rationalis, et hoc vel servituti culpae vel servituti poenae. Et 
hoc modo beati sunt liberiores quam viatores, quia magis liberi a 
servitute culpae et poenae. Alio modo opponitur necessitati 
secundum quod necessitas opponitur contingenti secundo modo dicto 
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as freedom from coercion, freedom from guilt and freedom from 
punishment. 46 Ockham disputes each sense of freedom. Human 
freedom does not exclude guilt or punishment which follow the ill-
use of freedom. Here Ockham agrees with his "authorities" because 
only men beatified in heaven withstand these consequences of free 
activity. But Ockham then rejects most of his predecessors when 
they assert that "freedom from coercion" describes the type of 
liberty peculiar to the "viator. 1147 Consider that the intellect 
cannot be coerced to assent to false propositions. Neither the 
intellect (a natural power) nor the will (a free power) can be 
forced by an external power to judge truth and goodness contrary 
to the agent's own estimation and affection. The point is 
significant for Ockham since he begins to look for a description 
of freedom which cannot be applied to the intellect--or any 
natural power. Autonomy is no longer sufficient for the prime 
characteristic of experienced freedom. 
Ockham's fundamental objective against his predecessors 
on the question of freedom is their tendency to consider freedom 
in priori distinctione. Et sic libertas est quaedam indifferentia 
et contingentia, et distinguitur contra principium activum natur-
ale.11 See the parallel and earlier text, Sent., II, q. 19, R, 
where Ockham uses this framework to differentiate the liberty pos-
sessed by angels, devils and men. 
46For the history of these divisions, see St. Bonaventure, 
.!.!!~.,- d. 25, part 1, q. 1 (Opera Omnia, II; Quaracchi: Ex 
typographia Collegi St.Bonaventurae, 1885, pp. 594-95). 
47For- example, see St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, V, 10 (f.L. 41, 152) and St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 6, art.4. 
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or the will as another instance of "nature" whose inner structure 
is revealed by the Aristotelian explanation of final, formal, 
efficient and material causality. Freedom, which is opposed to 
the operation of natural powers, cannot be analyzed as if it 
were a type of natural cause. For example, St. Thomas claims 
"Each power of the soul is a form of nature, and has a natural 
inclination to something. Hence each power desires, by natural 
appetite, that object which is suitable to itself. 1148 Finality 
or intrinsic teleology is needed to explain both the operation 
and the intelligibility of a spiritual power. Ockham rejects 
this "net of explanation" and those scholastics who used it to 
capture the character of human freedom. The human will possesses 
no inclination to the good, no natural appetite for goodness. 
According to Ockham, "inclination" or "appetite" can be taken in 
two ways. 49 A loose meaning of the term implies a being "in 
potency to another without any inclination and activity to the 
contrary." For example, prime matter has a receptive potency for 
48 Sum. Theol., I, q. 80, art. 2 (trans. Anton C. Pegis). 
49ouodl., III, q. 19; "Dico ad primum quod 'inclinatio' 
sive 'appetitus' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte. 
Large accipiendo inclinationem, non est aliud quam esse in poten-
tia ad aliud, sine omni inclinatione et activitate in contrarium. 
Et sic materia est in potentia naturali ad formam, et inclinatur 
ad earn. Et sie non accipitur inclinatio ut addit aliquid ultra 
formam. Aliter vero accipitur et hoc prout aliquid ultra addit 
esse in potentia receptiva, puta, activitatem. Et sic materia 
non inclinatur ad formam, quia sic accipiendo inclinationem nihil 
inclinatur nisi agens naturale, nee aliquid agens naturale quid 
sic inclinatur ad contraria non est indifferens, quia breviter, 
inclinare est idem quid agere. 11 Also see Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, D. 
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substantial form. Strictly speaking, however, the term "inclina-
tion" indicates more than receptive potency, it implies activity 
in some power. Bodies with weight "incline" to the center; air 
"inclines" upwards. To assert that a power is inclined to some 
object or end, is equivalent, according to Ockham, to saying that 
the power does something. "Appetite" implies some determined 
activity so that the power in which appetite resides cannot be 
undetermined. If the notion of inclination is thus understood, 
it follows that the will is not inclined either to the ultimate 
end or its own perfection. 50 Such inclinations would jeopardize 
the will's native indifference to opposites. 
A review of Thomistic and Scotistic doctrines regarding 
the will's inclinations reveals the originality of Ockham's posi-
tion. St. Thomas Claims that the will necessarily adheres to the 
50sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 507); "Ad argumentum principale 
dico quod voluntas non naturaliter inclinatur in finem ultimum, 
n1s1 accipiendo inclinationem naturalem secundum quod sit secundum 
communem cursum. Et de tali inclinatione non est verum quod quid-
quid fit contra inclinationem violentatur. Et quando dicitur quod 
'unumquodoque inclinatur in propriam perfectionem,' ista est 
neganda, stricte accipiendo inclinationem, nisi quando illud per-
fectibile est activum naturale, cuiusmodi non est voluntas." Also 
see Sent., III, q. 3, G. 
A qualification is required here. Ockham speaks frequent-
ly about the "inclination" within the will toward determinate 
objects consequent to habit formation. See Sent., IV, q. 4, O, 
and Quodl., III, q. 17. This "inclination," which Ockham calls 
a "habit," consists in the previous will-acts which generate a 
facility and promptitude in producing similar acts. Thus, the 
inclination consists of acts and the will might well be inclined 
or habituated to the ultimate end or self perfection. But Ockham's 
argument concerns innate or natural inclinations. He proposes the 
Will as a tabula rasa; its habits or inclinations are freely 
generated rather than original equipment. 
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ultimate end of human operations, happiness. The desire for 
happiness is not freely effected since the will moves to the 
ultimate end by internal and natural necessity. Aquinas maintains 
that the will's freedom concerns the means which can be chosen to 
. th" d 51 achieve is necessary en • Duns Scotus disagrees. According 
to the Subtle Doctor, the will is not necessitated by the ultimate 
end whether that end is known in general or in particular. 52 A 
more radical and extensive conception of volitional indifference 
accompanies Scotus' notion of the will because Infinite Goodness 
cannot determine the will's movement. The freedom of the will is 
51see Aquinas Sum. Theol., I, q. 82, art. 1. In this 
article, Aquinas explains that freedom is "opposed" to the "nec-
essi tas coactionis" and not to "necessitas naturalis." Hence-;-
the desire for the ultimate end derives from the will's nature 
and ex-presses an ontological relationship and affective tendency 
to the will's perfectant. See William R. O'Connor, "Natural 
Appetite," The Thomist 16 (1953), pp. 361-409. In St. Thomas' 
words, this volitive tendency or relation is the "necessitas 
finis." This means; a) the will necessarily adheres to the ulti-
mate end, happiness, and b) the will necessarily elicits acts 
which are indispensable for freely chosen ends. Ockham, however, 
denies that every movement of the will depends upon a immovable, 
permanent orientation to happiness as a "root" and principle. On 
the other hand, he agrees with St. Thomas that freely chosen ends 
necessitate the selection of sine qua !!.2Q means. The texts of 
St. Thomas and Ockham have been collected and contrasted by G. de 
Lagarde, Ockham ... , pp. 72-73. 
52scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 82 (ed. 
Vaticana, II, 62). In proving this conclusion, Scotus denies 
both senses of "necessitas finis" explained by St. Thomas. "Nec-
essitas naturalis non stat cum libertate, quia natura et voluntas 
sunt principia activa habentia oppositum modum principiandi, 
igitur cum modo principiandi voluntatis non stat modus princi-
piandi naturae; sed voluntas libere vult finem; igitur non potest 
necessitate naturali velle finem, ergo et circa finem. 11 (loc., 
.£11., n. 80; II, 60). ~ 
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manifested by its undetermination to the ultimate end of life and 
the means to that end. And Ockham sides with Scotus; the will 
can recognize the ultimate end clearly and still not choose this 
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end. 
Ockham's analysis of "inclinations," however, makes him 
reject the Scotistic position that the will possesses both abso-
lute freedom and natural inclinations. To be precise, Scotus 
posits a natural inclination within the human will toward its 
proper perfection. 54 In effect, the will contains a natural 
53ockham accepts the conclusions, but not the reasons, of 
Scotus. "Tertia conclusio est quod aliquis potest nolle beati-
tudinem in particulari creditam esse possibilem, ita quod potest 
- nolle habere beatitudinem." Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 504). Also 
see Sent., IV, q. 14, D. Ockham's disagreement derives from his 
conviction that certain acts are produced necessarily by the 
-· will, e.g., acts which are entailed by a prior volition through 
"necessitas finis." 
54 Comm., Ox., IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2 (XXI, 318-319); 
"Respondeoactprimam quaestionem dico, quod duplex est appetitus 
in voluntate, scilicet naturalis et liber. Naturalem solum dico 
potentiam voluntatis absolute, sed non aliquid superadditum vol-
untati, sicut enim quaelibet natura habet inclinationem naturalem 
ad suam perfectionem ••. De primo appetitu dico, quod non est actus 
aliquis elicitus a voluntate sed tantum inclinatio, quaedam. 11 Also 
in Rep. Par., IV, d. 49, q. 9, n. 3-5 (XXIV, 659ss). For Ockham's 
refutation of this text, see above, note 50. This argument be-
tween Scotus and Ockham appears verbal rather than substantive. 
Scotus claims the will's natural appetite is not an act; Ockham 
rejoins that it must be. As interpreted by Father Allan Wolter, 
O.F.M., the "natural appetite" is sim:ply "an ontological relation-
ship between any faculty (or the soul) and that which perfects 
it ••• [the will as nature] is regarded passively as the recipient 
of its own immanent operations." "Duns Scotus on the Natural 
Desire for the Supernatural," Franciscan Studies 31 (1949), pp. 
302-305. Understood in this way, Scotus' doctrine on natural 
appetite is not guilty of the inconsistency which Ockham attrib-
utes to it. Furthermore, the debate over terminology hides the 
fact that Scotus conceives the freedom of the will more exten-
sively than does Ockham. The Subtle Doctor claims that every 
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appetite and a free appetite which Scotus (and St. Anselm) call 
naffections" because these inclinations prompt selfish and 
altruistic acts respectively. 55 The will's natural appetite 
necessarily seeks its own perfection (velle commodi) while the 
free appetite appreciates what is good-in-itself (velle justitiae). 
Opposed appetites explain the will's indifference to opposites. 
But to Ockham, dual appetites do not explain the will's indif-
ference, they deny it. The will cannot possess a natural and 
pre-conscious inclination towards its own perfection without 
eliminating the possibility of altruistic acts. Consciousness of 
a good-for-the-will would determine the will's natural desire 
;. .. according to Ockham's analysis of "appetite" or "inclination" as 
act. Thus, Ockham rejects the Thomistic insertion of natural 
neces$ity, and the Scotistic assertion of natural appetite, within 
the free will. 
Ockham's critique of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus appears 
to announce a more radical and libertarian conception of human 
freedom. But the doctrinal development is not so clear. Ockham 
means to remove any intrinsic, teleological relationship from the 
will. He does not, however, eradicate all traces of necessity 
voluntary act is a free act, while Ockham teaches that some volun-
tary acts are produced of necessity. 
55comm. Ox., III, d. 26, q. unica, n. 17 (XV, 340-341); 
"In voluntate sunt duae affectionae, scilicet justitiae et commo-
di. Nobilior autem est affectio justitiae .•• secundum quam aliquis 
potest velle aliquod bonum non in ordine ad se. Secundum autem 
affectionem commodi non potest velle, nisi in ordine ad se." 
-· - ' •.. ._, 
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from the will's operation. To be specific, Ockham admits a 
necessity of the end (necessitas finis) reminiscent of Aquinas' 
doctrine. 56 He ever denied the natural or teleological necessity 
of the ultimate end, but admitted the necessity which a freely 
chosen goal imposes upon the selection of the consequent means. 
For example, if an agent freely desires health while believing 
that a certain medicine is indispensable for his health, then 
volition of that medicine follows necessarily. To terminate the 
desire for this medicine, the agent must first cease to desire 
health. The will cannot seriously or efficaciously desire a goal 
while rejecting sine qua .!!2.£ means. The natural or metaphysical 
dependence between things parallels a logical order of "conse-
quentiae" and, according to Ockham, parallels a volitional exi-
gency.which binds together certain ends and means. In this 
light, the freedom of will appears as the indifference and con-
tingency with which the agent decides the goals of his affection 
and behavior. The will freely decides its ends; but once the 
goals of activity have been established the will necessarily 
elicits the means which appear necessary. Ockham's criticism of 
56sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 499-500); "Hoc per experientiam: 
quia experimur quod libere et contingenter ante volitionem effica-
cem sanitatis possumus appetere potionem amaram vel non appetere, 
non autem stante illa volitione cum firma opinione aliter non 
posse consequi ••. manifestum per experientiam quod aliquando ad 
actum aliquem intellectus et actum voluntatis sequitur necessario 
et naturaliter aliquis actus voluntatis, quod ille actus causatur 
sufficienter ab illis actibus praecedentibus sine activitate vol-
untatis." Also see Sent., III, q. 4, O. Father Lucan Freppert, 
O.F.M., The Basis of Morality .•. , pp. 58-60, seems alone among 
Ockham's commentators in indicating this qualification on the 
Will's freedom. 
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Aquinas is that natural necessity contradicts the will's indif-
ference to opposite ends; his objection to Scotus is that natural 
inclinations deny the will's contingent operation concerning 
opposite acts. It is not coincidental, therefore, that Ockham's 
positive analysis and characterization of volitional freedom in-
volves indifference and contingency. 57 
A. The Freedom of Opposites 
The will's indifference or "freedom of opposites" concerns 
the connection between the will and its objects and between the 
will and intellect. Ockham indicates the psychological conditions 
of the will's freedom through analysis of volitional indifference 
or "rationality." The psychic context of free acts will serve 
to clarify the metaphysical basis of freedom--the "freedom of 
contraries." 
Volitional indifference concerns the will's undetermined 
stance towards apprehended objects of desire. Following Scotus, 
Ockham claims that "being," not "good," is the adequate object of 
the wil1. 58 The soul retains the capacity to love or hate any 
57For exam~le, Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); Sent., I, 
d. 2, q. 1 (II, 42); Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; and Quodl., I, 
q. 16. These texts analyze "freedom" into indifference and con-
tingency. 
58sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 434); 11 ••• aut hoc esset per 
libertatem voluntatis, quia scilicet voluntas ex hoc ipso quod 
libera est potest appetere quodcumque volibile ••• aut per univer-
salitatem objecti voluntatis, quia scilicet objectum suum est ens 
in communi, et per consequens quodlibet contentum .•. aut per 
capacitatem voluntatis, quia scilicet est capa boni infiniti." 
Also see Sent., III, q. 13, S. For Scotus' position and texts 
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being, or any aspect under which a being is conceived. Everything 
conceivable has an equal and un-determining claim to the will's 
affection. Perhaps, we should designate this the "primitive" or 
initial indifference of the will toward being in general. Accord-
ing to Ockham, the will loses its indifferent profile when elicit-
ing objects which entail or require concomitant objects. Preclud-
ing any prior volition which requires a further will-act--as 
desire for health requires desire for the medicine considered 
essential to health--the will is indifferent toward every being. 
Nevertheless, given the desire for health, the agent experiences 
medicine as necessarily desirable. Hence, Ockham's statement of 
the will's "primitive" indifference to opposites must be reform-
ulated to express a permanent (rather than initial) capacity of 
the created will. The human will is not indifferent to every 
object in every~· Rather, the will's indifference means 
that: a) by nature the will is undetermined by its objects--
bowever conceived, and b) the will can produce the situation in 
which it might accept or reject any habituated object--however 
conceived. 
In his own mind, there is a large difference between Ock-
ham 1 s doctrine of the will's indifference and the majority opinion 
Of Scholasticism. Many held that the volitive power must elicit 
its objects sub ratione boni. In every instance, volitional 
·see, Robert Prentice, O.F.M., "The Voluntarism of Duns Scotus as 
Seen in His Comparison of the Intellect and Will," Franciscan 
:§.tudies 28 (1968), pp. 63-65. 
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affection moves toward its proper object, the good. For example, 
manY Scholastics claim that the will necessarily chooses objects 
' 
t . b . 59 sub ra ione --2.!!,!· 
-
This terminology, and perhaps the entire 
"problem" which Ockham sees is a terminological one, the Venerable 
Inceptor finds inconsistent with the will's primitive indiffer-
ence. He insists that "indifference" means a neutral stance 
toward both opposite objects and objects c·oncei ved under opposite 
modes. As a moral power, the will can choose sub ratione boni 
·or sub ratione mali. Ultimately, Ockham sees the Aristotelian 
analysis of a nature in terms of an inherent final cause as 
insufficient and misleading when applied to a free nature. Only 
by understanding the term "good" in the metaphysical sense of 
!'what is willed or willable" can Ockham accept the position of 
the "authorities and saints. 1160 The transcendental or metaphysical 
59cf. Sum. Theol., I, q. 82, art. 2; and I-II, q. 10, 
art. 2, for the opinion that the will must choose its objects sub 
ratione boni. See the study of Robert-P:-Sullivan, O.P., "Natural 
Necessitation of the Human Will," The Thomist 16 (1951), pp. 351-
399; 490-528. 
60sent., III, q. 13, S-T; ttAd tertium dico quod 'bonum' 
accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo ut dividitur in bonum honestum et 
delectabile, alio modo bonum idem est quid volitum vel accipitur 
pro omni illo quid est volibile. Et eodem modo, 'malum' accipitur 
~upliciter ut opponitur bono primo modo dicto vel ut accipitur pro 
aliquo quid est nolibile vel nolitum. Accipiendo 'bonum' primo 
modo et 'malum' prout opponitur bono primo modo, sic dico quod 
voluntas potest velle malum quid nee est bonum realiter nee appar-
. enter .•. Secundo, dico quod accipiendo bonum et malum secundo modo; 
sic voluntas non potest velle aliquid nisi bonum nee nolle aliquid 
nisi malum vel sub ratione mali. Hoc patet, quia sic accipiendo 
bonum, idem est quid volitum vel volibile; malum idem est quid 
nolitum sive nolibile. Tune autem videtur contradicere quod 
Voluntas velit aliud [read, aliquid] nisi sit volitum et volibile. 
Igitur, etc. Et sic possunt glosari auctoritates et dicta 
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description of the good transforms the statement, 'the will must 
desire what is good,' into the equivalent and innocuous assertion 
that, 'the will must desire what is desireable.' It is not clear 
that Ockham's predecessors, such as Thomas Aquinas, did not hold 
the same position. Rather than a point of departure, it seems 
that Ockham's doctrine represents an emphasis upon the volitive 
capacity for evil chosen deliberately and unequivically. 
Ockham's doctrine on habits offers certain difficulties 
of consistency with the will's indifference. He teaches that the 
will lacks a necessary object, yet experiences that certain ob-
jects are chosen more easily than others. For example, the 
discipline of study becomes easier with each choice to apply one-
self. Repeated volitions have a cumulative and facilitating 
effect upon the will; they generate a proclivity toward certain 
'b . t d . t d . t 61 o Jee s an aversion owar opposi es. Habits incline the will 
to similar acts regarding similar objects. Ockham categorically 
denies an innate, inclination within the will, but allows for 
habitual and acquired inclinations produced and constituted by 
sanctorum qui dicunt quod voluntas non potest velle aliquid nisi 
sit bonum realiter vel sub ratione boni apparenter. 11 
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sent., III, q. 10, G; "Ideo dico quod virtus est ponenda 
in voluntate propter majorem perfectionem actus, et majorem facili-
tatem et inclinationem ad eliciendum actus, ceteris paribus, et 
tune potest sic argui: Quaecumque potentia, ceteris paribus, 
. magis inclinatur post actum quam ante et ad intensiorem actum, 
-;~t ex illis acquirit habitum. Sed voluntas est huiusmodi ..• 11 
~lltso see Quodl., III, q. 14. The volitive habits are studied by 
Oswald Fuchs, O.F.M., The Psychology of Habit According to William 
Qckham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1952), 
pp. 64-76, but he remains silent about the problem of determining 
habits within a free power. 
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the combined "weight" of many free acts. 62 A strong volitive 
habit, given the presence of its appropriate object, automatically 
receives that object and precludes its opposite. 63 Habits, there-
fore, provide another example of the necessity which affects the 
will's operation because of prior, free acts. Habitual desires 
give further evidence that total volitional receptivity and 
indifference to every being is a "primitive," initial condition 
of the will. Soon enough, the will's possibilities are restricted 
by its history. The adult, through discipline and contrary 
volitions, must frequently recapture his original capacity to 
accept or reject certain objects. 
It was Ockham's consistent position (Sent., III, q. 10, 
H; Sent., III, q. 12, G; Quodl., III, q. 13) that only habits of 
the will are per ~ virtuous. Only free acts are intrinsically 
moral; hence, only habits generated by free, voluntary acts are 
62sent., III, q. 4, U; "Ad aliud dico quod (habitus) non 
requiritur propter facilitatem vel promptitudinem tamquam princi-
pium activum tantum. Sed propter inclinationem dicitur proprie 
principium activum; et ex hoc sequitur facilitatio et promptitudo 
quia magis inclinatur nunc quam prius, et ita principaliter poni-
tur propter inclinationem, secundario autem propter alia duo." 
Also see Quodl., II, q. 18; for the two meanings of habitus. 
63sent., III, q. 4, N-0; "Potest dici quod licet voluntas 
sit libera respectu cuiuslibet actus ab eo eliciti absoluti con-
siderati; tamen considerando aliquem actum voluntatis inquantum 
ille actus antecedit in voluntate non est voluntas libera respectu 
illius actus .•• Tunc dico quod non est in potestate voluntatis 
quando eliciat cum habitu inclinate aliquem actum circa illud, et 
ille actus potest dici primus motus qui excusatur a peccato secun-
dum doctores. 11 See the parallel and later text in Sent., I, d. 
17, q. 2, C. See Quodl., II, q. 13, where Ockham says that pas-
sions within the sensitive powers can override the will's freedom. 
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intrinsically virtuous. Habits formed in the intellectual or 
sensitive powers are morally good by "extrinsic denomination," 
that is, by the causality of intrinsically good acts. The obvious 
objection arises: Ockham has excluded habituated actions from the 
dimension of free action and thereby, from morality. How can 
Ockham consider volitive habits intrinsically virtuous when every-
thing produced "with a habit inclined" is not "within the power 
of the will?" Any answer depends upon conjecture rather than 
explicit texts. Ockham sometimes speaks as if the will's inclin-
ation or addiction to a determinate object must be presently 
approved by a free volition to be operative; 64 elsewhere he says 
that habits are only partial causes, with the will, of volitive 
acts. 65 Such replies merely indicate that the primary and 
intrinsically moral act is volitional consent or dissent to habits 
which operate naturally within the will. The will's primitive 
indifference makes it possible for the agent to produce a situa-
tion, e.g., through formation of opposite habits, in which 
habitual inclinations can be countermanded. Thus, the presence 
64auodl., III, q. 19 (corr. by Vaticana Lat., 3075); "Ad 
aliud dico quod habitus et passiones proprie loquendo non inclinat 
voluntatem nisi quando consentit eis mediante voluntate. Et ita 
si voluntas nolit illas passiones et nolit elicere actum secundum 
habitum non inclinabunt voluntatem." 
65sent., III, q. 4, M; "Apparet inconveniens quod aliquis 
actus totaliter causetur in voluntate a causa creata alia a 
voluntate propter libertatem voluntatis quae non potest cogi, 
saltem per causam creatam, licet talis actus posset causari a 
Deo totaliter. Ideo potest dici quod ille actus (vel inclinatio 
habitus) causatur partialiter ab habitu et partialiter a volun-
tate.11 Also see Sent., III, q. 10, D. 
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~· . of habits within the will remains imputable even though the acts 
generated by those habits are non-moral. Of course, this does 
not "explain away" Ockham's attribution of per g morality to 
volitive habits which are naturally determined causes. It does 
explain, however, the techniques by which the will retains its 
indifference vis-a-vis its habitual inclinations. 
The freedom of opposites was traditionally given to the 
will as a "rational power." The will's rationality indicates; 
~a) its capacity to receive opposite objects, and b) its dependence 
upon intellectual acts. To "indifferently move to one opposite 
or the other," the will must recognize opposite acts or objects. 66 
Free choice (liberum arbitrium) implies knowledge of opposite 
things and volitive indifference to those options or alternatives. 
We must consider, therefore, the will's relationship to the 
intellect. 
Again, there is no real difference between the intellect 
and will. There is, however, a definite and constant order be-
tween cognitive and voluntary acts. "The will cannot wish some-
thing unless it is known. 1167 Volition does not create its options; 
rather it chooses among the rational proposals. Necessarily, an 
66 Sent., IV, q. 14, G; and Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, F. 
Curiously, when the soul produces an act of understanding, it 
should not be called a "rational power" according to Ockham. The 
intellect knows by necessity when presented with an intelligible 
object--it is a natural, active principle. "Sed omne principium 
activum respectu cuius necessario agit; respectu illius non potest 
dici potentia rationalis, quia respectu illius non potest dici 
potentia valens ad opposita." 
67 Quodl., III, q. 17; "Voluntas non potest aliquid velle 
nisi cognitum." 
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act of knowledge precedes any act of volition. The operation of 
the intellect determines the present scope, the "here and now" 
limits, within which the will exercises its freedom. Given Ock-
ham' s definition of a cause, he consistently concludes that in-
tellection is a partial cause of volition. 68 The will is a 
passive potency in the sense that it must receive as a possibility 
or option whatever the intellect apprehends as "do-able." Know-
ledge is a necessary, but not a necessitating, cause of volition. 
When the will elicits some volition, the preceding act of 
intellection is constituted as an efficient cause (i.e., because 
of Ockham's definition of cause as the essentially prior item 
with a sequence) of the volitive act. 
In summary, what we call the "freedom of opposites" con-
cerns the will's connection with.its objects. Ockham maintains 
that the will is originally free from any extrinsic determination. 
Furthermore, the human agent is permanently able to re-gain his 
primitive indifference toward opposites--even after the growth 
of passions or the formation of volitive habits and commitments. 
It should be understood that Ockham's defense of the will's in-
difference was simultaneously an attack against a prominent doc-
trine of Aristotelian psychology and physics. According to the 
Philosopher, every nature or. "source of motion and rest" possessed 
68
sent., II, q. 24, P; 11 ••• quia actus intelligendi est 
causa efficiens partialis respectu actus volendi; et potest esse 
naturaliter sine actu volendi, licet non e contra. Sed ista 
prioritas non infert perfectionem in illo quid est prius nee 
imperfectionem in posteriori." Also see Sent., II, q. 4-5, E; 
Where Ockham asserts that volition has a natural and free cause, 
namely, the intellect and will. 
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a teleological relationship or intrinsic finality to its perfect-
ant or fulfillment. 69 Independent of any act, a potency can be 
analyzed and explained by means of its final cause. For example, 
the power of sight is ontologically related to its proper object, 
color, as the condition of actually seeing. Hence, color perfects 
or completes the visual potency. The Scholastics who considered 
the will a distinct source of human operations generally followed 
Aristotle in asserting the will's inherent finality to what 
perfects or actualizes the volitive potency, i.e., "happiness," 
llbeatitude," "the good," etc. 70 But because Ockham denies the 
"distinct faculties" or "formally distinct powers" theories of 
the human soul, he protests against a specifically identical end 
or "aspect" involved whenever the soul elicits an act of volition. 
He denies that the will must be naturally and pre-consciously 
69cf. Physics, II, c. 7-8; De Anima, III, c. 10. Sir 
David Ross' comments on the Aristotelian doctrine of nature vis-
a-vis the four causes is enlightening. "But further Aristotre-
often indicates the identity of form with efficient and with 
final cause ..• The form is the plan of structure considered as 
informing a particular product of nature or art. The final cause 
is the same plan considered as not yet embodied in the particular 
thing but as aimed at by nature or by art .•. And in nature, the 
form which is to find fresh embodiment is already present and is 
the cause of movement. Aristotle (5th ed.; New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 1949), pp. 74-75. Ockham complains that Aristotle and 
Avicenna confused final and formal causality. Sent., II, q. 3, H. 
70At least some Thomistic and Scotistic scholars assert 
that the Will's natural desire, according to their mentor's 
thought, concerns a pre-conscious and ontological relationship 
rather than a conscious volition. Thus, Sullivan, The Thomist, 
16, pp. 351-399; and Wolter, Franciscan Studies, 31-;-pp. 300-
307. Cf., for example, Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, qes. 80-81. 
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directed to the good to explain the possibility and intelligibili-
ty of the will's activity. In asserting the will's freedom of 
opposites, Ockham precludes an Aristotelian analysis of the will 
.9..ua nature and form. Whatever is known and however the mind 
specifies the known object, the will remains indifferent. Only 
freely chosen final causes influence the will's operation. The 
will's objective indifference and undetermination has rather 
obvious consequences within Ockham's moral theory. To be explicit, 
nothing can be classified a priori as "unsuitable," "unnatural," 
or "immoral" on the basis of the will's nature. 
B. The Freedom of Contraries 
The freedom of contraries or "freedom of execution" con-
cerns the will's connection with its own acts. The will is not 
a passive potency in spite of the fact that volition requires a 
prior intellection. 71 Everything required for a determinate 
volition can be present to the will, yet the will need not act. 
In discussing the fundamental locus of human freedom, Ockham 
emphatically leaves the realm of "liberum arbitrium. 11 The will 
acts freely and indifferently even without the choices or alter-
natives which derive from the intellect's activity. 72 In 
?l Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 486); "Voluntas est receptiva 
nolitionis~volitionis respectu cuiuscumque objecti; sed nullius 
est receptiva nisi cuius est activa; ergo active potest in voli-· 
t~onem respectu cuiuscumque objecti, et etiam nolitionem; ergo 
libere et contingeter. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, F; and 
Sent., IV, q. 14, G. -
72 Sent., I, d. 6, q. 1, G; "Si voluntas tantum posset in 
unum, tamen contingenter sic quod haberet in potestate sua ferri 
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deliberating about a single goal, i.e., conscious of only one 
end, the will retains its intrinsic freedom to accept or reject 
that goal. For Ockham the freedom of the will rests ultimately 
upon the contingent connection between the soul and the contrary 
acts of "velle, 11 "nolle," and "non-velle." "Properly speaking, 
nothing is produced freely and non-naturally unless what is 
produced contingently and can be produced and not produced. 1173 
Ockham explains the positive freedom of the moral agent as the 
active, self-determining capacity of the will and characterizes 
every effect of freedom as contingent. 
Ockham's explanation, in contrast to his assertion, of 
the will's freedom rests upon the originative and spontaneous 
causality of the will. 74 As an active power, the will is self-
determining. The soul is an "unmoved-mover" in producing, deter-
mining and specifying its volitive effects. 
in illud vel non ferri in illud, adhuc sufficienter distingueretur 
a natura in causando. 11 Ockham rarely utilizes the notion of 
"free choice" in analyzing the will's freedom. "Choice" implies 
a determination of alternative means; according to Aristotle's 
terminology, one does not "choose" his ends. Ockham is emphatic-
ally opposed to the doctrine entailed by this vocabulary. He 
maintains that men are free to establish or decide their goals, 
and having decided their goals, certain means are willed natural-
ly and necessarily. Father Boehner correctly remarks: "Therefore 
according to Ockham liberty is not only the power of free choice 
which would presuppose the choice between two objects, but ulti-
mately the power of self determination or the dominion of the 
will over its own act." Collected Articles ••. , p. L+26. 
73sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 35). 
74sent., IV, q. 14, G.; "Si (voluntas) esset potentia 
passiva et nullo modo activa, non videtur quomodo possit salvari 
ejus libertas." 
If the object is known, and if God wishes to concur 
with the will for causing whenever the will is ready, 
the will can elicit or not elicit that act and its 
object from its freedom without any other habitual 
or actual determination. Therefore, concerning that 
act, it is not necessary that the will be determined 
to something unless by the will itself.75 
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Ockham's "principle of economy" prompts him to maintain 
only one active (i.e., self-moving) power among the spiritual 
faculties of man. 76 He rejects the Philosopher's and Commentata-
tor's doctrine of an "agent intellect," just as he denies the 
passivity attributed the "power of choice" or "rational appetite" 
by Aristotle. Only the will is active and "in nostra potentia" 
because causal explanations of any volition cannot proceed be-
yond the will's power. The effects of natural powers, however, 
require explanation through a series of causes which include the 
power and its determining object. As an active cause, the will 
75sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito 
omni sufficienti et necessario requisito ad talem actum, puta ad 
actum voluntatis; si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit concurrere 
cum vo1untate ad causandum quando placet voluntati, potest vol-
untas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione actuali vel 
habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel non elicere. 
Et ideo respecu illius actus non oportet in aliquo quod determine-
tur voluntas nisi a seipsa. 11 Also see parallel and later texts 
in~., I, d. 38, q. 1, G; and Quodl., I, q. 16. Ockham's 
evidence, therefore, for the will's active nature hinges upon the 
Will's indifference. Given all the conditions for volition, the 
will can produce or not produce its effect; thus, the determining 
factor is the will itself. 
76In Sent., II, q. 25, A; Ockham reviews twenty-one argu-
ments for asserting an "agent11 or "active intellect." He refutes 
all of them as inconclusive. 11 Sciendum est, quod circumscripta 
omnium sanctorum auctoritate et philosophorum, propter nullam. 
rationem necessario concludentem oportet ponere intellectum acti-
vum sed solum passivum ... 11 Often the arguments prove merely the 
active nature of the will (AA). 
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initiates and originates a causal series which can control every 
77 other human power. The will can command that the eyes close 
and thus impede vision; volition.can direct or re-orientate the 
intellect's consideration to certain objects. The will, by means 
of its acts, dominates the agent's physical faculties and con-
trols the mental faculties by affecting the objects available to 
the mind. 
We can now answer why the will alone is a sufficient 
principle of moral acts. If the will elicits some act, the 
moving cause is the will itself. The will's movement from poten-
cy to act is self-determined. Hence, the sufficient reason and 
responsibility for volition rests with the active will. 
A question might arise: Does not the active nature of 
the will's causality contradict the Aristotelian-Thomistic axiom 
that "whatever is in motion is placed in motion by another"--
omne guod movetur ab alio movetur? If the will is in potency to 
volition, how can it reduce itself to act? Three times Ockham 
·considers this objection to the will's self-determination. 78 His 
77sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292); "Omnis operatic quae 
est in potestate nostra est praxis. Et ideo cum tam cognitio 
quam volitio quam alii actus exteriores sint in potestate nostra, 
sequitur quod quilibet istorum vere poterit dici praxis. Tamen 
praxis primo dicitur de actu voluntatis, cum ipsa sit primo in 
potestate nostra, et nulla alia sit in potestate nostra nisi 
mediante ea .•• n The term "praxis" will be discussed in Chapter 
Two. Also see Sent., III, q. 10, H, where Ockham asserts the 
Will's mastery over the agent's physical operations. 
78First, in Sent., IV, q. 13,· Kand in Sent., IV, q. 14, 
~ and F; then in Quocrr.-:-;- I, q. 16; "Sed hie est dubium, quia 
impossibile est quod agens dum existit per tempus in potentia 
essentiali ad actum quod reducat se de potentia ad actum sine 
answer is that the cinesiological principle applies only to 
natural agents, i.e., passive powers. (And the principle is 
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not universally valid for instances of natural causality.)79 The 
agente extrinseco. Sed voluntas potest esse per tempus in poten-
tia essentiali ad volitionem; ergo, non potest educere seipsam. 
Respondeo et dico quod argumentum est verum de agente naturali 
sive sit corporale sive spirituale. Sed in agente libero cuius-
modi est voluntas est instantia manifesta .quia objectum potest 
esse cognitum et praesens voluntati, et omnia alia requisita ad 
actum volendi possunt manere per tempus, et potest non elicere 
actum suum et deindi elicere sine omni actione extrinseca--et 
hoc totum est propter liberatatem suam. Ad principale argumentum 
dico quod idem potest esse activum et passivum respectu ejusdem, 
nee ista repugnant ad invicem. 11 See the parallel argument of 
Scotus in Comm. Ox., II, d. 25, q. unica, n. 5 (XIII, 200 ff). 
Father Roy Effler has published a study of John Duns Scotus and 
~Principle "Omne guod movetur ab alio movetur." See especially 
pp. 32-51. Scotus refutes both the physical and the metaphysical 
sense of this axiom as given by St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent and 
Godfrey of Fontaines. Many of Father Effler's comments could be 
applied verbatim to Ockham's position. For example, "there is 
nothing in the bare notions of active and passive pri.nciple to 
forbid that one and the same thing be active and passive in 
reference to one and the same perfection. Thus the two notions 
do not necessarily exclude self-motion." p. 41. Cf. Aristotle, 
Physics VII, c. 1 (24lb 25-242a 16). 
79In the above text from the First Quodlibet, Ockham 
implies that natural agents are not self-moving. Elsewhere, Ock-
.ham analyses the mechanics of projectile motion as an instance 
of self-movement. When a stone leaves the hand of the thrower, 
it moves--not by the tangent air currents, or by an impressed 
force--but by itself. Professor Ernest A. Moddy reviews the Greek, 
Arabian and Scholastic background of the scientific discoveries of 
Galileo; he gives Ockham's theory of projectile motion a place of 
importance in the history of modern Mechanics. "Ockham helped to 
break down the tacit assumption, made by the partisans of Averroes 
and Avempace alike, which had vitiated the sound elements in each 
position. This was the assumption, summed up in the phrase Omne 
s_uod movetur ab alio movetur, that the condition of "being in 
motionfl is ipso "fa'Cto a condition of "being moved by something," 
so that the motion under the action of no force was excluded as 
f?rmally impossi.bl.e." "Galileo and Avempace," Journal of the 
iistory of Ideas 12 (1951), p. 399. P. Duhem, Etudes ~Leonard 
~Vinci, Vol. II (Paris: 1906), p. 86, maintains that Ockham's 
rejection of the cinesiological principle produced the first 
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experience in which all the external, non-volitive factors re-
quired for willing are operative, yet the will first refuses to 
act and then produces a determinate act, can only be explained 
as the will's self-activating ability. The will cannot be moved 
by another created power; an extrinsic force cannot actualize the 
will's potency. Although Ockham admits that cognition "causes" 
volition, i.e., cognition is prior necessarily to any act of 
willing, it is apparent that the intellect influences volition £y 
means of, and contingent upon, the will's causality. The intel-
lect's act does not place in act, or move, the will. Thus, Ockham 
asserts that the will can be both active and passive regarding 
the same perfection, i.e., volition. The soul is the active 
principle of the action which it receives. Hence, self-motion 
is not only possible, but demanded by the experienced facts. 
The acts within the will's power immediately are "velle, 11 
"nolle, 11 and "non-velle. 11 Acceptance (velle), rejection (nolle) 
or the absence of any decision (non-velle) regarding an object 
depends upon the will's self-determination. Not only positive 
acts of accepting or rejecting (velle and nolle), but the lack 
statement of the law of inertia. Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time ... , 
pp. 51-62, shows the tacit rejection of the principle of motion 
in Ockham's treatment of many questions of Natural Philosophy . 
. It should be noted, however, that Ockham's rejection of the causal 
principle is not categorical; he denies its usual sense that 
things in motion require an external created force to initiate 
an.d continue movement. He also "reinterprets" this lm·; of move-
ment as universally valid when it designates the necessity of 
S.ivine force for all secondary causality and movement. See Sent., 
IV, q. 13, K. -
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of positive action (non-velle) is attributable to the will's 
freedom. The will's responsibility for its active or indifferent 
state extends to all the mental and physical effects of the agent, 
which are controllable by volition. Notice, however, that the 
non-volitive powers regulated by the will's self-determination 
are not themselves free powers. Acts of eating, walking, think-
ing, etc., are natural activities although mediately controlled 
by a free power. This point deserves remembrance. Upon this 
basis, Ockham will claim that non-volitive acts have no moral 
status. Against his major predecessors--Aquinas and Scotus--
Ockham teaches that "external" actions lack a "proper moral good-
ness or evil." His reasoning is that external acts are "natural" 
and natural actions are not themselves contingent although they 
are produced by means of contingent acts. According to Ockham's 
thought, "moral" or "imputable" can be predicated properly and 
intrinsically of only the acts "velle, 11 ,"nolle," or "non-velle. 11 
Just as Ockham traces human freedom to the will's self-moving 
nature, so he attributes moral value only to acts produced freely 
and contingently by the will. "Only the act of will is praise-
80 
worthy or blameworthy." Sins of commission~ positive will-
acts (velle or nolle); sins of omission~ the will-not-willing 
(non-velle). 
The possibility of two simultaneous acts within the human 
I 
Will is admitted by Ockham. This assertion supports Ockham's 
80 
q. 13, P. 
Quodl., III, q. 13; Sent., III, q. 10, H; Sent., III, 
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claim of morally indifferent acts within the will; it renders 
problematic a necessarily good act; it subjects Ockham to strong 
criticism from his successors. Thus, Ockham's position requires 
close study. 
In the Reportatio, Ockham's earliest work, the possibility 
of indifferent acts derives from the will's capacity to constantly 
81 
will the same object for successively different reasons. For 
example, the will could first love some man and then love that 
man for God's sake. To simply love something is morally indif-
ferent--a single act; to love something out of love for God is 
morally good--two simultaneous acts. The love of object and end 
81sent., III, q. 10, P; "Si autem duo actus volendi pos-
sunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate--quid credo esse verum 
sicut in primo (Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1: I, 381-389) probatum est--
tune in voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo 
praedicto. Exemplum, si enim diligam aliquem hominem absolute 
terminando actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam 
circumstantiam bonam vel malam tune iste actus non est bonus vel 
malus moraliter, sed est neuter. Sed tune stante illo actu 
eligam alium actum quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter Deum 
secundum rectam rationem et secundum omnes alias circumstantias 
requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuo-
sus. Et qui prius fuit indifferens, nunc est virtuosus denomina-
tione extrinseca quatenus elicitur conformiter actui perfecte 
virtuoso et recto dictamini. 11 
Ockham's consistency in this text is problematic. In 
the preceding paragraph he claims that a change in the partial 
objects of an act changesthe numerical identity of the act. 
"Cum circumstantiae non sint nisi objecta partialia actus virtuo-
si, ad quorum variationem variatur necessario actus." (0). In 
his example, therefore, to simply love a man cannot be specifical-
ly or numerically the same act as to love that man for God's sake. 
The example introduces successively different acts rather than a 
single act which remains in conjunction with a novel volition. 
Yet unless two distinct actions occur simultaneously within the 
Will, Ockham claims no act would be morally indifferent. And 
Ockham proceeds to explain his example as "idem actus numero" 
being first indifferent and then extrinsically go~ 
r 
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are separable and distinct; hence, two acts can exist simultane-
ously within the will. Ockham's argument, therefore, seems to 
run thus: If volition can occur without being ordered to some 
end, then that volition is neither orderly nor disorderly. At 
the same time, Ockham implies that volition of the object and end 
remain distinct acts--even when elicited simultaneously. In the 
Ordinatio, when discussing the Augustinian terms "frui" and "uti," 
Ockham asserts that the will can determine the means and the end 
of action by a single volition or two simultaneous acts. 82 Just 
as the intellect knows the principle and conclusion of some 
'argument by distinct acts or by a single act; so the will can 
desire the means and the end by distinct volitions or by a single 
wish. Volition of the object and the end are not always differ-
'ent actions. Will-acts, therefore, can have simple or complex 
objects. How could Ockham distinguish between two simultaneous 
·acts and one act with many partial objects? What criteria 
individuate an act within the will? 
82sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 381-382); "Sed istis rationibus 
non obstantibus, videtur probabile quod possunt esse duo actus, 
et quod possunt esse unus actus. Hoc potest declarari, quia 
'sicut intellectus se habet ad principia et conclusiones, ita 
voluntas se habet ad finem et ad ea quae sent ad finem. Sed 
intellectus potest scire conclusionem distincto actu ab actu quo 
pognoscitur principium, et potest unico actu cognoscere utrumque, 
ergo eodem modo voluntas potest habere distinctos actus respectu 
finis et illius quod est ad finem, et unum actum respectu utrius-
que. 11 This text begins Ockham's response to six objections against 
his position that two acts might co-exist within the will (pp. 
379-381). Ockham's solution to these difficulties (pp. 384-389) 
proves how specifically different predications can be applied to 
.the same will-act--how specifically different acts co-exist--
and not how numerically distinct will-acts occur simultaneously. 
r 
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Ockham is simply not clear on these questions. He seems 
to vascillate between an integrated view of the will-act with 
many partial objects; and an analytic view of many will-acts in 
proportion to the partial objects. The ambiguity reappears in 
Ockham's effort to describe types of moral acts--witness below 
in Chapter Four. Ockham indulges in dubious logical acrobatics 
when he: a) maintains against Scotus that change in the partial 
objects of the act changes the act's numerical and specific 
identity and b) maintains against Aquinas that the same (morally 
indifferent) action can remain while the will's objects change. 
Ockham's evidence for simultaneous acts within the will is funda-
mentally the experience that certain will-acts "endure" for 
successively different reasons. Thus, the agent might love this 
man simply; then love this man for God's sake; then love this man 
to impress others. But by Ockham's standards, the same act 
numerically cannot "endure" for different final causes. 83 The 
same specific act endures; each action Ockham describes can be 
called "love-for-man." Ockham, who accepts the "plurality of 
forms" doctrine, allows the same thing to receive specifically 
different predications. Hence, specifically distinct actions can 
co-exist in the will because the same act can receive different 
"class" or "type" predications. The action "loving mankind for 
God's sake" receives different and opposed classifications--
83sent., III, q. 10, N; "Impossibile est quod unus actus 
nunc terminetur ad unum primarium objectum et post terminetur ad 
aliud objectum primarium; sed fines sunt objecta primaria volun-
tatis .11 See also Sent., III, q. 12, XX-YY; and Quodl., III, q. 15. 
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namely, love for man/love for God, volition of means/volition of 
end, ~ concupiscentiae/~ amicitiae, uti/frui, etc. Given 
the case of one who hates sin for God's sake, Ockham claims that 
the "same action numerically" might be called "detestatio" and 
84 
namor." Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), among others, was incredu-
-
ious that hating (nolle) one thing while loving (velle) another 
thing could be considered "the same action numerically. 1185 We 
poncur with Rimini; Ockham's position is perplexing in the absence 
pf a clear statement of what individuates action. In place of 
explanation, we have Ockham's assertion that the will's freedom 
determines whether diverse objects are elicited by separate acts 
or whether diverse objects are "ordered" and "conjoined" by a 
single act. This position rules out~ priori or methodological 
means_ for identifying individual volitions. The irony is acute--
Ockham, who rejects the need for "principles of individuation" to 
84 - . . . -
Sent., I, d. l, q. 1 (I, 386.:.337).; "Ad quartum potest 
concedi quod idem actus numero respectu unius potest denominari 
detestatio seu actus detestandi et respectu alterius actus amandi 
quando unico actu detest6r aliquid propter aliud amatum eodem 
actu. 11 This example would seem to offer the clearest instance 
~f two simultaneous acts within the will, but Ockham insists the 
terms "to hate" and "to love" could apply to the same action, and 
thus vitiates his only acceptable illustration that "in voluntate 
possunt esse simul duo actus volendi." Also see Sent., IV, qes. 
8-9, u. 
85super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, I, d. 1, q. 1, 
art.2 (Venice: 1522, f. 24r: reprint St. Bonaventure, New York: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1955); "Ad hanc rationem respondet 
Primus doctor (in marg •.. Ockham) concedendo consequens et dicit 
quad non est inconveniens eundum actum esse volitionem unius et 
n~litionem alterius .•• Sed procerto hoc non nj_si absurde concedi 
Vl.detur posse." Rimini's argument proposes that whenever opposite 
Predicates can be applied to the will, then two acts exist simul-
taneously. 
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explain the singular facts of experience, has no method for iso-
lating singular actions. 
The will·, therefore, determines its object (or objects) 
and its own act (or acts). The will's determination is accom-
plished, however, without terminating the volitive potency to 
opposite objects or acts. The will's indifference to opposites, 
to producing or not producing some act, occur "nullo variate ~ 
E.arte ~" or "nulla diversitate circa illam potentiam facta." 
With these phrases, Ockham describes a contingent power. 
A fundamental motive which vitalizes Ockham's theological 
orientation is to maintain the contingency of human existence 
and action. Our life and thought rest on a free divine choice. 
Creation depends upon the Necessary Being whose omnipotence is 
the sole sufficient ~eason for non-necessary beings. Ockham ex-
presses the contingency of every effect by saying that any effect 
produced by a created and secondary agent can be done by God 
immediately, as the primary and necessary agent. 86 Because of 
this regulative notion, Ockham asserts that human causality--
~hether free or natural--is contingent since the Creator could 
impede or totally effect any activity of the creature. 87 Anything 
. . 
86
ouodl., VI, q. 6; "Praeterea in illo articulo fundatur 
illa propositio famosa theologorum, Quidquid Deus producit median-
. tibus causis secundis potest immediate sine illis producere et 
conservare." 
, 
87sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Prima distinctio est 
~e contingenti quod dupliciter accipitur (ad presens) frui aliquo 
rontingenter sicut et producere aliquid contingenter. In uno modo 
~Uod simpliciter potest frui et non frui, vel producere et non 
which is an effect, therefore, is contingent in the sense that 
its being is radically dependent, non-necessary, and mutable. 
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Besides this metaphysical contingency of created being, 
which implies imperfection, Ockham also distinguishes another 
meaning of contingency which connotes a perfection possessed by 
the will. This second sense of contingent refers to "that which 
produces some effect, with no change on its part nor on the part 
of another. It has in its power, thus, to not produce as well 
as to produce, so that of its nature, it is determined to 
neither. 1188 (We imply this "volitive" sense of contingent when 
discussing the will, unless otherwise stated.) This conception 
of contingence belongs to both the divine and human will, but not 
to a natural power. The production and continuing production of 
natural potencies depend upon external factors; contact between 
agent and patient necessitates action which continues until the 
extrinsic conditions change. Volitive contingency, however, im-
plies that the will could cease its action unilaterally. 89 A 
producere. Et isto modo, quidquid producit quemcumque effectum 
producit contingenter, quia potest Deus facere quod non producat." 
Also see Sent., III, q. 4, L; and Quodl., III, q. 13. 
88sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 501); "Alio modo accipitur pro 
illo quod producit aliquem effectum et nullo variato ex parte sua, 
nee ex parte cuiuscumque alterius, habet in potestate sua ita non 
producere sicut producere, ita quod ex natura sua ad neutraum 
determinatur. Et eodem modo dicendum est de contingenter frui." 
89 . Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1, F; "Concedendum est quod voluntas 
quando causat contingenter causat. Sed ista potest habere duas 
causas veritatis. Vel quia possibile est quod in eodem instanti 
sit verum dicere quod non causat et hoc est impossibile quia 
posito quod in aliquo instanti sit causans, impossibile est quod 
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contingent act--and all moral actions are contingent--can be 
retracted immediately although all other prerequisites for willing 
continue unchanged. Ockham cautions that "contingent" does not 
mean that the will could ~ cause and not-cause at the same 
instant. 90 Rather, before and after a will-act, the will can 
either cause or not-cause. A positive movement of the will 
(either velle or nolle) produces a self-determined act but the 
will is not thereby determined. Ockham's rather extreme example 
of the will's contingent character pictures a person jumping from 
in eodem instanti sit non causans. Vel dicitur causare contin-
genter quia libere sine omni variatione adveniente sibi vel alteri, 
et non per cessationem alterius causae potest cessare ab actu in 
alio instanti, ita quod in alio instanti sit non causans, non quod 
in eodem instanti sit non causans. Et isto modo, voluntas causat 
contingenter. Also see~., I, d. 10, q. 2, H. 
901n probably a later work, the Tractatus de Praedestina-
tione et de Praescientia Qtl_ et de Futuris Contingentibus (ed. 
Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.; Saint Bonaventure, New York: The Fran-
ciscan Institute, 1945), Ockham seems to distinguish three "mo-
ments" in the will's operation--before, during and after the will-
act. Arguing against John Duns Scotus, Ockham insists 
that while the will elicits its act, it cannot simultaneously be 
capable of the contrary act. The will "valet ad opposita" suc-
cessively, not simultaneously. Hence, the will can produce 
opposite acts before or after its self-determination--but not 
during or while it elicits some volition. 11 ••• voluntas creata in 
illo instanti in quo agit contingenter agit. Sed hoc potest in-
telligi tripliciter: Uno modo quod ipsa prius duratione existens 
ante A instans, in quo causat, potest libere et contingenter 
causare vel non causare in A, et iste intellectus est verus .•• 
Secundo modo potest intelligi, quod in eodem instanti, in quo 
causat, sit verum dicere, quod non causat; et iste intellectus 
non est possibilis propter contradictoria ••• Tertio modo potest 
intelligi contingenter causare in A, quia libere sine omni varia-
tione et mutatione adveniente sibi vel alteri causae et sine 
cessatione alterius causaepotest cessare in alio instanti post 
A ab suo actu, ita quod in A instanti sit haec vera: Voluntas 
causat, et in alio instanti post A sit haec vera: Voluntas non 
causat; et sic voluntas contingenter causat in A." (pp. 35-36). 
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a cliff to take his own life. In the midst of his descent, and 
with no possibility of stopping his fall, the person retains his 
capacity to reject the volition which will produce his suicide. 91 
Physically, the man's body is determined by necessary laws of 
gravity but volitionally, the will is not necessitated to continue 
its choice even though the effect of that choice is inevitable. 
Thus, the normal sequence of volitive cause and effect is some-
times actual, always possible, but this sequence is never neces-
sary or permanent. 
Ockham often asserts a distinction between the Absolute 
and Ordinate Power of God. 92 This distinction concerns the dif-
ference between what God can do (absolutely) and what God actually 
decides to do (ordinately). Absolutely, there is no necessity 
that God produce or conserve any created effect. Due to the 
will's contingence, Ockham also speaks of the absolute power of 
the human will. "Every potency acting freely and contingently 
can cease from its acts by its own absolute power either mediately 
9lsent., III, q. 12, G; "Tum quia nullus actus est vicio-
sus nisi s"i1:Voluntarius et in potestate voluntatis, quia peccatum 
adeo est voluntarium etc. Sed actus exterior potest primo esse 
in potestate voluntatis, puta quia aliquis dimittat se in praeci-
pitium, et post descendendo potest illum actum simpliciter et 
meritorie nolle propter deum. 11 Ockham gives this same example in 
Quodl., III, q. 13. 
92The absolute/ordinate power of God will be discussed in 
Chapter Three. Cf. below, pp. 190-197. For now, we only wish to 
indicate that Ockham applies this distinction to the human will. 
The parallel is important. The absolute power of the created 
will expresses its contingent operation; likewise God's absolute 
power indicates fundamentally the contingency of divine action 
.§!.£ extra. 
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or immediately ••• but the will acts freely and contingently re-
garding every object; therefore, the will can simply stop its act 
by its absolute ·power. 1193 The absolute power of the will indi-
cates that every free movement of the will originates and contin-
ues contingently. 
Even though Ockham believes that the will's perfection 
is the loving enjoyment of God, 94 the will and its mode of opera-
tion remain contingent when face to face with the Creator. 
Ordinarily, the human will would elicit an act of love when pre-
sented with a vision of the Divine Essence. But absolutely, the 
human will could choose not to be blessed with the enjoyment of 
God. Just as Ockham claimed that "freedom of opposites" implies 
the primitive, volitive indifference to all objects; so the 
"freeqom of contraries" requires the will's native contingency 
to all acts. Even the love for God-known-clearly. 95 If the will 
93sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 399); also see Sent., II, q. 
19, E. and~ 
94sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 447); "Ad secundum dico quod 
solus Deus est summe diligendus, quia est summum bonum." Also 
see I, 446; "Ad primum principale dico quod nullum aliud objectum 
a Deo potest satiare voluntatem, quia nullus actus respectu cuius-
cumque alterius a Deo excludit omnem anxietatem et tristitiam quin 
quocumque objecto creata habito potest voluntas aliquid aliud cum 
anxietate et tristitia appetere." 
95sent., IV, q. 14, D; "Sexto potest dici quod videns 
clare Deum habens actum beatificum a Deo totaliter, creatus non 
potest Deum nolle propter repugnantiam formalem inter illos actus 
diligendi et odiendi. Si tamen actus beatificus non causaretur 
a Deo totaliter et voluntas relinqueretur totaliter naturae suae 
et libertati et fruitio beatifica suspenderetur per potentiam 
divinam, tune posset voluntas Deum nolle, sed illa non esset 
beatifica. 11 According to Ockham the clear vision (visio nuda) 
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necessarily loved its Creator when known through a proper concept, 
then the love of God would not be praiseworthy. Ockham intends 
to build his doc·trine of moral goodness upon the foundation of 
love for God; hence, he is careful to maintain the contingent arid 
imputable character of the viator's love for God. 
The will's contingency does not extend, however, beyond 
death. Ockham does not envision souls wandering between heaven 
and hell in the after-life, a la George Bernard Shaw. Rather, 
Ockham claims the permanent beatitude called "heaven" and the 
permanent misery called "hell" are supernaturally caused. 96 While 
of God and the consequent enjoyment (beatifica fruitio) engendered 
by that vision are effected supernaturally. Because God can sepa-
rate what is prior and posterior, it follows that God could cause 
the vision without the subsequent enjoyment normally associated 
with seeing God face to face. In this abnormal case, then, Ock-
ham asserts the will's natural power to cease loving God. Having 
determined the meaning of volitive contingency regarding already 
experienced volitions, Ockham simply extends this meaning to all 
possible acts. Cf. Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 398); and Sent., I, 
d. 1, q. 6 (I, 505). When "left totally to its own nature," the 
will produces and responds to its activity contingently. Ockham's 
position in this question was questioned by the papal commission 
at Avignon. See Auguste Pelzer, "Les 51 articles de Guillaume 
Occam censures~ en Avignon, en 1326, 11 Revue d'histoire ecclesias-
tique 18 (1922J, p. 254; 266-67; 268-69. Articles 6, 40 and 4b""" 
concern Ockham's doctrine of the relationship and primary causal-
ity of the vision and enjoyment of God. This seems to be the only 
point at which Ockham's doctrine of created freedom ran into 
official objections. The most strenuous censures were given to 
Ockham's "Pelagian" tendencies; these articles touch on the rela-
tionship between free will and divine grace. We will consider 
this relationship in Chapter Five. 
96sent., IV, q. 13, K (in finem); "Omnis natura libere 
mota ad volitionem aliquam potest esse misera si ejus felicitas 
non dependeat ab aliquo alio sicut a causa totali. Quid dico 
propter angelos et homines qui possunt libere velle multa in 
patria et tamen non possunt esse miseri quia eorum felicitas 
dependet a Deo sicut a causa totali. 11 Also see Sent., II, q. 19, 
F-G; and Sent., I, d. 1, q. 2 (I, 398). ~ 
th created will retains its native contingency, God will not . e 
75 
cooperate with the "blessed" to cease loving God, nor with the 
''damned" to cease hating God. Unable to reject this love without 
the general influence of God, the beatified person is necessarily 
and permanently happy. In his effort to reconcile permanent 
states of beatitude and damnation with the will's contingency, 
Ockham must appeal to the primary and total causality of God. 
ln patria, the metaphysical rather than volitive contingency of 
-
creatures is manifest. 
In summary, the freedom of contraries attributes a self-
determined and contingent connection between the soul and its 
volitive acts. These ~haracteristics--not indifference97--ex-
press Ockham's basic conception of human freedom. Except for the 
speci~l intervention of God, no external power could challenge 
the Will's sovereignty over its own acts. Analysis of motives, 
prior conditions and conditioning, and the immediate cognitive 
possibilities cannot sufficiently nor precisely explain the will's 
preference. In Ockham's ·estimate, personal autonomy and freedom 
97It is common to read that "indifference," "indetermina-
tion" or "freedom from coercion" typify man's basic freedom accord-
ing to Ockham. Thus, G. de La$arde, Ockham ... , p. 74; Anton Pegis, 
~ ~ Scholasticism 15 (1941), p. 43; and James Kevin McDonnell, 
'Religion and Ethics in the Philosophy of William of Ockham," 
t
(l.lllpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, George-
. own University, 1971), p. 85. "Freedom from" external forces and 
internal finality is part of Ockham's doctrine; bµt Ockham places 
the emphasis or basic characteristic of human freedom on the 
Will's active control over its own act. 
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;. require the irreducible element of spontaneity. 98 Rather than 
a lame excuse, the exasperating explanation "I wanted to" becomes 
the only adequate reason for my deliberate acts. Ockham's close 
analysis of "contingent" insures that no determining reason could 
be given for free volition save "I wanted to." In the end, human 
freedom is as unsearchable as personality itself. 
Ockham insists that "necessary" and "free," "natural" and 
•contingent" are formally contradictory notions--a position denied 
by many Scholastics before and after the Venerable Inceptor. The 
meaning of "freedom" and "contingency" derive from the experience 
·in which "I can cause or not-cause the same effect." Oakham has 
almost naive confidence in the libertarian meaning of this experi-
ence. Yet the awareness described is compatible with a deter-
ministic interpretation. The character resulting from native 
temperament and infantile-adolescent experiences could make con-
scious options either illusionary or trivial. Perhaps such 
criticism is "philosophical hindsight;" twentieth century experi-
ments in behavior modification and developments in psychoanalytic 
techniques make contemporary Libertarians more cautious with 
their evidence. On the other hand, hindsight brings Ockham's 
procedure into perspective. Namely, if self-determined alterna-
tives give rise to the concept of freedom, then these character-
istics must obtain whenever "free" is predicated. The situational, 
98sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, H; "Unde libertas et spontaneitas 
Videntur non posse distingui." Also see Quodl., II, q. 13. 
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intermittant awareness of operative options (velle, nolle, non-
velle) is generalized as a volitive capacity for all situations. 
-
Ockham need not re-define the resultant notions of freedom and 
contingency to describe the divine activity ad extra! 
4. The Moral Function of the Will 
~~~~ ~ ~- ~
For Ockham, the question of free will remains inextricably 
within a moralistic context. His experiential evidence, his 
logical and metaphysical analysis, serve to elucidate the will's 
freedom as moral agency. The elements of a humanistic and person-
alistic vision of human freedom are present, but not articulated. 
Radically and originally indifferent to extrinsic forces and 
attractions, the will possesses autonomy, self-determination and 
a dominant influence over the direction of one's life and behavior. 
Ockham mentions that "the rational animal is best distinguished 
by freedom which is the principle of volition. 1199 But man's 
uniqueness among the blind forces of nature introduces his moral 
responsibility. Freedom remains a Medieval preface to obligation 
rather than creativity or dignity. Ockham "secularized" the will 
only by eliminating any natural and intrinsic connection to the 
Supernatural. Human freedom still must render its account to the 
divine Legislator, find its perfect satisfaction in the Infinite 
99sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 (I, 426); "Creatura rationalis est 
perfectior--omni creatura irrationali, ergo illud accidens per 
quod distinguitur maxime a creature. irrationali erit perfectius; 
sed videtur quod creatura rationalis magis distinguitur per voli-
tionem quam per quamcumque delectationem. Assumptum patet, quia 
maxime distinguitur per libertatem quae est principium volitionis. 11 
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Good, and realize its true nobility in conformity to the Supreme 
Will. Pico's "Oration on the Dignity of Man" is still in the 
;future. 
Although the freedom of will is a meta-ethical concern, 
some moral doctrines follow immediately from Ockham's psychology. 
q,'he causal indifference and contingency which describe the free 
will also characterize every instance of "imputable" efficacy. 
With admirable but frustrating consistency, Ockham insists that 
moral value involve inevitably a radically free will. To be pre-
cise, Ockham's usual parlance that morals are "acts of will" or 
uwithin the power of will" must be understood as "contingent acts 
of will" and "within the power of will freely." This because some 
will-acts are elicited necessarily and naturally. Such acts are 
"voluntary" but neither free nor moral. With his rigorous logic, 
Ockham excludes any moral value from natural causes. Here is the 
origin of Ockham's criticism of Natural Law moralists who find 
a "proper moral goodness or evil" in external acts; here the 
source of Ockham's nebulous, if not evasive, treatment concerning 
the non-positive determinants of moral value. He cannot predicate 
11 good" or "evil" except of the free will, yet the will must 
recognize the moral course before its free volition. This problem 
is developed later. For now, we merely indicate that Ockham's 
value theory hinges upon a conception of freedom which entails 
indifferent, self-determined and contingent causality. 
The psychic conditions and limitations of volitive freedom 
· have a more extensive function within his ethic. The qualifications 
r 
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of liberty which derive from the psychological environment--
sensitive, mental or voluntary activity--directly affect certain 
moral doctrines. Passions or habits in the sense powers might 
overwhelm the will's primitive indifference; cognition precedes 
and causes every volition; previous volitive commitments could 
necessitate further will-acts. Each point has its impact. 
First, if passions override freedom, they also eliminate 
moral responsibility. There are significant conditions which 
must be met by the sensate-intellective-volitive complex called 
"man" before freedom obtains. The weight of repeated acts or the 
pleasure which accompanies certain physical acts produce a dis-
position or "promptitudo" which cancel the agent's immediate 
options. If the motive force of passions or habits elicits a 
determined effect within the will, that volition would be morally 
neutral. "Nothing is indifferent according to a habit since a 
habit is a natural cause."lOO 
Secondly, the immediate possibilities of volition follow 
from the intellect's activity. The specific acts "within the 
power of will" at any instant are a function of the contemporane-
ous cognitive acts. If the intellect (partially) causes every 
free volition, we might expect that the intellect has an essential 
part in moral activity. On the basis of Ockham's psychology, 
attempts to eliminate rationality from the fundamental character 
100 Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, C. 
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of morality should be suspect. The created will requires both 
efficient and final causality from the intellect. Cognition does 
not influence volition until the will's self-determination; but 
when the will decides, the intelle~tual act then becomes an effi-
cient cause and the known end a final cause of the resultant will-
act. Truely purposeful acts are permitted only to rational, free 
· l02 It · t . b t . t t t t 1 f beings. is poe 1c u 1ncorrec o cons rue na ura orces 
as "intending some goal;" fire burns and the intellect knows 
101Erwin Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie ..• , p. 47; and 
Osward Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit ..• , pp. 80-81, for example, 
tend to exaggerate the will's part in moral behavior to the 
exclusion of reason's partnership. Thus Iserloh says: "Verdien-
stlich ist allein das Handeln und nicht das Sein, und das Handeln 
wird moralisch gut nicht durch seine Ubereinstimmung mit der recta 
ratio, durch sein Ziel oder einen anderen Umstand, sondern allein 
durch seine Freiwilligkeit. 11 
102 Sent., II, q. 3, NN; Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308-
309); Quodl., IV, q. 1-2; and Summulae in libros Physicorum II, 
c. 6; "Praedicta de causa finali intelligenda sunt de agente a 
proposito et sponte, de quibus manifestum est quod agunt propter 
finem et quod est aliqua causa finalis eorum. De aliis autem 
quae non agunt per cognitionem et voluntatem, magis dubium est ... " 
Ockham's definition of "final cause" is "esse amatum et desideratum 
efficaciter ab agente propter quod amatum fit effectus. 11 Quodl., 
IV, q. 1. Ockham's notion of finality is studied unsympathetical-
ly by Harry R. Kloeker, S.J., "Ockham and Finality" The Modern 
Schoolman 43 (1966), pp. 233-247. We cannot agree with his analy-
sis that "final causality can be reduced to efficient causality." 
(p. 236) Rather, Ockham holds that the will freely establishes 
which final causes operate within volition. The same efficient 
cause, i.e., the will, produces specifically different acts 
~ccording to different final causes. Ockham's point, therefore, 
is not that finality reduces to efficiency but that final causes 
require (volitive) effects. In what viable sense could final 
causes be said to "move" the agent to action, if the agent does 
not act? Surely, Ockham does not eliminate final causes from 
Philosophical explanation. On the other hand, Anita Garvens indi-
cates the problems in determining natural moral norms which follow 
Ockham's denial of a teleological connection between non-rational 
natures. Franziskanische Studien, 21, pp. 249-262. 
r 
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because such is their nature. 103 It is cogent to ask "how" 
natural causes behave but not "why" because motive and purpose 
indicate a conscious and free agency. While denying that intrin-
sic finality which attributes intelligence as well as intelligi-
bility to Nature, Ockham insists upon final causality as concom-
itant with Will. Restricted to the agency of free will, final 
causes accept a central and critical role in morality. Clearly, 
Ockham's conception of final cause ("to be loved and desired 
efficiently by the agent and for the sake of which the loved 
thing is an effect") closes certain avenues of ethical knowledge 
open to "realistic" or "Aristotelian" metaphysicians. The end 
embodied in the nature of certain acts allow, for example, St. 
Thomas and Duns Scotus to judge the suitability and moral propri-
ety of those actions. In Ockham's system, the final cause and 
intention established by the free will replaces the natural 
finality of acts as standards of ethical value. 
Thirdly ••. finally, the 'internal logic' of the will 
directs Ockham to concentrate on the order between volitive ends 
and means. To achieve given purposes, an agent must accept com-
patible means. Often the means selected are pre-determined and 
automatic because the intellect (rightly or wrongly) considers 
. l03Quodl., II, q. 2; 11 Sed causa mere naturalis quae ex 
sui natura determinat sibi certum effectum et non aliud non 
requirit praecognoscentem nee ductorem; saltem ratio naturalis 
non concludit quod requirat. Verbi gratia: Ignis approximatus 
' ligno calefacit eum sive hoc intendatur a cognoscente sive non. 
Et si quaeras, quare tune plus calefacit quam frigefacit? Dico 
quod natura sua talis est." 
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" them indispensable to the will's anticipated goal. Ockham does 
not hesitate to articulate the implication--the ethical importance 
of "entailed" volitions is negligible. 104 Actions elicited be-
cause they are necessary to achieve more ultimate goals are nec-
essary, natural and non-moral actions. Ockham reserves intrinsic 
moral status to volition-of-ends; the means chosen often have a 
derived or extrinsic value. Given correct knowledge and volition 
regarding God, the rest of human activity falls into "ethical" 
line. 105 In this light, Ockham's central motive as a moralist 
is to articulate the ultimate end and greatest good which gives 
the volitive structure of the moral life. This is the moral 
program encapsulated in the first distinction of his Commentary 
on the Sentences. Ockham's inspiration and guide in this enter-
prise will be St. Augustine. 
The freedom of the will is a meta-ethical concern. Never-
theless, upon this psychological basis Ockham constructs his theory 
of morality. Certain turns taken by Ockham's ethic derive 
104sent., III, q. 4, O; 11 ••• voluntas non est libera 
respectu secundi actus stante primo actu cum apprehensione prae-
dicta; quia impossibile est quod ego uno actu diligam Deum et 
omne quid vult Deus diligi a me in generali et quod sciam quod 
Deus vult Johannem diligi a me, nisi diligam Johannem in speciali 
..• licet in primo actu voluntatis consistat meritum quia est in 
potestate voluntatis, non tamen in actu secundo qui non est in 
potestate voluntatis. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 499). 
l05Sent., III, q. 12, II; 11 ••• rectitudo circa finem ulti-
mum repugnat omni difformitati circa ea quae sunt ad finem ••• 11 
Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 390-391). Michele Fiasconaro 
gives a thorough analysis of the relationship between Ockham's 
psychology and ethics as contained in Distinction One. La 
Dottrina Morale di Guglielmo di Ockham (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Department of Philosophy, University del S. Cuore, 1958), 
Chapter Three. 
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properly from his conception of the conditions, limits and nature 
of human freedom--the executive agency of moral activity. But 
I 
free acts remain just that--free acts. The transformation of 
contingent volitions into good or evil acts requires the prin-
ciple of Right Reason. 
r 
CHAPTER II 
RIGHT REASON, THE PROXIMATE NORM OF REALITY 
The translation and dissemination of the complete 
Nicomachean Ethics during the early thirteenth century made the 
notion of "recta ratio" a common topic in Scholastic moral sys-
terns. On the authority of Aristotle, most Schoolmen argued that 
right reasoning must precede praiseworthy action. 1 A working 
definition of "right reason" would be: the correct understanding 
of suitable behavior based on man's rational nature and his total 
111What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit 
and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a 
state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliber-
ate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the 
desire right, if the choice is to be good." Nie. Ethics, VI, 2 
(trans. W. D. Ross; 1139a 21-25). The different perspectives 
from which Aristotle considered "brthos 16gos" may explain the 
diverse meanings which the Schoolmen attribute to recta ratio. 
For the Philosopher, right reason is a component of virtue's 
definition (II, 6, ll06b 35 - llo7a 3); it determines the mean 
between excess and defect (VI, 1 1138b 17-20); it is identified 
with Practical Wisdom or Prudence (VI, 13, 1144b 20-29); it is 
called a virtue (VI, 5, 1140b 20-25). H. H. Joachim finds a 
fundamental dualism in Aristotle's explanation. "The 1 l>rthos 
logos,' therefore, is the right rule of conduct in the twofold 
sense that (a) it is that which limits the amount of 'patha' so 
as to make the action good, and (b) it is the principle of the 
limitation formulated in and as the scientific knowledge of the 
'phr6nimos'." The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary, (ed. D. A. 
Rees; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 167. It is appro-
priate, therefore, to speak of right reason as knowledge qua 
(the regulative function of practical knowledge) and knowledge 
~uae (the content of practical knowledge). Ockham emphasizes 
the former sense. 
84 
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. t 2 environmen • But the notion is curiously difficult to verify 
by explicit definitions. Right reason seems to have a loose 
meaning: its manifestations include synderesis (knowledge of 
general norms), prudentia (knowledge of particular norms), and 
conscientia (knowledge of personal duties); its process merges 
with the practical syllogism; its content often coincides with 
eternal or natural law. The scholastics usually reserved analy-
sis for specific facets of right reasoning. Hence, elucive 
variations in the meaning of "recta ratio" go unobserved although 
they produce fundamental changes in the history of moral theory. 
Usually sensitive to problems of terminology, Ockham also 
neglects to define his understanding of Aristotle's phrase. His 
doctrine must be constructed from bits and pieces. The picture 
2Professor Vernon J. Bourke describes the general notion 
of right reason as; "simply another name for a correct or justi-
fiable understanding of the natural order. Universalized, right 
reason is expressed in general rules; applied to particular 
actions right reason is a personal decision as to the suitability 
or unsuitability of this individual action in its present condi-
tions." History of Ethics, I, 132. Robert Hoopes devotes half 
of his published study of the Renaissance understanding of right 
reason to the Greek and Medieval precedents. His general defini-
tion is: "Reason thus simultaneously disposed, so that it presides 
with equal validity and certainty over the realms of intellect 
and morality." Right Reason in the En~lish Renaissance (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1962 , p. 4. These authors 
point out that the phrase "right reason" was in general use from 
the mid-thirteenth century into the eighteenth century. Their 
definitions are more or less acceptable, as is our description, 
depending on whose thought is under consideration. When Profes-
sor Bourke contrasts the Thomistic and Scotistic theories of 
right reason (pp. 145 and 152-53), he adduces texts regarding the 
relational sets constituting moral goodness rather than explicit 
definitions. This comment does not intend criticism of the 
excellent research of Professor Bourke; it intends to indicate 
the indefinite, undefined status of this phrase which permits 
its inclusion within diverse ethical systems. 
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which emerges is considerably different than that found by, for 
example, commentators of St. Thomas or Duns Scotus. We will 
argue that the.inconsistency alleged between the individual's 
right reason and the moral prerogatives of God3 results partially 
from an inaccurate view of Ockham's unique doctrine of recta 
ratio. His peculiar understanding of a common scholastic posi-
tion supports a novel turn in the history of Medieval ethics. 
This chapter examines the structure and nature of "right 
reason" as the immediate, subjective norm of morality. Part One 
locates Ockham's doctrine within the context of the Practical 
Intellect and its divisions. Part Two takes up the analysis of 
why "right reason" is the proximate standard of moral behavior. 
The many facets of Ockham's doctrine reflect his essential 
3see Anita Garvens, Franziskanische Studien, 21, p. 374; 
"Hinsichtlich der v5lligen Kontingenz des Sittengesetzes, wie 
Ockham es in bezug auf Inhalt und Allgemeingultigkeit fasst, 
staunt man deshalb nicht wenig, dass bei ihm trotzdem eine sub-
jektive das sittliche Handeln des Menschen bindende Norm sich 
findet: die recta ratio ••• " Quoting Garvens approvingly, Father 
Elzearius Bonke, O.F.M., mentions God's power to command theft 
and adultery and concludes "In doctrina igitur Venerabilis In-
ceptoris ita considerata nihil remanet de relatione inter volun-
tatem et intellectum, immo videtur in flagranti contradictione 
cum illis quae prius dixerat de recta ratione ut norma volunta-
tis •.• 11 Collectanea Franciscana, 14, p. 67. Georges de Lagarde 
also cites the work of Garvens and concurs; "La somme des im-
peratifs de la droite raison s'impose a priori, sans qu'il y ait 
besoin de les rapporter a la nature ou-a la volonte ~ternelle 
de Dieu. 11 Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 67. The general criticism, 
then, seems to hold-=fhat Ockham's doctrine of right reason is 
inconsistent with the absolute power of God and that this doc-
trine is not justified rationally within his system. These 
criticisms might be warranted if Ockham meant by "right reason" 
exactly what, say, St. Thomas meant. 
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assertion that no one sins unknowingly; or conversely, that no 
one acts virtuously by accident. 4 
Part I: The Description of Right Reason 
A. Practical Reason 
We begin with Ockham's notion of the Practical Intellect. 
The myriad of issues which surround contemporary discussions of 
"ought" and "is" were attached to Medieval analyses of the 
"practical" and "speculative" intellects. In Ockham's mind, man 
possesses one, unitary intellect capable of formulating practical 
and speculative propositions. Practical Reason indicates the 
human intellect constructing and retaining practical statements. 
By way of preliminary definition, "practical" propositions 
signify some "practice" or human operation. Speculative propo-
sitions'signify matters which are beyond the scope of human 
powers to alter or cause. The precise character of these dif-
ferent propositions is established by Ockham in order to describe 
the nature of Practical Reason. 
Ockham holds that practical and speculative statements 
can be distinguished 1) inherently, 2) according to the formative 
causes, and 3) according to the objects of these statements. 5 
4
sent., III, q. 11, Z; "Sciendum est quod recta ratio 
requiritur ad perfectam virtutem et actualis; et ideo ebriosus 
et furiosus et pueri qui non habent usus rationis non peccant 
coram Deo; quia nullus ignora.nter peccat secundum Augustinum." 
Also see Sent., III, q. 12, GG; and Quodl., II, q. 6. 
5sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 310); "Ex his respondeo ad 
quaestionem quod istae scientiae seipsis distinguuntur intrinsece 
et forma1iter, sed per fines vel per finem distinguunter 
r 
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Regarding the first, Ockham is clear that all knowledge is the 
result of a unitary cognitive power and consists of simple, 
accidental forms which inhere in a substance, i.e., the sou1. 6 
As such, every proposition known is distinct from every other 
proposition. In this sense, speculative propositions are dis-
tinct from each other as well as distinct from practical proposi-
tions. Regarding the second distinction, different types of 
knowledge can be distinguished on the basis of different causes. 
The end or purpose for which a person forms a mental proposition 
has the character of a final cause. 7 Because the end is 
causaliter, sicut causaliter distinguunter per causam efficientem. 
Sed per subjecta scientiae nullo praedictorum modorum distinguun-
tur necessario quia, nee formaliter et intrinsece, nee causaliter 
necessario, nee tanquam per aliqua sibi propria. Sed isto ulti-
mo modo distinguuntur per objecta. Hoc est, per conclusiones 
sci tas." See also R. Guelluy, Philosoz.hie et Theologie chez 
Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris: J. Vrin, 19 7), pp. 300-306. 
6sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 311); "Primum patet quia 
istae scientiae sunt formae simplices, sicut alias declarabitur 
de omnibus accidentibus; sed formae simplices non possunt dis-
tingui intrinsece et formaliter nisi seipsis; ergo etc." 
7Idem.; 11 Secundum patet, quia ab eodem causaliter habet 
res esse et esse distinctum a quocumque alio; igitur cum quae-
libet scientia, sicut quaelibet alia res, habeat esse suum a 
causa finali sua, sequitur quod ab ea habet esse distinctum. Et 
ideo dico quod posito quod scientia speculativa et practica 
habeant eandem causam finalem, per illam distinguuntur causali-
ter, quia illa in illo genere causandi est causa distinctionis 
earum. Et isto modo omnes res creatae distinguuntur per Deum, 
quia est cause distinctionis omnium. Et si dicatur quod nulla 
distinguuntur per illud in quo conveniunt. Respondeo, quod 
verum est: tanquam per sibi propria •. Tamen causaliter, quando 
causa est illimitata vel simpliciter vel secundum quid, non est 
inconveniens quin per illud distinguantur in quo conveniunt, illo 
modo quo conveniunt in illo. Verumtamen, sciendum quod accipien-
do finem per illo qui secundum rectam rationem deberet esse 
finis, modo exposito, sic distinguuntur per fines tanquam per 
aliqua propria, quia alius est finis unius et alterius. 11 Also 
r 
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&i r partially responsible for the reality of knowledge, it is also 
t 
!.· partially responsible for the distinct reality of the proposition. 
However, Ockham cautions that the same end can be the final 
cause of specifically distinct types of knowledge. For example, 
out of self-love, a person might acquire both speculative and 
practical knowledge. 8 The speculative and the practical proposi-
tions of the intellect are distinguished by their final causes 
only when the "finis scientiae" is understood as what ought to 
• be done by the knower. Ockham will accept the "common saying" 
that the final cause which is characteristic of practical 
see Summulae in Libros Physicorum, II, c. 5 (Rome, 1637). 
8sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 304-305). Ockham develops 
his doctrine on the distinction of practical and speculative 
propositions in terms of final causes in contrast to the doctrine 
of Henry of Ghent. Henry's position is summarized accurately by 
Ockham and then criticized. Henry taught that the end of know-
ledge and the end of the knower were different; the former is 
"that to which knowledge is ordered," and the latter is "that 
to which the knower orders knowledge." Furthermore, Henry main-
tained a distinction between the ends of knowledge; namely, an 
accidental end and a principal end. The principal or per ~ end 
of knowledge is "that to which knowledge is ordered by its 
nature;" the principal ends of action and truth distinguish 
properly the practical and speculative types of knowledge, re-
spectively. See Henry of Ghent, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum, 
art. 36, q. 4 (reprint of 1520 edition; edited by Eligius M. 
Buytaert, O.F.M.; St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute 
Publications, 1953). Ockham criticizes this doctrine by indi-
cating that the reason for which a person acquires knowledge is 
the final cause of both the knower and the knowledge he acquires. 
Thus, Henry is wrong to claim that the end of knowledge and the 
knower is distinct. For exactly the same motive; i.e., personal 
gain, a person could acquire both practical and speculative 
knowledge. Only when the end apprehended by the knower is some-
thing which should be done does Ockham speak of a final cause 
which is proper and distinctive to practical knowledge as op-
posed to speculative propositions. 
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propositions is a deed, whereas the final cause of speculative 
knowledge is the truth; but he understands by "deed" an obliga-
tory act. Regarding the third, the "object" of knowledge can 
distinguish speculative from practical propositions. 9 The object 
of speculative knowledge; i.e., the speculative proposition it-
self, does not indicate anything which can be done by the knower. 
The object of practical knowledge, however, is a proposition 
which signifies something which can be accomplished by the 
9sent., Prologus, q. 11 (I, 315); "Ideo dico quod cum 
notitia practica sit directiva alicuius praxis, oportet quod 
semper notitia practica habeat praxim vel significans praxim 
vel aliquid operabile a nobis pro objecto saltem partiali. Et 
cum notitia practica sit respectu alicuius complexi, oportet 
quod illa notitia sit magis directiva operis quam notitia incom-
plexa cuiuscumque termini illius complexi. Et quando sic est, 
tune est notitia practica, aliter non." 
Previously, Ockham considered the "object" of knowledge 
as tbe "conclusion known." Now he speaks of the object as what 
is signified by a proposition. It is necessary to refer to the 
Expositio Super viii Libros Physicorum, which is one of Ockham's 
latest philosophical efforts, to clarify the "subjectum et 
objectum scientiae. 11 The subject of knowledge can be considered 
in three ways; as the intellect in which knowledge inheres, as 
the thing about which something is known, and as the subject-term 
of the proposition. The object of knowledge is the whole proposi-
tion which is known. See Philosophical Writings: William of 
Ockham, ed. by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (London: Thomas Nelson 
and Sons, Ltd., 1957), p. 9. The texts of the Ordinatio and the 
Expositi2 consider the "object" of knowledge in a three-fold way; 
as a conclusion known, as the significance of a proposition and 
as a proposition which is known. These three meanings of the 
"objectum scientiae" can be harmonized by considering the object 
of practical knowledge as "a proposition which indicates human 
operation." Father Armand Maurer, C.S.B. has published a valuable 
study of the "object of science" in "Ockham's Conception of the 
Unity of Science," Medieval Studies 20 (1958), pp. 98-100. "Let 
us observe Ockham's distinction between the subject and object 
of a science. This distinction became classic among the later 
scholastics and was adopted even by some Thomists. According to 
Ockham, the object of a science is the whole proposition which 
is known; the subject is only a part of the ~reposition namely 
the term functioning as its subject." (p. 99). 
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}cnower. In the end, therefore, Ockham proposes that the only 
distinctive characteristic of practical propositions is reference 
to human operations. 
The nature of the object of practical knowledge is ex-
plained by Ockham through analysis of the term "praxis." This 
term is transliterated from the Greek and stands for "an opera-
tion existing within the power of the will. 1110 "Praxis" indi-
cates any deed which can be effected immediately or mediately 
by the will. All practical propositions imply or signify praxis, 
i.e., a state of affairs subject to the contingent power of 
volition. Two items are clarified here. First, statements 
which include concepts or terms standing for human operations 
~ are not thereby practical. The praxis involved in practical 
~ 
propositions is an operation producible or changeable by the 
will. For example, "rational animals are capable of thought" 
signifies a state of affairs which is not within the power of the 
will. Hence, this proposition is not practical. Secondly, spec-
ulation or the formation of speculative propositions is a human 
operation which can be initiated and controlled by the will. For 
example, the proposition "God is triune" can be thought and its 
thinking is subject to the will, i.e., an instance of praxis. 
10sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, G; "Ad cuius intellectum scien-
dum est quod differentia est inter actum practicum et praxim. 
Nam praxis est operatic existens in potestate voluntatis, quia 
omnis talis actus potest elici virtuose et viciose, loquendo de 
actu voluntatis nostrae de quo est modo sermo. Sed actus practi-
cus est ille qui habet pro objecto saltem partiali praxim, vel 
aliqu.id operabile contingenter a voluntate. 11 Also see Sent.r 
Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292). 
r 
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Although speculative propositions do not signify operative 
potential, speculation itself can be effected by the will power. 
Thus, speculation is praxis, but the statements of the specula-
tive intellect are never practical. 11 In Ockham's terminology; 
"praxis" indicates an extra-conceptual action which the will can 
accomplish in fact; "practical" is a linguistic category whose 
member propositions all include a praxis-term; "speculative" is 
a linguistic category whose member propositions never include 
a praxis-term. 
The function of a proposition is perhaps the most serv-
iceable way to distinguish between Ockham's understanding of the 
speculative and the practical. A proposition can be a reason 
for true knowledge or a reason to do something. When a proposi-
tion is a reason to consider the truth, the proposition has a 
speculative function •. When a sentence is a reason to act, that 
knowledge is practical. 12 The particular function served by a 
sentence is reflected in the signification of that proposition. 
The speculative use of reason is apparent when the object of 
knowledge--what is signified--cannot be altered or caused by 
human powers. The practical function of the intellect, however, 
11sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 296); "Et ideo pura specu-
latio et similiter dilectio, quia sunt operabiles a nobis, quam-
vis non habeant talia pro objectis; vere sunt praxes et de ipsis, 
vere erit notitia practica. 11 
12sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308); 11 A1ius est finis 
scientiae qui secundum rectam rationem deberet intendi ab agente 
quad libere agit. Et isto modo finis scientiae practicae est 
opus vel operari, et finis speculativae est considerare." Cf., 
Aristotle, ~etaphysics, II, 1, 993b 20. 
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is indicated by objects (propositions) which signify human ac-
tions. The speculative and practical use of reason, therefore, 
involves different uses of knowledge and concomitantly, different 
meanings. 
Two minor points must be made concerning the distinction 
of speculative and practical propositions. First, Ockham claims 
that the subject-term of a proposition is not a reliable indi-
cator of the difference between speculative and practical intel-
lect.13 The same thing can have properties which cannot be 
controlled by a human agent and other attributes which are. 
Thus, the subject-term of a proposition can receive predicates 
which do not signify praxis and others which do. Secondly, Ock-
ham claims that speculative and practical propositions can be 
distinguished by the conclusions which can be deduced from them~4 
From the general principles of practical reason, other particular 
13sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 313); "Nee distinguantur 
per subjecta tanquam per aliqua sibi propria patet, quia idem 
simpliciter potest esse subjectum notitiae speculativae et 
notitiae practicae. Nam de omni subjecto quod habet aliquas 
passiones quae sunt in potestate nostra et aliquas quae non sunt 
in potestate nostra, potest esse notitia speculativa qua sciuntur 
illae passiones quae non sunt in potestate nostra de illo sub-
jecto, et etiam notitia practica qua sciuntur aliae passiones 
quae sunt in potestate nostra de illo eodem subjecto. 11 
14Ibid., (I, 315); "Quartum, scilicet quod istae notitiae 
distinguuntur per conclusiones scitas tanquam per propria sibi, 
ita scilicet quod necessario est alia conclusio scita notitia 
practica et alia scita notitia speculativa, patet; quia in illa 
conclusione quae scitur notitia speculativa, nihil ponitur oper-
abile a nobis, nee aliquid importans operabile a nobis, cum 
notitia speculativa non sit de operibus nostris. 11 
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propositions can be validly deduced. It would be impossible to 
deduce validly a practical conclusion from two speculative 
premises. Of course, to distinguish the speculative from the 
practical on the basis of distinct conclusions is a derivative 
method. That is, this method depends upon a prior difference 
between the speculative and the practical propositions which are 
the major premises of the syllogism. But Ockham's point is not 
irrelevant. Ockham means to affirm that a valid conclusion can-
not contain an element which is not virtually contained in the 
premises. The conclusion of a practical syllogism implies that 
something can be done or ought to be done; thus, a practical 
proposition could not be deduced validly from statements which 
do not imply that something can or ought to be done. 
There is only one intellect in a man which is capable of 
knowing speculatively and practically. Still, the speculative 
use of reason is nominally different from the practical function. 
The nominal definition of the speculative intellect is "the 
intellect able to consider those things which are not in our 
power." The definition of the practical intellect is "the intel-
lect able to consider or to have knowledge of those things which 
are in our power. 1115 
15sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292); "Et ita est intelli-
gendurn dictum auctorum quando distinguunt inter intellectum 
speculativum et practicum, quia habent distinctas diffinitiones 
exprimentes quid nominis eorum. Unde si definiatur intellectus 
speculativus, hoc est, iste terminum 'intellectus speculativus,' 
debet sic dici: 'Intellectus speculativus est intellectus potens 
considerare illa quae non sunt in potestate nostra.' Intellectus 
practicus sic: 'Intellectus practicus est intellectus potens 
considerare vel habere scientiam illorum quae sunt in potestate 
nostra. 11 
r 
Having distinguished the practical use of reason from 
the speculative on the basis of an object (proposition) which 
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. signifies something "do-able," Ockham further differentiates 
practical propositions as "directive" and "ostensive. 11 Some 
practical propositions express what ought to be done; that is, 
some propositions imply an obligation to accomplish some deed. 
A proposition whose object should be effected is categorized by 
Ockham as directive, practical knowledge. Other practical propo-
sitions show how a deed should be done without directing that it 
16 be done. Ockham mentions the propositions which form the 
science of logic, grammar, rhetoric and the mechanical arts as 
ostensive, practical knowledge because they show how certain 
operations should be done. For example, the statement "This 
house should be built," is directively practical, while the 
assertion that "This house should be built with brick walls" 
is ostensively practical. Both directive and ostensive 
16
sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316); "potest tamen distin-
gui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa et quaedam tantum 
ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate dictatur aliquid esse 
faciendum vel non faciendum; et sic loquitur Philosophus, vi 
Ethicorum et iii De Anima. Et isto modo nee logica nee grammati-
ca nee rhetorica est practica, nee etiam ars quaecunque mechanica, 
quia nulla istarum dictat aliquid esse faciendum vel fugiendum, 
sicut ars mechanica non dictat quod domus est facienda, sed hoc 
pertinet ad prudentiam qua scitur quando est facienda et quando 
non, et quando est operandum et quando non. Secunda notitia 
practica est tantum ostensiva, quia non dictat aliquid fugiendum 
aut persequendum, sed tantum ostendit opus quomodo fieri potest, 
virtute cuius notitiae, si intellectus dictet illud est faciendum 
et voluntas vellit, statim potest recte operari." Also see, 
~., III, q. 11, U. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 
c. 1 (1138b 18-29); De Anima, III, c. 9 (432b 26-29). 
statements comprise prescriptive language; but Ockham's moral 
doctrine involves properly only the former. 
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It should be understood that Ockham does not explicitly 
differentiate practical and speculative proposition on the basis 
of the verbs "ought" and "is." Rather, Ockham distinguishes 
between a state of affairs within the will's competence and other 
affairs which are not. Ockham does not specifically say that 
practical propositions are assertions of obligation or value 
while speculative propositions are statements of fact. This 
-
terminology is characteristic of more contemporary discussions 
of moral philosophy. Nevertheless, the "ought-is" difference is 
clearly implied by Ockham's analysis of practical, "directive" 
propositions. Some practical propositions are "directives," 
which "dictate that something is to be chosen. 1117 An analysis 
of the structure of a directive practical proposition reveals 
three distinctive features. A directive proposition 1) signifies 
a deed within the power of the human will, 2) has a final cause 
which is that possible deed and 3) directs that this future deed 
be done. 
17summulae in libros Physicorum, I, c. 4; "Duplex est 
notitia practica: una dictativa quae scilicet aliquid esse 
eligendum dictat vel dimittendum, et sic prudentia et moralis 
philosophia est practica. Alia est notitia practica tantum 
ostensiva quae scilicet docet qualiter res potest fieri vel de-
beat fieri, si aliquis vellet earn facere. Non tamen dictat earn 
esse faciendum vel fiendum et sic artes moechanicae sunt prac-
ticae. 11 Notice that Ockham uses "debeat" to formulate an osten-
sive proposition. He does not seem aware of special problems 
or pre-eminence belonging to "ought" statements within moral 
doctrine. 
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In summary, practical reason concerns what .£§;!! be through 
the human will; the speculative reason involves what is. In 
Latin, the linguistic peculiarity of practical propositions can 
be expressed adequately by gerundives or future passive partici-
ples which express actions "to be done." But whether prescrip-
tive language incorporates gerundive constructions or the verb 
"ought," its distinctive feature is the signification of behav-
ioral ends. Action "to be done" has the character of an end. 
11 The practical intellect pertains to practical principles and 
also practical conclusions, and thus, the practical intellect 
concerns the end. 1118 Practical propositions originate evidently 
from the consideration of the human will's capacities. Ockham 
finds empirical justification for expressing what .£§;!! be, as well 
as for what is. Men know the definite possibilities open to 
their volitional acts as they know determinate facts. Ockham 
does not derive "ought" from "is", but he bases the demonstrative 
and evident character of moral science on the validity of 
deriving "can" from "is." Knowing what the will-power is, and 
knowing what a given extra-mental thing is, a person knows what 
.£§;!!be done voluntarily. Ockham never doubts the empirical 
18sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); "Circa primum dico 
quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum 
et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectus 
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine 
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est 
intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat 
aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium 
practicum in operando." Ockham claims that "whatever can be 
dictated by Right Reason can fall under the will's competence." 
Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 (I, 504). 
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warrant and verification for practical statements such as "Health 
is to be sought" or "The house is to be built." This is hardly 
the procedure of a strict empiricist since these gerundive con-
structions signify future, un-realized actions. The descriptive 
feature common to all directive and ostensive propositions is 
the indication of "praxis," future ends available to the will's 
free orientation. The verbal structures of description--gerun-
di ves or the verb "ought"--lend themselves to prescription. That 
is, the normative feature of practical propositions derives from 
what is implied by assent to particular, volitional ends. If 
the agent thinks "Health is to be sought" or "The house is to 
be built," then his assent or "yes-saying" establishes a norm of 
behavior. Consistency requires the appropriate action if one 
agrees that something is to be done. Because of the meaning of 
practical propositions, their affirmation entails or implies a 
behavioral response. Ockham's argument with Henry of Ghent 
(d. 1293) regarding the "end of practical knowledge" clarifies 
the Venerable Inceptor's position that linguistic structure alone 
cannot explain the imperative function of normative language. 
Academic moralists construe and analyze the logic of practical 
propositions with the same detachment with which physicists 
consider the law of gravity. We speculate about moral laws for 
reasons other than knowing what to do. Ockham claims that the 
significati.ve peculiarity of practical language does not explain 
fully the moral function of such talk. An obligatory final 
cause or "required" end of behavior follows from the meaning 
of practical propositions and the assent of Right Reason. 19 
The notion of Practical Reason is more inclusive than 
that of Right Reason. Practical Reason denotes the natural 
apprehension and formation of practical propositions and the 
habitual possession of such propositions. However, there are 
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many propositions in the practical intellect which do not have 
an immediate moral function. For example, the ostensive proposi-
tion that "This house can be built with brick and mortar" might 
be necessary to build this house correctly. But this ostensive 
proposition does not dictate that this house be built. Further-
more, the practical intellect apprehends directives which may· 
not be considered true. For example, the propositions "men 
should not eat meat" or "men should not cut their beards" may be 
apprehended but not considered as true moral norms. "Right 
Reason" on the other hand, involves only those propositions of 
l9Sent., I, d.·35, q. 6, I; "Secundum rectam rationem, 
acquirens scientiam practicam debet intendere opus tanquam finem 
et tanquam objectum illius scientiae." Sent., Prologue, q. 11 
(I, 308); 11 ••• potest distingui de fine scientiae: Unus, qui 
simpliciter potest esse causa finalis proprie dicta propter quern 
ipsa scientia adquritur et qui movet agens ad agendum. Alius 
est finis scientiae qui secundum rectam rationem deberet intendi 
ab agente quod libere agit. Et isto modo finis scientiae 
practicae est opus vel operari, et finis speculativae est con-
siderare ..• 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 291). Ock-
ham's doctrine of practical reason \normative language) paral-
lels the contemporery treatment of "assent to commands" by R. M. 
Haret The Languag~ of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1964), Ockham would say with Professor Hare "the essential dif-
ference between statements and commands ... lies in what is in-
volved in assenting to them." (p. 19). For Ockham, "assenting 
to them" is the function of right reason. 
r ,, 
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the practical intellect which are judged to be true directives. 
"According to Right Reason, one acquiring practical knowledge 
ought to intend the deed just as an end or just as the object of 
that knowledge. 1120 
B~ Right Reason 
Ockham, no less than his Scholastic predecessors, in-
sisted that morally right action was consequent to a right or 
true reason for acting. A proportion was established between 
goodness in the will and truth in the intellect, based upon the 
texts of Aristotle. 21 Thus, Ockham's doctr.ine of "Right Reason" 
concerns the true, intellectual directives which are necessary 
to correctly regulate the will. 
Right Reason is discussed by Ockham in two ways; as a 
possession and as a function of the Practical Intellect. His 
statements about "recta ratio" become hopelessly confused if. 
these two meanings are not distinguished. Indeed, the inconsist-
ency which commentators -find between the divine authority to 
posit moral obligations and Right Reason as a necessary and 
indispensable cause of moral goodness, betrays a lack of sensi-
tivity for the two facets of Ockham's doctrine. 
20 Sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, I. 
21Nic. Ethics, VI, c. 2 (1139a 21-26); "What affirmation 
and negati~are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; 
so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with 
choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the 
reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to 
be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts." 
(trans. W. D. Ross) See St. Thomas' use of this text in Summ. 
Theol. Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5. 
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As a possession or content of the practical intellect, 
right reason indicates every directive proposition which a person 
knows to be true. These "right reasons" may be known naturally 
or by revelation. 22 Experiential, conceptual or revealed data 
all provide and verify moral directives. But Ockham will not 
admit that contrary moral rules can be simultaneously true ac-
cording to diverse types of evidence. Apparent conflicts between 
laws known naturally and divine laws are decided in favor of the 
revealed and believed mandates. 23 One meaning of "recta ratio," 
therefore, signifies the apprehension of a complex or proposi-
tional statement which asserts that, in truth, some act should 
be performed or avoided. 
22sent., III, 13, K; 11 ... ponatur aliquis habens istam 
rationem universalem rectam 'omni indigenti in extrema necessi-
tate est benefacienum ne pereat' quae est evidens ex notitia 
terminorum •.• 11 Quodl., III, q. 16; "Reeta ratio deberet dictare 
quod 'volendum est abstinere propter Deum' quia sic est dictatum 
a recta ratione aliter non esset recta sed erronea. 11 Opus Nona-
ginta Dierum, c. 65 (Manchester ed.; II, 574); "Jus autem poli 
vocatur aequitas naturalis, quae absque omni ordinatione humana 
et etiam divina pure positiva est consona rationi rectae, sive 
sit consona rationi rectae pure naturali, sive sit consona 
rationi rectae acceptae ex illis, quae sunt nobis divinitus 
revealata. 11 
23sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 293); 11 •.• nulla ratio recta 
potest dictare quod 'inimicus est odiendus' contra divinum prae-
ceptum.11 Also see Sent., III, q. 13, M. This brief quotation 
may leave the impression of an antagonism between faith and 
natural reason; its meaning may be interpreted as a Scholastic 
precedent for the Lutheran "so la fj_des." But Ockham means to 
indicate the harmony of scripture and reason as he indicates 
elsewhere. 11 •.. prima regula et infallibilis in huiusmodi est 
scriptura sacra et ratio recta. 11 An Princeps pro~ succursu 
...:....:_:.., c. 6 (Manchester ed.: I, 254). 
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This descriptive or literal meaning of right reason in-
sures an objective basis for morality. A "right reason" is 
simply a true norm of behavior. However, coupled with strong 
convictions about the primacy and contingency of the divine man-
dates, this conception of right reason opens to a system of 
theological positivism. When the absolute standard of morality 
is conceived as the unlimited and changeable Will, then the human 
formulation of the moral order, i.e., right reason, has an 
objective but flexible basis. The infinite freedom of God gives 
the scope of flexibility. Hence, Ockham and others of the so-
called "Nominalist" school will speculate on the extreme possi-
bility of God's moral authority--the possibility of a divine 
command and thereby a right reason to hate God. 24 Ockhamists 
24 Cf. Ockham, Sent., IV, q. 14, D; and Quodl., III, q. 
13. Robert Holcot, Deterillinationes guarundam aliarum quaestionum, 
q. 1, art. 2, ZZ (Lyons, 1497). Gregory of Rimini, Super primum 
et secundum sententiarlUn, I, d. 42-44, q. 1, art. 2, F-H (Venice, 
1522), and Gabriel Biel, Epi thorna pari ter et collectorium circa 
tuattuor sententiarum libros, I, d. 42, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 2 
Tubingen, 1501). The various branches of the so-called "Nomin-
alist school" which have been indicated by Professor Oberman, 
"Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," The Harvard Theologi-
cal Review 53 (1960), pp. 51-56, should be kept in mind. Ockham, 
Holcot, Rimini and Biel all raise the question of a commanded 
odium Dei; their responses to the question show considerable 
diversity. Ockham and Holcot seem to grant the possibility of 
a meaningful, divine command to hate God. Rimini and Biel, how-
ever, admit only the metaphysical possibility of a command to 
hate God since God is co-efficient with created agents who might 
issue this command. But they deny that God could issue this 
command as total cause without contradicting his Goodness. Cf. 
Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Publishing Co. , 1967), pp. 90-96. We take up this question sys·-
tematically in Chapter Four. For now, we want to indicate only 
that conformity to the will of God was critical to Ockham's ethi-
cal insight. His treatment of the commanded odium Dei means to 
emphasize, not the possibility of drastic and perplexing changes 
r 
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do not necessarily stabilize morality by associating "right 
reason" with God's eternal law, 25 since from eternity God might 
have ordained individual exceptions and drastic changes to the 
present moral order. Because the revealed laws take precedence 
over natural evidence, and because the revealed laws are contin-
gent decrees of God ad extra, the truth of a "right reason" is 
mutable. The moral life becomes a question of obedience; its 
orientation is given by private or public revelation. 
More frequently, however, Ockham intends a technical 
rather than a descriptive meaning of recta ratio. As the oblig-
ing function of the practical intellect, "right reason" is an 
act of judgment or assent to a directive proposition. 26 Ockham 
in the moral order, but the permanent moral requirement of con-
formity to God's will. This emphasis fosters an authoritarian 
morality; its spirit announces Luther's extreme example of con-
formity wherein the creature should wish his eternal damnation 
and unhappiness if God so wishes. 
25For example, Gabriel Biel, Sent., II, d. 35, q. 1, 
art. 1, n. 1, C (Tiibingen, 1501); "Lex aeterna extendit se ad 
omnem rectam rationem et non solum ad praeceptionem vel prohibi-
tionem proprie acceptam. 11 Biel, however, goes on to say (Sent., 
III, d. 37, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 3) that the right reasons and 
eternal laws contained in the second table of the Decalogue might 
be dispensed. The identification of right reason with the 
eternal law supports radically different deductions within the 
"via moderna." See W. Kolmel, "Von Ockham zu Gabriel Biel. 
Zur Naturrechtslehre des 14 .. und 15.Jahrhunderts," Franziaskani-
~ Studien 37 (1955), pp. 218-259. 
26sent., III, q. 12, CCC; ·11 ••• recta ratio sive actus 
assentiendi quae vocatur recta ratio .•• " Sent., III, q. 11, X; 
"Reeta autem ratio est prudentia in actu vel in habitu .•. Et 
sciendum quod actus dictandi intellectus non est formaliter 
complexum; sed est actus assentiendi vel dissentiendi complexo 
jam formate et ex illo actu assentiendi generatur prudentia; non 
autem ex formatione complexi. 11 Cf. my article, "William of Ock-
ham on Right Reason," Speculum 48 (1973), pp. 13-36. . 
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intends this second meaning with the phrase "the dictate of Right 
Reason." The difference between the descriptive and the func-
tional meanings turns on the separability of acts of apprehension 
and judgment, and on the distinction between speculative and 
practical assent. An apprehended directive may be a true rule 
of behavior, but it lacks the force of obligation until the agent 
assents that it is true. Ockham is emphatic on this point--it 
is not enough to simply remember a rule and act accordingly. 27 
The intellect must judge that rule to be true now, in this 
. 
situation, before the agent explicitly recognizes a moral obli-
gation. Thus, beyond the normal scholastic distinction between 
speculative and practical propositions, Ockham teaches a specific 
difference between speculative and practical assent. To be 
precise, judging that a directive is true constitutes an impera-
tive or "dictate" that the will conform. Rather than a "complex" 
or proposition, the functional meaning of recta ratio signifies 
a non-complex act of judgment which asserts an obligation. The 
human will is morally obliged, not when the intellect formulates 
a directive, but when the intellect dictates that directive. A 
practical rule may be incorrect--literally a wrong reason for 
27sent., III, q. 11, X; "Si dicas quod ostenso objecto 
diligibili sine omni dictamine rationis potest voluntas illud 
diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quid dili-
gendum est etc.: puta si formetur hoc complexum 'Hoc bonum est 
diligible' et intellectus non assentiat, tune est dubium utrum 
illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus ille 
sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est 
virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur con-
formi ter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et 
quod habens talem actum sit sciens." 
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acting--yet judgmental assent through inculpable ignorance be-
comes a "right reason" for following the erroneous rule. The 
technical meaning of Right Reason (hereafter this useage is in-
dicated by capitalizing), therefore, is that practical assent 
which provides the proximate norm of morality and the subjective 
basis of moral obligation. 
Any natural or "secular" morality fostered by Ockham 
would derive from this functional meaning of recta ratio. Moral 
autonomy centers on the personal and subjective judgment of 
what is right; even divine commands must be judged as true moral 
rules before they bind the creature. Norms are variable with 
changes in circumstance or divine decrees, but the sanction and 
force of Right Reason's dictate remains constant for every moral 
response. Ockham maintains a "positive" obligation to conform 
to Right Reason; but without any divine command the dictate of 
Right Reason would still be binding. 28 Certain of Ockham's 
28Those commentator's who find an absolute voluntarism 
or positivism in Ockham's ethic 11 explain 11 his doctrine of recta 
ratio as ultimately a positive obligation and contingent upon 
the divine will. E.g., Father Copleston, A !_Iistory ..• , p. 121; 
Erich Hochstetter, "V.iator Mundi. Einige Bemerkungen zur 
Situation des Menschen bei Wilhelm von Ockham, 11 Franziskanische 
Studien 32 (1950), pp. 12-14; Professor Oakley, "Medieval Theor-
ies ..• , p. 70; and Professor Bourke, History of Ethics, p. 155. 
Indeed, Ockham does teach that God commands the creature to 
conform to right reason. An act against conscience or Right 
Reason 11 eliceretur contra praeceptum di vinum et voluntatem di vj.-
nam volentem talem actum elicere conformiter rationi rectae. 11 
Sent., III, q. 13, C. But Ockham also claims that the obligation 
"t'Ofollow Right Reason is known naturally and is binding without 
a "superior will." "Scientia moralis non-positiva est quae, sine 
omni praecepto superioris, dirigi t actus humanos, sicut pri.ncipj_a 
per se nota vel nota per experientiam, sic dirigunt, scilicet 
quod 'Omne honestum est faciendum' et 'Orone inhonestum est 
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successors, however, defend the legitimacy of Right Reason's 
dictate as independent of the divine will. For example, Gregory 
of Rimini (d. 1358) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) both define sin 
as "voluntarily to commit or omit something against Right Reason" 
rather than "against the eternal law." Why? 
so that one would not think that sin is precisely 
against divine reason and not against some right 
reason about the matter, or would maintain that 
something is a sin, not because it is against the 
divine reason as right, but because it is against 
the divine reason as divine. For although impos-
sible, if there were no divine reason or if that 
divine reason were in error, or if God himself did 
not exist, still one would sin if he acted against 
angelic or human or some other right reason - if 
such existed. And if there were no right reason at 
all, still if someone should act against that which 
some right reason would dictate to be done - if 
there were any - then he wou1d sin.29 
Their defense of recta ratio strongly suggests the systematic 
effort of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) to elucidate a secular system 
fugiendum" .•. 'Voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi,' 
'Omne malum vituperabile est fudiendum' •.. " Quodl., II, q. 14 
(corrected by Vaticana Lat. 3075, f. 20vb). 
29Rimini, Sent., II, d. 34-35, q. 1, art. 2, H-J (Venice, 
1522); "Respondeo ne putetur peccatum esse praecise contra 
rationem divinam et non contra quamlibet rectam rationem de 
eodem, aut estimetur aliquid esse peccatum non quia est contra 
rationem divinam inquantum est recta sed quia est contra earn 
inquantum est divina. Nam si per irnpossibile ratio divina sive 
Deus ipse non esset, aut ratio illa esset errans, adhuc si quis 
ageret contra rectam rationem angelicam vel humanam aut aliam 
aliquam - si aliqua esset - peccaret. Et si nulla penitus esset 
ratio recta, adhuc si quis ageret contra illud quid agendum esse 
dictaret ratio aliqua recta - si aliqua esset - peccaret." See 
the literal parallel in Biel, Sent., II, d. 35, q. 1, art. 1, 
D-E (Tubingen, 1501). Cf. Professor Oberman's treatment of 
this text from Rimini and Biel in The Harvest of Medieval Theolo-
gy_, pp. 105-107. 
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of morality and legality which would be valid "etiamsi daremus 
30 
non esse Deum." 
---
Ockham's own statements on natural or Aristotelian 
morality serve to highlight the Christian transformation of 
30see Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, ed. Joannes 
Barbeyracius and trans.-William Whewell (Cambridge, John W. 
Parker, 1853), Vol. I, p. xivi; "Et haec quidem quae jam diximus, 
locum aliquem haberent, etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere 
dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana." 
The respect which Grotius had for Francis Suarez (1548-1617) has 
been well documented by Anton-Herman Chroust, "Hugo Grotius and 
the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition," The New Scholasticism 
XVII (1943), pp. 114-120. Before Grotiuswrote the "De Jure 
Belli et Pacis" Suarez had outlined a well developed tradition 
of treating the dictate of right reason as valid independent of 
any divine legislation. Mentioning texts in Gregory of Rimini 
and Gabriel Biel, Suarez says "Atque hi auctores consequenter 
videntur esse concessuri legem naturalem non esse a Deo, ut a 
legislatore, quia non pendent ex voluntate Dei, et ita ex vi 
illius non se gerit Deus ut superior praecipiens aut prohibens; 
immo ait Gregorius quern caeteri secuti sunt, licet Deus non 
esset, vel non uteretur ratione, vel non recte de rebus judica-
ret, si in homine esset idem dictamen rectae rationis dictantis, 
verba gratia, malum esse mentire, illud habiturum eamdem rationem 
legis, quam nunc habet." Tractatus de Legibus et Le islatore 
Deo, II, c. 6, ed. Carolus Berton, Opera Omnia: Suarez Paris: 
Vives, 1856), Vol. 5, p. 105. See Jaime Fernandez - Castaneda, 
S.J., "Right Reason in Francis Suarez," The Modern Schoolman 45 
(1968), pp. 105-122. A .rather clear line-O'f influence can be 
dravm from Rimini and Biel, through Suarez, to Grotius and Pufen-
dorf in the seventeentl) century. Commentators such as Chroust 
(p. 116), and A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law .•• , p. 70, see this 
development as a reaction to the excessive voluntarism of Ock-
hamism. This judgment is only half true. True because Suarez 
interprets this perspective on right reason as the "extreme 
contrary" of Ockham's position. Ockham would not admit the 
separation of morality from God's will; but neither would Rimini, 
Biel or even Grotius. False because the hypothetical arguments 
of Rimini and Biel in which this tradition originates are devel-
oped from Ockham's suggestion that "sine omni praecepto superior-
is" the will should conform to Right Reason:- Partially, there-
lO"re, the source of a secular theory of· natural law rests in 
Ockham's doctrine of Right Reason's autonomy. 
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th . 31 e ics. He woUld not support a doctrine of Right Reason or 
conscience which repudiates a theological foundation. The 
objective and subjective norms of morality, the literal and the 
functional meanings of recta ratio, are mutually consistent and 
required. Every act of judgment entails an act of apprehension; 
the "act of assent which is called Right Reason" includes the 
directive or "right reason" to which the intellect assents. 32 
Ockham distinguishes between directives and dictates; first 
because prescriptive statements are not always moral imperatives 
and secondly, because obligation occurs precisely with the 
intellectual assent to, not formulation of, normative proposi-
tions. Thus, it is appropriate to speak of two complementary 
facets of Ockham's doctrine of recta ratio. The texts do not 
support the claim, however, that Ockham pursues the autonomy of 
Right Reason's dictate into ethical Subjectivism or a "secular" 
ethic. Only excusable or inculpable ignorance can justify a 
discrepancy between the objective (i.e., the will of God) and 
31The difference between Aristotle's ethic and that of 
Christianity is not in what the moral agent does, but rather, 
in why the agent acts. The intention to love God characterizes 
the perfect, Christian virtue. See Sent., III, q. 10, I; Sent., 
III, q. 12, GGG; Sent., IV, q. 3, S. 
32Quodl., V, q. 6; "Circa primurn, dico quod duplex est 
1 assentus, ' lL"'1US quo intellectus assen tit aliquid esse vel 
aliquid non esse vel aliquid esse bonum vel album; alius quo 
intellectus assentit alicui complexo. Secunda distinctio est 
quod duplex est apprehensio; una est compositio vel divisio 
si ve proposi tionis formatio, alio qua est cogni tio ipsius com-
plexi jam formati ... 11 The assent of Right Reason is the second 
type of judgment (see above, note 26) which presupposes an 
apprehended "complex" or directive proposition to which it 
a.ssents. 
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subjective (i.e., the dictate of Right Reason) norms of morality. 
On the other hand, Ockham could assert that the obligation to 
obey Right Reason stands without any divine decree. 
Although complementary, a careful determination of which 
sense of "right reason" Ockham intends within a given text is 
not merely academic. Individual doctrines turn on the meaning 
of this notion. To give one example, Ockham criticizes Henry 
of Ghent for distinguishing practical and speculative proposi-
tions in terms of intrinsic, final causality. 33 Only after the 
judgment of Right Reason will Ockham speak of activity as the 
proper and distinctive end of practical knowledge because activi-
ty is then the required or obligatory end. 
Nevertheless, according to the common position, one 
can distinguish regarding the end of knowledge: one 
which can be simply the final cause (of knowledge) 
properly speaking for the sake of which the knowledge 
itself is acquired and which moves the agent to ac-
tion. I spoke previously about this. The other is the 
end of knowledge which according to Right Reason ought 
to be intended by an agent which acts freely. In this 
way, the end of practi.cal knowledge is the deed or the 
operation.34 
The assent of Right Reason gives a practical directive a morally 
required final cause regardless of the purpose for which the 
knower formulated that proposition. Assent to factual statements, 
on the other hand, does not demand a conforming act of the will. 
Ockham's position on the causal import of prescriptive language 
33see above, notes 7 and 8. 
34 Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 308). See above, note 19. 
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would be objectionable if recta ratio were taken in its literal 
~ense of a true directive proposition. The literal meaning 
makes the argument circular; namely, that right reason gives 
practical knowledge its distinctive final cause while right 
reason is itself practical knowledge. 
Although Ockham is clear about what he means by recta 
~; ratio, the phrase is not explicitly defined. He simply uses the 
w f notion in two different ways. Most of Ockham's commentators 
~ 
equate right reason with prudence or conscience and analyze these 
latter notions. 35 Father Lucan Freppert, O.F.M., seems alone in 
indicating the importance which Ockham places upon Right Reason 
as "an act of_ assenting or dissenting to this proposition already 
35For example, Anita Garvens, Franziskanische Studien, 
21, p. 374, says that recta ratio "dem scholastischen Begriff 
des Gewissens entspricht. 11 Iserloh claims 11 ••• gebraucht Ockham 
recta ratio gleichbedeutend mit conscientia und besonders mit 
prudentia ... " Gnade und Eucharistie ... , p. 54. Ockham does 
equate recta ratio with "prudence" and "conscience," but these 
notions do not exhaust what Ockham means by "right reason." It 
is important that "Right Reason" be understood in its non-
propositional designation. Logical contradictions obtain between 
propositions. Even though the divine commands were formulated 
as propositions they could not stand as contradictory to this 
simple act of assent to directives which Ockham calls "Right 
Reason." Reeta ratio is not "a" judgment about good or evil 
which God might overrule; rather, it is that function of the 
practical intellect which turns natural value judgments and 
divine commands into moral imperatives. By considering recta 
ratio as normative propositions, however, commentators introduce 
the false possibility of conflict between God's legislative power 
and the natural assessment of morals. In view of Ockham' s 
doctrine of Right Reason, and the importance this doctrine as-
sumes within his value theory, scholars might better ask if the 
principles of the Practical Intellect and the general axioms of 
ethical reasoning are normative statements or simply factual 
assertions to the "Venerable Inceptor." 
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formed. 1136 Surely, this is a unique perspective within the 
Medieval history of Aristotle's irth~s ltgos; it argues irrefut-
ably against construing recta ratio as a monolithic doctrine 
which passes unchanged through the generations of Scholasticism. 
Within Ockham's system, this functional sense of recta ratio 
supports his analysis of normative language and his value theory. 
Right Reason is the psychological mechanism which transforms 
value judgments into imperatives; whether directive propositions 
f:· ~ are grounded in experience or in revelation, the assent of Right 
r 
!';.,; 
~ Reason renders them obligatory. Moral values inevitably connote 
the judgment of Right Reason. The unity of Ockham's moral doc-
trine depends upon his innovative treatment of Right Reason. 
And it is the unity of Ockham's ethic which suffers when recta 
ratio is understood exclusively as moral knowledge. Prudence 
and Conscience indicate types of directive propositions which 
can be called right reasons or ethical knowledge. But in con-
sidering these facets of Ockham's moral science, we must remember 
that the assent of Right Reason gives prudence and conscience 
their binding force. 
36The Basis of Morality .•• , pp. 71-72. Our only com-
plaint with Father Freppert's treatment of "recta ratio" is 
that, after detecting Ockham's unique understanding of this doc-
trine, he proceeds to split the Venerable Inceptor's ethical view-
point into a right reason theory and a will of God theory. (pp. 
241-247) We will argue, especially in the Conclusion, that the 
functional meaning of Right Reason is precisely Ockham's method 
of avoiding such dualism. 
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c. Prudence 
Ockham's doctrine of right reason and prudence corres-
pond closely. Ockham states that "the role (ratio) of prudence 
is to regulate the act of will because it is the right reason 
of do-ables. 1137 "It is impossible for moral virtue to exist 
without right reason which is an act of prudence. 1138 A close 
analysis of the meaning of "prudence," will clarify Ockham's 
literal understanding of right reason. 
According to Ockham, "prudence" can be understood in four 
different ways. 39 Notice that the common element of these four 
37sent., III, q. 13, D; "Cum igitur de ratione prudentiae 
sit regulare actum voluntatis, quia est recta ratio agibilium." 
38 Sent., IV, q. 3, L. Also see Sent., III, q. 13, B. 
39sent., III, q. 12, H; "Circa secundum articulum est 
prima distinctio quod prudentia accipitur quadrupliciter. 
Uno modo accipitur pro omni noticia directiva respectu 
cuiuscumque agibilis mediate vel immediate. Sicut accipit 
Augustinus prudentiam in De Libero Arbitrio. Et isto modo tam 
noticia evidens alicuius universalis propositionis (quae eviden-
ter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit ex propositionibus 
per se notis, quae noticia scientifica proprie est scientia 
moral is) quam noticia evidens proposi tionis uni.versalis quae 
solwn evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam, quae noticia etiam 
est scientia moralis et prudentia. Exemplum primi: 'omni bene-
factori ·bene est faciendum.' Exemplum secundi: 'quilibet 
iracundus est per pulchra verba leniendus.' 
Secundo modo accipitur pro noticia evidenti immediate 
directiva circa aliquid agibile particulare, et hoc per noticiam 
alicuius propositionis quae evidenter sequitur ex propositione 
per se nota tanquam majori et per doctrinam. Exemplum huius; 
. 'huic benefactori est benefaciendum1· quae sequitur evidenter ex 
ista 'omni benefacienti ••• ' 
Tertio modo accipitur per noticia immediate directiva 
accepta per experientiam solum respectu alicuius agibilis. Ex-
emplum: 'iste iracundus est per pulchra verba leniendus.' Et 
hoc noticia est solum respectu alicuius propositionis particular-
is cognitae per experientiam. Et hoc videtur esse prudentia 
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definitions is the apprehension of a practical, directive propo-
sition while the distinguishing feature of each description is 
the way in which the practical proposition is recognized or con-
sidered. First, "prudence" indicates every evident and directive 
apprehension of some operation which can be done immediately or 
mediately by the knower. Thus, prudence signifies the universal 
proposition known through their terms (per se) or known through 
experience. Secondly, prudence indicates an evident and immedi-
ately directive cognition of some particular operation. Thus, 
prudence signifies the particular propositions which can be 
deduced from universal, directive premises. Thirdly, prudence 
indicates an immediately directive apprehension of some operation 
which is known only through experience. Thus, prudence signifies 
the particular directive propositions whose origin is not deduc-
tion but rather experience. Fourthly, prudence indicates the 
collection of all, immediately directive apprehensions necessary 
to live morally. Thus, prudence designates the universal and 
proprie dicta secundum intentionem Philosophi prout distinguitur 
a scientia morali. 
Quarto modo accipitur per aliquo aggregate ex omni noti-
cia immediate directiva, sive habeatur per doctrinam sive per 
experientiam, circa omnia opera humana requisita ad bene vivere 
simpliciter. Et isto modo prudentia non est una noticia tantum, 
sed includit tot noticias quot sunt virtutes morales requisitae 
ad simpliciter bene vivere, quia quaelibet virtus moralis habet 
propriam prudentiam et noticia directivam." Also see Sent., .II, 
q. 15s G-H. A useful study of Ockham's doctrine of prudence was 
made by Othmar Suks, O.F.M., "The Connection of Virtues According 
to Ockham," Franciscan Studies 10 (1950), pp. 9-32, 91-119. The 
above text follows Father Suks' correction of Sent., III, q. 12, 
Hand Quodl.,IV, q. 6 according to the better manuscripts. 
particular propositions, known per~ or through experience, 
which are required "to live well." 
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The first two meanings of prudence coincide with Ockham's 
notion of "moral science. 1140 He considers the universal direc-
tive propositions of Practical Reason which are known per~ 
and their deducible conclusions as the content of ethical philos-
ophy. 41 This agrees with Aristotle's maxim that "science" con-
cerns the universal. Moral science is a collection of universal, 
directive propositions regarding those things which are within 
40
on the distinction between moral science and prudence 
as between "habitus magis universalis et minus universalis" see 
Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 321); Sent., III, q. 11, U; and Sent., 
III, q. 12, U. Ockham describes moral science in a twofold way: 
"Dico quod scientia moralis dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro 
scientia quae est praecise de moribus qui sunt in potestate 
nostra, ita quod in omni scito ponatur aliquid importans aliquid 
quod est in potestate nostra. Aliter accipitur pro illa scientia 
secundum quod est tradita ab Aristotele et a philosophis et a 
Sanctis." Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 359). Ockham repeats this 
division when explaining the term "morale" in Quodl., II, q. 14. 
He gives a slightly different analysis of "moral science" in 
Sent., III, q. 15, G. 
41
ockham gives four different meanings of the term 
"scientia." See Gaudens F. Mohan, O.F.M., "The Prologue to Ock-
ham's Exposition of the Physics of Aristotle," Franciscan Studies 
5 (1945), pp. 236 and 239-240. The meaning applicable to "moral 
science" or "non-positive moral science" is "notitia evidens veri 
necessarii nata causari ex notitia evidenti praemissarum neces-
sariarum applicatarum per discursum syllogisticum." (p. 240) 
This is Aristotle's description of "demonstrative science" in 
the Nie. Ethics, VI, 6 (1140b 30-35). In Quodl., II, q. 14, 
Ockham asks "Whether there can be demonstrative science about 
morals?" and answers: 11 ••• disciplina moralis non-positiva est 
scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia notitia deducens conclu-
siones syllogistice ex principiis per se notis vel per experien-
tiam scitis, est demonstrativa; huiusmodi est disciplina moralis; 
ergo etc." On Aristotle's position that science concerns the 
universal rather than the particular, see Meta., XI, c. 1 (1059b 26). -----
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42 human powers. The object of ethics is not the good life, nor 
beatitude, nor virtue; rather, the object of moral science is 
any proposition which directly or indirectly regulates human 
volition. 43 In contrast to the interpretation that his moral 
doctrine lacks any metaphysical basis, Ockham himself claims that 
42sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 8-9); "Ad primum istorum 
dico quod scientia, ad praesens, dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo 
pro collectione multorum pertinentium ad notitiam unius vel 
multorum determinatum ordinem habentium. Et scienta isto modo 
dicta continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam 
complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum ..• 11 Also see 
Father Mohan, Franciscan Studies, 5, p. 240. An important text 
in this regard is Summulae in Libros Physicorum, I, c. l; "Sic 
ergo dico, quod scientia naturalis non est una numero primo modo, 
sed secundo modo quia est una unitate collectionis vel ordinis. 
Omnes enim partes istius scientiae habent determinatum ordinem 
inter se qualem non habent cum logica ~ cum morali philosophia 
nee cum aliqua alia scientia, propter quod dicuntur una scien-cia. 11 
Thus, the propositions which comprise "moral science" do not have 
a determinate order; there is no primary or fundamental directive 
to which all other moral norms are attached; there is no subject 
matter common to all ethical knowledge. On the basis of this 
text alone, the search for a central insight or an organizing 
principle in Ockham's moral doctrine should be considered suspect. 
43sent., I, d. 2, q. 4 (II, 134); "Ad secundum argumentum 
principale dico quod scientia realis non est semper de rebus 
tamquam de illis quae immediate sciuntur sed de aliis pro rebus 
tantum supponentibus. Ad cuius intellectum et propter multa 
prius dicta et dicenda, propter aliquos inexercitatos in logica, 
est sciendum quod scientia quaelibet sive sit realis sive ra-
tionalis est tantum de propositionibus tamquam de illis quae 
sciuntur, quia sole propositiones sciuntur." Father Maurer com-
ments accurately that Ockham "was convinced with Aristotle that 
science concerns the universal and not the particular as such ..• 
Having proved to his own satisfaction that universality is a 
property only of concepts, which are the terms of propositions, 
he drew the inevitable conclusion: propositions alone are the 
object of science." Medieval Studies, 20, p. 100. This study 
shows the contrast between Ockham's notion of science and those 
of Scotus and Aquinas. 
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ontological truths contribute to ethical knowledge. 44 .Any 
proposition which participates in a practical syllogism about 
what ought to be done, is a part of moral science. 
This conception of moral science reveals that turn in 
moral doctrine peculiar to Ockham and his followers. The tools 
and concern of the moralist are propositions and concepts; logi-
cal formulas and words are the matter of scientific ethical 
study. To be sure, ethics is a "real" science (in contrast to 
a "rational" science such as logic) because its concepts stand 
for real, non-conceptual things. But the created intellect 
directly and immediately "knows" propositions; real things are 
known through concepts. For Ockham, there exists a certain 
"distance" between thought and the extra-mental world. This 
distance or distinction between concepts and things is the heart 
of Ockham's criticism of Scotistic "common natures" and "formal 
distinctions." Regarding morality, this notion of science 
44sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 364); "Illa tamen quae con-
siderantur--arrietaphysica possunt esse principia ad probandum 
conclusiones practicas de Deo, sicut ex hoc quod Deus est causa 
omnium est summe diligibilis vel honorandus vel aliquid huius-
modi." Ibid., (I, 360); "Et propter hoc in scientia morali 
tradita a philosophis et a Sanctis inveniuntur multae veritates 
simpliciter speculativae, sed vocant earn scientiam moralem quia 
conclusiones practicae morales sunt ultima adquisita in illa 
scientia. 11 These texts stand in direct opposition to the opinion 
of Anita Garvens that "Das Sittengesetz hat sein Fundament nicht 
in der Seinsordnung und damit im Wesen der Dinge und ihren Bezie-
hungen zum Urheber allen Seins. 11 Franz. Studien, 21, p. 262. 
Following Professor Garvens, commentators who find a strict 
voluntarism or positivism in Ockham's moral thought also assert 
that he "severs the bond between metaphysics and ethics." On 
the contrary, Ockham claims there are "good reasons"--ontological 
reasons--for certain moral norms. 
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produces Ockham's certitude about the principles of morality and 
bis doubt about a necessary and unchangeable moral status inher-
ent in concrete acts. The third meaning of prudence is a proper 
definition because it distinguishes prudence from the meaning 
of moral science. Strictly speaking, prudence is constituted 
by the particular, directive propositions of practical reason 
which are known only through experience. Properly, "prudence" 
signifies the particular premises which are known experientially 
and the conclusions of a practical syllogism. 45 Only by extend-
ing this signification can Ockham also consider the general 
premises of a practical syllogism as constitutive of prudence~ 
The fourth sense of "prudence" indicates the collective unity 
imposed upon the total practical propositions required for the 
moral pursuit of life. 
The importance of prudence in determining what one 
ought to do is clear. Moral deliberation is resolved by action; 
a moral agent who recognizes a required or obligatory end must 
determine the means which will realize that end. The sensitive 
moment in determining a moral issue is the concrete decision 
45sent., III, q. 12, T; "Virtutes omnes generales con-
nectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus; puta, 'omne 
honestum est faciendum,' 'omne bonum est diligendum,' 'omne 
dictatum a recta ratione est faciendum, ' quae possunt esse 
majores et minores in syllogismo practico, concludente conclu-
sionem particularem, cuius noticia est prudentia immediate dir-
ectiva in, actu virtuoso. Et potest idem principium numero esse 
major cum diversis minoribus acceptis ad concludendum diversas 
conclusiones particulares quarum notitiae sunt prudentiae 
directivae in diversis actibus virtuosis." See also Sent., III, 
q. 15, H. --
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that ~ action should be accomplished for the sake of a deter-
46 
mined end. The general moral principles--such as "everything 
honest should be done," and "all evil should be avoided"--would 
be futile and ineffective if these norms could not be applied 
to factual situations. Universal directives can be realized in 
particular situations, only after the intellect decides on the 
basis of experiential evidence that "this is honest" and "this 
is evil." It is the proper role of prudence to take into account 
the circumstances and peculiarities of an act, and thus to direct 
that this deed should be done here and now. 47 The moral suit-
ability of concrete acts often depends upon circumstantial 
factors which can only be known experientially. 
Ockham makes prudence an indispensible condition of 
morally good behavior because experience is necessarily involved 
in knowing what is good. A virtuous act must be reasonable and 
voluntary. To be reasonable, a moral act requires the presence 
of prudence in at least the second and third senses given to the 
term by Ockham. 48 Th 0 kh t th t . th . 1 us, c am asser s a ei er universa 
46
sent., III, q. 12, PP; 11 Peccans ex ignorantia habet 
noticiam universalem sicut peccans ex malitia; quia peccans ex 
ignorantia scit tales majores 'Orone justum est faciendum,' 
'Orone bonum est faciendum,' 'Orone quid Deo placet .•• ' et cetera; 
sed ignorans minores, puta quod, 'Hoc est justum,' 'Hoc est 
honestum,' 'Hoc est placitum Deo. ' 11 
47sent., Prologue, q. 11, (I, 316); "Et non dictat 
(notitia practica ostensiva) quod domus est facienda nee quando 
est facienda; sed ad prudentiam pertinet dictare quod tali tem-
pore est facienda, vel sic est agendum vel sic." 
48sent., III, q. 12, UU; "Sed ad hoc quod actus virtuosu.s 
eli ciatu.r necessario requiri tur prudentia secundo modo vel ter·t:io 
r 
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directives or particular directives known by experience are re-
quired for a person to elicit a virtuous act. The notion of 
"experience" can be taken in two respects; first, an "indirect 
experience" in which a person perceives the activity of another 
and secondly, a "direct experience" in which a person intuits 
his own act. 49 Any practical proposition evidenced by direct, 
inner experience indicated the presence of moral virtue. Ockham 
claims that "the acquisition of prudence cannot be separated from 
moral virtue. 1150 He means, for instance, that a person cannot 
know evidently that temperate acts prompt one to love God without 
actually performing temperate actions. Likewise, a person can-
not know evidently how much alcohol is a moderate amount to drink 
without direct experience. Such interior experiences indicate 
the actual presence of a temperate or a virtuous act. 
Ockham does admit that the divine will could alter the 
"common law." The scriptural commandments, for example, could 
modo dica. Eodem modo ad virtutem moralem non requiritur pru-
dentia primo modo dicta, quia ut patet notitia particularis 
cuiuscunque immediate directiva potest haberi per experientiam 
ad quam non requiritur notitia alterius universalis. Si tamen 
notitia evidens alicuius particularis non posset haberi per 
experientiam, tune virtus illa cuius notitia particularis esset 
directiva requireret necessario prudentiam primo modo et 
secundo modo et non tertio modo. 11 Also see Ibid., NN. 
· 
49,eent., III, q. 12, SS; "Aliqua talis propositio non 
potest cognosci nisi per experientiam aliquam acceptam respectu 
actus al terius horn.inis, alia non potest evidenter cognosci nisi 
per experientiam actus proprii. 11 
. 50 Sent., Prologue, q. 11, (I, 320); "Non potest prudentia 
seperari, in acquisitione ipsius a virtute morali." Also see 
~., III, q. 12, SS; and Sent., IV, q. 14,G. 
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be changed so that fornication, adultery, stealing, etc., would 
be good and meritorious acts. Given the possibility that God 
could change the revealed directives of right reason, prudence 
remains necessary to produce a moral act. Whether a moral agent 
thinks that "Murder is wrong" or "Murder is right" because of 
t ~· the divine wish, it is still necessary to determine experiential-
~ ly that "This is murder." Consequently, the possibility that 
~ 
.,· 
f 
k' r 
some directives of right reason are positive or authoritarian 
norms does not deny the absolute requirement of natural reason, 
[ i.e., 
r 
prudence, in establishing the particular location of moral 
~ obligation. I Virtues :::::i::~o O~:~:~. ~:~:z::n::::r::~::::::e 0 :s t:e cardi-
" 
' nal virtue. 51 This does not seem correct; prudence is not a 
moral virtue in Ockham's thought. For one thing, Ockham placed 
the moral virtues in the will but prudence is clearly an intel-
lectual habit. Secondly, every moral or virtuous act requires 
an act of prudence and an act of the will as partial efficient 
causes of virtue. 52 An act of prudence must precede the 
51Franciscan Studies, 10 (1950), p. 18. 
52sent., III, q. 12, NN; "Et si quaeras utrum post gener-
ationem virtutis potest elici actus virtuosus sine actu pruden-
tiae; respondeo quad non, quia nullus virtuose agit nisi scienter 
et ex libertate. Et idea si aliquando talis actus virtutis 
voluntatis elicitur a tali habitu sine actu prudentiae non dice-
tur virtuosus, nee est ... Si quaeras de actu prudentiae; in quo 
genere causae se habet ad actum virtuosum? .•• Respondeo quod est 
causa efficiens necessario requisita ad actum virtuosum, sine 
quae impossibile est actum esse virtuosum, stante ordine divi:'.1.o. t1 
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production of a virtuous act. If prudence were a virtue it 
would precede .itself. Thirdly, prudence is a "natural" or unfree 
act "and no more within our power than an act of seeing. 1153 
Only a free act of the will, however, can be intrinsically 
virtuous and only a habit of the free will can be a virtue. 54 
Prudence, therefore, is not a moral virtue but rather a necessary 
condition and cause of any moral virtue. Prudence is located in 
the intellect and is presupposed by any moral action in the will. 
The close association between prudence and right reason 
gives an empirical feature to Ockham's notion of moral knowledge. 
Prudence adds an experiential emphasis to Ockham's treatment of 
moral science. It is morally necessary to apply the knowledge 
expressed as universal norms and general rules. Consequently, 
the collection of right reasons necessary to act properly is 
impossible without an empirical and intuitive knowledge of 
particular cases. Ockham claims that it is impossible or "pos-
sible with extreme difficulty" to acquire the propositions 
necessary for virtuous activity without prudence. 55 Ockham's 
53sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Sed actus prudentiae secundum 
veritatemest solum actus naturalis, et nullo modo in potestate 
nostra plusquam actus videndi." 
54Ibid., F; "Quarta conclusio est hoc, quod actus primo 
et necessario virtuosus est actus voluntatis. Haec patet primo 
quia ille solus est laudabile et virtuosus secundum se; alii 
vero non nisi secundario et per quandam denominationem extrin-
secam, puta, per hoc quod eliciuntur conformiter actui voluntatis. 
. 55sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 320); "Et ideo dico quod si 
aliquis studens in morali philosophia sine omni actu prudentiae 
vel morali, posset acquirere notitiam omnium propositionum 
uni versalium quas acquiri t alius exerci tatus, quod i ta perfechi.m 
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notion of prudence indicates the importance of sensitivity to 
the factual order and to the interior life in determining right 
and wrong behavior. Experience, both in the sense of perception 
of other beings and in the sense of a person's awareness of his 
internal condition, is required for a person to live morally. 
Aristotle's empirical approach to determining the means of virtue 
is apparent in Ockham's doctrine of prudence. 
Is it possible to distinguish Ockham's notion of prudence 
from his conception of right reason? As was mentioned before, 
Ockham sometimes considers the terms prudence and right reason 
as convertible. "Perfect moral virtue cannot exist without 
prudence and consequently, there is a necessary connection among 
the moral virtues to prudence. This is proved because the es-
sence (ratio) of virtue and its perfect act is that it is elicit-
ed in conformity to right reason; because virtue is thus defined 
by the Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics (Cf., Nico-
machean Ethics II, 6, 1107a). Moreover, right reason is prudence 
in act or in habit. 1156 It can be said, however, that right 
habitum et ita perfecte directivum haberet ipse sicut alius. 
Sed de facto vel hoc non est possibile vel cum maxima difficul-
tate. Et propter istam rationem, sicut patebit in tertio (III, 
q. 12), non potest prudentia separari in acquisitione ipsius a 
virtute mor<?-li. 11 Also see Sent., IV, q. 14, G. 
56sent., III, q. 11, X; "Dico quod virtus moralis per-
fecta non potest esse sine prudentia, et per consequens est 
necessaria connexio inter virtutes morales ad prudentiam. Quid 
probatur, quia de ratione virtutis et actus ejus perfectae est 
quod eliciatur conformiter rationi rectae, quia sic diffinitur 
a Philosopho secundo Ethicorum. Reeta autem ratio est prudentia 
in actu vel in habitu. 11 
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reason is a more inclusive notion than that of prudence. Every 
moral directive, whether it is known through revelation or 
through natural evidence, belongs to the content of right 
reason. The notion of prudence, on the other hand, properly in-
cludes only those directives which are known by experiential 
evidence. Thus, every act of prudence is a right reason but not 
every right reason is an act of prudence. Prudence signifies 
only those right reasons which are known naturally. Prudence 
can be distinguished from the notion of right reason, therefore, 
!; because 11 prudentia 11 has a less extensive signification than 
t "right reason. 11 Furthermore, prudence indicates a type of 
~ t ethical knowledge and is distinguishable from the functional 
·' ~" 
meaning of Right Reason which does not signify an act of know-
ledge. 
D. Conscience 
Ockham's consideration of "conscientia" adds another 
dimension to his notion of Reeta Ratio. When Ockham wishes to 
speak about the autonomy of Reeta Ratio, he speaks about con~ 
science. The inviolable and authoritative character of right 
reason, as the conscious norm of moral right, is manifested by 
Ockham's notion of conscience. 
It is impossible that some act of the will 
elicited against conscience and against the 
dictate of reason--whether right or erroneous--
be virtuous. It is clear about right conscience 
because such an act would be elicited against the 
divine precept and the divine will which wishes 
him to elicit such an act in conformity to Right 
Reason. Regarding an erroneous conscience in 
invincible error it is clear because such an error 
is not culpable for him because it is not in the 
power of the erring person to be acting against an 
erroneous reason which you do not know is erroneous, 
nor is it in your power to know this, that you are 
acting against an erroneous conscience. Regarding 
an erroneous conscience in vincible error, it is 
clear because although the error is culpable by 
which you are not aware that you, err, nevertheless, 
by acting against such a reason you condemn a reason 
which you do not know is erroneous; and thus you sin 
from contempt.57 
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Ockham makes distinctions about conscience similar to 
those made by St. Thomas, 58 namely: correct conscience, errone-
ous conscience in invincible error and erroneous conscience in 
vincible error. Both thinkers agree that to act against one's 
conscience is sinful. The conscientious judgment of reason is 
morally binding. No one sins unknowingly; to commit a moral 
fault a person must violate his conscience. What a person 
believes to be his duty is thereby obligatory. 
Ockham seems to consider conscience as the awareness of 
a personal moral obligation. As in the case of Right Reason, 
57sent., III, q. 13, C; "Impossibile est quod aliquis 
actus voluntatis elicitus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen 
rationis sive rectum sive erroneum sit virtuosus. Patet de con-
scientia recta, quia talis eliceretur contra praeceptum divinum 
et voluntatem divinam volentem talem actum elicere conformiter 
rationi rectae. De conscientia erronea errore invincibili patet, 
quia talis error non est culpabilis pro eo quod non est in potest-
ate errantis sic faciendo contra rationem erroneam quam nescis 
erroneam, nee est in potestate tua hoc scire quod facis contra 
conscientiam erroneam. De conscientia erronea vincibili patet, 
quia licet error sit culpabilis, tamen, ex quo tu ignoras te 
errare faciendo contra talem rationem, contemnis rationem quam 
nescis erroneam et sic peccas ex contemptu." 
58see St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 17, a. 4; Quodl., III, 
q. 12, a. 26. ~ 
r 
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Ockham does not define explicitly the concept of conscience. 
statements such as "A person sins, when acting against conscience, 
through contempt of that which ought to be his rule in acting, 1159 
however, indicate that conscience is the voice of personal duty. 
Conscience might be expressed as personal directives, e.g., "I 
should do this," or indicate the "assent of Right Reason" which 
is invariably "my" judgment of practical truth. By characteriz-
ing conscience as the awareness of a personal obligation, it is 
possible to distinguish Ockham's notion of "recta ratio" from 
that of "conscientia." Right reason includes every normative 
proposition of the Practical Intellect which is judged to be 
true; conscience involves only those particular norms of the 
Practical Intellect which express my obligation. The distinction 
between right reason and conscience is not superfluous or irrele-
vant. The norms of right reason might include many dictates 
which are not personally binding, but which are valid directives. 
In Ockham's milieu, there were obligations endemic to the clergy 
which did not apply to the laity. A layman might consider cele-
bacy as a valid requirement for priests but not as a personal 
59sent., III, q. 13, M. St. Thomas is more clear that 
the judgment of conscience is the last intellectual judgment 
made by an agent regarding his actions. See Aquinas, De Verit., 
q. 17, a. l; Sent., II, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4. Vernon J. Bourke 
presents a clear analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine of conscience· 
which is helpful in recognizing the similarities between the 
philosophies of 'I'homas and Ockham on this point. See Ethics: 
A Textbook in Moral Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1951), chapters IV and VI. 
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requirement, i.e., not as a matter of the lay conscience. 60 
Ockham asserts that it is always sinful to act against 
one's conscience. The judgment of conscience can be wrong re-
garding facts which are pertinent to determining one's obliga- · 
. 61 tion, or wrong regarding the divine command which pertains to 
t . 1 •t t• 62 a par icu ar s1 ua ion. Nevertheless, the Judgment about what 
60
ockham gives examples of moral norms which are obliga-
tory for one person and not another. "Et si dicatur voluntas 
nunquam debet esse difformis voluntati divinae, sed iste qui vult 
honorare parentes quos Deus non vult honorari habet voluntatem 
difformem voluntati divinae, ergo peccat in honorando. Dicendum 
est quod si Deus vult eos non honorari, nee ab isto nee ab illo, 
iste peccat in honorando parentes suos. Si tamen Deus non vult 
eos honorare ab alio, sed vult eos honorari ab isto, iste in 
honorando non peccat. 11 Sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, H. Also see 
Sent., IV, q. 9, E. James Keven McDonnell, "Religion and Ethics 
Inl~°he Philosophy of William of Ockham" (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 1971), 
pp. 135-136, claims that Ockham rejects the "universalizability" 
of moral-norms in the above quoted text. "The commands of God, 
as Ockham conceives them, are not universalizable in this way. 
These commands are particular in that God may command one person 
to do something in one situation while commanding another person 
to do something quite different in a morally identical situation." 
We cannot agree. Situations covered by different divine com-
mands are not "morally identical" for Ockham. 
61 . Sent., III, q. 13, K; "Hoc patet per exemplum. Ponatur 
aliquis habens istam rationem universalem rectam, "Omni indigenti 
in extrema necessitate est benefaciendum, ne pereat, 11 quae est 
evidens ex notitia terminorum. Occurrente igitur aliquo paupere 
qui apparet indigere in extrema necessitate, si voluntas imperet 
intellectui ut inquirat si talis sic indigeat, sicut apparet 
indigere, facta investigatione per omnem viam possibilem poni, 
si ex aliquo latente quid non est in potestate sua scire, intel-
lectus assentiat quod talis indigeat sicut apparet indigere 
(licet non sic indigeat secundum veritatem), evidenter intellec-
tus dictabit quod tali qui sic apparet indigere (licet non sic 
indigeat), est subveniendum ••. Et tamen voluntas volens effica-
citer sic ei subvenire habet actum rectum et virtuosum et meri-
torium si hoc velit pro amore Dei." 
62sent., III, q. 13, O; "Ad propositionem dico quod 
quamvis intellectus divinus dictet quod tali non sit subveniendum 
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ought to be done by me in this situation conveys a moral obli-
gation that the will execute this judgment. Ockham's notion of 
conscience, however, should not be considered as subjectivistic. 
The judgment of conscience is not the source of moral obligation. 
Clearly the foundations of moral obligation exist prior to the. 
judgment of conscience if conscience can be mistaken about its 
duty. Furthermore, Ockham asserts only that it is always wrong 
to act against conscience; he does not claim that one is always 
right in following conscience. On the contrary, to follow a 
conscience in culpable error is wrong. 63 I~ a person does not 
fulfill his obligation to be aware of his obligations, then that 
person's conscience is "perplexus." The state of 'perplexity' 
results in a morally wrong act whether the will is conformed to 
erroneous conscience, or not conformed to erroneous conscience, 
modo predicto et voluntas Dei nolit quod sic ei subveniatur, 
tamen, voluntas creata sequens rationem erroneam errore invinci-
bili est voluntas recta quia voluntas divina vult earn sequi 
rationem non culpabilem." 
63Ibid., M; "Eli~iendo actum conformiter rationi erroneae 
vincibili peccat, quia elicit actum quern non debet elicere, immo 
oppositum actum tenetur elicere ... Si autem voluntas eliciat ac-
tum difformiter rationi erroneae culpabili, puta, contra talem 
rationem, peccat etiam duplici peccato comrnissionis, eliciendo 
actum contra rationem quam credit esse veram et sic peccat fac-
iendo contra conscientiam per contemptum illius quid debet esse 
regula sua in agendo, etiam tenetur conformare dictamini ... et 
cetera, in operando sive sit rectum sive erroneum. Si ·autem 
nullum actum eliciat nee conformiter rationi erroneae nee dif-
formiter, sed omnem actum suspendit, tune peccat duplici peccato 
ommissionis ... Et per consequens, talis necessario peccat et est 
perplexus et sive voluntas operatur conformiter illi rationi 
sive difformiter sive nihil operetur, semper peccet uno modo 
Vel alio modo. 11 For a discussion about "perplexity" by St. 
Thomas, see Sent., II, d. 39, q. 3, a. 3. 
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or suspends any act regarding the dictate of erroneous conscience. 
Therefore, the subjective norm of morality, i.e., conscience, is 
not an independent source of moral authority. The necessity of 
acting according to one's conscience derives by definition from 
the consciousness of duty. 
Ock~am's notion of conscience has been cited as proof of 
64 the nascent "natural morality" in his thought. G. de Lagarde 
and Paul Vignaux find the seeds of a moral theory independent of 
theology and scriptural authority which was to be characteristic 
of Renaissance and Enlightenment morality. This may be true 
about the historical use of Ockham's doctrine, but not about his 
own motives. Ockham means to show the psychological constants 
within moral deliberation and action; but he is also aware of 
the tension between a naturalistic ethic and the prerogatives 
which scripture attributes to God. Ockham makes the point that 
a law must be recognize&by the moral agent to be binding: he 
is cognizant of the complexity of concrete moral issues which 
often must be solved by a sincere but not certain judgment of 
64
see G. de Lagarde, Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 66; "M. 
Vignaux a done raison de dire que le nominalisme 'ouvre le plus 
large horizon a la moralite naturelle.' Apres avoir paru resumer 
toute la morale dans le precepte arbitraire de Dieu, il nous incline~ penser que, meme si Dieu n'existait pas, la categorie 
de moralite s'imposerait a l'homme qui trouverait toujours en 
luimeme la coexistence des deux elements constitutifs de la 
moralite: une raison dictant des imperatifs categoriques, et 
une volonte libre de s'y soumettre ou de se rebeller contre eux." 
This statement is based upon the text of Sent., III, q. 13, and 
it refers to Vignaux' article "Nominalisme" in the Dictionaire 
~ Theologie Catholigue, XI, col. 771. 
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what should be done. But Ockham also teaches that conscience 
can be erroneous and that a person sins when following a (cul-
pably) erroneous conscience. Ockham's doctrine of conscience 
substantiates that of St. Thomas; at least this aspect of Ock-
ham' s moral doctrine does not break with the scholastic tradition. 
In summary, it has been shovm that Ockham's notion of 
Practical Reason, right reason, prudence and conscience all in-
volve practical propositions but that each concept in this series 
has a less extensive signification than the preceding concept. 
Practical Reason is composed of the propositions which are known 
to deal with volitive actions. Right reason concerns those 
propositions of the practical intellect which are directive or 
prescriptive statements and which are-known to be true. Prudence 
indicates the particular directives of right reason which are 
known by experience. Conscience signifies the acts of prudence 
which are personally obligatory. Right reason, when considered 
as moral knowledge, is a generic category so that the specific 
acts of prudence and conscience can be considered as acts of 
right reason. Together, these intellectual judgments constitute 
the structure or form of every moral deli~eration, and represent 
the rational precedents for every virtuous act of the will. It 
should be clear, furthermore, that these intellectual acts per-
tain to the apprehension and attainment of human goals. Ockham 
describes right reasons or the prudential and conscientious acts 
of right reason HS the intellectual effort to specify the proper 
order between ends and means. Right Reason, when considered as 
a non-propositional act of assent, is the technique by which 
these various types of value judgments become obligatory. 
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Remember, however, that the act of conscience, which is 
the final act of the intellect in a moral deliberation, can err 
regarding what should be done. Mistakes about the facts of a 
given situation or mistakes about the divine mandate applying to 
a given situation are mentioned by Ockham as the causes of an 
erroneous conscience. Conversely, evident facts and the divine 
commandments can also be shown as the reasons for a correct 
judgment of conscience. It is now necessary to study these 
natural and revealed foundations of Right Reason. 
Part II: The Foundations of Right Reason 
The doctrine of Reeta Ratio is of central importance to 
the ethical theory of William of Ockham. A general feature of 
every good act is the conformity of the will-act to an act of 
Right Reason; conversely, the formal characteristic shared by 
every evil action is a deformity to Right Reason. In light of 
the criticism of Anita Garvens and George de Lagarde that Ock-
ham's doctrine is "unexplained" it is necessary to search the 
reasons for Right Reason. 65 Analysis reveals both psychological 
65Professor Garvens claims: "Grund und Entstehung der 
recta ratio ist nach Ockham in der urteilenden Tatigkeit des 
praktischen Verstandes gegeben," Franz. Studien 21, p. 377. 
G. de Lagarde says: "Or, cette loi exterieure a notre volonte, 
qui s'impose a priori sans discussion et sans explication, est 
celle de la "droite raison." Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 65. The 
only explanation of recta ratio, whichthese and many other 
comme~tators find in Ockham's writings is the free command of 
God that men act in accord with Right Reason. 
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and metaphysical dimensions. Two distinctions have been main-
tained in this section: first, the distinction between Right 
Reason as the moral function and right reason as the proposition-
al content of the Practical Intellect; secondly, the distinction 
between "positive" elements and "evident" elements. These dis-
tinctions are Ockham's own and should be recognized by any 
interpretation. 
We intend to answer two questions: Why is Right Reason 
itself a condition of moral behavior, and Why are the directives 
of right reason morally binding? A double question is required 
because Ockham treats the notion of "Reeta Ratio" from two 
perspectives. That is to say, Ockham considers Right Reason as 
a function or simple act of the practical intellect (a judgment 
of assent to directive propositions) and as a complex act or 
habitus of the Practi.c~l Intellect (the directive proposition, 
itself). 
A. Right Reason as the Proximate Norm of Morality 
As a condition of moral behavior, Right Reason indicates 
the intellectual act of assent to a directive proposition which 
must precede the production of any good or bad action in the 
will. The phrase "condition of moral behavior" is appropriate 
because an intellectual dictate must precede but cannot necessi-
tate the voluntary production of a good action. The intellectual 
assent or dictate is a ne~essary cause of moral goodness in the 
Will, but not a necessitating cause. The relationship between 
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the intellect's assent and the will's volition is hypothetically 
necessary. That is, on the condition that the will acts cor-
rectly, the will-act must be conformed to, or caused by, the 
intellect's directive. Ockham formulates this connection as an 
evident principle of demonstrative moral science--voluntas debet 
f t t • • 66 Wh n se con ormare rec ae ra ioni. Yf 
-
Ockham maintains that the human will is obliged to con-
form to Right Reason because the divine will has ordered it. 
"While the present ordination stands, no action is perfectly 
virtuous without being elicited in conformity to Right Reason. 1167 
'~ction of the will elicited against conscience ... would be 
elicited against the divine precept and will which desire that 
we elicit such action in conformity to Right Reason. 1168 Thus, 
ther.e is a revealed reason; i.e., a law promulgated by the free 
will of God through revelation, which supports Ockham's conten-
tion that an act of Right Reason is partially the cause of moral 
goodness and presently the vehicle of moral obligation. Can we 
assume, therefore, that Right Reason is a necessary and permanent 
~dition of all moral behavior? 
When Ockham asserts that the will is obliged by God to 
conform to Right Reason, he is not asserting that Right Reason 
is a necessary component of a virtuous act. The phrase, "Stante 
66 II, 14. Quodl., q. 
67 Sent., III, q. 12, CCC. 
68 III, 13, c. Sent., q. 
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.ordinatione guae ~ est," ("While the present ordination 
-
stands") is a qualification which Ockham often attaches to his 
statements about the world of experience. The ordained order 
could be changed by God's absolute power; if conformity to Right 
1.·.· .Reason is a moral requirement de potentia Dei ordinata, then de 
t potentia Dei absoluta non-conformity to Right Reason could become 
~· a moral requirement. 69 If conformity to Right Reason is simply 
If·,.· . -.·.· ..  a positive good, that is, good because it is commanded, then the . conclusion is inevitable that Right Reason is not a necessary condition of moral behavior. Ockham mentions that theft, adul-~ .. · 
.. 
.· tery and hate for God are evil because these acts are prohibited 
by divine precept but the divine precept could change and render 
th t . •t . 70 ese ac ions meri orious. Might the obligation to follow 
Right Reason change? 
69sent., III, q. 13, G; "Aliter potest dici quod actus 
intrinsece virtuosus non potest fieri non virtuosus negative, 
etiam per naturam, quia si corrumpatur actus prudentiae, neces-
sario corrumpitur actus virtuosus cuius prudentia erat directiva 
necessitate, dico, naturali •.. Tamen, per potentiam Dei absolutam 
potest fieri contrarium sicut prius probatum est, quj_a de illa 
potentia non intelligebatur illud dictum." 
70Sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium 
dei, furari, adulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et 
similia de communi lege quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex prae-
cepto divino obligatur ad contrarium. Sed quantum ad esse absol-
utum in illis actubus possunt fieri a deo sine omni circumstantia 
mala an..Ylexa, et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si 
caderent sub praecepto divino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita 
cadunt sub praecepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad oppo-
si ta eorum non potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene 
exercere, quia non fiunt meritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto 
divino et si fierent a viatore meritorie, tu..Ylc non dicerentur 
nee nominarentur "furtum," "adulterium," "odium," etc." 
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It is consistent with Ockham's principles to suppose that 
the command to follow Right Reason could be changed by God's 
absolute power·. Unfortunately, Ockham never treats the possi-
bility of this divine precept being retracted. However, the 
command to love God could be changed and Ockham considers this 
act as intrinsically and necessarily virtuous. 71 Thus, while 
the possibility remains that the mandate to follow Right Reason 
could change it does not follow that Right Reason is not a nee-
essary and essential cause of a virtuous act. Philotheus Boehner 
has shown that an actual divine command to hate God would result 
in absurdity or an ethical antimony; i.e., the obedient hate of 
God would be love for God. 72 In the same way, an antimony would 
71ockham frequently asserts that the command to love God 
might change. See preceding note; Sent., IV, q. 14, D; Quodl., 
III, q. 13. But Ockham is specific that the altruistic love of 
God is intrinsically, and necessarily right. See Quodl., III, 
q. 13; Quodl., III, q. 14. 
7211 it is well known that Ockham admitted that God can 
command by His absolute power that a person should hate Him or 
at least not love Him. It is important to note that this pos-
sibility is admitted in the purely ontological and logical realm. 
For in this realm there cannot be a contradiction, since it is 
a fact that creatures can command others to hate God; the com-
mand, therefore, is a reality, considered as a mental or spoken 
sentence, and every reality has God as its primary cause. In 
the ethical realm, however, an antimony is encountered, the only 
real antimony in Ockham's philosophy. If God commanded a crea-
ture to hate Him or simply not to love Him, the creature would 
be obliged to obey, but it could not obey since in obeying it 
would love Him." See Philosophical Writings: Ockham, pp. xlix-1 . 
. The love of God above all, as the intrinsically virtuous act, 
will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
It is interesting that although Ockham speaks of the pos-
sibility of God changing the "positive" law to love God, he still 
considers the act of loving God above all necessarily virtuous. 
In the same way, Ockham admits that God might command acts con-
trary to Right Reason (Sent., III, q. 13, G), yet he later affirms 
that "necessarily" Right Reason is required for intrinsically good 
acts. Quodl., III~ q. 15; "Sicut voluntas potest velle abstinere 
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occur should God command that a person violate Right Reason. 
Right Reason is the dictate or assent to a directive proposition; 
a directive proposition can be known naturally or known through 
revelation. The fact that God commands something to be done is 
a "right reason" for the will to perform this act. 73 Consequently, 
if God commanded the human will to elicit acts which are not con-
formed to Right Reason, Right Reason should dictate that the will 
reject Right Reason. Just as the divine command to hate God 
would result in the moral absurdity of hating God out of love for 
God, so the divine command to act contrary to Right Reason would 
result in an act which is non-conformed and conformed to Right 
propter Deum pro loco et tempore, mediante actu dictativo intel-
lectus, ita potest velle abstinere propter Deum loco et tempore, 
cum sola apprehensione illius propositionis--'Volendum est abstin-
ere propter Deum pro loco et tempore'--sine omni assentu respectu 
ejusdem. Hoc posito, tune quaero; aut ita volitio est virtuosa 
intrinsece vel non. Si sic: contra, non elicitur conformiter 
rectae rationi, quid necessario requiritur ad actum intrinsece 
virtuosum; ergo, non est virtuosa intrinsece." Here, Ockham 
clearly discusses the "assent of Right Reason" as a necessary 
cause of moral virtue. What is necessary cannot be contingent 
on the will of God. This is another example of the "distance" 
between thought and reality. The changeable form of divine com-
mands encounters certain moral "facts" which are constant. The 
necessary goodness of the love of God is one such "fact;" the 
regulative function of Right Reason's assent is another. 
73sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 293); "Ex istis sequuntur 
aliquae conclusiones. Una, quod non est respectu cuiuslibet 
~raxis est scientia practica cui notitia debeat conformari, vel 
magis proprie, cui sit nata elici conformiter .ad hoc quod sit 
recta. Et hoc quia quantumcumque de omni praxi posset esse 
aliquod dictamen verum quid debet elici vel non elici, et ita 
aliquo modo sibi conformatur, tamen aliqua est praxis mala quae 
ntillo modo potest conformiter elici rationi rectae, quia nulla 
ratio recta potest dictare earn eliciendam, sicut nulla ratio 
recta potest dictare quod inimicus est odiendus contra divinum 
praeceptum." Also see Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, K. 
r 
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Reason. Thus, while God's absolute power could issue the com-
mandment to "Hate God" and "Reject Right Reason," it would be 
impossible for.the moral agent to accomplish these deeds in 
obedience to the divine commandment. Clearly, Ockham's statements 
that Right Reason is an essential and a necessary cause of a 
74 virtuous act indicate a permanent, pervasive and indispensable 
characteristic of moral goodness which remains unaltered in the 
face of changeable divine commands. The test of "God's absolute 
power" can be used to establish necessary truth as well as con-
tingency. 
74 Sent., III, q. 13, F; "Ad primum istorum tenendo istud 
principium, quod effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis causis 
essentialibus, ex quo sequeretur quod nullurn absolutum necessario 
requiritur ad aliquem effectum nisi aliquo modo sit causa illius 
effectus et per consequens cum prudentia actualis necessario 
requiratur ad actumvirtuosum et est aliquo modo prior, necessario 
sequitur quod actus prudentiae sit vera causa efficiens essen-
tialiter et necessario requisita ad acturn virtuosum, ita essen-
tialiter sicut voluntas necessario requiritur tanquam causa 
efficiens ad hoc, quod sit virtuosus vel meritorius, et consequens 
sequitur ultra quod suspensa activitate voluntatis vel actus 
prudentiae nullo modo dicitur talis actus virtuosus. Et ratio 
est; quia virtuosum et viciosum sunt nomina connotativa et signi-
ficant ipsum actum non absolute sed connotando cum hoc activitatem 
voluntatis et prudentiae, et quando deficit aliquid connotatum 
non dicitur talis actus virtuosus. Et si dicas quod talis actus 
per positurn elicitur effective a voluntate conformiter rationi 
rectae secundum alias circumstantias requisitas, igitur est 
virtuosus. Respondeo, actum elici conformiter rationi rectae est 
ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem et dictantem 
talem actum esse eliciendum, quid quidem 'dictare' sive 'regulare' 
non est aliud quam speciali modo illum actum causare." Because 
Right Reason is an essential and a necessary cause of virtuous 
acts, Ockham says that a voluntary act conformed to Right Reason 
cannot be evil. "Si quaeratur utrum ille habitus acquis.itus ex 
actu detestandi peccatum propter Deum sit virtuosus vel non. 
Respondeo quod sic, cuius ratio est, quia inclinat ad actus con-
formes rationi rectae et actus sunt ita boni quod non possunt 
esse mali." Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, X. Acts which are "so good 
that they cannot .. be evil" are necessarily good acts. AJ.so see · 
§.ent., IV, q. 3, L. 
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Right Reason is a condition or necessary cause of morality 
because of the divine command. But what rarely is noticed is that 
Ockham also teaches that the directive "The will ought to conform 
to Right Reason" is known per g. 75 "Without any precept of a 
superior" the moral agent knows the truth of this directive. 
When the terms of this proposition are understood, the intellect 
immediately and necessarily assents to this statement as evident 
and true. Ockham considers analytic propositions as "evident" 
because intuitive knowledge of the meanings of the constitutive 
terms is sufficient to assert the truth of the statement. In-
tuitive knowledge of the meaning of the terms "will" and "Right 
Reason" immediately causes the dictate or assent that, in fact, 
the will ought to conform to Right Reason. Ockham explains that: 
For this, that a correct act be first elicited by the 
will, some right reason in the intellect is necessarily 
required. This is clear through reason and authorities; 
through reason because that will which can act well or 
badly regarding itself, because of itself it is not 
necessarily right, requires some directing rule other 
than itself for this, that the will act correctly. 
This is clear, because for that reason the divine will 
does not require some directing rule, because that will 
is the first directing rule and cannot act badly; but 
our will is like this because it can act correctly and 
incorrectly, thus it requires some directing reason. 
Through authority it is clear through the definition of 
75o\J.od1., II, q. 14; "Sed disciplina moraJ.is non-positiva 
est scientia demonstrativa. Probo, quia noticia deducens con-
clusicnes syllog.istice ex principiis per se notis vel per exper·-
ientir.i.m sci t.ts, est demonstrati va; huiusmodi est disciplina rnor-
alis, ergo et cetera. Major est manifesta. Minor probatur, quia 
mul ta sunt pri:nci~1ia :per se nota in philosophia morali; puta, 
quod 'Volunt3.s de bet E~e conformare rectae rat.ioni'." See D. 
Webering, O.? .M., 'l'heory cf pPmonstratJ.o!:?:. /1.c~_s:_0:cding to William 
£! Ockham (St. BonaveTiture, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, Philosophy 
series, 10; J.9:53), for an exceJ.lent and pertinent study of Ock-. 
ham's understarJding of demonstrative knowledge. 
virtue in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics 
that 'Virtue is an elective habit consisting in the 
mean determined by reason' etc •.• And there are many 
other authorities for this point that an act cannot 
be right and virtuous unless it have Right Reason.76 
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The will is a rational, active potency capable of produc-
ing or not producing volition freely, contingently and indiffer-
ently: this is known on the basis of inner-experience. To call 
volition right or wrong requires that some standard or criterion 
be applied to the acts of will which sub-divides free actions into 
correct and incorrect actions. The standard or rule which deter-
mines free acts as good or bad is the judgment of Right Reason. 
It is the nature of Right Reason to dictate what ought to be 
done. It happens when I say, "Yes, I should do this," that a 
particular act is required. "Doing this" is implied by saying 
"yes." The practical principle that the will should conform to 
Right Reason, therefore, is grounded on evident facts of human 
psychology known by anyone who has affirmed a directive statement. 
Unfortunately, Ockham does not analyze the logical struc-
ture of this directive--the will ought to conform to Right Reason 
76sent., III, q. 13, B; "Ad quaestionem primo sciendum est 
quod ad hoc quod actus rectus prirno eliciatur a voluntate neces-
sario requiritur aliqua recta ratio in intellectu. Hoc patet per 
rationem et auctoritates; per rationem quia illa voluntas quae 
potest quantum est de se bene agere et male, quia de se non est 
recta necessario, ad hoc quod recte agat indiget aliqua regula 
dirigente alj_a a se. Hoc patet, quia ideo voluntas di.vina non 
indiget aliquo c3.irigente, quia illa est p::·ima regula d:i.recti va 
et non potest male agere; sed nostra volu.ntas est huiuzmodi quia 
potest recte et :non recte agere, igitur indiget aliqua ratione 
dirigente. Per auctoritatem patet per diffinitionem virtutis, 
II ~ic2£_ll!ll, qucd 'virtus est habi tus electi vus consistens in 
medio determinata. ratione' etc. Et multae aliae auctoritates sunt 
ad hoc quod non po-test esse actus rectus et virtuosus ni.si habeat 
rationem rectam.~ See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6, 
llO?a. Another persuasion is given by Ockha.m in Sent., IVi q. 3,L. 
I 
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--to confirm that it is known per se. Nevertheless, this direc-
tive can be corroborated by reference to Ockham's treatment of 
".E..er ~" knowl~dge. Ockham hold$ that every necessary proposition 
is known "through itself" in either the first or the second mode. 
In the first mode, "per se" indicates that nothing signified by 
the predicate is extrinsic to what is signified by the subject of 
the proposition: in the second mode, "per ~" indicates that 
what is signified through the predicate is really distinct from 
what is signified through the subject. 77 In both the first and 
second mode, per .§_£ indicates "direct and proper" predication, 
and that "the cause of the other" is predicated. 78 The proposition 
77sent., Prologue, q. 6 (I, 178 and 180); "Circa primum, 
dico quad omnis propositio necessaria est per se primo modo vel 
secundo modo. Hoc patet quia omnis simpliter necessaria .... 
Potest dici quod per se primo modo et per se secundo modo 
dupliciter accipiuntur distingui: Uno modo, quando praedicatum 
non dicit aliquid totaliter distinctum ab importato per subjectum 
primo. Et tune dicitur 'per se primo modo', quando nihil impor-
tatum per praedicatum, tamquam praedicabile de illo praedicato 
universaliter et non solum particulariter, est totaliter extrin-
secum subjecto. Et sic nihil praedicatur per se primo modo nisi 
per se superiora et partes intrinsecae rei, vel importantia 
praecise partes rei. Per se autem secundo modo dicitur illud 
quad importat aliquid distinctum realiter ab importato per sub-
jectum, sicut hie: 'omnis homo est risibile;' 'Deus est creati-
vus, 1· et sic de aliis." This text is discussed by Robert Guelley, 
Philosophie et Theologie ... , pp. 215-217. Also, E. A. Moody, The 
Logic ... , pp. 234-36; and Leon Baudry, Lexigue Philosophigue .•. , 
pp. ·196-99, offer useful analyses of Ockham's notion of "per se" 
knowledge, and fill out this text from the Ordinatio with later 
statements of Ockham in the Summa Totius Logicae. Ockham's com-
ment that "nee potuit esse falsa" is an important characteristic 
of necessary and per~ nota propositions which sheds light on the 
distinction between intrinsically necessary and accidentally nec-
essary propositions. Pertaining to ethical norms which are known 
]er .§.£, Ockham certainly does not conceive of a time prior to the 
divine commands of revelation in which such moral norms "were able 
to be false." 
78summulae in Libras Physicorum, II, c, 8; "Ad cuius 
evidentiam est sciendum quad 'per se' et 'per accidens' 
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t 1 "The will ought to conform to Right Reason," therefore, is known 
f,. 
r ~, £,e.£ ~ in the second mode because the act of Right Reason signi-
fied by the pre:dicate is extrinsic t0 the act of will signified 
by the subject. Simply by knowing the terms or concepts which 
constitute this proposition, it is evident that this predication 
\ 
.is direct and proper because Right Reason and the will are the 
ordered, essential causes of a virtuous act. Because Right Reason 
is the rule of volition, the will ought to conform to Right Reason. 
-
.An analysis of this practical principle from Ockham's logical 
point of view would be helpful. In its absence, we simply echo 
Ockham's position that this directive is known per~' and is 
logically necessary and universal--characteristics shared by all 
principles of demonstrative science. 79 
As the moral function of .the intellect, Right Reason 
dictates what ought to be done by the will. The intellect assents 
to, or judges to be true, necessary and contingent propositions 
multipliciter capitur primo Posteriorum quia aliqua sunt, in 
quibus omnia sunt necessaria, et ubi est praedicatio directa et 
propria et illi dicuntur 'per se' primo modo vel secundo modo ..• 
Aliter accipitur 'per se' et 'per accidens" in propositio, quod 
illa propositio dicitur 'per se' et non 'per accidens' in qua 
praedicatur propria causa de aliquo, scilicet, quando in subjecto 
exprimitur propria causa praedicati, sicut ista est per se, 
'aedif'icator aedificat,' vel 'est causa domus.'" Cf. Post. 
Analytics, I, 4 (73a 12-27). The history of the scholastic treat-
ment of "propositions known through themselves" is covered by 
Rainulf Schmucker, frc.2£.ositio p(r se nota. Gottesbeweis und ihr 
Verhaltnis nach Petrus Aureoli Franziskanische Forschungen, Heft 
'S; Werl. 1:-W.;"DrucK"erei, 1941). 
7911Every proposition belonging to 
must be necessary, per..§.£ and universal." 
.Q.f Demonstration •.. , p. 32. 
a demonstrative proof 
Webering, The Theory 
r 
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80 because the propositions convey the facts. In distinction to 
the intellectu~l assent to a speculative proposition, the mental 
assent to a directive proposition presents an obligation to the 
will. The difference between speculative and practical assent is 
affirmed by Ockham when he calls the latter assent a "dictate. 1181 
80sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 16); 11 ••• Quia nulli assentimus 
per intellectum nisi quod verum reputamus; nee dissentimus nisi 
quod falsum aestimamus. 11 Also see Quodl., IV, q. 17; "Alius est 
actus assentiendi quo assentio alicui ita quod actus assentiendi 
referatur ad aliquid, assentiendo complexo vel dissentiendo; puta, 
assentiendo huic propositioni 'Haec propositio, homo est animale, 
est propositio vera,' ubi haec propositio 'homo est animale' est 
subjectum. Sed assentio huic propositioni 'homo est animale' in 
se et absolute. Et hoc quia scio quod sic importatur per istam 
propositionem sicut est in re." 
81sent., III, q. 11, X; "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo 
objecto diligibili, sine omni dictamine rationis, potest voluntas 
illud diligere, et iste est bonus moraliter quia diligit quid 
diligendum est etc., puta si formetur hoc complexum, "Hoc bonum 
est diligibile" et intellectus non assentiat; tune est dubiurn 
utrum illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus 
ille sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non 
est virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur 
conformiter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et 
quod habens talem actum sit sciens. Unde dicit Philosophus sec-
undo Ethicorum, primo quod sit sciens, deinde quod sit eligens 
(Nie. Ethics, II, 9, 1109a 20-29); 1mde si modo omnes circum-
stantiae requisitae ad actum virtuosum praeter rectam rationem 
ponantur, non erit ille actus perfecte virtuosus. Et sciendum 
quod actus dictandi intellectus non est formaliter complexus, sed 
est actus assentiendi vel dissentiendi complexo jam formate, et 
ex illo actu assentiendi generatur prudentia. Non autem ex form-
atione complexi." Also see Sent., III, q. 13, F. 
Both Aristotle and Augustine substantiate Ockham's posi-
tion that an act must be done knowingly and willingly to be 
morally good or bad. This quotation clarifies what Ockham means 
by !'sciens. 11 First, a person does not know what should be done 
until the intellect judges that some directive is true. Secondly 
a person must choose to follow the dictate of Right Reason; that 
is, the moral agent must intentionally execute the dictate of 
Right Reason because it is right. Both of these elements are con-· 
tained in t:he notion of "conformity to Right Reason." 
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Even the principle "the will ought to conform to Right Reason" 
roust be intellectually confirmed or "dictated" before this direc-
tive is morally binding. "Conformity," therefore, is a proportion 
which obtains between the dictate (assent) of the intellect and 
the command (assent) of the will to execute that dictate. The 
will is conformed to Right Reason when the intellectual assent 
to a directive is matched by the affective and effective volition-
al assent to that directive. And conformity to Right Reason must 
be deliberate. The will should act because of, or for the sake 
of, a practical dictate. 82 The obligation embodied in Right 
Reason's dictate is a dimension of human experience with its own 
exigencies. We are not justified in asking: Why should we do 
what we ought to do? We are not permitted to translate moral 
"ought" into "the pleasing," "the socially expedient" or even 
"the salvific." Ockham considers the "dictate" of Right Reason 
s-
as a cause and object of every good act produced by the will. 5 
82sent., III, q. 12, CCC; "Confirmatur, quia nullus actus 
est perfecte virtuosus nisi voluntas per illum actum velit dic-
tatum a recta ratione propter hoc, quod est dictatum a recta 
ratione. Quia si vellet dictatum a ratione, non quia dictatum 
sed quia delectabile vel propter aliam causam, jam vellet illud 
dictatum si solum esset ostensum propter apprehensionem sine 
recta ratione. Et per consequens, ille actus non esset virtuo-
sus, quia non eliceretur conformiter rectae rationi; quia hoc 
est elicere conformiter rationi rectae, velle dictatum a ratione 
recta propter hoc quid est dictatum. 11 Also see Quodl., III, q. 
14, and Sent., III, q. 11, X. 
83sent., III, q. 13, f; "Respondeo, actum elici conformi-
ter rationi rectae est ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regu-
lantem et dictantem talem actum esse eliciendum; quid quidem 
'die tare' si ve 'regulare' non est ali.ud quam speciali modo 'ill um 
actum causare,' sicut alibi patet. 11 Quodl., III, q. 15; " •.. ergo 
ille actus voluntatis, qui non habet istam rationem pro objecto, 
non est natus elici conformiter rationi rectae .•. 11 Right Reason 
as an object of virtuous will-acts is discussed systematically 
in the fourth chapter. 
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A person must know what is right before he can choose to do what 
is right. The intellect dictates or assents that "The will ought 
to conform to Right Reason" is true per ~ because this proposi-
tion expresses the sequence of essential, necessary causes for 
any and every virtuous act. 
When Ockham calls Right Reason a condition or necessary 
cause of moral behavior his reasons cannot be catalogued as either 
voluntaristic or rationalistic. Ockham teaches that conformity 
to Right Reason is a moral requirement because of revealed evi-
dence and the natural evidence of human psychology. This evidence 
gives necessary truth. God's will complements the rational 
determination of the inner moral order. Upon the certitude of 
free will and the normative function of Right Reason's assent, 
Ockham supports the "non-positive part" of his moral doctrine and 
his v<;:tlue theory. The simple, non-propositional act of judgment 
passed upon directive propositions and commands functions itself 
as the proximate, indispensable norm of volition. To identify 
and exhaust Ockham's doctrine of "recta ratio" with the complex, 
propositional acts of Prudence and Conscience is an unfortunate, 
vitiating oversight. The assent of Right Reason is a generic and 
formal feature of all moral behavior whereas the particular 
directives of Prudence or Conscience may or may not enter a 
concrete moral deliberation. 
According to Ockham, it is not cogent to ask why one 
should do what he judges ought to be done. On the other hand, we 
must ask vrhy the agent judges, in the first place, that sometbh1.g 
ought to be done'? 
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The Evidence for the Directives of Right Reason 
Ockham's two-sided conception of "recta ratio" permits 
that all true directives of Practical Reason be called "right 
reasons." Thus, a preliminary but trivial reason for Right 
Reason's assent is that the agent reputes the directive to be 
true. "We assent to nothing unless what we consider to be true." 
Why do we consider a proposition true? If the will ought to con-
form to Right Reason, to what should Right Reason conform? It 
·remains to establish the evidence on which the particular direc-
tives of right reason are based. 
Ockham often asserts that the intellect should not con-
sider anything as true unless there is an evident or a revealed 
reason for doing so. To be precise, the foundation of every 
warranted assent of the intellect rests in conceptual analysis, 
. s . t 84 experience, or crip ure. "Ratio," "experientia," and "aucto-
ritas" are the sources or types of evidence to which the intellect 
refers in substantiating the truth of any proposition--speculative 
or practical. The directive propositions of the Practical Intel-
lect are morally binding, (a) because Right Reason judges them 
to be true directives, and (b) because ultimately either logical 
84sent., IV, q. 3, N; "Ideo dico quantum ad istum articu-
lum quod praeter virtutes morales natas acquiri ex actibus nos-
tris, non sunt aliquae aliae ponendae. Sed istud non potest 
evidenter probari vel improbari sed quia pluralitas non est ponen-
da sine necessitate, nee apparet aliqua necessitas; nee per 
rationem nee per experientiam nee per auctoritatem ... 11 Also see 
~., I, d. 30, q. 1, E; Sent., III, q. 8, D; Sent., Prologue, 
q. 11, (I, 319-320); Epistola ad Fratres MinoreSTManchester ed., 
III, 16); and De Sacramento Altaris, ed. T. Bruce Birch (Burli1ng-
ton, Iowa: Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), p. 126. 
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analysis or experience or revelation verify these directives. We 
roust consider the psychological and metaphysical aspects of Ock-
bam' s position on valid evidence. 
The mind performs two related acts; apprehension and 
85 ~µdgment. The act of apprehension produces a concept while the 
a:ct of judgment produces "knowledge." Ockham describes these two 
, ~cts in the following way: 
I say that assent (judgment) is twofold: One, by 
which the intellect assents that something is or 
that something is not or that something is good or 
white. Another by which the intellect assents to 
some proposition. The second distinction is that 
apprehension is twofold: One is the composition 
or division or the formation of a proposition. The 
other which is the cognition of the proposition it-
self already formed just as the cognition of white-
ness is called apprehension.86 
Assent or judgment, therefore, must concern an object which is 
apprehended. The first kind of judgment has an individual thing 
for an object. Assent in this sense forms a proposition. The 
second kind of judgment. has a "complex," i.e., a proposition, for 
an object. This second type of judgment includes those 
85sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 16); "Inter actus intellectus 
sunt duo actus quorum unus est apprehensivus, et est respectu 
cuius libet quod potest terminare actum potentiae intellectivae, 
sive sit complexum sive incomplexum; quia non solum apprehendimus 
incomplexa sed etiam propositiones et demonstrationes et impos-
sibilia et necessaria et universaliter omnia quae respiciuntur 
a potentia intellectiva. Alius actus potest dici judicativus, 
quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit objectum sed etiam illi 
assentit vel dissentit. 11 
. 
860 dl V 6 II C • • d • d d 1 t uo ., , q. ; irca primum, ico quo up ex es 
'assentus;' unus quo intellectus assentit aliquid esse vel aliquid 
non esse vel aliquid esse bonum vel album, alius quo intellectus 
assentit alicui complexo. Secunda distinctio est quod duplex eq;t 
apprehensio; una est compositio vel divisio sive proposition.is 
formatio, alio qua est cognitio ipsius complexi jam formati, 
sicut cognitio albedinis dicitur apprehensio. 11 
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judgments called Right Reason. This judment assesses 
truth value of the proposition. When the intellect judges 
-hie truth or falsity of a proposition, it then possesses know-
; ' 87 
.· fedge. The truth or falsity of a statement depends upon the 
Jborrespondence between the significance of the statement and the 
... t f ff . . . .f' • d 88 actual sta e 0 a airs s1gn1~1e . Ultimately, therefore, the 
psychological causes of Right Reason's assent to "evident" direc-
.fives are acts of apprehension which point to the natures of 
_things as the real or non-conceptual foundations of moral rules. 
87Quodl., III, q. 6; "Circa primum dico quod actus assen-
tiendi duplex est sicut actus sciendi. Unus quo aliquid scitur 
' ~sse vel non esse; sicut scio quod lapis non est asinus, et tamen 
nee scio lapidem nee asinum, sed scio quod lapis non est asinus. 
Similiter assentio quod homo est animale. Alius est actus quo 
aliquid scitur quo de aliquo habetur scientia; ita quod actus 
~ciendi referatur ad aliquid.n Properly speaking, the second 
sense of "knowing" or "assenting" means that a proposition is 
considered or "referred" in terms of its truth or falsity. 
"Scientia," therefore, is to know what is true. See Aristotle, 
~ Interpretatione, 4. 
88Philotheus Boehner has examined Ockham's theory of 
truth, signification and supposition most thoroughtly. See Boeh-
ner, CoJlected .Articles, pp. 174-267. Father Boehner's studies 
indicate that Ockham's epistemology is a form of Realism, namely, 
Realistic Conceptualisrn. Ockham teaches an immediate causal 
connection between reality and conception; his doctrine of intui-
tive and abstractive cognition is meant to insure the immediacy 
of this causal connection. Regarding Ockham's theory of truth, 
Boehner says: "Verum and Falsurn predicated about a proposition 
mean or express the correspondence between the proposition and 
the fact; i.e., between the proposition as signum and the fact 
as significatum. If, therefore, the proposition signifies the 
state of thing or the thing as it is, the proposition is true; 
if it signifies as it is not, the proposition is false." (p. 200) 
To justify this analysis Boehner quotes Expositi.Q. Aurea, In Peri-
herm., Prooem.,: "Sed veritas et falsitas sunt quaedarn praedica-
bilia de propositione importantia, quod est ita vel non est ita' 
a parte significati, sicut denotatur per propositionem, quae est 
sigm.un. Unde proposi tionem esse veram est: i ta esse in re, 
sicut significatur per eum. 11 
r I i~ 
•· I" i 
,. Regarding "revealed" directives, Ockham claims that the 
;J. 
will will can be a cause why the intellect assents to a proposi-
tion. An act of the will is a psychic reason for assent to a 
proposition in two ways. First, apprehension is simply the 
recognition of an object or of a mental statement. The recogni-
. tion of a simple object results in a concept; however, apprehen-
sion cannot account for the formation of concepts into proposi-
tions. Hence, Ockham considers the will's command that a certain 
proposition be formulated as a cause of the truth or falsity of 
that proposition. 89 Secondly, the intellect's assent to a propo-
sition which is already formulated and apprehended, can be 
commanded by the will. Some contingent propositions are judged 
to be true because the will wishes to believe them. The will can 
freely choose to consider some propositions as authoritative and 
therefore the intellect assents to them. Because of an assent to 
one thing, e.g., God, the intellect will also assent to other 
. 
89sent., II, q. 25, K; 11 Ideo dico quod causa quare plus 
formatur propositio vera vel falsa, affirmativa vel negativa, est 
voluntas. Quia voluntas vult formare unam et non aliam. Et ideo 
actus qui apprehenditur post complexum formatur a notitiis incom-
plexis terminorum illius propositionis, et ab actu illius volun-
tatis et hoc generaliter; quia posito actu voluntatis quo vult 
~ale complexum formari et positis notitiis incomplexis terminorum 
J.llius complexi, necessario sequitur actus apprehendendi sive 
formandi illud complexum--sicut effectus sequitur necessario ad 
suam causam." Ockham continues in this question to affirm that 
contingent propositions can be affirmed because of authority or 
because of the will. Ibid., L; "Et si sit contingens tune illi 
assentit intellectus aliquando propter auctoritatem, aliquando 
propter voluntatem quia vult credere. 11 
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things, e.g., the divine precepts.90 
Apprehension and volition are thus the psychological 
causes of every intellectual judgment. The judgments of Right 
Reason are based upon internal acts of apprehension and acts of 
the will. The psychological causes of a judgment give the means 
by which the intellect formulates an act of assent or diss$nt. 
Ockham holds that an act of apprehension and volition must precede 
and cause every intellectual judgment. Natural directives are 
known to be true; positive mandates are believed to be true. 91 
Thus, acts of apprehension which terminate at factual matters 
verify or falsify the practical propositions which are known 
naturally; i.e., known per~ or known through experience. 92 
Acts of the will which command that the mind consider a given 
proposition as certain are psychic causes of non-evident directives. 
90sent., II, q. 25, L; "Et si sit contingens (propositio) 
tune illi assentit intellectus aliquando propter auctoritatem, 
aliquando propter volentatem, quia vult credere. Si primo modo, 
assentus respectu auctoritatis causat assentus respectu illius 
propositionis. Si secundo modo, tune volitio cum notitiis incom-
plexis et apprehensione complexi causat assentum illum. Et de 
similibus, simile est judicium, quia non potest certa ratio dari 
quomodo causatur assentus vel dissentus respectu omnium proposi-
tionum. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 21). 
91sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Intellectus nulli adheret nisi 
propter evidentj.am rei aut auctori ta tern, vel propter imperium 
volu.ntatis; sed sive sic adhereat sive sic, semper necessario 
~dher~t posito illo propter quod ad.heret, puta evidentia rei vel 
1mper1.o voluntatis. 11 . 
92sent., Prola'gue, q. 7 (I, 187); 11 0mne quid est evidenter 
notum, aut est per se notum, aut notificatum est per 'per se nota,' 
aut per experientiam mediante notitia intuitiva, et hoc mediate 
Vel immediate." Also see Quodl., IV, q. 17; and Quodl., V, q. 6; 
"Actus apprehensivus causat actum judicativum. 11 
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For a number of reasons, the positive norms of right 
reason, which are based upon a divine command, constitute the more 
sensitive issue regarding the metaphysical foundations of Right 
Reason. For one thing, the command of God could establish every 
simple action which is possible for a man to perform as a moral 
obligation. By "simple act" we mean those volitions or nolitions 
which terminate at one individual object. The same voluntary or 
physical act could be now good and later evil because the will 
of God now commands and later prohibits that action. Secondly, 
_/the positive commands of God do not express the intrinsic and 
necessary goodness or evilness of certain actions, but rather the 
divine freedom in determining which acts will be conducive to 
salvation. Thus, Iserloh, Lagarde, Garvens and others, claim 
that: (a) there is no metaphysical basis for the positive right 
reasons because they are grounded in the unrestricted freedom and 
omnipotence of the divine will and (b) there is no metaphysical 
basis for the non-positive, natural directives of right reason 
because they could be countermanded by God's absolute power to 
"posit" the contrary of any natural directive. 93 Ockham, for 
one, would not agree. 
93see E. Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie ... , pp. 58-59; 
"In bezug auf Ocl\:ham musste man sagen: Das Freigewolltsein eines 
von der Vernunft als geboten hingestellten Aktes macht dessen 
Moralitat aus. Dabei ist noch zu bedenken, dass die Vernunft fur 
das Gebotensein keine vom Sein geforderten Gri..inde beizubringen 
vermag, worauf auch de Lagarde geblihrend hinweist. Wir haben 
keinen Grund, von besonderer Rationalitat oder gar von Rational-
ismu.s in Ockhams Moralauffassung zu sprechen. Ein Weniger an 
Vernunftgebundenheit des moralischen Handelns war fur jemand, der 
r 
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The positive directives of Right Reason signify some ac-
tion which is neither good nor evil of itself; but which is 
presently a moral obligation or prohibition because of a command 
of a superior. 94 "To worship God .2!! Sunday" is a moral obligation 
"posited" by God; "To drive on the right side of the road" is an 
noch im Rahmen des Christlichen bleiben wollte, kaum moglich." 
Professor Iserloh quotes G. de Lagarde who also finds a separation 
between metaphysics and morality and concludes: "Ainsi le volun-
tarisme ockhamiste commande un rationalisme intransigeant dont 
aucune ecole n'avait encore approche-. 11 Ockham, La Morale ... , p. 
77. In his turn, Professor Lagarde quotes Anita--a:arvens' comment 
that moral norms in Ockham have no connection to the nature of 
things. Franz. Studien, 21, pp. 373-74. Earlier, and in an 
article known to Professor Garvens, Father Gallus Manser, O.P., 
had asserted a break between ontology and moral doctrine in Ock-
ham' s thought. See "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im 14. Jahr-
hundert," Jahrbuck fur Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 27 
(1912), p. 412. These systematic studies have had an influence 
upon the textbooks of the history of Medieval Philosophy. It is 
somewhat common to read that Ockham "severs the bond between 
metaphysics and ethics." 
94 Quodl., II, q. 14 (corr. by Vat. ~at., 3075. f. 20 vb); 
"Circa secundum; sciendum quod moralis doctrina habet plures 
partes, quarum una est positiva, alia non-positiva. Scientia 
humana positiva est illa quae continent leges humanas et divinas 
quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae nee bona 
sunt nee mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore, 
cuius est leges condere seu statuere. 11 Regarding the divine 
positive laws, Ockham does not mean that all the moral precepts 
which God has revealed are "positive." Many revealed directives 
can also be known naturally. See Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 347-
348); "Ad tertium dubium dico, distinguendo de habitu theologico 
practico sicut de theologico speculative, quod sicut dictum est 
in una quaestione quidam habitus theologicus speculativus est 
notitia evidens et quidam non est evidens. Ita est in proposito 
quod habitus practicus quidam est evidens, sicut ille quo eviden-
ter cognoscitur quod 'Unicuique reddendum est quod suum est.' 
'Nulli est pro bono malum reddendum.' Alius est non evidens, 
sicut ille quo cognoscitur quod 'Corpus Christi in sacramento 
altaris est adorandum,' et sic de aliis. 11 Thus, in many cases 
the revea1ed commandments reaffirm directives which are "evident" 
or known by the Practical Intellect naturally. 
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obligation "posited" by the legitimate civil authorities in the 
United States •. The intellect dictates that these acts ought to 
be done propter auctoritatem. That is, if the source of a direc-
tive is a legitimate authority "able to decide and establish 
laws," then Right Reason dictates.that directive on the basis of 
its authority. The commands to "worship God on Sunday11 or to 
"drive on the right side of the road" are not "evident;" that is, 
these directives do not command the agent to perform acts which 
are necessarily and evidently good. If these commands were put 
into propositional forms, they would be contingent propositions. 
The assent of Right Reason to these commands depends upon a prior 
assent to the source, divine or civil, of the commands and not 
upon conceptual analysis or direct experience of the positive 
directive itself. 
It is Ockham's position that many propositions of the 
Practical Intellect are dependent upon speculative or metaphysi-
cal principles. 95 That is, some practical directives can be 
95!1ent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 359-360); "Dico quod scientia 
moralis dupliciter accipitur; uno modo pro scientia quae est prae-
cise de moribus qui sunt in potestate nostra, ita quod in omni 
scito ponatur aliquid importans aliquid quod est in potestate 
nostra aliter accipitur pro illa scientia secundum quod est tra-
dita ab Aristotele et a philosophis et a Sanctis. Primo modo 
scientia moralis est simpliciter practica et nullam partem specu-
lativam habet, quia sic nullum complexum ibi habetur nisi quod 
includit aliquid importans aliquid operabile a nobis cuius not.itia 
est directiva magJs quam notitia incomplexa illius operabilis. 
Et sic scient.ia moralis non speculatur aliquod verum nisi sim-
plici ter practjcwn. Unde isto modo accipiendo scientiam moralem 
istae ve:citates 'Ornne quod est in anima vel est passio vel poten-
tia' etc., et 'Anima dividitur in intellectum practicum,' etc., 
et huiusmod:L quae ponuntur in libro Ethicorum, non pertinent ad 
scientiam mora:i.E:m. Secundo modo, tales veritates pertinent ad 
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known through speculative truths "because practical moral conclu-
sions are ul tim.ately acquired in that knowledge." Pertaining to 
the "positive" directives of God, Ockham holds that metaphysical 
scientiam moralem, et sic una pars scientiae moralis est simpli-
. citer speculativa et alia simpliciter practica. Et ratio est 
'' quia, sicut dictum est prius, mul tae conclusiones practicae 
. dependent ex principiis speculabilibus et sciuntur per ea, et 
· ideo volens tradere notitiam talium conclusionum practicarum 
,. oportet quod utatur principiis speculabilibus ex quibus conclu-
siones illae sequuntur. Et propter hoc, in scientia morali tradita 
a philosophis et a Sanctis ·inveniuntur multae veritates simpliciter 
speculativae, sed vocant earn scientiam moralem quia conclusiones 
practicae morales sunt ultima acquisita in illa scientia. 11 See 
fil.9:· (I, 314). 
96Ibid. (I, 364); "Ad aliud respondeo, quod metaphysica 
non est practica quia quamvis de Deo sint aliquae veritates prac-
-, ticae etiam naturali ter inventae, illas tamen_ non considerat meta-
physicus, quia metaphysicus non considerat aliquid de Deo quod 
sit in potestate nostra sed tantum illa quae non sunt in potestate 
nostra, sicut quod 'Deus est incorruptibilis, simplex, perpetuus) 
causa omnium' et sic de aliis, et ideo metaphysica est simpliciter 
speculativa. Illa tamen quae considerantur a metaphysica possunt 
esse principia ad probandum conclusiones practicas de Deo, sicut 
ex hoc quod 'Deus est causa omnium, est summe dil"igibilis vel 
honorandus, 1· vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed illae conclusiones 
practicae non pertinent ad metaphysicam sed ad aliquam aliam 
scientiam moralem quae erit practica." 
97 Quaestiones super Li bros Physicorum, q. 136 ;. and Quodl., 
~' q. 1, both affirm that the existence of God can be proven and 
in the former question, Ockham offers a demonstration for a "I?..ri-
~ eff~iens:" Boehner has edited and analyzed these texts in 
_ ~u.i.ie0"ect Articles, pp. 399-420. 
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E..erfectissimum?8 that God is good, 99 the practical conclusion 
follows that Gqd ought to be loved and obeyed. Ockham does not 
maintain that the positive directives of Scripture signify acts 
which are good or evil by nature. But he does assert that altru-
istic love and obedience to God are good by nature. The authority 
of divine positive laws is grounded (a), in the facts of God's 
supreme goodness and perfection which can be known through a 
natural use of reason. and (b), in the end served by the fulfill-
ment of those positive laws; namely, the love of God. Surely, 
98sent., IV, q. 7, I; "Unde argumentum de causalitate et 
activitate respectu effectus perfectioris vel imperfectioris in 
creaturis non concludit universaliter causam esse perfectiorem 
effectu; et ratio est, quia nulla creatura est causa totalis res-
pecu alicuius effectus sed tantum partialis, quia in omni actione 
creature concurrit Deus. Sed ex causalitate et activitate causae 
totalis quae est totalis vel potest esse totalis respectu cuius-
libet effectus potest argui causam esse perfectiorem effectu. Et 
sic solus deus est causa totalis vel esse potest causa totalis 
respectu cuiuslibet effectus. Ideo sequitur quod Deus sit per-
fectior omni effectu producto: aliter, enim, periret omnis via 
ad probandum Deum esse ens perfectissimum. 11 
99sent., Prologue, q. 1 (I, 7); "Ex isto sequitur quod 
aliquae veritates naturaliter notae seu cognoscibiles sunt theo-
logicae, sicut quod Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus etc., cum 
sint necessariae ad salutem; aliquae autem sunt supernaturaliter 
cognoscibiles, sicut: Deus est trinus, incarnatus et huiusmodi." 
Also see Quodl., II, q. 6. In 1326, the papal commission at 
Avignon censured Ockham for saying that "ex puris naturalibus, 
possumus cognosccre istam propositionem: Deus est summum bonum.ll 
See A. Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire eccl~siastique 18, p. 57; and J. 
Koch, "Neue AkenstU.cke zu dem gegen Wilhe1m Ockham in Avignon 
gefiihrten Prozess," Rescherch~ de Theologie ancienne et medievale 
8 (1936), pp. 169-171. The papal commission refers to Sent., I, 
d. 1, q. 5 (I, 464) in Ockham's corpus. 
r 
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Right Reason does not dictate irrationally when directing the 
will to fulfill the divine positive laws. 100 
Ockham maintains explicitly that the principles of 
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Practical Reason are non-positive directives which are valid and 
binding "sine omni praecepto superioris." Indeed, these princi-
ples govern the application of positive directives. In spite of 
God's absolute moral authority, the directives of Right Reason 
.which are known per~ cannot change. Consider the directives 
which Ocl~ham mentions as being "evident" and "known per se:" 
the will ought to conform to Right Reason; every evil is avoid-
able and should be avoided; everything honest should be done; 
every dishonesty should be avoided; 101 everything determined by 
Right Reason to be done for the sake of a determined end and also 
concerning the other circumstances, should be done; every good 
dictated by reason should be elicited. 102 The truth of such 
propositions does not depend upon a positive command of God; 
their evidence rests in the meaning of the constitutive concepts. 
As universal, necessary and "per ~ nota" directives, conceptual 
lOOindeed, Ockham is explicit that the obligation to obey 
God is consequent to "some cognition of God." Sent., I, d. 48, 
q. 1, D: "Dicendum quod aliquis talis quo complacet voluntati 
omne illud quid complacet voluntati divinae, qui debet esse sem-
per in omni honeste usum rationis postquam ad aliqualem Dei cogni-
tionem attingerit vel potuit attingere. 11 Also see Sent., III, 
q. 12, PP. where Ockham claims that the directive 11 Nullus est 
inducendus ad faciendum contra praecepta Dei sui" is known per se. 
--
101 Quodl., II, q. 14. 
102 Sent., III, q. 11, Z. 
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analysis can show these norms are true by definition. Ockham's 
definition of '.'moral good" and the derivation of virtue-defini-
tions from the primary value term will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. For now, we merely assert that "moral good" is something 
which should be willed according to Right Reason; a moral evil 
is something which should not be willed according to Right Reason. 
The directives which are per ~ ~ are various restatements of 
Ockham's basic definition of good or evil. In a given situation, 
to tell a falsehood might be a "positive" right or wrong, but in 
either case the moral agent is evidently obliged to pursue what 
is right and flee what is wrong. Thus, these evident norms of 
morality do not signify absolutely the simple nature of some 
action; rather, they are composed of connotative concepts which 
signify an action and connote acts of will and Right Reason. 
Divine commands or circumstances could change "what" is now 
proper, but propositions known per~ would still be valid direc-
tives on "how" the agent should respond to the changeable com-
mands and circumstances. The norms of morality which are 
necessary and known through themselves are formal or analytically 
true statements. The meaning of these norms remains constant in 
spite of variable circumstances and the mutable will of God, which 
might alter the moral determination of particular acts. The 
validity of the natural or "evident" directives of Right Reason 
depends logically upon the meaning of moral goodness and 
r 
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metaphysically upon the nature of moral goodness. 103 Thus, the 
search for the.foundations of the evident 11 Right Reasons" keeps 
returning to the executive powers of morality--the free will and 
assent of Right Reason which cause and define moral goodness. 
The principles of Practical Reason are "formal" directives in 
that they describe and prescribe the generic features of moral 
behavior rather than specific acts. Indeed, with Ockham it ap-
.pears that human nature as a moral norm shrinks to the imperative-
giving nature of Right Reason's judgment. 
The formalistic character of the directives of Right 
Reason which are known per se has been noticed before~04That is 
l03Quodl., III, q. 14; "Nullus actus est moraliter bonus 
vel virtuosus nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rat-
ionem, vel quia causatur a tali velle, puta, velle honorare 
patrem vel continuare honorem quia volo facere quid recta ratio 
dictat. Et similiter, volo benefacere tibi quia volo quid dictat 
recta ratio .•. Et ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam ipse 
actus qui debite elicitur secundum rectam rationem." Thus, in 
answer to the question, What is moral goodness or rectitude? Ock-
ham responds that it is the will act itself ·which is elicited in 
conformity to Right Reason. This metaphysical stance supports 
the prescriptive propositions which are known per se. Ockham 
explicitly makes the connection between Right Reason and the fac-
tual state of affairs. See Sent., III, q. 13, S; "hoc solum voco 
realiter apparenter bonum vel malum, quid judicatur ab intellectu 
bonum vel malum. Et si judicetur ab intellectu recto, non errante, 
esse tale, tune non solum est apparenter bonum vel malum sed 
realiter, quia sic dictat intellectus esse sicut est in re." 
Needless to say, Ockham considers the laws ordained by God as 
"revealed" facts which an "unerring" use of Reason would recognize. 
.. 
104E.g., Anita Garvens, Franz Studien, 21, p. 248; "Wenn 
fur Ockham die allgemeinen ethischen Prinzipien schliesslich doch 
mehr als nur formaJ.e Satze sind, wie im Laufe der folgenden 
Untersuchung sich zeigen wird, so liegt das vornehmlich in seiner 
glaubigen Annahme der Offenbarung als der Erkenntnisquelle fur 
die vom Willen Gottes festgesetzte Sittenregel, die augenblicklich 
und ordinate giiltig ist. Sie allein liefert Ockham den Inhalt 
r 
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to say, these directives are a priori statements which are true 
by definition put which give little information about concrete 
acts. These general directives are not self-sufficient in estab-
lishing which particular acts are good or evil. A person knows 
by conceptual analysis that to do what is right remains his 
unchangeable obligation; but on the basis of a directive which 
is known per .§§., the moral agent does not know what particular 
act is right. Likewise, we know a priori that it is either 
raining or not raining outside; but without knowing whether or 
not we should take an umbrella. 
While it is true that the universal norms called "right 
reasons," which are known per.§§., have a formal character; never-
theless, Ockham provides a mechanism for adding "content," i.e., 
reaching particular, practical conclusions. Namely, Ockham's 
analysis of recta ratio as prudence indicates how a person applies 
general norms, whether they are known through revelation or 
through themselves, to particular situations. It is the function 
der sicheren allgemeinen ethischen Prinzipien." Erwin Iserloh 
calls Ockham's ethic a "formalism" because the meaning of all 
moral directives reduces to conformity to the will of God. Gnade 
~ Eucharistie •.. , pp. 66-67. 
It is undeniable that, for Ockham, the general ethical 
principles which are known per se, are formalistic statements. 
It is not true, however, that the will of God is the only means 
of determining what particular acts are good or evil. The divine 
will adds "positive" content to the general propositions of moral 
science. But also, acts of prudence are means by which general 
principles are brought to particular, practical conclusions which 
are known naturally. See Sent., III, q. 15, G. And given a 
"contentful" directive issued by God, e.g., "parents should be 
honored," this directive is operative only through an experiential, 
J?rudential judgment, e.g., "these are my parents. 11 See SummulaEl 
1g Libros fhysicorum, I, c. 4. 
j; ;· 
~·. 
r ~ 
f ~ 
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of prudence to consider the various circumstances of an act as 
determinants of the correctness of that act. 105 Experience is 
a necessity for the proper determination of a moral question 
since the particular and individual aspects of an act--e.g., the 
principal object or end, the common object which is the exercise 
of a human potency, the time and the place--affect the propriety 
of that act. 106 For Ockham, morality is not simply a question of 
deductions from a priori norms. The effort to know what is right, 
L 
i· 
105
sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, C; "Sicut ostensum est prius, 
, logica, rhethorica,grammatica et artes mechanicae sunt simpliciter 
t practicae et tamen non sunt dictativae, sed dictamen de exercitio 
illarum notitiarum practicarum non pertinet ad istas artes sed 
ad prudentiam pertinet. Quod, autem, ad prudentiam pertineat 
patet quia omnis actus imperatus qui virtuose elici potest ad 
prudentiam pertinet. 11 Also see, Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316); 
"Potest tamen distingui de practica, quia quaedam est dictativa 
et quaedam tantum ostensiva. Prima est illa qua determinate 
dictatur aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum; et sic loquitur 
Philosophus VI Ethicorum et III De Anima. Et isto modo nee logica 
nee grammatica nee rhetorica estpractica, nee etiam ars quaecum-
que mechanica, quia nulla istarum dictat aliquid esse faciendum 
vel fugiendum, sicut ars mechanica non dictat quod domus est 
facienda, sed hoc pertinet ad prudentiam qua scitur quando est 
facienda et quando non, et quando est operandum et quando non ... 
sed ad prudentiam pertinet dictare quod tali tempore est facienda 
vel sic est agendum vel sic." 
106
sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae 
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus; ita quod 
finis in omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patuit, 
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria, partialia respectu 
illius actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc quod actus voluntatis 
quo aliquis vult orare deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur 
de necessitate istae circumstantiae: quia velit orare propter 
honorem dei seclrr1dum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statuto, 
... puta, die dominico, in loco determinato, puta, in ecclesia; tune, 
iste actus sic virtuosus habet honorem dei pro objecto principali, 
actum orandj pro objecto communi, rectam rationem, diem dominicum 
et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus." 
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.. ,here a:nd now, requires that a person consider the variable factors 
of each situat~on. The concrete decision that "I should do this," 
or "I should not do this" involves the facts which surround this 
t The circumstances or obJ·ects of a will-act are various ac · 
,determinants of the act's virtuousness. Likewise, these circum-
stances are the various means or criteria by which the intellect 
can determine the propriety of an intended act. 
The positive directives of Right Reason, therefore, which 
are based upon divine authority depend on the fact that God is 
~h~ Summum Bonum. 107 The evident directives which are known per 
. ; 
.se are verified by the nature of a good act. In either case, the 
:-
dictate of Right Reason is generated for the sake of an end; 108 
l07Sent., I, d. 1, q. 4 (I, 447); "Ad secundum dico, quod 
.sol us- Deus est summe diligendus, quia est summum bonum." Also, 
Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 375-376); "Secunda conclusio est quod 
, .Deus non est objectum usus ordinati, quia si sic, aut esset 
objectum volitionis ordinatae aut nolitionis. Non nolitionis, 
.quia nullus potest ordinate odire Deum; nee volitionis, quia tune 
posset aliquid plus amari ordinate quam Deus. Similiter, finis 
ultimus non est ad aliquid aliud referibilis, sed Deus est sim-
pliter finis ultimus. 
Tertia conclusio est quod omne aliud a Deo potest esse 
objectum usus ordinati. Hoc probatur, quia omne aliud a summe 
acceptato potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter summe 
acceptatum; sed Deus ordinate summe acceptatur, ergo omne aliud 
a Deo potest ordinate assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter 
·neum." 
108sent., Prologue; q:. 10 (I, 290-291); "Circa primum 
dico quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum 
practicorum et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo 
intellectus practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de 
aliquo fine judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et 
hoc est intelligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod af-
firmat aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum princi-
piurn practicum in operando. Et hoc modo dicit Philosophus quod 
'sicut principium in speculabilibus, ita finis in agibilibus.' Et 
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~ the end in the former case being the Ultimate End; in the latter 
case being the production of a moral end or obligatory act. Ock-
nam shows no fear that the validity of divine positive laws might 
undermine the validity of the formal principles of Right Reason. 
On the contrary, Ockham teaches a single moral doctrine which 
contains positive and evident norms. The moral principles which 
are known per ~ give the structure and framework of moral deci-
sions. Right Reason necessarily assents to these principles 
because they invariably signify ~he essential causes of moral 
.goodness. Positive laws add content to this .austere framework. 
Right Reason assents to the divine positive laws as deriving from, 
and conducive to, the Greatest Good. It is then, with the con-
tent or specific norms of morality that Ockham finds a certain 
"relativity" here. Those who call Ockham a moral voluntarist are 
partially correct. But only partially. Reason as well as faith 
militate against an intrinsic, native and unchangeable moral value 
in simple acts. 
Consider the Decalogue or Ten Commandments as examples of 
non-formal, moral norms since these directives command or prohibit 
specific acts as good or evil. The formal directives or universal 
"right reasons" which are known per .§.Q command goodness and pro-
. hibit evilness in general; the Decalogue precepts determine certain 
acts as good or evil. Are the ten commandments "evident," or are 
they positive norms? 
ratio huius est, quia voluntas nihil agit nisi propter finem .•• 11 
See Aristotle; Physics, II, c. 9 (200a 15-24). 
r 
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Ockham never speaks of the Decalogue as moral rules which 
are known per~ in the philosophical-theological works. 109 
l09In the political works, Ockham finds occasion to dis-
cuss the notions of common law, natural law, and j(s gentium more 
extensively. In the Opus Nonaginta Die~, c. 99 Manchester ed., 
II, 747); for example, Ockham claims that the Ten Commandments 
were part of the law of nature before they were promulgated by 
Moses. In the same work Ockham asserts that the natural law is 
immutable (c. 66, p. 581). In the Octo Quaestiones de Potestate 
Papae, q. 1, c. 12 (Man~hester ed.,--r;-245); Ockham speaks of 
certain laws of the Old Testament which are known to oblige with-
out dis~ensation. In the Dialogus III, II, I, X (Lyons edition, 
F. 235r), Ockham considers the Decalogue precepts as "absolute 
natural precepts" and without any condition, modification or 
determination. These texts might incline one to think that the 
commandments of the Decalogue are known per se since they are 
characterized by immutability and unchangeableness. Such is not 
the case. Ockham recognizes the right of the Creator to counte_r-· 
mand the laws of nature. "Secunda absurditas est quad papa de 
plenitudine potestatis posset contra legem divinam et jus naturae, 
praesertim in hiis in quibus potest Deus contra huiusmodi; et ita, 
quemad.modum Deus praecepit--nec contra fas praecepit--Abrahae ut 
filium suum innocentem occideret, quia Deus est dominus vitae et 
mortis, cum tamen ad legem divinam et jus naturae pertineat non 
occidere innocentem, posset papa de plenitudine potestatis praeci-
pere fidelibus occidere innocentes, et fideles Christi obedirent; 
quod sapit haeresim manifestam." An PrinceI?s, c. 5 (Manchester 
ed., I, 245). If there are cases in which natural laws, such as 
the law not to take an innocent life, are not in effect; there 
are also cases in which the divine laws are not operative. "Si 
enim leges, non solum humanae, sed etiam divinae, in necessitate 
cessant et in eis excipitur necessitas ... multo fortius privilegia 
humana cessant et in eis necessitas excipi debet. 11 (Ibid., c. 8, 
p. 259). --
. These texts from Ockham's polemical tracts indicate that 
he considers the Ten Commandments to be natural laws and revealed, 
divine laws. There are exceptions to the validity of these man-
dates; both because God can order the opposite of some mandate and 
because human events admit of extreme situations in which these 
mandates are dispensed. Ockham implies that these special cases 
or exceptions "prove the rule;" rather than denying validity of 
the prohibition against killing, for instance, the case of Abraham 
or the case of a just war, reveal the spirit or intention of the 
law. Ewart Lewis' study of Ockham's political ideas (Medieval 
Political Ideas, Vol. II, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954) finds 
that the Venerabile Inceptor makes constant use of the principle 
that the authority of an office or a law is measured by the e:ad 
for which that office or law exists. " Thus in Occam's system 
the normal pattern of government in the Christian commonwealth, 
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; ~owever, Ockham does mention that certain revealed mandates can 
pe known naturally. For instance, the directives that "Unicuique 
reddendum ~ guid ~ est," "Nulli est pro bono malum reddendum, 11 
-~d "~ est honorandus" are known through scripture and "evi-
110 dently." Furthermo:i;e, the acts of P-_raying and giving alms are 
generically good while acts of theft and fornication are evil "ex 
111 genere." On the basis of these texts, it would seem that Ock-
·ham considers the precepts of the decalogue as "evident" or 
.naturally known moral norms. On the other hand, Ockham says that 
''hate for God, theft, adultery, etc.," are acts which could be 
~one meritoriously by the earthling, implying that the Decalogue 
is a series of divine, positive laws which could change 
was bordered by a frontier of special cases which required a more 
tundamental criterion than could be derived from traditional right 
or official fiat. For the solution of problems that arose on 
that frontier he was willing to make use of precedent and canon 
l~w, but he would not admit their validity against the imperative 
'of a particular situation. Even the prescriptions of revelation 
must be understood 'with their exceptions."' (p. 551, Lewis re-:-
ters to De Imperatorum, c. 11; and Breviloquium, II, c. 14, in 
support of his statement.) The "exceptions" to natural or _divine 
law are those peripheral situations in which such laws were not 
intended to be authoritative; the "exceptions" clarify the appli-
cation of the rule. 
110 ) Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348 and 364. See above, 
note 94. -
111
sent., III, q. 12, N; "Sexta distinctio est quod ali-
q~is actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstan-
tia, aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad 
actum bonum ex genere, sicut orare, dare elemosinam sive velle 
talia facere absolute sine omni circumstantia bona vel mala. 
~xemplum quantum ad actum malum ut furtum facere, velle fornicari 
absolute sine aliquae circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus di~ 
cunt philosophi et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt cum 
malitia." 
·1 112 JDOillentari Y· 
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If the Ten Commandments are simply positive pre-
cepts, then the acts which are commanded or forbidden there, can-
not be evidently known as "good" or "evil." A reference to Duns 
f scotus, with whom Ockham is in basic agreement regarding the 
K , ~ Decalogue, will set the stage for Ockham's own view. 
~ i~ Scotus asserts that most of the Ten Commandments do not 
r belong to the "law of nature," strictly speaking. The commands 
,. 
5· ! of the Second Table--Honor thy father and mother, Do not bear 
f 
r 
' 
' 
,. 
false witness, Do not commit adultery, etc.--cannot be known per 
f -~ nor deduced from principles known per ££· One reason for 
· Scotus' position is that the bible and experience offers examples 
~-
t of situations in which these commandments were dispensed. For 
" 
" 
instance, the Israelites were com.~anded to despoil the Egyptians 
before the exodus, and persons in extreme need may take what is 
' necessary to preserve their life, although both of these cases 
-'appear contrary to the prohibition against stealing. 113 Scotus, 
-however, after a lengthy analysis of the "relativity" of most of 
the precepts of the Decalogue, continues in the next question to 
say that every lie is a sin. 114 His reason is that the term "lie" 
112 Sent., II, q. 19, O; Sent., IV, q. 14, D • .See below, 
·note 116. --
ll3Scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 37, q. unica, nos. 5-10. 
· S~e Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M.-,-Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of 
Hi~ PhilosoJ2hY, trans. by Bernadine Bonansea (Washington: Catholic 
.University Press, 1961), pp. 170-174; and C. R. S. Harris, Duns 
Scotus, Vol. II, The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns Scotus--COX-
ford: The Clarendon Press, 1927'J'":-pp. 304-310;-for these texts and 
competent surveys of Scotus' ethics. 
114 Scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 38, q. unica, n. 6 (XV, 870); 
"Aliter dicitur quodlffientiri' ex ratione sua dicit intentionem 
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implies a bad and blameworthy intention on the part of the agent. 
In the same way, Ockham maintains that the prohibitions 
against the simple acts designated by the terms "murder," "adult-
ery," and "covetousnes~" are not necessary and immutable laws of 
morality. Ockham takes the relativity of moral norms further 
than Scotus did since the Subtle Doctor held that at least the 
command to love God was the necessary and unchangeable standard 
of morality. 115 Ockham holds that God could validly command a 
person to hate Him. Yet, Ockham speaks of acts that are "generic-
ally good;" and non-formal precepts of the Decalogue which are 
evident. Ockham clarifies this ambiguity by considering the 
terminology contained in the moral prohibitions. "Theft," 
"adultery," and "hate for God" are wrong acts because these terms 
co-signify prohibitive circumstances; and the divine commands are 
moral "circumstances" for Ockham. 116 Such terms indicate a 
malam, quia intentionem decipiendi; licet autem aliqui actus non 
includentes intentionem malam, possint aliquando esse boni ex 
aliqua bona circumstantia, actus tamen includens secum intentionem 
malam, nunquam potest esse bonus quia includit formaliter malum 
'velle,' ita est in proposito." 
115scotus, Comm. Ox., III, d. 37, q. unica, n. 5 (XV, 
826); "De praecepti"S"aUtemprimae tabulae .•. ista sunt stricte de 
lege naturae, quia sequitur necessario si est Deus, est amandus 
ut Deus ... " Ockham asserts that the command "hate God" or "Do not 
love God" could issue from God as sole cause. But he insists that 4!! every instan_£_El:, the complex act of "loving God above all" is 
intrinsically and necessarily good. Quodl., III, q. 13. 
116
sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium 
Dei, furari-;-acrulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et 
E.~m~lia de ..£2.!Q!!lUni lege, quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto 
~J.VJ.no obligatur ad contrarium; sed quantum ad esse absolutum in 
illis actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala 
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[ deliberate violation of a moral obligation which the agent recog-
~~ 
~ nizes. The physical act signified by "theft" or "adultery" could 
be done without guilt, but only on the condition that extreme 
circumstance or a direct command of God dispense one from his 
Qbligation to the contrary. 
Ockham requires that the necessity attributed to the 
f Decalogue precepts be logically apparent. When the divine com-
f ~·. mands are stated proposi tional1y, or when the mind formulates 
, 
~. 
~,'" 
~ these directives through natural evidence, their necessary truth ~-l derives from the constitutive concepts. If the Decalogue precepts 
t !~.:.'. . signify the "absolute being" of specific acts, then they are not .· necessarily true. If, on the other hand, these mandates signify 
l.: annexa. Et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore, si caderent 
t(.. sub praecepto di vino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposi ta cadunt 
·. sub praecepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad opposita 
eorum non potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene exercere; 
• quia non fiunt meritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto divino et ~ si fierent a viatore meritorie, tune non dicerentur nee nominaren-
tur 'furtum,' 'adulterium,' 'odium,' etc., quia ista nomina sig-
nificant tales actus non absolute sed connotando vel dando in-
t telligere quod faciens tales actus per praeceptum divinum obliga-
~ tur ad oppositum et ideo quantum ad totum significatum quid 
L nominis talium nominum significant circumstantias malas; et quan-
J tum ad hoc intelligunt sancti et philosophi quod ista statim nom-
, inata convoluta sunt cum malicia. Si autem caderent sub praecepto 
J divino, tune faciens tales actus non obligaretur ad oppositum et 
f 
per consequens tune non nominaretur 'furtum,' 'adulterium,' etc." 
By "common law," Ockham means those revealed moral laws 
. Which generally obtain. Those laws of ethics whose exceptions re-
l. quire God's "special dispensation" belong to the "common law," l meant by God to be followed by all men. Father Lucan Freppert, 
~ ~ B~ of Morality ... , pp. 223-24, shows the importance of 
~ quoting paragraph 11 0 11 of question nineteen in its entirety. Ock-
~ ~am claims that the simple acts described by the terms "theft," 
~· adultery," etc., might be commanded by God. On the other hand, 
~- Ockham could well assert that theft is always wrong because as ·we 
. understand this concept, it signifies a simple act against ~'s 
.\ mres_~ obligation. 
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specific acts as ordered or forbidden by God then the Decalogue 
is a series of necessary, indispensable moral norms. Scotus in-
serts the connotation of an "evil intention" into the meaning of 
concepts which stand for acts which are always evil. Ockham seems 
more confident in including "divinely prohibited" in the descrip-
;tion of such acts. Both indicate that the concept of which "evil" 
is predicated necessarily cannot have a purely descriptive content 
and still attain the standards required for analytical truth. The 
natural evidence by which Right Reason might judge that, say, 
"murder is wrong" receives but meager treatment by Ockham. He 
objects to the doctrine that "for one thing, there is one essen-
tial final cause," and thereby excludes a source of natural 
evidence which Scholastics such as St. Thomas find significant. 
Ockham gives only "quasi" validity to the moral uses of finality. 
To all authorities, I respond that they treat the end 
which according to Right Reason (at least in most 
cases) ought to be intended if everything were ordered 
suitably. Nevertheless, if it is not actually intended 
then it is not truly and properly a final cause.117 
We might well wish that Ockham had devoted more time to "the 
order between things" as a basis of natural moral norms. His 
treatment shows the logician who is more concerned with the 
conceptual formulation of necessary norms. 
117
sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309); "Praeterea, unius rei 
est una causa finalis essentialis, sed si omne tale intentum esset 
causa finalis, essent plures causae finales, cum talia plura pos-
sint intendi: 
Ad omnes auctoritates respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui 
secundum rectam rationem--saltem ut in pluribus--deberet intendi 
si omnia essent convenienter ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua 
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Both the political works and the philosophical-theologi-
cal texts, therefore, suggest that the precepts of the Decalogue 
are known naturally and evidently as well as by revelation. The 
decalogue precepts, however, should not be considered as necessary 
moral norms in the sense that they indicate acts whose "absolute 
being" is good or evil. These moral norms are necessary only in 
the sense that connotations which Ockham associates with the 
names of "theft," "adultery," "murder," etc., make these acts evil 
by definition. Regarding natural knowledge, Ockham points out 
that even the pagan philosophers abstained from acts like forni-
cation because such acts are generally inconsistent with worthy, 
natural ends. 118 The impact of Christian Revelation upon natural 
morality does not change "what" is right or wrong, but "why" the 
agent acts. Regarding revealed knowledge, Ockham indicates that 
the acts commanded or prohibited by the Decalogue are ordinarily 
habet quod sit ordinabilis ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter 
intendatur non est vere et proprie causa finalis." Also see Sent., 
I, d. 48, q. 1, C. 
118sent., IV, q. 3, S; "Et quando dicitur quod virtutes 
, philosophorum fuerunt ejusdem rationis cum virtutibus nostris 
(Christianis). Nego et dico quod virtutes morales distinguntur 
secundum distinctionem objectorum partialium. Nunc autem finis 
est objectum partiale virtutis, sicut aliis dictum est; nunc 
autem philosophi in acquirendo virtutes morales habuerunt alium 
finem quam Christum. Verbi gratia, abstinet christianus ab actu 
fornicandi propter Deum et quia Deus praecepit sibi abstinere, 
ita quod Deus est hie causa finalis vel praeceptum istius absin-
entiae; et sic de omnibus aliis virtutibus acquisitis a bono 
christiano, quia semper Deus est principalis finis intentus. 
Philosophus, autem, licet abstineat a talibus, tamen totaliter 
propter alium finem vel propter conservationem naturae vel ad 
perficiendum in scientia vel propter aliquid tale. Igitur aliud 
fuit objectum partiale abstinentiae philosophi et boni chris-
tiani." Also see Sent., III, q. 10, I; Sent.,III, q. 12, CCC. 
~ 
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'conducive or detrimental to the achievement of man's Ultimate End. 
However these substantive norms are known, the circumstances of 
the actions--the time, place, end and the command of God concern-
ing that act--are included ini:he meaning of actions which are 
conceptualized as "obligatory. 11119 Consequently, the non-formal 
I directives or right reasons such as the Ten Commandments might 
~·. 
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be kno~n naturally or through scripture, but in either case these 
precepts invariably connote contingent circumstances and pre-
suppose the conscious, deliberate and voluntary response of those 
subject to these directives. 
Previous interpreters have placed an exaggerated emphasis 
upon the absolute power of God to posit moral obligations as the 
reason for the "relativity" and contingency of moral rules in 
Ockham's ethic. While it is true that Ockham's belief in the 
omnipotence of God prompts him to assert that God could order any 
simple action possible to man as a moral obligation, it is also 
true that Ockham has philosophical reasons for considering non-
formal moral rules as contingent. First, a madman could perform 
the opposite of every divine and natural law without moral fault~20 
ll9sent., IV, q. 3, L; "Contra, impossibile est virtutem 
moralem esse sine suo objecto, quia sicut impossibile est quod 
aliquis intelligat se intelligere nisi intelligat, ita impossibile 
est talem virtutem esse sine tali objecto. Nunc autem objecta par-
tiali.a virtutis moralis sunt circumstantiae, sicut locus et tempus, 
inter quae est precipua recta ratio, cuius actus debet conformari 
ad hoc. quod sit virtuosus perfecte." Also see Sent., III, q. 10, o. , --
120
sent., III, q. 11, Z; "Sciendum est quod recta ratio 
requiritur ad perfectam virtutem et actualis, et ideo ebriosus 
et :furiosus et pueri, qui non ha bent usus rationis non peccant 
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In a similar way, God concurs in the production of every human 
~. action since He is the immediate cause of the "absolute being" or 
I positive being of every hwnan act; yet God cannot sin. 121 These 
considerations reflect and support Ockham's metaphysic of goodness 
since the "absolute being" of any act--that is, an existential and 
individual reality as isolated from its extrinsic causes--is 
. 
neither moral nor immoral. The created will is completely free 
to order and re-order the ends and means of volition. Every 
object accepted by the will, every individual whi.ch terminates an 
act of volition, might be directed by the agent's motive or intent 
to something else. Hence, every action commanded by the Decalogue, 
and even the love of God, could be performed with malice because 
of an evil intention in the w.ill. 122 Ockham devotes the first 
coram Deo; quia nullus ignoranter peccat secundum Augustinum. 
Unde, ebrius non habens usus rationis committens adulterium non 
peccat quia licet habeat volitionem respectu talis actus et 
intentionem, non habet rectum dictamen rationis; idea non peccat. 11 
Also see Sent., I, d. I, q. 1 (I, 378-379). 
121
sent., II, q. 19, F; "Potest Deus causare actum obiendi 
Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in actu in voluntate creata. Pro-
batur, quia Deus potest omne absolutum causare sine omni alio 
quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus odiendi Deum quan-
tum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem cum difformitate et 
malitia in actu, ergo Deus potest causare quicquid absolutu.m est 
in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi non causando aliquam difformita-
tem vel malitiam in actu, ergo etc ... " In Sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, 
Ockham takes up the question of "whether God can order that evil 
. be done?" Ockham can avoid attributing the production of evil to 
God, even though he holds that God is a partial cause in every 
instance of human causality, by distinguishing the metaphysical 
being of an act from the obligation to avoid that act which is 
extrinsic and accidental. Also see Sent., IV, q. 14, D. 
· 
122sent., II, q. 19, Q; "Illud etiam quid assumit est 
falsun1 quod dilectio Dei sit semper bona propter de bi tum finem, 
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distinction of the Ordinatio to various questions on "enjoyment" 
(frui) and "use" (uti). These terms designate acts of will assum-
ing something "for its own sake or for the sake of another. 11123 
Because God is the Ultimate End, God should be enjoyed or loved 
for His own sake and cannot be ordinately "used" or loved for the 
sake of something other than God. 124 Everything other than God--
quia aliquando potest esse mala et propter indebitum finem; puta, 
quando amo Deum amore concupiscentiae." Also see the principal 
objection in Quodl., III, q. 13. 
123sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 374); "Circa quod primo viden-
~ dum est quomodo distinguitur actus utendi ab actu fruendi; secundo, 
quod est objectum actus utendi. Circa primum sciendum quod ali-
quis potest assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis dupliciter: 
vel propter se vel propter aliud. Primo modo aliquid assumitur 
in facultatem voluntatis quando aliquid praesentatum voluntati per 
intellectum (etiam si sine omni alio praesentaretur) assummeretur 
in facultatem voluntatis. Secundo modo assumitur in facultatem 
volUl1tatis quando aliquid assumitur in facultatem voluntatis alio 
praesentato, ita quod si illud aliud non praesentaretur voluntati 
vel non assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis illud non assumeretur 
in facultatem voluntatis." 
124Ibid., 375-376; "Secunda conclusio est quod Deus non 
est objectu.IllU.Sus ordinati, quia si sic, aut esset objectum voli-
tionis ordinatae aut nol~tionis. Non nolitionis, quia nullus 
potest ordinate odire Deum; nee volitionis, quia tune posset 
aliquid plus amari ordinate quam Deus. Simi.liter, finis ultimus 
non est ad aliquid aliud referibilis, sed Deus est simpliciter 
finis ultimus. 
Tertia conclusio est quod omne aliud a Deo potest esse 
objectu.m usus ordinati. Hoc probatur, quia omne aliud a summe 
acceptato potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis propter summe 
acceptatum; sed Deus ordinate summe acceptatur; ergo omne aliud 
a Deo potest ordinate assumi in faculatem voluntatis propter 
Deum, et per consequens, omni alio contingit ordinate uti. Major 
patet, quia omne aliud a summe acceptato aut est bonum aut malum. 
Si bonum, potest esse amatum propter summe acceptatum. Si sit 
malum, potest ordinate esse nolitum a voluntate propter summe 
acceptatum. Igitur omne aliud a summe acceptato potest ordinate 
assumi. in facultatem voluntatis propter ipsum." Notice that Ock-
ham "proves" this argument; statements which are believed; i.e., 
"cred.abilia," cannot be demonstrated . 
....,..., ··--
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persons, virtues, acts--should be accepted by the moral agent as 
means to the Ultimate End. Thus, Ockham establishes the required 
priority of the will's affection and t~e moral direction of life 
in the first distinction of his Commentary. Consequently, every 
object of the will's affection other than God is not valuable-in-
itself but ought to be valued for the sake of God. No simple act 
of the human agent is good-in-itself; but every complex act could 
be good if directed to, and ordained by, the Ultimate End. 125 
125The first distinction of Ockham's Ordinatio, in our 
interpretation, is the clearest and most systematic presentation 
of his ethical program. The inspiration of this distinction 
flows from St. Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 11, where Augustine 
discusses fruition and use-Cfrui et uti); and Aristotle, Nie. 
Ethics, I, c. 7, where Aristotle considers three kinds of ends 
and asserts that the end chosen for itself and never for the sake 
of another is simply perfect and the ultimate goal of action. 
These precedents are accepted by Ockham and developed as the 
framework of his moral doctrine. By identifying the Ultimate End 
as God, Ockham establishes the priorities of human love, specifies 
the intrinsically and primarily good act, and formulates the para-
digm relation of end and means. Ockham's ethical doctrine, both 
its positive and non-positive parts, elucidates the procedure of 
the viator toward the Ultimate End. Erich Hochstetter has noticed 
the general direction of Ockham's ethical thought (Franz. Studien, 
32, pp. 9-16), and indicated that Ockham's basic purpose in 
ethical doctrine is to articulate the way of man to God. On the 
other hand, Muschietti, Breve saggio sulla Filosofia di Guglielmo 
Ockham, Fribourg, 1908, p. 157; Garvens, Franz. Studien, 21, pp. 
249-2"52; and Lagarde, Ockham La Morale ... , pp. 54-55; all deny 
that the finality of human acts influences the morality of those 
acts in Ockham's ethic. The importance of the end intended by an 
agent in determining the morality of an act will be systematically. 
studied and documented in the fourth chapter. For the present, 
however, it should be said that the first distinction of the 
Ord.inatio states emphatically that every human act should be a 
means to the Ultimate End and every object of the human will 
should be loved in terms of the Greatest Good. Thus, the finality 
or teleology of the will-act, even though it is not the imminent 
finality which Aristotle and Thomas teach, is crucial to the moral 
determination of that act. 
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The order between the ends and means of the moral life cannot be 
established rationally without identifying the Greatest Good. As 
a Christian, Ockham means to emphasize that moral norms which are 
perfectly directive about "what" is good or evil, must conceive 
those specific acts in relationship to God. Not all concrete 
acts are ethically relative. The complex act of loving God above 
, all for His sake is necessarily, immutably and only good. But 
every moral norm, whether known naturally or revealed, which 
signifies only the simple nature of human acts is but contingently 
true. Ockham's search for moral certitude, therefore, is not 
jeopardized by the Absolute Power of God so much as by a standard 
of logical clarity which requires every factor which affects the 
moral performance of a specific act to be governed by the full 
understanding of the pertinent directive. Without connoting the 
divine wish, no moral directive attains this degree of logical 
precision. 
Ockham does not doubt that in the ordinary course of human 
events, the acts commanded or forbidden by the Decalogue can be 
recognized by natural reason, as well as by scripture, to be valid 
directives. But Ockham is careful to admit that extraordinary 
situations can arise naturally and supernaturally which are ex-
eluded from the application of such precepts. For example, a 
starving person represents a peripheral case in which the law 
against stealing does not apply. Likewise, a "private revelation" 
giving a special mandate to some individual or individuals would 
r 
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be an extraordinary situation. Thus, if God countermanded the 
order prohibiting theft, as when the Hebrews despoiled the Egyp-
tians, it would be a particular and exceptional case rather than 
126 the general rule. 
Ockham expresses the binding force of Right Reason's 
dictate as the practical principle: "The will ought to conform 
itself to Right Reason." The directives which express the content 
of the will's obligation are authorit~tive through the principle 
that "Every good dictated by Right Reason is to be chosen. 11127 
In general, the natural or revealed sources of directive proposi-
tions are also the means by which their truth is determined and 
dictated by the intellect's judgment. Positive laws are binding 
because of prior assent to the origin of those laws. Non-positive 
laws are considered true and obligatory because of experiential 
evidence (e.g., "whoever is angered is to be calmed through soft 
126
sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, F-G; "Circa secundum dicerent 
illi qui vellent tenere primam opinionem jam dictam, quod Deus 
potest praecipere malum, non tamen male, et potest praecipere 
injustum, non tamen injuste. Alii dicerent quod sicut haec est 
impossibilis, 'Deus praecipit aliquid injuste sive male.' Et ideo 
loquendo deberet dicere quod Deus non potest praecipere malum 
propter quod illa distinctio quae ponit quod Deus potest praeci-
pere malum non manens malwn, sed non potest praecipere malum man-
ens malum; ut in uno sensu sit haec vera 'Deus potest praecipere 
malum' et in alio sensu falsa: non est secundum artem logicae, 
de qua tamen pertranseo quia alibi tactum est de consimilibus. 
Ad primum principale, patet quod spoliare Egyptios non 
fuit malum sed bonu~. Et ideo Deus praecipiendo spoliare Egyptios, 
non praecepit malum, nee filii Israel peccaverunt spoliando, nisi 
illi qui malo animo non precise obediendo divino praecepto s:pol-
ia.verunt.11 Ockham refers to Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 47-49). 
127 
'Sent., III, q. 11, Z. 
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words") 128 or conceptual analysis (e.g., "all dishonesty is to 
~ be avoided"). 129 It is simply untenable to claim that Ockham 
~-f }(nows no necessary and immutable moral norms. In point of fact, 
his texts include many such norms. Ockham's ethical certitudes, 
however, give little information to guide the decision-making 
process. The rational principles of morality indicate the psy-
chological framework of free will and Right Reason within which 
ethical acts occur. He conceives a permanent pattern of causality 
among the changeable circumstances and determinants of morality. 
Perhaps ••• perhaps it is warranted to speak of an "inner moral 
order" and an "outer moral order." Within the Christian agent, 
morality requires the constant priority of Right Reason's assent 
to the proper exercise of human freedom for the sake of God. 
Without, the moral order displays all the flexibility of the 
circumstances and determinants which might affect the moral 
decision. 
Ockham 1 s doctrine of free will reveals his consistent 
effort to encapsulate morality within the created will. Only con-
tingent volitions are intrinsically "good" or "evil." In conjunc-
tion with this doctrine, Ockham's treatment of the necessary and 
immutable principles of morality concerns the "subjective" world 
of intellect and will; the psychic complex of efficient and final 
causality. The ethical knowledge which gives demonstrative 
128 Sent., III, q. 12, H. 
129ouodl., II, q. 14. 
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certitude indicates the interior order between intellectual and 
voluntary assent, between the ends and means of volition. Ockham 
interprets even the divine precepts as regulating primarily the 
exercise of free will and secondarily the physical acts controlled 
by the will. The divine will might alter the moral choices or 
means in particular situations; but Ockham consistently maintains 
the unchanging end of morality to be God himself for all men who 
recognize His goodness. Beyond doubt, the circumstance of the 
present divine wish has a special importance for Ockham in deter-
mining what choices the created agent should make. But as long 
as God commands men, the structure of moral response will be 
rational-voluntary assent for the sake of the Greatest Good. 
Finally, Ockham denies any determinant order among the 
propositions which comprise moral science. He does not speak of 
a formal or material subject of ethics; he does not list "a" 
first principle of morality. Consequently, efforts to locate 
Ockham's central insight or organizing principle are suspect. 
Attempts to classify his ethics as "voluntarism," "subjectivism," 
"rationalism," "positivism," or "formalism," miss Ockham's point 
that our understanding of morality--our "right reasons"--have no 
formal or systematic unity. These categories are all true par-
tially and, for that reason, imprecise. To rigorously apply any 
of these interpretive categories to Ockham's moral doctrine would 
exclude a significant portion of the data to be explained. 
r 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DIVINE WILL, THE OBJECTIVE NORM OF MORALITY 
Ockham has critics and sympathizers who place the emphasis 
of his thought on God's omnipotence. Those who see Ockhamism as 
an unconstructive movement within Scholasticism--a~d this judgment 
was current among some of Ockham's contemporaries1--complain that 
speculation about the "absolute power of God" undermines not only 
1Father Damasus Trapp, O.E.S. A., "Augustinian Theology 
in the 14th Century," Augustiniana VI (1956), pp. 146-274, indi-
cates a movement of thought among the Augustinian order in reac-
tion to the "logico-critical" and destructive tendencies of the 
14th century. "The dis-quieting thought of the potentia Dei 
absoluta, already prominent in Anselm for whom the Moderns and 
the Modernists have so much affection, makes the revolutionary 
Modernists in particular lose sight of all perspective and of all 
horizons. On an ever-increasing scale, allowances are made for 
a possible divine intervention liable to suspend the created 
order ... " (p. 149). Ockham is one of the revolutionary Modernists 
charged with"subtitilitas" or the unbalanced application of divine 
omnipotence to theological and philosophical problems by the 
Augustinian monks who Father Trapp quotes. The most serious 
charges of the papal commission appointed to examine Ockham's 
writings center on the employment of the doctrine of God's omni-
potence which seems to promote the heresy of Pelagianism. See 
the first four articles questioned in Auguste Pelzer, Revue d'his-
toire ecclesiastigue, 18, pp. 250-253; and F. Hoffmann, Die erste 
Kritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutter-
~ (Breslauer Studien, Neue Folge 9: Breslau, 1941), pp. 1-21. 
Professor Moody's article on "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of 
Autrecourt, the Pa.risian Statutes of 1339 and 1340," Franciscan 
Studies 7 (1947), pp. 113-146, is an important study showing 
Ockham' s more conse:cvati ve image in the second generation of 
"Nominal.ism." 
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natural knowledge but the theological enterprise as well. 2 Re-
cent and generally approving studies of fourteenth century reli-
gious currents find a more biblical, less "philosophical," image 
of God dominating Ockham's vision. 3 We wish to test the extent 
to which God's omnipotence affects the conduct of morality. 
The free will, the dictate of Right Reason and the will 
of God are the three efficient causes of morality listed by Ock-
4 ham. The divine will, however, is a cause of moral goodness only 
2Thus, Iserloh, Die Gnade und Eucharistie ... , pp. 74-78; 
David Knowles, The EvolutIOn of MeCII"eval Thought (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1962"},"" pp. 323-324; Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought, St. 
Augustj.ne·to Ockham (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 286-
290; and Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1957), pp. 130-133-. -
3Leon Baudry, who can hardly be called Ockham's critic, 
finds the divine omnipotence at the heart of the Venerable In-
ceptor's thought. Le/'Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae' attribut 
~Guillaume d'Occam---C-Etudes de Philosophie MJdidvale, t. 23: Paris, 
193b), pp. 23-25 of Introduction. Also discussing Ockham's phil-
osophy, Francis Oakley claims " ..• from Ockham's fundamental in-
sistence on the omnipotence and freedom of God follow, not only 
his nominalism, not only his ethical or legal voluntarism, but 
also hj.s empiricism." Natural Law Forum, 6, p. 82; and his 
article "Pierre d'Ailly and the absolute power of God; another 
note on the Theology of Nominalism, 11 Harvard Theological Review 
56 (1961), pp. 63-65. Professor Heiko A. Oberman treats the 
religious and theological character of Ockham's thought, and 
concludes 11 that the theological concept of God is not merely one 
of many aspects of the inner core of Nominalism, but that its con-
cept of God and Revelation is at the heart of this movement, while 
logic is its expression in philosophical language ... " "Some notes 
on the Theology of Nominalism, with Attention to its Relation to 
the Renaissance," Harvard Theological Review, 53 (1960), p. 49. 
William J. Courtenay follows this line of interpretation j_n 
"Covenant and Causality in Pierre d'Ailly," Speculum 46 (1971). 
4
sent., II, q. 4-5, K; "Dico ergo quantum ad secundum 
articulrnn quod Deus est prima causa immediate omniwn quae produc-
unter a causis secundis. 11 The fact that God is required for 
producing volition, renders God a partial cause of good or bad 
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~oncurrently or co-operatively. God is co-efficient in every 
instance of created causality and thus participates in whatever 
~ositive or metaphysical being that moral activity has. Normally, 
God's cooperation is available "whenever it pleases the created 
will." If God's co-efficiency were not forthcoming, the human 
• agent could produce no activity--moral or otherwise. If God's 
cooperation turns to total causality, as when God alone produces 
some effect within the human will, then that divine effect cannot 
be imputed morally to the created agent. Hence, the issue of 
Ockham's "moral voluntarism" or "positivism" concerns the legis-
lative rather than efficient influence of God's will. The extent 
of God's moral authority and the arbitrary character of His 
authority are in question. These problems become clearer against 
the historical background of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. Their 
solution requires a study of the prerogatives and rationality 
which Ockham attributes to the divine will. We hope to look 
over Ockham's shoulder as he views the moral order from the awe-
some perspective of God's absolute power. 
1. The Historical Context 
A growing positivism seems to characterize the development 
of ethical doctrine from St. Thomas to Ockham. The natural 
foundation which Aquinas finds for the Decalogue gradually erodes 
volition. Also see the parallel texts of Sent., II, q. 19, Land 
~., IV, q. 14, K. For a statement of the three essential 
causes of virtue--the will, Right Reason's assent and God--see 
~., III, q. 12, NN. 
£ 
~· ~ 
~ 
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to reveal its sole support in God's discretionary powers. 
It was the doctrine of St. Thomas that the precepts of 
the Decalogue were altogether indispensable. These laws express 
the intention of the Supreme Lawgiver; they are orientated to the 
common and final good; they express the proper regulation of the 
natural appetites of man. 5 Those instances related by the Old 
Testament which seem to indicate that God dispensed or revoked 
the natural law and Decalogue, e.g., the laws against murder, 
adultery, theft, etc., only show the right of the Creator to con-
trol His creation. Thus, God's actions are always in harmony 
B j· with the order of justice proposed by the natural law. 
~' 
' 
' t- All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death 
of nature; which death of nature is inflicted by the 
power of God because of original sin, according to I 
Kings, ii, 6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive. Con-
sequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted 
on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice 
whatever. --In like manner, adultery is intercourse with 
another's wife; who is allotted to him by the law eman-
ating from God. Consequently, intercourse with any 
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor 
fornication. --The same applies to theft, which is the 
taking of another's property. For whatever is taken 
by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is 
not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is 
in this that theft consists. --Nor is it only in human 
things that whatever is commanded by God is right; but 
5sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 100, art. 8; "Praecepta autem 
decalogi continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. 
Nam praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent 
ipsum ordinem 2d bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; prae-
cepta autem secundae tabulae continent ordinem justitiae inter 
homines observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat indebitum, et cuilibet 
reddatur debitum; secundum hanc enim rationem sunt intelligenda 
praecepta decalogi. Et ideo praecepta decalogi sunt omnino in-
dispensabilia.11 
r 
also in natural things, whatever is done by God is, 
in some way, natural, as was stated in the First 
Part. (trans. by Anton C. Pegis)6 
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Scotus refuses to consider the whole Decalogue as "Laws 
of Nature;" nor does he agree precisely with Aquinas regarding the 
exegesis of the revealed "exceptions" (e.g., Abraham's duty to 
kill his innocent son) to the common law. In these cases, Scotus 
teaches that God dispensed individuals from moral laws which are 
neither immutable nor, strictly speaking, natural. Such "excep-
tions" show how God intended His laws to be understood in particu-
lar situations. For Scotus, the characteristics of "laws of 
nature" are; first, that the precept is known as true when the 
terms of the precept are known, secondly, that the precept com-
- mands some good necessary for the final end of men (or forbids 
some evil which necessarily excludes the final end), and thirdly, 
that the precept be stated negatively so that it is binding always 
6sum. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 94, art. 5; "Dicendum est quod 
naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter, tam nocentes quam 
innocentes. Quae quidem naturalis mors divina postestate induci-
tur propter peccatum originale; secundum illud I Reg. ii: "Dominus 
mortificat et vivificat. 11 Et ideo absque aliqua injustitia, 
secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors cuicumque homini, vel 
nocenti vel innocenti. Similiter etiam adulterium est concubitus 
cum uxore aliena, quae quidem est e.i deputata secundum legem Dei 
divinitus traditam. Unde ad quam cumque mulierem aliquis accedat 
ex mandate divino, non est adulterium nee fornicatio. Et eadem 
ratio est de furto, quod est acceptio rei alienae. Quidquid enim 
accipit aliquis ex mandate Dei, qui est Dominus universorum, non 
accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est furari. Nee solum in 
rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc ipso est debitum; sed 
etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a Deo fit, est naturale quod-
ammodo, ut in Primo dictum est." 
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and at every moment. 7 These qualities make natural laws immutable 
and indispensable. The laws of the "second table," however, can 
change by special commands of God or by grace of extreme circum-
stances. The precepts of the second table explain how the 
Legislator intends that a man should love his neighbor. 8 Clearly, 
the realm of natural law begins to shrink according to Scotus' 
estimate, while the extent of positive law grows. 
Ockham's sympathies are with Duns Scotus on this question. 
But Scotus did not go far enough. According to Ockham, even the 
precepts of the "first table"--i.e., the command to love God, 
could change by God's absolute power. In his philosophical-
theological works, Ockham rarely even mentions "natural law" but 
7 . . Comm. Ox., III, q. 37, q. unica, n. 5 and 10 (XV, 825 and 
844); "Ad quaestionem igitur dico quod aliqua possunt dici esse de 
lege naturae dupliciter: Uno modo tanquam prima principia practica, 
nota ex terminis, vel conclusiones necessario sequentes ex eis; et 
haec dicuntur esse strictissime de lege naturae ..• Non enim in his, 
quae praecipiuntur ibi [in tabula secunda], est bonitas necessaria 
ad bonitatem ul timi finis, convertens ad finem ul timum; nee in hi::; 
quae prohibentur, est malitia necessario avertens a fine ultimo, 
quin si bonum istud non esset praeceptum, posset finis ultimus 
amari et attingi; et si illud malum non esset prohibitum, staret 
cum eo acquisitio finis ultimi •.. (n. 10) Ad hoc potest triplici-
ter responderi: Primo modo, quod illud praeceptum: Diliges 
Dominum Deum tuu.m, non est simpliciter de lege naturae, inquantum 
est affirmativum, sed inquantum est negativum prohibens oppositum; 
non odire enim est simpliciter de lege naturae •.• 11 
8Ibid., n. 12 (XV, 845); "Verum est igitur, quod diligens 
.Proximum, legem implevit, eo modo scilicet quo lex explicata est 
debere servari, licet non eo modo quo dilectio proximi concluditur 
ex primis principiis legis naturae; et a simili, tota lex quantum 
ad secundam tabulam, et Prophetae pendent ex hoc praecepto: Dili-
ges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, intelligendo tale praeceptum, non 
ut sequitur ex primo principio practico legis naturae, sed ut 
Legislator intendit debere illud servari, prout explicatur in 
praeceptis secundae tabulae. 11 
r 
r· 
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he is emphatic that God could command any act which is presently 
forbidden by the Decalogue. To some commentators, Ockham's ethic 
is the total number of revealed precepts and a total rejection of 
moral orders which are necessary, indispensable and evident to 
natural reason. 
Although hate of God, theft, adultery and such might 
have an evil circumstance connected regarding the common 
law; insofar as they are done by someone who, by the 
divine precept is obliged to the contrary act; but 
regarding the absolute being of these acts, they can 
be done by God without any evil circumstance connected, 
and they could even be done by the earthling meritori-
ously if they should fall under the divine precept just 
as now, de facto, their opposites fall under the divine 
precept. And with the present di.vine precept for their 
opposite acts in force, one cannot perform such acts 
meritoriously or well, because they are not done mer-
itoriously by an earthling, then they should not be 
called or termed "theft," "adultery," "hate," etc., 
because these names signify such acts, not absolutely, 
but by connoting or giving to understand that one per-
forming such acts is obliged to the opposite acts by 
divine precept.9 
9sent., II, q. 19, O; "Ad aliud dico quod licet odium Dei, 
furari, adulterari habeant malam circumstantiam annexam et similia 
de communi lege quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto divino 
obligatur ad contrarium; sed quantum ad esse absolutum in illis 
actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala annexa, 
et etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si caderent sub prae-
cepto divino sicut nunc de facto eorum opposita cadunt sub prae-
cepto divino. Et stante praecepto divino ad opposita eorum, non 
potest aliquis tales actus meritorie nee bene exercere, quia non 
fiunt moritorie nisi caderent sub praecepto divino. Et si fierent 
a viatore meritorie, tune non dicerentur nee nominarentur 'furtum, 1 
'adul teriurG,' 1 odium, 1 etc., quia ista nomina significant tales 
actus non absolute, sed connotando vel dando intelligere quod fa-
cj.e:ns tales Bctus per praeceptum di vinum obligatur ad opposi turn." 
Not.tee that Ockham cons:!_ders d:Lv5ne laws as circumstances of moral 
acts. Comment:Lng on this passage, Elzearius Benke says; "Clarius 
certe et mag5.s concrete posi ti visrnus moralis exprimi non potui.sset'i 
Collectanea Francj~, XIV, p. 60. 
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The difference in doctrines between Aquinas, Scotus and 
Ockham on the relationship of positive and natural law can be 
overstated. All three recognize the creature's obligation to obey 
a direct command of God; all teach that the concept of "murder," 
"theft," "adultery," etc., connote some illicitness. None would 
assert that the significance of the term prescribed is simply 
descriptive. Each of these theologians admit that the Decalogue 
consists of moral laws which are "natural" in some sense of the 
10 term; each teaches that moral doctrine includes positive and 
non-positive norms. Their disagreement over the "dispensability" 
of the Decalogue precepts is a matter of terminology. If the 
negative precepts mean actions done "with evil intent" or "against 
the divine command," then Scotus.and Ockham concur that these 
mandates are "omnino indispensabilia. 11 The doctrinal variations 
are more subtle than the stark contrast between the systematic 
unity of positive and natural law in Aquinas and Ockham's thorough-
going positivism. 
Our intention is not to analyze the ethics of Thomas and 
Scotus in depth; we only want to appreciate Ockham's heritage. 
How to reconcile the Decalogue precepts with the apparent 
10 Scotus asserts the precepts of the second table are 
"consona" or harmonious with the laws of nature. Loosely speak-
ing, all the Decalogue precepts are "laws of nature." Comm~ Ox., 
III, d. 37, q. unica, n. 8. Ockham's political works often appeal 
to natural rights and laws as the individual's defense against 
the excessive claims of either king or pope. See Opus Nonaginta 
Dierum, c. 99 (Manchester ed.; II, 747); and Tractatus contra 
Johannem, c. 28 (Manchester ed.; III, 118). See W. Komel, "Das 
Naturrecht bei Wilhelm Ockham," Franziskanische Studien 35 (1953), 
pp. 39-85. 
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inunoralities of the Patriarchs was a lively issue in Scholasti-
cism.11 The Scotistic solution was developed and extended by 
Ockham giving his ethical outlook a biblical tone. 12 Scotus 
taught that the mandates of the second table explain how one's 
neighbor should be loved in normal situations. In an extraordi-
nary case, and Abraham is witness, God might decide a different 
way of loving one's neighbor. Without changing any significant 
factor save the divine command, an act which normally would be 
murder becomes a moral obligation and praiseworthy. In Ockham's 
mind, this criticism suggests the overriding importance of the 
present divine command in establishing the specific acts which 
are morally suitable or unsuitable. As a moral determinant, the 
will of God takes precedence over any natural evidence. To 
reconcile the common laws with their exceptions, Ockham proposes 
that all Decalogue precepts be understood as denoting: a) the 
simple nature of actions and b), the obligations presently 
11
see Roland H. Bainton, "The Immoralities of the Patri-
archs According to the Exegesis of the Late Middle Ages and of the 
Reformation," Harvard Theological Review 23 (1930), pp. 39-49. 
This article indicates the importance of the question for the 
Scholastics. The four types of solution, however, are poorly con-
ceived since Ockham would fj_ t three (supposedly) separate categor-
ies. Furthermore, the absolute power of God was Ockham's way of 
allowing for the recurrence of "special revelations" and "excep-
tions" to the common law; Professor Bainton was unable to find "a 
single clear illustration" of this position. (p. 51). 
12
see Erich Hochstetter, Franz. Studien, 32, pp. 1-20, for 
a fruitful attempt to place Ockham within the intellectual currents 
Of the early fourteenth century and to locate his ethics within 
a biblical or "covenantal" frame of reference. 
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, associated with those acts. 13 A second point of Scotus' solution 
was well taken by Ockham. The Subtle Doctor maintains that only 
· the negative formulation of the "first table" belongs to the law 
of nature, strictly speaking. God could not dispense men from 
the command to love their Creator, but men are not obliged to 
elicit the love of God continually. The suggestion is that men 
/could "not love" God momentarily without moral fault. Here Ockham 
begins to speculate on the possibility of a divine command "Do 
not love God." The permanence of the "first table" breaks down. 
God can command that He be not loved for a certain 
time, because He can command that the intellect be 
occupied with study and the will likewise, so that 
at this time it cannot think anything about God. 
(P. Boehner's trans.)14 
Developing suggestions made by Scotus on the exegetical 
problem of the Patriarchs' "immoralities," Ockham holds the 
"simple nature" of every human action is morally indifferent. By 
13sent., II, q. 19, F; 11 ••• quia Deus potest omne absolutum 
causare sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed 
actus odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem 
cum difformitate et malitia in actu ... 11 Scotus anticipates this 
position, although not its radical application, in saying "Hoc 
potest exponi sic, quia licet actus positivus et malitia non sint 
unum per se, nee in re nee in conceptu; potest tamen aliquod nomen 
imponi ad signif.icandum nee actum solum, nee deformi tatem illam, 
sed totum simul. '' .Q:Q.. Ox., III, d. 38, q. unica, n. 6 (Waddings-
Vives, ed.; 15, 870-71). · 
14 Quodl., III, q. 13. See P. Boehner, Ockham, Philosophi-
~ Writings, p. 146. In earlier texts, Ockham asserts the pos-
sibility of a divine command to "hate God;" the difference between 
"non-ve11e 11 and "odire" is considerable. We discuss the hate of 
God (odire Deum) in Chapter Four. For now, we only indicate that 
the question of "not loving God" could arise from a Scotistic doc-
trine which Ockham accepts and asserts, namely, 11 ••• non tenetur 
(qu~libet) semper implere praecepta divina affirmativa. Sent.~ 1 1 
d. 48, q. lr F. 
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"simple nature" is meant the specific character of acts of voli-
tion or nolition which terminate at one object. Even the act 
nolle ~--to reject God--is not wrong by nature. A man cannot 
-
be obligated to the impossible; 15 but men might be obligated to 
any simple act possible for them. This latter assertion seems an 
extreme position within the history of Scholastic ethics. It 
'demands a hearing for those commentators who claim that Ockham 
-teaches moral "voluntarism." The divine will might associate a 
negative or affirmative command with the performance of every non-
complex act within the power of man. A radical notion of divine 
omnipotence supports this possibility. But there is also a dif-
ferent conception of human nature at work. Both Aquinas and Scotus 
believed in "almighty God 11 without reaching this conclusion about 
the divine legislative power. 
2. The Divine Will 
Ockham's teaching on the divine will depends on the 
privilege of revealed evidence. The "facts" by which Ockham 
governs a coherent image of God's operation ad extra are Scriptual 
data and ecclesiastical pronouncement. In particular, the abso-
lute simplicity, omniscience and power of God must be maintained 
15sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Nullus obligatur ad impossibile 
···" Also--se8, Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, E; and Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6 
(I, 504-505). Ockham does not say that men could be obliged to 
any simple act within their power; but his principles and, in 
particular, the absolute power of God imply this position. This 
opinion was current by the time of Gregory of Rimini who explicit-
ly rejects it. Sent., II, d. 34-35, q. 1, art. 2 (Venice, 1522; 
f. 119.r.). --
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a"s revealed truth and each statement made about the di vine will 
must be consistent with these tenets. Scripture speaks of God's 
external operation in diverse ways; Ockham's role as theologian 
is to explicate these various locutions in a manner consistent 
with the unity and omnipotence of God. Divine will-acts are 
t . 1 . th d. . B . 16 I th d. . t t f iden ica. wi ivine eing. n e ivine agen , an ac o 
willing does not indicate a faculty or permanent power which is 
distinct from intellect or essence. Rather, an act of willing is 
the divine will, is the divine essence. 17 The term 11will" signi-
fies God's Being as productive and creative. Ockham speaks of 
the' will of God in diverse ways and by means of various attributes, 
but these diverse locutions do not deny the Oneness of God. 
Ockham discusses the will of God in terms of a distinction 
between the voluntas beneplaciti (benevolent will) and a voluntas 
signi (definite will). 18 The Benevolent Will is divided into 
16 Sent., I, d. 35, q. 6, F; "Ad aliud dico quod volitio 
divina diversimode accipitur. Uno modo pro ipso actu existente 
realiter eodem cum divina essentia, et ista volitio divina non 
est praxis quia non est in potestate voluntatis, sed tanta neces-
sitate est illa volitio quanta est ipsa voluntas, quia est omni-
bus modis ipsa voluntas. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 45, q. 1, B. 
17 Sent., I, d. 10, q. 1, P; 11 ••• nihil est volitum a 
voluntate creata nisi praecognitum, tamen in Deo est simpliciter 
falsa, quia in Deo actus voluntati.s et actus intellectus et vol-
untas sunt omnibus modis idem, nee plus distinguitur actus vol-
untatis a volux1tate quam distingui tur voluntas a voluntate. 11 
Also see Sent., I, d. 45, q. 1, C. This position is explicitly 
critical of the "divine psychology" constructed by Duns Scotus. 
See Quodl., XIV, n. 14 (XXVI, 52-54). The contrast between Scotus 
and Ockham is analyzed by Paul Vignaux, 11 Nominalisme," DTC, XI, 
Col. 762. 
18 Sent., I, d. 46, q. 1, Band C; "Ad quaestionem dicitur 
conummi ter quod voluntas Dei est duplex, scilicet voluntas 
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, a) the Antecedent Will which indicates the "antecedents given to 
someone by which he can cause something and with whom God will 
be prepared to cooperate if the other should wish" and b) the 
consequent Will "by which God wishes efficaciously by actually 
(iQ ~) doing something." The Definite Will of God is divided 
into five acts: prohibition, command, counsel, implementation, 
and permission. This structure of the divine will is imposed 
upon God's Oneness by the human perspective which understands the 
divine activity in diverse ways. Scholastics often used these 
categories (voluntas beneplaciti and voluntas signi) as a means 
beneplaciti et voluntas signi, qui distinguitur in quinque--pro-
hibitionem, praeceptum, consilium, impletionem, et permissionem. 
Similiter, voluntas beneplaciti distinguitur in voluntatem ante-
cedentem et consequentem. Contra voluntatem beneplaciti Dei 
consequentem, nihil fit. Contra voluntatem autem Dei anteceden-
tem beneplaciti, aliquid fit. Etiam contra voluntatem signi, 
aliquid fit. Et ita patet quomodo voluntas Dei potest impediri 
et quomodo non. 
Concordando cum aliis in illa responsione; primo videndum 
est de praedictis distinctionibus, secundo ad quaestionem. Cir-
ca prirnum sciendur.J. quod illa distinctio non est alicuius quid est 
realiter in Deo quia in Deo non est aliquo modo multiplex volun-
tas. Immo, etiam divina voluntas nullo modo distinguitur ab 
essentia, sed istae distinctiones sunt nominum et dictionum qui 
significant divinam voluntatem, qui Deus est, ... Et ideo debet 
intelligi quod sit multiplicitas nominis ita quod voluntas ante-
cedens equivalet isti toti propositioni, 'dari alicui anteceden-
tia unde potest consequi aliquid cui Deus erit paratus coagere 
si alius velit,' et hoc cum praecepto vel consilio exequendi .•• 
Voluntas autem consequens est 'illa qua Deus vult efficaciter 
ponendo aliquid in esse. '" The terms "voluntas beneplaciti" and 
. "voluntas signi" are commonly rendered as "will of good pleasure" 
and "will of sign." We feel that "Benevolent Will" and "Definite 
Will" better captures Ockham's employment of these terms. See 
below, footnote 20. 
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of reconciling the diverse statements in Scripture concerning the 
manifestations of God's activity. 19 
Ockham distinguishes the Benevolent and Definite Will 
because God wishes the existence of not only things, but free 
things. The Definite Will gathers the various ways in which God 
guides the activity of free beings; the Benevolent Will handles 
the possible discrepancy between what God antecedently wishes for 
creation and what actually occurs. Ockham claims that antecedent-
ly God wishes the salvation of all rational creatures; in fact, 
some have been damned. 20 Yet the will of God as identical with 
His essence remains unchanged, unchangeable. There is a note of 
optimism and trust in God's love throughout Ockham's writings; 
21 
an undercurrent which, as Gregory of Rimini would point out, 
is not rationally warranted. But Ockham's trust in God promotes 
his fearless application of the distinction between God's absolute 
and ordinate power. 
19 . Cf. St. Thomas, Summ. Theol., I, q. 19, arts. 6-11; and 
~., I, d. 45, q. 1, art:--z+,"° C. 
20
sent., I, d. 46, q. 1, G; "Ad tertium dico quod Deus 
vult antecedenter omnes salvos fieri, quia scilicet dat eis ante-
cedentia quibus possunt consequi salutem, cum praecepto et con-
silio exequendi et nunquam eis praecipiet contrarium et eis erit 
paratus coagere permittens eos libere velle agere ad consecutionem 
salutis. Et per illud ultimum excluditur una cauillatio quae 
posset fieri de damnatis, quam Deus non V1ll t salvos fieri etiam 
antecedenter. 11 Also see Quodl., IV, q. 10, in finem; Sent., IV, 
q. 3, X; Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, L. . --
21Rimini, Sent., I, d. 41-42, q. 1, art. 1 (Venice, 1522; 
f. 180r); "Si ideo dicatur Deus velle omnes salvari antecedenter, 
quia omnibus vult vel dat antecedentia salutis quaecumque sint 
illa; multo fortius dici deberet quod vult omnes peccare vel ess9 
in peccato anteced.enter: quam omnibus dat antecedentia quibus 
possunt peccare ... " 
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It is difficult to overlook the importance of the distinc-
1 tion between God's absolute and ordinate power in Ockham's thought. 
~ 
~ The distinction itself was traditional, namely, that God could do 
everything within the realm of possibility (His absolute power) 
even though He determined to produce a certain set of possibles 
(His ordinate power). 
I say that God can do certain things by ordinate power 
and others by absolute power. This distinction should 
not be understood so that in God there are really two 
powers, of which one is ordinate and the other absolute, 
because there is only one power in God regarding created 
being (ad extra) which is God Himself in every way. Nor 
should the distinction be understood so that God could 
do some things ordinately and others absolutely and 
inordinately, because God can do nothing inordinately. 
Rather, it must be understood thus, "to be capable of 
something" is sometimes considered according to the 
laws ordained and instituted by God. God is said to 
be able to do those things by ordinate power. Otherwise, 
11 to be capable of something" is taken as "to be able to 
do everything which does not entail a contradiction to 
be done," whether or not God ordained that He would do 
this, because God can do many things which He does not 
wish to do.22 
Many studies, however, have isolated the dialectic of God's 
absolute-ordinate power as the key to Ockham's thought and that 
of Nominalism in generai. 23 It is true that the manner and 
22 Quodl., VI, q. 1. 
23Professor Oberman indicates the vital part played by 
this distinction in Nominalist theology. It is "the common denom-
. inator of four such diverse characteristics as: 1) the sovereignty 
of God; 2) the immediacy of God; 3) the moral autonomy and free-
dom of man; 4) an attitude of scepticism which leans toward 
secularization." (Harvard Theological Review, 56, p. 56. A more 
critical interpretation of this distinction is found in David 
Knowles, "A Characteristic of the Mental Climate of the 14th 
Century' II Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson (Etudes de philoso--
phie medievale, hors seree, Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), p. 323; and 
Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of his De 
r ~ 
J :rrequency with which this distinction enters fourteenth century 
~ i debates is unique; it is a theological reason for enlarging God's 
f moral authority and the domain of positive law. But what needs t t to be said, if research is to remain within Ockham's viewpoint, 
~. 
t.·.:· is that nothing happens by God's absolute power. By definition, 
l an occurrence de potentia Dei absoluta would be a fact realized 
without ~ivine ordination or foreknowledge--to assert such a 
possibility would be both dangerous and untrue according to Ock-
24 ham. Christ's miracles, St. Paul's conversion, the immaculate 
conception of the Blessed Virgin and the divine command that 
Abraham kill Isaac were extraordinary facets of the divine plan, 
but they occurred with God's prescience as products of His ordi-
nate power. Reference to the abs.olute power of God is one way 
to express the contingency of the present physical and moral orders 
as created systems, and the possibility of other exceptions to 
the lex communis of salvation. 
causa Dei and its Qpponents (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), 
~ pp. 131-133. These commentators find scepticism and fideism 
resulting from Nominalism's use of this distinction. We hold 
that this distinction, by itself, gives no clue to the doctrinal 
:peculiarities of Ockham, or any "Nominalist." God's absolute 
power has an explosive effect only when asserted with a more 
empirical metaphysical stance. 
24opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 95 (Manchester ed., Vol. II, 
p. 726); "Et ita dicere quod Deus potest aliqua de potentia abso-
~uta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata, non est aliud, secun-
dum intellectwn recte inte.lligentium, quam dicere quod Deus aliqua 
· .. Potestr quae tamen minime ordinavi t se facturum; quae tamen si 
·· ~ac~ret, de potentia ordinata faceret ipsa; quia si faceret ea, 
prdinaret se facturum ipsa. 11 Also loc. cit., p. 727; 11 Ita haec 
~st impossibilis: 'Aliquid fit a De~et non de potentia ordin-
a.ta; ' haec tam en habet unu.rn sen sum verum: 'Aliquid potest fieri. 
a Deo, quod non fiet de potentia ordinata;' et tamen, si fieret, 
de potentia ordinata fieret. 11 
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The absolute-ordinate distinction provides Ockham with 
a methodology for analyzing issues in terms of necessity and 
possibility. He calls it "the famous distinction of theologians" 
and uses it with sophistication. To understand Ockham's subtlety, 
one cannot identify and exhaust God's ordinate power with the 
expression "communis lex" or "stante ordinatione quae ~ est." 
Nor is it correct to equate God's absolute- power with the phrase 
"specialis dispensatio." The ordinate will of God includes past, 
present and future facts; it includes the "common law" or Deca-
logue precept against theft currently in force, the past excep-
tion to this common law, e.g., Exodus 12:36, and any future 
dispensation to this mandate. On the other hand, the absolute 
power of God is somewhat hypothetical. It is Ockham's reminder 
that whatever God ordains, He ordains contingently. Together, 
the ordinate and absolute power of God expose the hypothetical 
necessity of creation. The use of this theological distinction 
was paralleled by the philosophical development of the condi-
tional or hypothetical syllogism within the Nominalist school--
a fruitful movement from the perspective of modern logic. 25 The 
dialectic of absolute-ordinate power shows the contingency of 
creation and affirms its nature as a process rather than a static 
. 
25cf. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., Medieval Logic: An Out-
~ of Its Developmen_i;; from 1250 to .£· 1400 (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1952);-and "Does Ockham know of material 
implication?" in Collected Articles ... , pp. 319-351. Also E. A. 
Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic (Amsterdam:North 
Holland Publishing Co., 1953). 
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fact. But, at the same time, this dialectic reveals the condi-
tional necessity of certain features of human experience. 
Ockham asserts, by means of the absolute-ordinate dis-
tinction, the omnipotence and freedom of God's creative activity. 
The omnipotent God can effect "everything which entails no 
contradiction to be done. 1126 Ockham maintains that God could 
produce any "thing" whose "absolute being" is both possible and 
producible. He has in mind finite things which could be the 
referent for "absolute terms." The scope of God's omnipotence 
would not include, for example, moral . goodne_ss or evilness which 
are not things with "absolute being," but states of affairs which 
obtain between created beings and which are signified by "conno-
tative terms. 1127 On the other hand, an infinite-eternal person 
is a non-contradictory notion which could signify an independent 
28 
or "absolute" being, yet such being cannot be produced. Most 
26Quodl., VI, q. l; "Aliter accipitur "posse" pro posse 
facere omne illud quid non includit contradictionem fieri .•. 11 
Also see Sent., I, d. 20,. q. 1, L-M. 
27sent., Prologue, q. 3 (I, 141); "Et ideo in rnultis 
argurnentis est fallacia figurae dictionis, sub nornine sirnpliciter 
absoluto accipiendo nomen connotativurn. Sicut sic arguendo: 
quidquid potest Deus rnediante causa secunda, potest immediate per 
se; sed actum meritorium potest producere mediante actu volunta-
tis; ergo sine ea." Also see Quodl., V, q. 5. 
28
sent., I, d. 20, q. 1, L; "Ad probationem, dico quod 
ornnipotentia sicut modo loquirnur non respicit omne illud quid non 
includit contradictionern. Hoc est dictum quod ornnipotens non 
potest eff:i.cere ornne illud quid non includit contradictionern, 
quia non potest efficere Deurn. Omnipotens tamen potest efficere 
ornne factibile quid non includit contradictionern .•. 11 Father Lucan 
Freppert, The Basis of Morality •.. , pp. 148-155, indicates that 
Ockham tries to rectify the imprecision of Duns Scotus regarding 
divine omnipotence. It was Scotus who said 11 ... ornnipotentia est 
r 
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t Scholastics would agree that the effective potential of God's 
will initially includes all possible and producible beings. Ock-
ham, however, seems the first to apply this position to state-
ments. Sentences which are contradictory are nevertheless real 
as spoken, written or mental expressions. For example, the 
proposition that "all men are immortal" might indicate an impos-
sible state of affairs but nothing prohibits this proposition 
from being said, written or thought. In affirming God's omni-
potence, the Venerable Inceptor allows that meaningless state-
ments or contradictory commands are creatable. 
The divine will is capable of producing all finite, pos-
sible beings. But their actual production or creation remains a 
free, non-necessary act. "God does nothing externally (ad extra) 
by necessity; nor wills anything other than Himself by neces-
sity.1129 Ockham explains this position by means of necessary 
propositions, i.e., those propositions which are true independ-
ently of any divine volition. Absolute necessity obtains when a 
statement cannot be denied meaningfully. 3° For examples, Ockham 
ad omne quad non includit contradictionem." Comm. Ox., I, d. 20, 
q. unica, n. 5 (X, 200). Ockham quotes this formula to refute 
it be the above "proof." It appears that St. Thomas would be 
included in Ockham's criticism. See Summ. Theol., I, q. 25, 
art. 3. For Ockham' s claim that contradictory statements (e.g., 
man is an ass) are possible as assertions, see Quodl., III, q. 3; 
and Quodl., II, q. 8. 
29 4 Quodl., VI, q. 2. Also see Sent., I, d. •3, q. 1, L. 
30Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Circa primum dico quod duplex est 
necessitas, scilicet absoluta et ex suppositione. Necessita.s 
absoluta est quando aliquid simp1iciter est necessarium ita quad 
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gives "God exists" and "man is capable of laughter" which cannot 
be denied without contradiction. God is the only necessary 
being; 31 but necessarily true propositions can be formed regard-
ing contingent things. If no man ever existed or ever will 
exist, it remains true to say that "man is capable of laughter." 
Hypothetical necessity deals with contingent propositions which 
have some necessary connection. 32 In the conditional statement, 
"If Peter is predestined, Peter will be saved," neither the ante-
cedent nor the consequent are necessary--but the "consequence" 
is. The will of God affects the state of affairs signified by 
both the antecedent and the consequence. But "if" God creates 
and predestines Peter, then necessarily "Peter will be saved." 
While Ockham claims everything other than God is radically or 
ontologically contingent, the truth value of certain categorical 
and conditional statements does not derive properly from divine 
creativity. God's will freely governs the existence of all finite 
ejus oppositum esse verum includit contradictionem. Et sic haec 
absolute est necessaria: 'homo est risibilis,' ' Deus est,' quia 
contradictio est quod hae sint falsae et contradictoriae verae. 11 
31summ. Tot. Log., III, II, c. 5 (quoted from Webering, 
Theory of Demonstration., p. 37); "Propter quod sciendum est quod 
necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile dupliciter accipiuntur. 
Uno modo dici tur aliquid necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibj_le 
quia per nulJ.am potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse. Et 
sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis." 
32ouodl., VI, q. 2; "Necessitas ex suppositione est quando 
aliquid conditionalis est necessaria quamvis tam antecedens quarn 
consequens sit contingens. Sicut haec est necessaria: Si Petrus 
est praedestinatus, Petrus salvabitur. Et tamen tam antecedens 
quam consequens est contingens. 11 
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beings; but the possibility and intelligibility of finite things 
is clearly not a function of divine freedom according to Ockham. 
Those facts which constitute the experienced world, and 
the physical and moral laws which connect these facts, are 
dependent upon the contingent will of God. Even the formation 
of "necessary" propositions is a mental effect which requires 
the free co-efficiency of God. The absolute-ordinate distinction 
gives Ockham a way to assert the hypothetical necessity of what 
is given in experience. The ordinate power of God locates a 
hypothetical necessity within the laws and entities of creation; 
the absolute power of God reveals its lack of absolute or meta-
physical necessity. Nothing compels God to continue the world's 
existence. And given the continued existence of the world, 
nothing compels God to conserve any physical or moral law which 
is not entailed necessarily by the existent natures. 
There are two sides to the hypothetical necessity of 
creatures. From one perspective, all finite existence depends 
upon the free creative action of God. From the second perspective 
--and this facet is too often overlooked--the essential properties 
or characteristics of an individual thing are necessary on the 
condition that the individual exists. Ockham spoke of the "nec-
essity of the end'' which typifies the logic of human volition. 33 
If the agent-freely desires health, then the indispensable· means 
to health must be chosen. In a similar way, if God wishes the 
33see above, Chapter One, pp. 47-49. 
f , 
f 
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factuality of something, He is thereby committed to willing all 
the essential features of that thing. God could not create a 
naturally immortal man. 34 Nor could God produce a virtuous act 
without producing the created will and Right Reason which are 
necessarily required for morally good action. The rule of thumb 
seems to be: any attribute which can be predicated necessarily 
about some subject, must obtain if that subject exists. Hence, .. 
if Ockham extends the legislative authority of God there must be 
a corresponding reduction in the moral consequences which follow 
from the idea of human being. 
3. The Divine Ideas 
Ockham does not admit any priority of intellection to 
volition in the divine Being. 35 Acts of intellect completed prior 
to, and independent of, volition would jeopardize the absolute 
simplicity of God. For this reason, Ockham denies that the divine 
will is regulated (i.e., caused) by Right Reason. A text fre-
quently offered as proof .of the irrational and blind obedience 
which Ockham's God requires of His creatures intends to show the 
identification of will and reason in God. In response to the 
principal argument: 
34 Quodl., II, q. 5. 
35sent., I, d. 10, q. 1, P; 11 Nihil est volitum a voluntate 
creata nisi praecognitum. Tamen in Deo est simpliciter falsa 
quia in Deo actus voluntatis et actus intellectus et voluntas sunt 
omnibus modis idem; nee plus distinguitur actus voluntatis a 
voluntate quam distinguitur voluntas a voluntate. 11 
Every right will is conformed to Right Reason; but that 
will by which God predestines this man and not the 
other is right, therefore it is conformed to Right 
Reason. Thus, there is some reason why the former man 
is predestined and not the latter. But that reason is 
not in God who is equally disposed to all men on His 
part since He is no respector of persons. Hence, there 
is some reason in another and that can only be in the 
predestined. 
Ockham replies: · 
To the first principal argument, when it proves that 
generally there is some reason and cause for both 
predestination and reprobation, it can be said that 
every right will is conformed to Right Reason. But it 
is not always conformed to a prior Right Reason which 
shows cause why the will should wish this; but by the 
fact that the divine will wants it, Right Reason dic-
tates that it should be willed.36 
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Because God's intellect, will and essence are the same "in omni-
~ modis" there is no possibility of non-conformity between 
intellect and will. Hence, Ockham frequently insists that God 
cannot act immorally; that God is subject to no moral obligation. 37 
36 Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, A and K; "Omnis voluntas recta 
est conformis rectae rationi; sed illa voluntas qua Deus prae-
destinat istum et non alium est recta, ergo est conformis rectae 
rationi. Ergo, est aliquae ratio quare illllin praedestinat et non 
alium. Sed illa ratio non est in Deo quia Deus equaliter se habet 
ad omnes quantum est ex parte sua, cum non sit acceptor personar-
um. Ergo, est aliquae ratio in alio et non nisi in praedestinato. 11 
0 Ad primum principale, quando probat quod generaliter tam in 
praedestinato quam reprobato est aliquae ratio et causa, potest 
dici quod omnis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectae. Sed 
non est semper conformis rationi rectae praeviae quae ostendat 
causam quare voluntas debet hoc velle, sed eo ipso quod voluntas 
divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum. 11 Clearly, 
Ockham means to show the identity of reason and will in God. Yet 
Francis Oakley uses this text to show that for Ockham's version of 
morality "the last word lies with the will." Natural Law Forum 6, 
p. 70. Professor Vernon Bourke calls this quotation "aclassic 
statement of divine voluntarism." Proceedings of the American 
Qatholic Philosophical Association 36 (1962), p. 2~ 
37For example, Sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; Sent., II, q. 19, 
199 
The divine Bring is beyond good and evil. An essential condi-
tion of morality is absent without the possibility of discrepancy 
between one's reason and will. Thus, God's connection with the 
moral order is extrinsic. Whatever moral norms are embodied with-
in the nature of created things operate because of God's creative, 
unilateral action. Revealed commands express some moral neces-
sity or salvific economy for those other than the divine Legis-
lator. It is foreign to Ockham's viewpoint to conceive of 
eternal truths of morality which necessitate the divine will. 
Nevertheless, God operates rationally. Laws of intelli-
gibility describe how the divine will operates. That which "non 
posse non-esse" and "~ posse esse" can be expressed as the 
volitive characteristics "~posse non-velle" and "~posse 
velle." First, that which "cannot not-be" is necessarily loved 
by God because of the inner logic of His own activity. To be 
, 
precise, God necessarily loves Himself as the only necessary 
existent. 38 . Perhaps this assertion explains one sense in which 
H; ~., III, q. 13, O; Sent., IV, qes. 8-9, S. Occasionally, 
Ockham implies the identity of Right Reason and will in God as 
the reason He cannot act immorally. Thus, Sent., I, d. 14, q. 2, 
G; "Ex hoc ipso quod (Deus) vult, convenienter fit et non frustra; 
secus est in causis naturalibus et in causis voluntariis creatis, 
quae voluntariae causae debent se conformare rectae rationi primae, 
nee aliter faciunt aliquid juste vel recte. 11 At other times, Ock-
ham asserts that God cannot act immorally because He is "debtor" 
to no one. That is, God is totally self-sufficient and existen-
tially independent. No other being presents a "claim" on the 
divine activity. Thus, see Sent., II, q. 19, Hand P; Sent., III, 
q. 13, O; Sent., III, q. 5, N. 
38 Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 385-387); and Sent., I, d. 17, 
q. 1, T. --
r 
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Ockham considers the divine will the 11 first directing rule 11 of 
morality. 39 The natural exigency of God's self-love becomes a 
moral necessity for creatures to love the Creator. The importance 
which Ockham places on "conformity to the divine will 11 gives 
credance to this conjecture. Whatever God produces ad extra is 
done for the sake of His Goodness; likewise, Ockham claims that 
every perfectly virtuous movement of the created will is done 
for His Goodness. Secondly, that which 11 cannot be 11 indicates the 
limits of divine volition. God cannot will to produce a mani-
fest contradiction; He cannot actualize the impossible. 40 But 
Ockham does not speak of the law of contradiction as "limiting" 
•or 11 obliging" the divine will. Impossibility or possibility is 
simultaneous with the divine will's incapacity or capacity. 41 
What "cannot be" describes the extent of the divine will's com-
peteirce. 
39sent., III, q. 13, B; 11 ••• illa voluntas quae potest 
quantum est de se bene agere et male, quia de se non est recta 
necessario, ad hoc quod recte agat, indiget aliqua regula diri-
gente alia a se. Hoc patet, quia ideo voluntas divina non indi-
get aliquo dirigente, quia illa est prima regula directiva et non 
potest male agere. 11 Ockham implies the identification of will 
and Right Reason in God; but further, God's will is necessarily 
directed to the Greatest Good. And Ockham claims elsewhere that 
"rectitudo circa finem ultimum repugnat omni difformitati circa 
ea quae sunt ad finem. 11 Sent., III, q. 12, II. (Also see Sent., 
III, q. 13, O; where Ockham discusses another ramification of con-
forming to the divine will.) In his late work, the Quodlibetal 
Questions, Ockham calls the 'Love of God above all' necessarily 
virtuous and "prirnus omnium actuum bonorum. 11 Quodl., III, q. 13. 
The moral priority of love for God thus reflects the metaphysical 
exigency of God's self-love. 
40Quodl., VI, q. 6; 11 Quidlibet est divinae potentia attri-
buendum quod non includit manifestam contradictionem. 11 Also see 
Sent., II, qes. 8-9, S. 
4.1 L Sent., I, d. ~3, q. 2, F; "Et quando quaeritur, an primo 
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For many reasons, the relationship between the divine 
will and that which "posse ~" is the important issue in deter-
mining the legislative authority of God. Creation makes no 
necessary claim on the divine will yet it remains a contingent 
possibility and producible by God. Does God operate rationally 
regarding creatures? 
Ockham discusses God's knowledge in Distinction Thirty-
Five of the 11 Sentences-Commentary. 11 Question five of this dis-
tinction asks; Whether God understands everything other than 
Himself though ideas of them? Here Ockham claims that there are 
divine ideas because, as Augustine says, "God operates ration-
ally. 1142 11 By the fact that God is God, He knows everything; 
-
otherwise He would not be said to operate rationally unless He 
conveniat Deo non posse facere impossibile quam conveniat impos-
sibili non posse fieri a Deo, dico quod non prius convenit Deo 
non posse facere impossibile quam convenit impossibili non posse 
fieri a Deo. Nee etiam prius convenit impossibili non posse 
fieri quam Deo non posse facere impossibile. Et eodem modo dico 
de affirmativis, quod non prius convenit Deo posse facere possi-
bile vel creaturam quam creaturae posse fieri a Deo, sed simul 
. natura eo modo, quo secundum Philosophum factivum et factibile 
sunt simul natura ..• 11 Father Allan Wolter has published a thought-
. ful study of Ockham's doctrine of intrinsic and extrinsic possi-
bility. His ironic conclusion is that Ockham is often criticized 
for the position of Henry of Ghent (i.e., the possibility of 
things derives from the divine will) which the Venerable Inceptor 
refutes. 11 0ckham and the Textbooks: On the Origin of Possibility," 
Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 70-96. 
42~., I, d. 35, q. 5, F; 11 Ideo dico quod ideae sunt 
ponendae praecise ut sint examplaria quaedam ad quae intellectus 
divinus aspiciens producat creaturas; cuius ratio est quia, 
secundum beatum Augustinum ubi supra, propter hoc praecise pon-
endae sunt ideae in Deo quia "Deus est rationabiliter operans." 
See Aueustine, De diversis guaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 43 (P.L., 
XL, 30). 
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could know that which is done. 1143 God acts reasonably regarding 
the creation and conservation of finite things--at least in the 
sense of having ideas about what He accomplishes. At face value, 
this does not attribute greater rationality to God than is at-
tained by psychotics. But Ockham.has an interesting and innova-
tive conception of the divine ideas. 
Ockham describes a divine idea as "something known by the 
effective intellectual principle, to which the causative (activum) 
knower can look to produce something in real being. 1144 This 
description hardly pertains to the divine essence; Ockham con-
sciously steps outside the majority opinion of Scholasticism which 
held that the divine ideas were really the divine essence and 
distinguishable only by reason. 45 Ockham's definition indicates, 
43sent., I, d. 35, q. 5, R; "Ex hoc ipso quod Deus est 
Deus, Deus cognoscit omnia, nee aliter diceretur rationabiliter 
operans nisi cognosceret illa quae operatur. 11 
44Ibid., D; "Idea est aliquid cognitum a principio effec-
tive intellectuali, ad quid activum aspiciens potest aliquid in 
esse reali producere. 11 
45Ibid., B; "Circa primum (i.e., Quid sit idea?) concor-
dant multi doctores et fere omnes in una conclusione communi; 
scilicet quod idea est realiter divina essentia et tamen differt 
ratione ab ea ..• Contra istam conclusionem communem ostendo quod 
idea non est realiter divina essentia ... 11 Also see Sent., I, 
d. 2, q. 3 (II, 93); 11 ... ideae in mente divina non sunt realiter 
ipsa divina essentia. 11 Ockham cites as examples of the "common 
opinion" Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl., VII, q. 1 (ed. M. De Wulf 
and J. Hoffmans, Les Philosophes Belges, III); Henry of Ghent, 
Quodl., IX, q. 2 (Paris, 1518); and Duns Scotus, Comm. Ox., I, 
d. 35, q. unica. St. Thomas could be included, see Summ. Theol., 
I, q. 15, art. 1. When Ockham claims the ideas are "in the divine 
mind" but are different from the divine essence he means: a) the 
act by which the ideas are known is the divine essence, and b), 
What is known is other than the divine essence. 
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not the divine essence as imitable, but the creatures-as-known 
which are really distinct from the divine mind. Indeed, "the 
creature itself is the idea. 1146 In Ockham's jargon, the divine 
ideas are "connotative terms" which signify the creatures-as-
known directly and the singular act of divine knowing indirectly. 
This definition avoids, to Ockham's satisfaction, certain per-
plexing problems annexed to the question of God's omniscience. 
First, it allows that God knows everything without disallowing 
the simplicity of God's Being. An infinite number of ideas are 
known by a single and unitary act of knowing which is the divine 
essence. God's intellection terminates at, but does not include, 
plurality~ Secondly, as external to God's essence or as the 
creatures themselves, the ideas insure that God knows what is 
other than Himself. Ockham thinks that previous attempts to 
bring the divine ideas into God's mind as "relations of imita-
bility" or the divine essence as "participateable" throws into 
question any divine knowledge of difference or otherness. Third-
ly, the "cause of knowing" (ratio cognoscendi) remains God's 
46
sent., I, d. 35, q. 5, E; 11 ••• quantumcumque Deus cog-
nosceret suam essentiam, nisi cognosceret creaturam non diceretur 
rationabiliter producere quantumcumque produceret. Ergo, ipsa 
creatura est idea." Also see Sent., I, d. 2, q. 2 (II, 71); ..• 
quia ideae in Deo sunt ipsae res producibiles a Deo, nee prae-
dicantur de Deo sicut ipsa attributa vere de Deo praedicantur." 
Grammatically, the term "idea" signifies "ipsammet creaturam in 
recto et etiam ipsammet in obliquo et praeter hoc, importat ipsam 
divinam cognitionem vel cognoscentem in obliquo. Et ideo de ip-
samet creatura est praedicabilis ut ipsa sit idea; sed non est 
_praedicabilis de agente cognoscente vel cognitione, quia nee 
cognitio nee cognoscens est idea sicut nee exemplar." Sent., I, 
d. 35, q. 5, E. ~ 
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intellect. A finite being cannot cause knowledge in the infinite 
and self-sufficient God. The ideas are "what is known" and the 
means by which they are known is the divine essence. Finally, 
the ideas were known eternally by God although what is signified 
by the ideas, i.e., the creatures themselves, begin-to-be. The 
necessity and immutability by which God understands the ideas 
cannot be attributed to the ideas, but only to God's knowledge. 
This gives Ockham a foundation for necessary and immutable truths 
about the created world without asserting anything but God exists 
necessarily. 
The Scholastics spent considerable metaphysical energy 
on the question of the divine ideas. It was Aristotle's position 
that scientific knowledge "must rest on necessary basic truths; 
for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it 
is. 1147 Accepting this position, and the revealed truth God alone 
"cannot be other than He is," the Schoolmen had to find some 
basis for necessary truth about the created world besides Plato's 
world of forms or Aristotle's eternal species. The divine ideas 
provided a likely place to establish at least the necessity of 
being known for finite things. The "common opinion" on the 
divine ideas was unacceptable to Ockham. His objections follow 
two lines: a) if the divine ideas are really the divine essence 
then God does not know other things and b) if the ideas have some 
type of being or ontological "weight" within God's mind then the 
47p t . OS • Anal., I, c. 6 (trans. G. R. G. Mure). 
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divine simplicity is lost. Ockham avoids these problems by 
eliminating the ideas qua creatures from God's intellect. He is 
left with divine ideas which are "nothings. 1148 They have neither 
esse essentiale, nor esse intelligibile, nor ~ possibile, nor 
-
esse creabile: the eternal ideas are simply "null classes" whose 
-
one member might exist actually. 49 Yet Ockham insists that God's 
48 Sent., I, d. 36, q. 1, P; "Ideo dico quod 'nihil' multi-
piciter accipitur. Uno modo sincathegoreumatice et sic est unum 
signum universale negativum includens suum distribuibile secundum 
modum loquendi logicorum; sicut dicimus 'nihil currit,' 'nihil 
est intelligens.' Alio modo accipitur cathegoreumatice pro 
aliquod quid dicitur 'unum nihil.' Et hoc potest accipi dupli-
citer: quia uno modo 'nihil' accipitur et dicitur illud quid 
non est realiter, nee habet aliquid esse reale. Et isto modo 
dicendum est quod angelus ab eterno fuit nihil quia nullum esse 
reale habuit ab eterno, quia nullum esse fuit ab eterno nisi 
solus Deus. Aliter accipitur 'nihil' pro illo quid non tantum 
non habet esse reale sed etiam sibi repugnat esse reale, et isto 
modo dicimus quod chymera est nihil .•. Dico, ergo, quod esse 
repraesentatum vel esse cognitum creaturae ab aeterno fuit 'nihil' 
primo modo accipiendo vel cathegoreumatice, non secundo modo. Et 
ideo non infert istam quod nihil fuit repraesentatum a Deo •.. 11 
Ockham explains the difference between "categorematic" and "syn-
categorematic" terms in Summa Logicae I, c. 4 (ed. by Philotheus 
Boehner, pp. 15-16). Also see Boehner, Collected Articles .•. , 
pp. 22-224. Also see Quodl., VI, q. 6 where Ockham claims that 
every creature is a "pure nothing" before its production. 
49ockham, in denying the position of Henry of Ghent and 
Duns Scotus that ideas have a type of being in the divine mind 
(~in essentia and esse intelligibile), denies any ontological 
or positive status to the ideas. The fact that they are known 
and can be created implies no reality on the part of divine ideas. 
Ockham is not asserting that the possibility or intelligibility 
of finite being is a function of the divine will or intellect; 
but that _§§~ possibile and ~ intelligibile are not "quasi" or 
"diminished" beings which precede the actuality of created things. 
For the context of Ockham's doctrine see Father Armand Maurer, 
"Ens diminutum: A Note on Its Origin and Meaning," Medieval Stud-~12 (1950), pp. 216-222; and Edward Sullivan, The Divine 'ICie'as 
!?cording to William of Ockham: Study and Text (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 
1951), pp. 1-92. Father Allan Wolter comments that, according to 
'Jictivi ty regarding creation is guided by these exemplars. We 
•. jnust determine the type of rationality these ideas-examplars-
.creatures impute to God's legislation. 
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God knows perfectly, intuitively and individually every 
"creatable." As omniscient, God recognizes the truth and falsity 
of every proposition which could be formulated about that crea-
ture at any instant. 50 This knowledge includes certain hypotheti-
·cal necessities. If a human creature exists, then he is existen-
tially dependent upon the Creator; then he is a rational animal; 
then he is composed of matter and form; then he is mortal; then 
he is similar to every other existing man; 51 then he is a free 
[ 
~ Ockham, "possibility is not a real something which inheres in a 
f creature. 'To be possible' is something predicable of a creature; 
it is a logical modality that has been elevated to the status of 
a predicate." Franz. Studien 32, p. 89. In support of this anal-
ysis, Fr. Wolter quotes: "Nee est proprius modus loquendi dicere 
quod esse possibile convenit creaturae, sed magis proprie debet 
dici quod creatura est possibilis non propter aliquid quod sibi 
conveniat sed quia potest esse in rerum natura." Sent., I, d. 
43, q. 2, F. Fr. Wolter's comments regarding"~ possibile" 
could be extended to other areas on the basis of Sent., I, d. 36, 
q. 1, S - DD. Ockham maintains that: a) knowing-knowable, creat-
ing-creatable, able to do-able to be.done, etc., are correlative 
terms so that neither is prior to or cause of the other; and b), 
that from eternity creatures were knowable, creatable and able to 
be done although metaphysically they were "nothings"! After 
solving the problem of attributing simplicity and omniscience to 
God, Ockham might have smiled at the consequent questions whose 
solution he left unclear. 
50Tractatus de Praedestinatione ..• , q. 2, art. 4 (ed. 
Philotheus Bo elmer, pp. 28-29); " ... sci en ti.a Dei, qua sciuntur 
futura contingentia, sit necessaria; et hoc est verum, quia ipsa 
essentia di vina est uni ca cogni t.io necessaria et immutabilis 
omnium tam complexorum quam incomplexorum, necessariorum et con-
tingentium." See also the parallel text in Sent., I, d. 38, q. 1, 
L-M. 
51ockham's position on universal divine ideas is somewhat 
confusing. He first claims that 11 ideae praecise sunt singularium 
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being. Divine knowledge of the ideas entails these truths. 
These facts must obtain if ~ exist; expressed in the mode of 
possibility they are necessarily true even if men do not exist. 
Ockham's position that men cannot be obliged to the impossible 
indicates that God's creative power and legislative power are not 
co-extensive. God conceives inteliectually and could effect 
verbal commands whose significance ·is incompatible with the 
ideas of human creatures. For example, the commands "Never die," 
"Lift yourself by your shoe laces," and "Know everything" are 
possible for God to produce but impossible for men to fulfill. 
Whatever God commands while expecting men to obey must respect 
the natural capacities of the human being commanded. Thus, the 
scope of God's legislative authority is established by what is 
impossible for.moral beings to accomplish. 
The moral "facts" which derive from the divine ideas are 
few. For one thing, the ideas as creatures depend upon God as 
their ontological principle or source. The original inventory 
of the divine mind comprises everything "producible" whose actual 
production requires a free and creative decision by God. Thus, 
quia praecise singularia sunt factibilia." Sent., I, d. 35, q. 
5, Q. Then he proceeds to say that "Deus de fiendis ab eo non 
habet tantum cognitionem de universalibus, sicut habet artifex 
. creatus de fiendis ab ipso, sed itiam habet cognitionem distinct-
am et particularem de quolibet particulari fiendo ... 11 Ibid., R. 
Probably, Ockham means that God knows every "universal proposi-
tion" which can be expressed about or by creatures. Surely, God 
knows the similarity between things because men can form true 
propositions about specific likeness. From eternity, God knows 
that "Socrates is similar to Plato." The truth of this proposi-
tion, however, does not require a universal essence of humanity 
but only knowledge of Socrates and Plato. 
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creatures are "debtors"--an ethical expression of man's dependence 
in origin and destiny. To be created, conserved and redeemed by 
God places a rational creature in a "claim producing" or obliging 
situation. Secondly, created acts of will and reason are not 
identical--whence the possibility of moral good or evil. The 
human capacity for free and rational actions gives the "condition 
of the possibility" of morality and meaningful divine commands. 
Those principles of demonstrative moral science listed by Ockham 
--Everything honest is to be done, All dishonesty is to be avoid-
ed, The will ought to conform itself to Right Reason, All blame-
worthy evil is to be avoided--are necessarily true. 52 Such 
principles are valid "sine omni praecepto superioris;" if they 
are formulated they cannot be false; God knows them from eternity 
as immutably true. Yet the value terms contained within these 
ethical principles are "connotative" and invariably signify a 
52These principles are listed in Quodl., II, q. 14. Ock-
ham follows Aristotle in asserting that the principles of demon-
strative proof must be necessarily true. See Meta., V, C. 5 
(1915b 5-10) and Nie. Ethics, VI, c. 3 (1139b 18-35). As a 
Christian, Ockham believes that only God is absolutely necessary 
and everything else, even the facticity of a proposition, is 
radically contingent. These principles of morality are necessar-
ily true in the sense that they cannot be false if they ~ 
formulated. "Aliter dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorrupt-
ibile propositio, quae non potest esse falsa, quae scilicet ita 
est vera, quod si formatur, non est falsa sed vera tantu,"Il. 11 Summ. 
12g., III, II, c. 5 (quoted from Webering, Theory of Demonstra-
-=cIOn ... , p. 37, also found in Baudry, Lex.igue Philosophique, p. 
170). Thus, before creation these moral principles would be true 
~f God formulated them. Other per ~ nota principles are given 
in~., III, q. 12, H; Sent., III, q. 11, Z; Sent., III, q. 13, 
K; and Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348). Among the divine ideas, 
therefore;-are some "eternal laws" although-not in the sense of 
Aquinas' "Eternal Law." 
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created volition and its created causes of freedom and Right 
Reason. 53 Moral necessities, for Ockham, are grounded on the 
human possibilities of free and rational behavior. No man exists 
necessarily; no virtuous act is metaphysically necessary--but if 
either is asserted then the "inner moral order" of intellectual 
dictate and volitive freedom must be asserted as the possible or 
actual causes of morality. Whatever transcends the productive 
powers of the created will (either categorically such as eternal 
life or "individually" such as singing tenor or understanding 
Einstein's theory of relativity) cannot be matters of conscience. 
We can speak of God's absolute power to issue "impossible" com-
mands such as "Hate God" or "Act contrary to Right Reason," but 
according to Ockham, the discussion has left the realm of morali-
ty. 54 
Creating while He looks to the exemplars, God knows; a) 
the creature's existential "indebtedness," b) the freedom and 
Right Reason which together make men moral beings, and c) the 
53chapter V treats the meaning of value terms. Here we 
only assert that moral values are defined by Ockham by their 
essential causes, i.e., the created will and Right Reason. " 
'virtuosum' et 'vitiosum' sunt nomina connotativa et significant 
ipsum actum non absolute sed connotando cum hoc activitatem vol-
untatj_s et prudentiae; et quando deficit aliquid connotatum non 
dicitur talis actus virtuosus. 11 Sent., III, q. 13, F, ad primum. 
54Quodl., II, q. 14; "Circa primum; dico quod morale 
accipitur largiter pro humanis quae subjacent voluntati absolute, 
~t sic accipitur in Decretis, distinctio prima, c. 'Mos,' ut patet 
in glossa. Aliter accipitur stricte mqgis pro moribus sive acti-
bus subjectis potestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen 
rationis et secundum alias circumstantias. '' Also see Sent., Pro-
logue, q. 12 (I, 359). 
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total volitional capacities of every individual man. He knows 
the framework of morality as hypothetically necessary. These 
facts validate God's moral authority and define the limits of its 
application. 
Ockham's doctrine of divine ideas allows God to command 
any "simple" act producible by the creature's operative power. 
{"Simple" means the volitional power as actualized or specified 
by a single object.) Between the individual nature of creatures 
and the simple nature of actions within the power of those crea-
tures, God "sees" no inherent and necessary bond of moral suita-
bility or unsuitability. Is there any simple act which would not 
be morally indifferent when performed by the insane, or one in 
inculpable ignorance, or accidentally? Besides distinguishing 
carefully between fact and value, Ockham requests a strict dis-
tinction between moral determinants and moral actions. The simple 
nature of an action is one moral determinant among many. (Ockham 
does talk about actions which are generically good; but he is 
clear that eliciting such acts for improper motives renders the 
volition an evil.)55 Ockham insists that moral activity is a 
human enterprise with complex causes, objects and circumstances. 
55sent., III, q. 12, N; 11 Sexta distinctio est quod aliquis 
actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstantia, 
aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad actum 
bonum ex genere; sicut orare, dare elemosinam, sive velle talia 
facere absolute sine omni circumstania bona vel mala. Exemplum 
primi quantum ad actum malum; ut furtum facere, velle fornicari 
absolute sine aliqua circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus di-
cunt philosophi et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt cum 
malitia." 
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At the same time, he allows for drastic and sweeping changes in 
the circumstance of the divine determination of right and wrong. 
Ockham saw an internal problem with asserting; a) the 
creatures' ontological-moral "debt" to the Creator, and b) the 
possibility of affirmative or negative commands regarding every 
simple act of man. For example, rejecting God is a simple action 
(nolle Deum) controllable by the human will yet this action seems 
clearly inconsistent with man's existential dependence. Ockham 
could not resolve this problem at first. In the Ordinatio, he 
-
claims "no one can ordinately hate God;" in the Reportatio, he 
reasons that "to hate God can be a correct act on earth, if pre-
scribed by God, therefore in heaven also. 1156 His final solution 
in the Quodlibetal Questions does not retreat from his assertions 
that, a) God could command creatures to hate or "not love" Him 
and that, b) the creature ought to obey this extraordinary man-
date. But he finds a way to maintain these prerogatives of the 
divine Legislator while simultaneously asserting that love for 
56sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 375); 11 ••• nullus potest ordin-
ate odire Deum ... 11 Sent., IV, q. 14, D; "Praeterea, omnis volun-
tas potest se conformare praecepto divino; sed Deus potest prae-
cipere quod voluntas creata odiat eum; igitur, voluntas creata 
potest hoc facere. Praeterea, omne quod potest esse actus rectus 
in via, et in patria: sed odire Deum potest esse actus rectus 
in via, puta si praecipiatur a Deo; ergo, et in patria." Also 
see Sent., II, q. 19, 0. We discuss the odium Dei further in 
the following chapter. As Erich Hochstetter has indicated, Ock-
ham seems to change his mind about this question. Franz. Studien, 
32, pp. 15-16. Yet when the papal commission at Avignon questioned 
Ockham about the possibility of the commanded hate for God and the 
human fulfilment of such a command, they determined that "non 
dixit. 11 See Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire ecclesiatigue, 18, pp. 253-
254. The commission cites the text quoted above in Sent., IV, 
q. 14, D. 
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God above all is necessarily and immutably good whenever it 
occurs within the created will. Ockham's solution re-affirms the 
free and rational character of human moral response; man's moral 
nature requires conformity to the divine wish in a deliberate, 
well-motivated and free manner. 
Thirdly, I say that this necessary virtuous act in the 
manner mentioned is an act of will, because the act by 
which God is loved above all for His own sake is this 
kind of act. For this act is so virtuous that it cannot 
be wicked nor can it be caused by the created will unless 
it be virtuous •.. 
If one objects: God could prescribe that He not be loved 
for a certain time because He could command that the in-
tellect and likewise the will be occupied with study so 
that it could not think about God for that period. Then 
I request that the will elicit an act of loving God. 
Now either that act is virtuous--and this cannot be 
asserted since it is elicited against God's command--
or it is not virtuous and the proposition prevails 
that the act of loving God above all is not virtuous. 
I answer: if God could prescribe this act as it seems 
He could without contradiction, then I assert that the 
will could not elicit such an act for this period. By 
the fact that it elicits such an act, the will would 
love God above all and consequently would fulfil the 
divine command because to love God above all is to love 
whatever God wishes to be loved. And by the fact that 
it would thereby love God, the will would not follow 
the divine command in this hypothetical case. Conse-
quently, by thus loving God, one would love and not love 
and fulfil the divine command and not fulfil it.57 
Ockham did not repudiate the common Scholastic position 
that loving God above all is necessarily and unalterably good. 
Nor is it correct to interpret Ockham as knowing only positive 
moral obligation. Given a hypothetical and highly improbable 
divine command to hate God, the created nature of man requires 
a loving, obedient response to the Creator's command. The 
57Quodl., III, q. 13. Our translation follows the text 
established by Father Boehner in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, 
pp. 146-147. 
r 
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absolute power of God does not throw all morality into question. 
on the contrary, divine omnipotence highlights and "proves" the 
natural structure of moral activity. This because God commands 
man who necessarily executes his moral obligations rationally 
-
and freely. Without asserting a divine idea of "humanity" Ock-
ham' s God is conditionally (i.e., if men exist) committed to 
"how" moral goodnei?s is accomplished and the immutable goodness 
of created love for Himself above all. 
4. The Objective Norm of Morality 
Ockham maintains: "Every created will is obligated to 
conform itself to its rule; but the divine will is the rule of 
every created will; therefore, every created will is obligated 
to conform itself to the divine will. 1158 Religious belief af-
fects the conduct of morality. Concern to fulfill the divine 
wish "always should be in every honest use of reason. 1159 The 
manner in which the divine will governs moral decisions, however, 
is far from clear. 
Belief changes the motives or final causes of moral 
activity. The Christian acts are orientated to God; this perva-
sive intention differentiates Christian from "philosophical" 
58sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, A; "Ad oppositum: quaelibet 
voluntas creata tenetur se conformare regulae suae; sed voluntas 
divina est regula cuiuslibet voluntatis creatae; ergo, quaelibet 
voluntas creata tenetur se conformare voluntati divina.e. 11 
59Ibid., D. 
2l4 
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virtues. Ordering human acts to the Infinite Good seems to 
be an implication of religious belief rather than an explicit 
demand of divine positive law. At least, Ockham's willingness 
to defend the virtuousness of loving God above all in the face 
of divine commands to the contrary suggests the "natural" or non-
positive obligation to love God. Believing that God is the cause 
of everything and the ultimate end has moral consequences. De-
pendent upon the divine will for his existence, the human creature 
should not allow a more fundamental obligation than his "debt" 
to the Creator. The moral necessity of loving God reflects the 
absolute necessity with which God loves Himself. 61 The altruistic 
love for God, the "first of all good acts," becomes the human 
image of God's own life. Thus, the Christian conscience appreci-
ates· a motive in acting which is not apparent nor operative out-
side of faith. 
The commands which God has or might institute, however, 
require behavior patterns which are observable. Here "conformity" 
60
sent., IV, q. 3, S; 11 ••• abstinet Christianus ab actu 
fornicandi propter Deum, et quia Deus praecepti sibi abstinere, 
ita quod Deus est hie causa finalis vel praeceptum Dei istius 
abstinentiae. Et sic de omnibus aliis virtutibus acquisitis a 
bono Christiano, quia semper Deus est principalis finis intentus. 
Philosophus autem licet abstineat a talibus, tamen totaliter 
propter alium finem, vel propter conservationem naturae vel ad 
proficiendum in.· scientia vel propter aliquid tale. Igi tur, aliud 
fuit objectum partiale abstinentiae philosophi et boni Christiani 
et per consequens alia virtus et aliterius rationis •.. 11 Also see 
~., III, q. 12, GGG; Sent., III, q. 10, I. 
61sent., r; d. 10, q. 2, L; "Ad aliud dico quod voluntas 
divina necessario vult bonitatem suam; non tamen libere sed it.a 
naturaliter sicut naturaliter intelligit bonitatem suam." 
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means the creature's accomplishment of a contingent divine wish. 62 
Ockham maintains that God's express desire for the human agent 
to perform some action is reason enough for Right Reason to dic-
tate such action. It would be incorrect to conceive of God's 
will as "superceding" or "overriding" Right Reason--the proximate 
norm of morality. The requirement to love and obey God presup-
poses that this obligation is recognized and dictated by Right 
63 Reason. Rather, the objectively correct use of Practical 
Reason would not prefer some natural criterion of moral goodness 
to the revealed will of God in determining the concrete location 
of one's obligation. Thus, God's will might require church 
attendance or baptism as facets of "Christian" morality--a some-
what trivial difference between the ethics of belief and unbelief. 
More importantly, on the basis of a divine command the Christian 
62
sent. I, d. 48, q. 1, G; "Quinto dico quod voluntas 
tenetur se conformare voluntati divinae volendo ea quae voluntas 
divina vult earn velle; et hoc si velit earn velle illud voluntate 
beneplaciti vel voluntate praecepti." See Freppert, The Basis 
of Morality ... , pp. 157-67, for a study of the various senses of 
"conformity." 
63sent., III, q. 11, Z· 11 ••• hoc est unum tale principium 
(quibus virtutes connexae sunt): Omne determinatum a ratione 
recta propter determinatum finem et sic de aliis circumstantiis 
esse faciendum, est faciendum; aliud, Omne bonum dictatum a recta 
ratione est eligendum--ista et alia multa sunt principia communia 
omni virtuti sine quibus non potest elici actus virtuosus. Et 
sicut ista principia sunt communia, ita habitus sunt communes 
istorun1 principiorum quae vocantur prudentiae; i ta quod no ti tia 
istius principii communis est causa partialis immediata notitiae 
conclusionis in speciali. Et loquor de notitia actuali utrobique, 
ut si arguatur: Omne dictatum a recta ratione esse diligendum est 
diligendum; sed patrem vel matrem vel Deum diligendum esse est 
dictatum a recta ratione; ergo, et cetera." Also see Sent., I, 
d. 1, q. 4 ( I, 44 3) . --
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__ might be obliged to actions which the non-believer would find 
unconscionable. For example, Ockham teaches that the directive, 
"each should receive what belongs to him" is known evidently. 64 
Yet religious commitment to God, the Creator of heaven and earth, 
gives a "supernatural" flexibility to the notion of ownership or 
property. According to the natural evidence, the Israelites were 
wrong to plunder Egypt prior to the Exodus, i.e., they committed 
"theft." But Ockham claims: "To despoil the Egyptians was not 
wrong but right, and thus God did not prescribe evil when com-
manding them to take from the Egyptians. Nor did the children 
of Israel sin by despoiling them unless they acted in the wrong 
spirit--unless they did not pillage precisely in obedience to the 
divine command~ 1165 God's wish not only presents a valid claim 
upon the created will's activity, it-also affects the application 
of evident moral norms and the ethical designation of concrete 
actions. 
Those who claim that Ockham teaches moral voluntarism 
have their point in that the divine will could override every 
natural criterion of moral right and wrong. With the exception 
of the altruistic love for God, which seems to be the only nee-
essarily good act, the "content" or application of ethical prin-
ciples is relative to God's contingent decrees. 66 Two common 
64 Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 348). 
65sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, G. 
66 Anita Garvens suggests the "form--content" distinction 
in Ockham' s ethic. "Wenn fiir Ockham die allgemeinen ethischen 
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assertions of the Scholastics--a) that God is omnipotent and 
absolutely free and b) that God can produce immediately what He 
ordinarily causes mediately through secondary causes--break loose 
l- from their metaphysical restraints of intrinsically related es-
ff~; 
sences, teleological connections between individuals and the 
internal continuity of divine operations ad extra. Thus, God 
could command or totally create acts 6f hate for Himself in 
spite of the moral necessity that men love God or the internal 
exigency of divine self-love. 67 As total cause, God might pro-
duce statements which are logically contradictory or imperatives 
which are humanly impossible to fulfill. The permanent truths 
Prinzipien schliesslich doch mehr als nur formale Satze sind, wie 
im Laufe der folgenden Untersuchung sich zeigen wird, so liegt 
das vornehmlich in seiner glaubigen Annahme der Offenbarung als 
der Erkenntnisquelle fur die vom Willen Gottes festgesetzte 
Sittenregel, die augenblicklich und ordinate gultig ist. Sie 
allein liefert Ockham den Inhalt der sicheren allgemeinen ethi-
schen Prinzipien." Franz. Studien, 21, p. 248. This terminology 
is helpful with two qualifications. First, the love of God above 
all is a concrete and "contentful" moral value whenever it occurs 
in the created will regardless of changeable divine decrees. 
Secondly, God's positive .laws may be self-authenticating but 
they are not self-explanatory. That God has issued the command 
is warrant to obey the law for any believer; but understanding 
the intent and application of the law requires by necessity the 
agent's prudent judgments. For example, the agent must judge on 
the basis of experience that "this is murder," "these are my 
parents," etc., to recognize how to fulfill the divine mandates. 
67To reconcile the freedom of the created will with the 
"obstinacy" of the damned, Ockham makes God the primary cause of 
the permanent hate for God which characterizes the state of 
damnation. "Et eodem modo, potest assignari ratio obstinationis 
malorum per hoc quod Deus causat tanquam causa totalis quicquid 
absolutum est in actu nolendi et odiendi Deum ... 11 Sent., II, 
q. 19, F. The fact that God does produce hate for Himself in 
the devils is a fortiori evidence that He might do so in men. 
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of morality and the limits placed upon God's legislative power 
derive from the nature of men and virtuous activity--not from 
the intrinsic necessity of divine Goodness. 
Without doubt, Ockham's confidence in the ordained will 
of God makes the present moral order reliable. He speaks of 
God's "quasi absolute" will regarding "all goods which are not 
evils by guilt nor punishment. 1168 And notice that by defining 
"murder," "theft" and "adultery" as "contrary to divine command," 
Ockham can maintain that only a direct revelation by God would 
justify the deliberate and voluntary taking of innocent life, 
another's property or wife. The biblical instances of dispensa-
tions to the "common law" are few; the likelihood of future 
expectations is small. But Ockham's expectation of continuity 
is just that, an expectation. God might have foreknown and 
ordained drastic and universal changes in the content of moral 
obligation. After allowing for particular exceptions to the 
present classification of (simple) acts as right or wrong, what 
prevents the exception from becoming the rule? The ordinate 
power of God might contain general mandates whose application 
would be as socially ruinous as the revolutionary potential which 
commentators have located mistakenly in God's absolute power. 
Admittedly, images of indiscriminate homicide or appropriation 
of property are completely foreign to Ockham's viewpoint and 
68
sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, B; 11 Tertio, sciendum quod quaedam 
sunt volita a Deo quasi absolute; cuiusmodi su..'YJ.t omnia bona quae 
nee sunt mala culpae nee penae •.. 11 
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intentions. Nevertheless, only terminology stands between his 
principles and such chaotic possibilities. A "common law" has 
been revealed; God is committed to the physical, moral and sal-
vific orders which He has "ordained." But Ockham insists that 
God has commanded exceptions to the common law, e.g., in the 
cases of Abraham and Osee; and whatever God ordains regarding 
creatures is itself contingent. 
The prerogatives of the divine will are a serious and 
pervasive polarity in Ockham's moral doctrine. But he does not 
recognize the discretionary power of God as the only source of 
moral obligation. 69 Without cognition or belief regarding the 
deity, divine positive laws should not be considered as authori-
tative within the non-believers moral decisions. For believers, 
God's wish the objective norm of morality because His will is 
the unqualified extrinsic basis of obligation. It is only be-
lievers who face the "theological" possibility of slight or 
sweeping changes in the content of one's duty. And Christians 
can balance this highly unlikely prospect with religious convic-
tions about God's faithfulness and mercy. 
69sent., III, q. 13, M; 11 ••• semper peccat voluntas peccato 
commissionis quando elicit aliquem actum ad cuius oppositum obli-
gatur per praeceptum divinum vel ordinationem divinam vel alio 
.!!!2..£2. obligatur ad oppositum .•. " 
r 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MORAL ACTIONS 
William of Ockham seems reluctant or unable to explain 
the natural and evident criteria by which moral agents decide 
right and wrong. There are strong suggestions that the Decalogue 
precepts are harmonious, at least, with the natural evidence for 
ethical value. For example, he claims that Christian and "philo-
sophical" virtues differ in motives--not in what is done. 1 In 
his political writings, he asserts that the Decalogue precepts 
were matters of natural law before their positive revelation. 2 
What empirical data supports the moral judgments that acts of 
1
sent., III, q. 12, GGG; "Philosophus tamen non ponit 
virtutem moralem esse respectu objecti supernaturalis sicut nos 
ponimus; quia non ponit quod abstinentia et continentia sit 
volenda propter honorem divinum tanquam propter finem, nee talia 
et consimilia quae sunt praecepta a Deo quomodo bonus Christianus 
ponit talia. Sed solum ponit talia esse volenda quia sunt hones-
ta vel conservativa naturae vel aliquid aliud mere naturale." 
Also see Sent., III, q. 10, I; and Sent., IV, q. 3, S; and Sent., 
III, q. 12, CC. 
2opus Nonaginta Dierum, c. 99 (Manchester ed.; II, 747); 
"Male arguit [Johannes XXII in bulla "Quia vir reprobus"], acsi 
argueret: 'Deus praecepit filiis Israel, ut legitur Exodi xx, 
li2.g occides, non moechaberis, !l2!.! furtu.rn facies; haec ergo eis 
prius praecepta non erant.' Constat enim quod in lege naturae 
ante legem Mosaicam haec erant praecepta .•. haec ante librum Deu-
teronomii praecepta fuerunt. 11 See W. Kolmel, "Das Naturrecht bei 
Wilhelm Ockham, 11 Franziskanischen Studien 35 (1953), pp. 39-85. 
Francis Oakley's article, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law; 
William of Ockham and the Significance of the Voluntarist Tradi-
tion," shows the problem with attempts to derive a coherent 
theory of natural law from the political works. Natural Law 
Forum 6 (1961), pp. 65-72. 
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theft or adultery are wrong? Because of Ockham's ambitious 
doctrine of God's legislative authority and his frequent descrip-
tions of the divine will as the "first directing rule" of morali-
ty, the question of experiential criteria is problematic. 
Two doctrines cause interpretive difficulties when isolat-
ing the non-scriptural foundations of moral judgments. First, 
ethical value is unavoidably an affair of human volition for Ock-
ham. The intricate system of relationships proposed by St. 
Thomas and Duns Scotus for establishing moral suitability (.£.Qg-
venientia) in actions controlled by the will are applied by 
Ockham to the will-acts themselves. Circumstances such as place 
and time pertain to the will itself. 3 Even divine commands are. 
understood as prescribing specific volitions and the circumstances 
of specific volitions. 4 When the objects, ends and situational 
3sent., III, q. 10, F; 11 ••• circumstantiae nihil faciunt 
ad actum ve1 habiturn partis sensitivae; sed tantum ad actum vol-
untatis quia sunt objecta ad actum voluntatis •.• " Also see Quodl., 
I, q. 20. 
4
sent., III, q. 10, K; "Aliter potest dici quod actus 
interior et exterior prohibentur distinctis praeceptis, non quia 
sunt distincta peccata, quia peccatum solum consistit in actu 
interiori qui potest esse unus et idem cum actu exteriori et 
sine, sed ne detur simplicibus occasio errandi. Potest enim 
aliquis cred.ere quod est peccatum solum quando actus interior 
est malus et actus exterior similiter. Et haec est opinio multor-
um quod non est peccatum in sola voluntate sed tantum quantum 
ponitur in opere. 11 Also see Quodl., I, q. 20. Here Ockham ob-
jects to the doctrine of Duns Scotus that external (i.e., non-
volitive) actions have some "proper moral goodness or evilness." 
See Scotus, Quodl., q. 18, nos. 12-14. This denial shows the 
clear dist:i.nctior; made by Ockham between moral determinants and 
moral values. On the other hand, it complicates the decision-
making process. If there is nothing good or evil about sexual 
intercourse with another's wife, on what evident basis might the 
agent determine that to will adultery is evil? 
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factors affecting moral decisions are discussed in Ockham, their 
referent is- not external or physical actions. Secondly and 
corroboratively, Ockham establishes the elements of the decision-
making process as constitutive of actual virtue. Moral criteria 
appear in Ockham's work as components of the specific nature of 
will-acts. With these peculiarities in mind, we will study the 
causes-criteria of moral virtue, the degrees of virtuousness and 
the necessarily virtuous act. Our analysis attempts to recon-
struct the moral order from the human agent's point of view. 
The final picture which emerges shows Ockham's concern for the 
divine will; but voluntarism is not the final word of his moral 
doctrine. 
1. Causes and Criteria of Virtue 
Ockham accepts the Aristotelian scheme of causality as 
comprising material, formal, efficient and final causes. 5 But 
Ockham proposes definitions of these types of causes which can-
not be considered strictly Aristotelian. Specifically, he de-
fines an efficient cause as "that whose being or presence is 
followed by something else;" and a final cause is "a thing which 
is loved and desired efficiently by an agent. 116 Both efficient 
5summulae in Libros Physicorum, II, c. 1-13; Sent., I, 
d. 35, q. 5, N; Quodl., IV, q. 1. 
6
ouodl., IV, q. l; "Ex his patet quod causa finalis et 
efficiens ratione distinguuntur. Hoc est, diffinitiones expri-
mentes 'quid nominis' earum sunt diversae; quia diffinitio causae 
f'inalis est esse amatum et desideratum efficientis est esse 
agente propter quid amatum sit effectus. Diffinitio causae 
. .' 
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and final causes are involved in the production of a moral act. 
Ockham's unique understanding of efficient and final causes pro-
vides the technique by which the circumstances-objects of a 
voluntary act become partial causes of the substance of a will-
act and therefore the rectitude or evil of the will-act. 
Ockham mentions three powers which comprise the total 
cause of a moral act--the will, God and the intellect. 7 A vol-
untary act, the divine concursus and an intellectual act are 
efficientis est esse illud ad cuius esse sive praesentiam sequi-
tur aliquid. Et aliquando una istarum diffinitionum convenit uni 
et alia alteri; aliquando possunt competere eidem." 
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2; Physics, II, 7, 198a 
14 -198b 10. It should be mentioned that the identification of 
final and efficient causality in some cases is not an innovation 
in Ockham's thought. Aristotle also teaches that these causes 
can be the same. "The soul is the cause or source of the living 
body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul 
is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we ex-
plicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, 
it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living 
body." (De Anima, II, 4, 415b 8 - 12, trans. J. A. Smith). Also 
see Physics, II, 7, 198a 25-27. On the other hand, Ockham's des-
cription of efficient causality seems to be more reserved than 
Aristotle's. Aristotle defines efficient causality as "initiat-
ing mot.ion" as "the source or origin of movement" as "that from 
which the change or the resting from change first begins." Ock-
ham, however, prefers to describe efficient causality without 
asserting a transfer of power. In Ockham's thought an efficient 
cause is a being whose precedence is required before another 
thing can be asserted. (See above, Chapter I, pp. 17-26 .) Thus, 
all knowledge required for virtuous will-acts appears as a cause 
of virtue. 
7sent., III, q. 12, NN; "Si quaeras de actu prudentiae in 
quo genere causae se habet ad actum virtuosum, ex quo necessario 
requiritur per se? Et effectus sufficienter dependet ex causis 
suis essentialibus; igitur etc •.. Respondeo quod est causa effi-
ciens necessario requisita ad actum virtuosum sine qua, impos-
sibile est actum esse virtuosum stante ordinatione divina quae 
nunc est. Ita quod ad actum virtuosum necessario requiritur 
acti vi tas actus prudent.iae et acti vi tas volur1tatis; i ta quod 
illae duae causae sunt causa.e partial.es cum Deo respectu actus 
virtuosi. 11 Also see Ibid. , CCC; Quodl. , III, q. 3. 
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mutually necessary to produce moral behavior. However, the 
causality of the will is "principally" required for the produc-
tion of a praiseworthy or blameworthy act. Strictly speaking 
8 only a voluntary act is considered as a moral act. There is a 
rigid distinction between natural and free causality in Ockham's 
thought; moral goodness is necessarily the contingent effect of 
a free cause. Ockham implies that the free choice of the will 
establishes God and the intellect as partial causes of a moral 
effect. Given the willingness of God to concur and the mental 
preconception of some act, the human will remains free to produce 
or not produce the action. 9 If the will elicits the act, however, 
then God and the intellect become partial causes. Because the 
efficient causality of the will is a sine qua !!.2Q of moral 
activity, the fundamental characteristic of moral behavior is its 
8
sent., III, q. 12, F; "Quarta conclusio est quod actus 
primo et principaliter virtuosus est actus voluntatis. Hoc patet 
primo quia ille solus est laudabilis primo vel vituperabilis. 
Alia autem non nisi secundario et quadam denominatione extrinseca; 
puta, per hoc, quod eliciuntur conformiter actui voluntatis .•. 
Praeterea, secundum sanctos, nullus actus est laudabilis vel 
vituperabilis nisi propter intentionem bonam vel malam. Inten-
tio autem est actus voluntatis; ergo etc., Item, sola voluntas 
punitur sicut sola peccat secundum Anselmum, igitur etc ..• Also 
see, Quodl., III, q. 13; Sent., III, q. 10, D, H, R, I. 
9sent., IV, q. 14, G; "Loquendo de primo actu, posito 
omni sufficienti et necessario requisito ad talem actum, puta, 
ad actum voluntatis; si objectum cognoscatur et Deus velit con-
currere cum voluntate ad causandum quando placet voluntati; 
potest voluntas ex sua libertate sine omni alia determinatione 
actuali vel habituali actum illum et ejus objectum elicere vel 
non elicere. Et ideo respectu illius actus non oportet in aliquo 
4uod determinetur voluntas nisi a seipsa." Also see Sent, I, d. 
3, q. 1, K. 
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voluntariness, its origination in freedom. Ockham's ethical 
program means to contain moral value within the contingent 
operation of the free will. 
The intellect is a cause of moral activity because an 
act of reason must precedee.rery volitional act. An act of under-
standing is an efficient cause of volition and hence, a partial 
efficient caus~ of every moral use of the will. 10 To be precise, 
Ockham considers an act of prudence or Right Reason as the mental 
precedent for a correct act in the will. 11 An act of Right 
Reason is an essential cause of moral goodness in the will, but 
not a necessitating cause. The dictate of Right Reason does not 
force the will's production of a good act; on the contrary, Right 
Reason is not even a partial cause of moral behavior unless the 
will freely and contingently elicits an act conformed to Right 
10 Sent., III, q. 11, C; Sent., III, q. 12 NN. Cf. Chap-
ter I, pp. 42-43. 
11sent., III, q. 13, B; 11 Ad quaestionem primo sciendum 
est quod ad hoc quod actus rectus primo eliciatur a voluntate 
necessario requiritur aliqua recta ratio in intellectu. Hoc 
patet per rationem et auctoritates. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 11, 
C; and Sent., Prologue, q. 10, K. On the basis"""()f"°these texts, 
we must take exception to Oswald Fucks, O.F.M., who denies that 
Ockham teaches the causal participatJon of Right Reason in the 
production of a good act. "If the contribution of Right Reason, 
while being necessary, is not one of causal influence on the 
moral act, then it can only be of the nature of a necessary con-
dition or constitutive element of that act." The Psychology of 
~ According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, New York: The 
Franciscan Institute, 1952), p. 89. In this text just quoted 
and in others (Sent., III, q. 13, F; Sent., III, q. 11, C), Ock-
ham asserts that because Right ReasoniSa necessary condition 
or precedent for a virtuous act of the will, that Right Reason 
is thereby a cause of virtue. "Dictare sive regulare non est 
aliud_quam speciali modo illurn actum causare" as Ockham says. 
See below, in footnote 12. 
r 
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Reason. The will freely chooses to accept or reject the intellec-
tual dictate that "this ought to be done." But in order to freely 
do what is right, the agent must first know what is right. Hence, 
because acts of Right Reason or prudence must precede every cor-
rect operation of the will, Ockham considers Right Reason as a 
necessary efficient cause of moral goodness. 
The dual meaning of "right reason" is consistently main-
tained in Ockham's analysis of the components of a morally good 
act. Reeta ratio is both cause and object for virtuous will-acts. 
Assent to moral rules dictates the will's conformity; dictating 
. 1 d f . 12 is a specia mo e o causing. The conformity of the will to 
Right Reason, a point which Ockham's moral doctrine insists upon, 
becomes the psychological parallel between intellectual and 
volitional assent to the same directive. Furthermore, Ockham 
calls recta ratio an "object" of a virtuous act. "The end and 
right reason and all the other circumstances are secondary partial 
objects of a virtuous act. 1113 The objects of an act give that 
action its specific nature. Every factor which determines a 
moral decision--intention, time, place, divine command, moral 
directive, physical act, sensitive passion, etc.--comprise the 
total object and specific character of a virtuous act. The 
12sent., III, q. 13, F; "Respondeo actum elici conformiter 
rationi rectae est ipsum elici secundum rectam rationem regulantem 
et dictantem talem actum esse eliciendum (quid quidem 'dictare' 
sive 'regulare' non est aliud quam speciali modo illum actum 
causare; sicut alibi patet). 11 
l3Sent., III, q. 12, CCC. Also see Sent., III, q. 10, Q. 
227 
criteria by which future acts are known to be virtuous are the 
constituents of actual virtue. For example, walking to church 
for the exercise is morally indifferent and specifically differ-
ent than walking to church because "God ought to be worshipped." 
These are not specifically identical acts with different circum-
stances. While Right Reason dictates or partially causes moral 
behavior, right reason (as a directive proposition) partially 
determines the kind of moral act produced. 
It is the role of prudence to consider the propriety of 
an action in.terms of its circumstances. 14 All the circumstances 
which affect the moral status of intended acts, are determined 
and jointly dictated by the intellect. For example, the time 
and place in which volition should occur are dictated by Right 
Reason or prudence. 15 A moral agent cannot determine whether the 
14 Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 316). 
l5sent., III, q. 12, DDD; "Si dicas quod requiritur ad 
actum virtuosu.s quod locus et tempus apprehendatur et dictentur 
a ratione sicut finis; et taliter non potest ratio causare actum 
virtuosum et per consequens tam locus quam tempus sunt objecta 
partialia actus dictandi et apprehensionis, non tamen sunt ob-
jecta volitionis virtuosae. Contra, volitio dicitur perfecte 
virtuosa quia in on;mibus conformiter elicitur rationi rectae, 
quia si in aliquo conformiter eliceretur et in aliquo non, jam 
non essetperfecte virtuosa. Exemplum, si aliquis vellet actum 
carnalem propter talem finem dictatum a ratione recta, et nullum 
alium actum volendi haberet respectu loci et temporis quamquam 
ista dictentur a ratione recta, ista volitio non est perfecte 
virtuosa sed potius viciosa vel indifferens. Igitur ad hoc, 
quod sit perfecte virtuosa oportet quod conformetur rationi rectae 
et omnibus dictatis a ratione recta sibi debite competere. Igi-
tur, si recta ratio dictet quod talis actus sit volendus loco et 
tempore, et per consequens, quicquid est objectum actus dictandi 
rectae erit oppositum [read, •.• "objectum"] actus perfecte virtu-
osi." 
r 
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act of drinking is correct or incorrect without considering the 
circumstances within which the act of drinking occurs. To perform 
a virtuous act of drinking, the moral agent must voluntarily con-
form to Right Reason because it is obligatory, because the time 
and place are correct, because the end is right. Profit or 
pleasure are morally unacceptable motives to act in the correct 
time and place. The dictate of Right Reason includes a determin-
ation of the proper rule and end according to which the will 
should act. Consequently, Ockham considers the circumstances of 
an intended action as partial objects and partial causes of an 
actually virtuous act. 16 The reasons why the will should elicit 
certain acts are recognized and affirmed intellectually, prior 
to any volitive fulfillment of obligation. Thus, the influence 
of final causes arrives through the efficient causality of the 
dictate of Right Reason. 
Acts which St. Thomas Aquinas considers as intrinsically 
wrong, e.g., theft and murder; and which Duns Scotus considers 
as contingently wrong, e.g., telling a falsehood, are considered 
16
sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae 
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus; ita quod 
finis in omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patuit, 
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu 
illius actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc, quod actus volun.tatis 
quo aliquis vult orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur 
·de necessitate istae circumstantiae; quia velit orare propter 
honorem Dei secundum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statuto, 
puta, die dominico, in loco determinato, puta, in ecclesia; tune 
iste actus sic virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro objecto principali, 
actu orandi pro objecto communi, rectam rationem, diem dorninicum 
et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus; ita quod 
respectu actus voluntatis istae circumstantiae sunt objecta. et 
causae effectivae partiales respectu illius actus. 11 
as the "common object" of a volitional act by William Ockham. 
The physical actions denoted by the participles "stealing," 
229 
"killing" or "lying" can be "common" to agents who act according 
to worthy or unworthy motives. An agent could contemplate steal-
ing with a worthy motive, e.g., to avoid starvation; he could 
intend not to steal with an unworthy motive, e.g., to promote 
his own reputation. Physical acts are not moral actions inde-
pendent of their voluntary and rational causes. The end or motive 
for which these "common objects" are produced by the will is 
considered by Ockham as the "principal object" of the will-act. 17 
"That object is the principal object of an act of the will whose 
choice is intended principally." The human will always acts for 
the sake of an end. Hence, Ockham asserts that the "common ob-
ject"- of a will-act can be substantially identical while the moral 
status of the will-act might change. During the same physical 
action--walking to church--an agent's intentions might change. 
Regarding the same physical act the will can produce a praise-
worthy and a blameworthy act. Although the agent's physical 
action of walking to church is uninterrupted, and "walking to 
17Idem., "Si dicas quod actus principaliter intentus a 
voluntate dicitur esse objectum primarium illius actus; scilicet, 
si velim ambulare ad ecclesiam ad orandum propter laudem Dei, 
actus principaliter intentus est actus orandi vel ambulandi; 
ergo, isti actus sunt objecta primaria respectu actus voluntatis. 
Respondeo, illud objectum est principale objectum actus volunta--
tis cuius dilectio principaliter intenditur; huiusmodi est finis. 
Sed tamen vocando illud objectum principale quid est objectum 
causae, prout dicitur contra circumstantias requisitias, tune 
actus exterior est objectum principale, quia objectum eorum com-
mune est actus exterior, quia posset idem manere respectu mu1tor-
um actuum voluntatis." 
r 
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church" remains the common object of the will act, Ockham holds 
that a change in the agent's intention produces two different 
moral acts. In terms of the principle of morality, the will, an 
act of walking to church for God's sake and walking to church 
for my sake are not the same act. A change, therefore, in the 
partial objects of the will-act results in a different will-act. 18 
Ockham may follow the doctrine of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus in 
holding that certain acts are good or evil "by nature." But 
Ockham holds that only volitional acts which are deliberately 
conformed to Right Reason, or deliberately opposed to Right 
Reason, are good or evil "in se. 11 The physical actions possible 
for the moral agent are "common objects;" they are one of the 
partial objects which together with the principal object or end, 
Right Reason dictates as the total cause of moral goodness in a 
voluntary act. 19 Similarly to Peter Abelard, Ockham conceives 
the importance of the agent's intention to a degree which jeop-
ardizes the 11 simple" natures of actions as sufficient or inde-
pendent criteria of moral value. Dictated prior to virtuous 
will-acts, the required end affects the specific nature of the 
morally good volition. 
Just as an action of the will is morally good because of 
its objects and causes, so also moral evil must be discussed in 
18Ibid., O; 11 ••• quia semper per additionem vel subtrac-
tionem alicuius, quid est objectum et causa partialis respectu 
actus, variatur actus." 
19Ibid., P-Q. 
r 
231 
terms of causes. A sin of omission is a "privation;" that is to 
say, such a sin has a "defective cause. 1120 The absence of an 
act which ought to be in the will indicates the absence of a 
cause which ought to have been operative. A sin of commission 
is not a privation; rather, it is the presence of a forbidden 
act within the will. Thus, the "positive" sins of commission 
have a positive cause. It is an act which "lacks rectitude" in 
the case of evil by commission; the will "lacks rectitude" in the 
case of evil by omission. Ockham questions the somewhat tradi-
tional distinction between the matter and the form of sin or 
moral evil because he thinks it incorrect if applied indiscrimin-
ately to both sins of commission and omission which have differ-
21 
ent causes. 
20
sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Ex hoc patet quomodo peccatum 
dicitur privatio quia peccatum omissionis est formaliter privatio, 
et aliquid peccatum, scilicet commissionis, non dicitur privatio, 
sed est actus positivus quern voluntas tenetur non elicere, et 
ideo est peccatum. Si tamen cum isto peccato sit semper peccatum 
omissionis, tune cum omni peccato est privatio, quia est peccatum. 
Non tamen omne peccatum est privatio quia solum peccaturn omis-
sionis est privatio. Et ex hoc patet quid est causa efficiens 
peccati, quia peccati omissionis nulla est causa positiva quia 
ipsum nihil est positivum, sed tantum habet causam defectivam, et 
illa est voluntas quae tenetur actum oppositum illi carentiae 
elicere et non elicit. Si autem loquamur de peccato commissionis, 
sic non solum voluntas creata est causa efficiens illius actus sed 
ipse Deus qui omnem actum immediate causat sicut causa secunda 
quaecunque, et ita est causa positiva difformitatis in tali actu; 
sicut ipsius substantiae actus, quia sicut dictum est, difformitas 
in actu commissionis non est nisi ipsemet actus elicitus contra 
praeceptum divinum et nihil penitus aliud dicit." 
21Idem., "Ex hoc etiam patet quod non bene dicitur quod 
actus positivus est materiale in peccato et carentia justiciae 
debitae inesse est formale; quia aut est peccatum commissionis 
aut omissionis in voluntate aut utrumque simul. Si primum solum, 
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The objects and circumstances do not merely "surround" 
a morally good act, they cause and constitute that act. The 
dictate of Right Reason, the end or principal object, the common 
object, the time and place, the divine commands--these consider-
ations are part of the prudential judgment that "this ought to be 
done." The factors by which the intellect judges what should be 
done, constitute the specific nature of the will-act which ful-
fills the dictate of prudence or Right Reason. The criteria 
which enable the moral agent to determine his moral obligation, 
comprise the structure of moral actions which are good. Ockham's 
doctrine of causality renders means by which the intellect decides 
moral goodness, as objects and causes of actual moral goodness. 
It seems to follow that there are no extrinsic moral determinants 
in Ockham's system regarding actual moral goodness. 
The mind begins its deliberation with a directive proposi-
tion; a problematic situation which calls for some action gener-
ates a principle governing the agent's response. "Problematic" 
might mean a claim-producing situation (to meet a beggar evokes 
puta si voluntas eliciat aliquem actum contra rectam rationem et 
praeceptum divinum et non teneatur elicere oppositum actum, tune 
solll.t~ est in voluntate actus peccati sine omni carentia rectitu-
dinis vel justiciae debitae inesse. Et per consequens, carentia 
non est illi formale. Si secundum solum sit in voluntate, puta, 
quia voluntas tenetur aliquem actum elicere quern non elicit, tune 
solum est illa carentia rectitudinis sine omni materiali et sine 
omni actu elicito. Si tertium detur, puta, quod voluntas elicit 
actum aliquem contra praeceptum Dei cum ad oppositum tenetur tune 
est ibi duplex peccatum commissionis et omissionis. Peccatum 
commissionis est actus ille positivus solum; omissionis est 
carentia alterius actus debiti inesse. Et quod per consequens, 
nihil aliud erit dicere quam quod in peccato sunt talia duo ma-
teriale et formale, et quod peccatum commissum est materiale et 
omissum est formale. 11 
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the proposition - Every indigent in extreme need is to be helped) 
or a stimulation of sorts (to fall sick engenders the formula -
Health is to be attained). 22 Concrete circumstances suggest an 
end which the agent expresses as a directive. Ockham's analysis 
of the situational factors concern how or if these directives 
should be applied. He refrains from a priori classifications of 
specific will-acts as "suitable" or "unsuitable" with human na-
ture. Instead, he outlines the procedural decisions which affect 
the relevance of rules to particular situations, of means to 
ends. Criteria serve to elucidate the precise import of evident 
directive principles and to characterize those actions subsumed 
under the principle. All virtuous activity is connected--not 
because virtuous actions all conform to some ideal of rational 
humanity or reflect a divine idea of human nature--but because 
th d . f . . 1 23 ey er1ve rom common pr1nc1p es. The elements of an ethical 
22
sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); "Circa primum dico quod 
intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum et 
etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectus 
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine 
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est in-
telligendum quia est respectu unius complexi quod aff irmat ali-
quem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium prac-
ticum in operando. 11 Ockham describes the process of moral delib-
eration regarding the principle, Every indigent in extreme need 
is to be helped, in Sent., III, q. 13, K. The principle that 
"Health is to be attained" occurs in Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 
285-287) and Sent., II, q. 3, LL. Usually, therefore, the divine 
commands affect the agent's deliberation about the proper means 
for achieving his express ends. In the case of a special revela-
tion, the divine wish would be the principle or expressed end 
since the encounter with the diety would be the "problematic" 
situation. 
23sent. , III, q. 12, T; 11 ••• virtutes omnes general es con--
nectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus; puta, Omne 
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deliberation are together dictated by Right Reason giving the 
specific nature of conformed will-acts. The intellectual dictate 
includes and combines decisions about pertinent rules, the "sim-
. ple" or common nature of the proposed action, the proper end, 
time and place. Conforming to this dictate, the will-act assumes 
the specific "ratio" of the combined judgments. 
Two difficulties attend Ockham's methods. First, he 
gives no clear explanation of how the "suitability" or "propriety" 
of situational factors could be inferred from directive princi-
ples. For example, he claims that practica~ principles suggest 
a certain final cause which "ought to be intended if everything 
were ordered suitably, and thus practical knowledge is orderable 
to such an end as if by its nature. 1124 Ockham seems to teach 
that the propriety of circumstances and ends are indicated by the 
directive which initiates moral deliberations. The precise tech-
nique for deriving the "suitable order" of situational factors 
is left unsaid. Ockham offers only the prudence of the moral 
agent to fill the silence. The second problem arises because 
Ockham contains all moral determinants within the will-act itself. 
The goodness or evilness of will-acts is not distinct from the 
substance of those acts. "If you ask from where an action 
honestum est faciendum, Omne bonum est diligendum, Omne dictatum 
a recta ratione est faciendum ... 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 11, Z. 
2Lf Sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309). The passages in Ock-
ham which assert some order between things as the basis of moral 
judgments are rare. 
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receives its goodness or evil? I answer from the same causes 
by which the act has its substance--from the common object and 
all the circumstances as if from many partial causes which 
asserted together make one total cause. 1125 The difficulty here 
is that Ockham also claims that God could separate the 11 absolute 
being 11 of any created volition from its goodness or evilness. 26 
If the nature of volition varies in proportion to the diverse 
causes-objects, how could God produce the specific nature of any 
created will-act without producing moral goodness or evil? Ock-
ham would answer that God is not subject to any obligation and 
thus He cannot produce 11 goodness" or "evilness" even though He 
might "duplicate" every human volition as total cause. Yet by 
Ockham's standards, acts which are not caused to fulfill the 
agent.' s obligation cannot be specifically similar to actions 
which are so caused. This problem affects the coherence of Ock-
ham' s doctrine of the moral good. We return to it in Chapter V. 
2. Degrees ~ TyPes of Moral Virtue 
The rational object of volition gives the will-act its 
specific nature. The intellectual consideration of the propriety 
25 Sent., III, q. 10, Q. Also see Quodl., III, q. 14. 
26sent., II, q. 19, F; 11 ••• quia Deus potest omne absolutum 
causare sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed 
actus odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem 
cum difformitate et malitia in actu; ergo, Deus potest causare 
quicquid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi non 
causando. aliquam difformitatem vel malitiam in actu." 
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of some action (common object), includes deliberation about the 
end (principal object), the right reason, the place, the time and 
the divine wish. These objects.can be partial causes, and thus 
components of the volitional act which conforms to Right Reason 
or prudence. Thus, in discussing Ockham's doctrine of degrees 
and types of moral goodness, it is important to recognize that 
only direct and immediate experience of an agent's spiritual 
acts can verify whether the agent's effects are morally good or 
evil. The motives and intentions of a person's behavior are not 
readily apparent to the observer. I know the reasons for my 
actions; I do not perceive or observe the reasons for the behavior 
of other persons. The constitution of moral good and virtue must 
be approached introspectively. 
Ockham distinguishes five grades or degrees of virtuous-
ness on the basis of variations of the intellectual objects of 
volition. He cautions that each degree of virtue is an instance 
of generically the same virtue, e.g., justice or temperance, but 
that each grade constitutes a specifically different act than the 
other four grades of that virtue. 27 
27sent., III, q. 12, K; "Tertia distinctio est quod justi-
tia et quaelibet alia virtus moralis secundum quid, non est alia 
virtus nee formaliter nee equivalenter, habet quinque gradus non 
quidem ejusdem speciel sed distinctarum specierum ... (in finem) ..• 
Distinctio numeralis istorum actuum et habituum patet per separ-
abilitatem ipsorum. Distinctio specifica patet primo per distinc-
tionem specificam objectorum partialium •.•. Ideo quando talia 
objecta variantur secundum speciem, actus et habitus eorum varian-
tur secundum speciem, sed actus cuiusli.bet gradus ascendendo 
habet aliquid objectum et circumstantiam speciem quid non habet 
alius gradus inferior. Secundum patet quia quantumcunque unus 
237 
The first level of virtuousness is described as an act 
produced in the created will which is conformed to Right Reason, 
and the definite circumstances dictated by Right Reason for the 
sake of the "justness" or "goodness" or "peace"--or any naturally 
28 good end. The second degree of perfection possible in a vir-
tuous act includes these elements and the added resolve that the 
agent will persevere in his virtuous act in spite of the conse-
quences. In this situation, the agent might intend to follow 
Right Reason for the sake of justice and intend to perform this 
just act in the face of forture and death. 29 The third degree of 
virtuousness includes all the elements of the first two degrees. 
This third "level" is characterized by the added intention to 
perform some just act precisely because it is obligatory--"quia 
gradus augeretur in infinitum, nunquam inclinabit ad actum 
alterius gradus, sed illa quae sunt ejusdem speciei possunt hab-
ere effectum ejusdem speciei, igitur etc." 
28Ibid., "Primus gradus est quando aliquis vult facere 
opera justa conformiter rationi rectae dictanti talia opera esse 
facienda secundum determinatas circumstantias, respicientes prae-
cise ipsum objectum propter honestatem ipsius operis sicut propter 
finem; puta, intellectus dictat quod omni tale opus est faciendum 
tali loco, tali tempore, propter honestatem ipsius operis vel 
propter pacem vel aliud tale et voluntas elicit actum volendi 
talia opera conformiter juxta dictamen intellectus." 
29Ibid., 11 Secundus gradus est quando voluntas vult facere 
opera justa secundum rectum dictamen predictum et propter hoc, 
cum intentione nullo modo dimittendi talia pro quocunque quid est 
contra rectam rationem et non pro morte si recta ratio dictaret 
tale opus non esse dimittendum pro morte; puta, si homo velit sic 
honorare patrem secundum predictum dictamen rectum, loco et 
tempore etc., cum intentione et voluntate non dimittendi illum 
hominem·pro morte si immineret." 
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est sic dictatum a recta ratione. 1130 The fourth degree of virtue 
-
is the "true and perfect moral virtue about which the saints 
speak. 1131 Virtue in the fourth grade includes all the elements 
of the prior degrees but adds the precise intention of loving God 
by producing the action. Finally, Ockham identifies a fifth 
stage of virtuousness, namely, heroic virtue. 32 This level of 
30Ibid., "Tertius gradus est quando aliquis vult tale 
opus facere-8e'cundum rectam rationem praedictam cum intentione 
etc., et propter hoc, vult tale opus secundum circumstantias 
praedictas facere praecise et semel; quia est sic dictatum a 
recta ratione. 11 
3libid., 11 Quartus gradus est quando -vult illud facere 
secundum omnes conditiones et circumstanitas praedictas et prop-
ter hoc, propter amorem Dei precise; puta, quia sic dictatum est 
ab intellectu quod talia opera sunt facienda propter amorem Dei 
praecise, et ita universaliter est perfecta et vera virtus mor-
alis de qua Sancti loquuntur. Autem sit prorie virtus moralis 
patet, primo, quia proprie generatur ex actuibus moralibus et 
inclinat ad actus consimiles et dirigit in actibus respectu 
eorunidem objectorum quid proprie pertinet ad virtutem moralem. 
Secundo, quia variatio finis non variat virtutem quantum ad 
moralitatem vel non moralitatem, quia respectu diversorum finium 
possunt esse diversas virtutes morales. Hoc autem solum variatur 
finis a tribus primis gradibus. Tertio quia vicium oppositum est 
proprie vicium morale, igitur istud est virtus moralis. 11 
32Ibid., "Quintus gradus quando aliquis eligit facere tale 
opus et non praedictas conditiones excepto fine, quando indiffer-
enter potest fieri propter Deum tanquam propter finem aut propter 
honestatem vel pacem vel aliquid tale quid, dico pro intentione 
philosophi et propter hoc, elicit tale opus facere actu impera-
tivo formaliter non tantum equivalenter, et si tune velit actu 
imperativo formaliter facere vel pati aliquid quod ex natura sua 
excedit communem statum hominum, et est contra naturalem inclina-
tionem vel si tale opus non excedit communem statum hominum, nee 
est hoc contra inclinationem naturalem quantum est ex natura 
actus, tamen ex circumstanita est contra incli.nationem naturalem, 
talis inquam actus .imperatus formal.iter tale opus est generativus 
virtutis heroicae, vel elicitus a virtute heroica secundum inten-
tionem philosophi et secundum veritatem, et nullus alius habitus 
generatus ex quibuscunque aliis actibus est virtus heroica. Ex-
empla primi, aliquis vult actu imperativo formaliter morte sibi 
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virtue directs an action to either God or a natural end such as 
"justice" without considering the other objects and circumstances. 
This degree of virtue is characterized by a general commitment 
to acts which exceed the "common state of man" or "natural incli-
nations" for the sake of some worthy goal. To profess one's 
faith in spite of imminent death is an example of heroic virtue. 
Heroic virtue is not identical with-the second stage of virtue 
because it is the total and unqualified love of some good, while 
the second level of virtuousness is the commitment to some good 
within a definite set of circumstances. 
Strictly speaking, a moral virtue is a volitional habit 
rather than an act of the will. However, these five grades of 
moral habits are caused by repeated will-acts which are specifi-
cally the same as the various habits engendered. Further, moral 
habits incline the will to produce specifically the same acts 
as those which produce.the volitional habit. Hence, these grades 
of moral habits can be applied to five corresponding degrees of 
virtuous acts. Clearly, the degrees of morally good or virtuous 
action show a progressively more complex structure (at least, 
through the first four grades) which is indicated by a progres-
sively more complete object. 
The different levels of moral perfection possible for a 
volitional act reflect different partial objects of the will-act. 
imminente pro definsione fidei sive combustione sibi imminente 
sustinere mortem vel combustionem. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 15, 
D, where Ockham disputes Duns Scotus on the nature of heroic 
virtue. 
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Especially important is the end intended by the agent in differ-
entiating the five kinds of virtuousness. 33 Each level is 
characterized by the distinct intensity with which the agent in-
tends his end, or by a distinct and proper end. The importance 
of the agent's intention, and the end intended in determining the 
virtuousness of an act is further substantiated by Ockham's 
doctrine of the types of morally good actions. 
Ockham holds that acts of the human will can be morally 
indifferent, contingently good or evil and intrinsically good or 
evil. Indifferent acts are possible; first,_ because the human 
will can immediately and spontaneously love or reject any object 
on the basis of its apprehension, and secondly, because the 
human will can produce two acts simultaneously. These "explana-
tions~' require explanation. Regarding the first, Ockham is not 
prepared to admit that a moral agent acts correctly or incorrect-
ly without deliberately intending to do so. To love some object, 
without considering the object as morally good or evil, is not 
actually good or evil. For example, to simply pray without 
considering the propriety of the circumstances or motive, is 
morally neutra1. 34 Ockham suggests that not every action possible 
33The fourth level of moral virtue is "true and perfect" 
virtue for Ockham. It is interesting to note that Ockham holds 
that the Aristotelian virtues produce the same physical acts as 
do Christian of "true and perfect" virtue, but they are specifi-
cally different virtues since the end or intention of a pagan is 
different than that of a Christian. See Sent., III, q. 10, i; 
~., IV, q. 3, s. ~ 
34sent., III, q. 12, M; "Quinta distinctio est quod ali-
quis habitus est i.ntrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece 
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to man is the subject of moral obligation; man is not obliged to 
direct every action to the love and honor of God. 35 A will-act 
produced without regard for the circumstances or the dictate of 
Right Reason, and which is not commanded or prohibited by some 
valid moral obligation is morally indifferent. Regarding the 
second, Ockham considers morally indifferent acts as ones which 
can be rendered morally good or evil by an intrinsically good 
malus et viciosus, aliquis neuter sive indifferens •.. Exemplum 
tertii, velle simpliciter orare sine aliquae circumstantia dic-
tata a ratione, quia nee propter bonum finem nee propter malum 
finem, et talis actus sive sit interior sive exterior, solum 
dicitur bonus denominatione extrinseca, et nullo modo intrinsece 
bonus nee viciosus." 
35ockham defends his assertion that the human will can 
produce acts which are morally indifferent in Sent., I, d. 1, 
q. 1 (I, 378); "Et si dicatur quod ille actus est malus quando 
diligitur aliquid quod est ad finem et non propter finem, res-
pondeo quod actus respectu alicuius ad finem potest esse non malus 
quamvis non dirigatur vel non referatur positive ad finem; et hoc 
maxime si non apprehendatur finis. Et si dicatur quod omnis 
defectus circumstantiae requisitae ad actum bonum facit actum 
malum, sed circumstantia finis est requisita ad actum moraliter 
bonum, ergo quandocumque deficit, actus erit malus. Sed in pro-
posito deficit, ergo etc. Respondeo quod non omnis defectus 
circumstantiae requisitae ad actum moraliter bonum facit actum 
esse malum vel peccatum. Tune enim ignorantia nunquam excusaret; 
cum tamen secundum doctores et Sanctos, ignorantia aliquando 
excuset a toto. Sed quando deficit aliqua circumstantia ad quam 
eliciens actum pro tune obligatur, tune est actus malus, si autem 
non obligetur tune ad illam circumstantiam, non est actus malus." 
Ockham may argue here against the position of St. Thomas 
that a free act within the human will is always either morally 
good or bad, since that actual act is either referred to the final 
end or not. See Thomas, Summ. Theol., Ia IIae, q. 18, art. 9. 
Scotus affirmed the possibility of actually indifferent acts (See 
~· O!., II, d. 41, q. unica; and Rep. Par., II, d. 41, q. 
unica) because there is no affirmative command of God that every 
human act must be directed to the Ultimate End. Ockham seems to 
agree with the argument of Scotus on this point. 
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act.36 Moral goodness or evil can be predicated of an indiffer-
ent act by extrinsic denomination; such predication requires that 
the will produce two acts simultaneously--one which is morally 
neutral and the second which is intrinsically good or evil. For 
example, the human wil-1 can simultaneously hate sin and love 
God. To simply hate sin without any ulterior motive or regard 
for the pertinent circumstances is morally indifferent; to hate 
sin, however, out of the contemporaneous love of God renders the 
hate of sin an extrinsically good act. 
Indifferent actions are morally good or evil "per aliud. 11 
If an indifferent act is caused by an inherently good action, then 
the morally neutral act is "denominated" or called extrinsically 
good. Ockham does not distinguish sharply between morally 
36sent., III, q. 10, P; "Secundo, dico quod si quaeratur 
utrum aliquis actus voluntatis posset esse indifferens ad boni-
tatem et maliciam, et post fieri bonus vel malus denominatione 
extrinseca, sicut actus partis sensitivae? Tune distinguendum 
est, quia aut ponitur quod in voluntate possunt esse simul duo 
actus volendi naturaliter aut non. Si non, tune non posset esse 
aliquis actus in voluntate indifferens praedicto modo, quia non 
posset sic esse indifferens nisi quatenus conformare posset se 
alicui alteri perfecte et intrinsece virtuoso; sicut actus appe-
titus sensitivi non dicitur aliter virtuosus, ut patet. Si autem 
duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate, 
quid credo esse verum, sicut in primo probatum est, tune in 
voluntate potest esse aliquis actus indifferens modo praedicto. 
Exemplum, si enim diligam aliquem hominem absolute terminando 
actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad aliquam circumstantiam 
bonam,vel malam, tune iste actus non est bonus vel malus morali-
ter, sed est neuter; sed tune stante illo actu, eligam alium 
actum quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter Deum secundum 
rectam rationem, et secundum omnes alias circumstantias requisit-
as, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuosus, et 
qui prius fuit indifferens nunc est virtuosus denominatione 
extrinseca. 11 Ockham refers to Sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 381-384), 
where he shows the possibility of two acts simultaneously inher-
ing in the human will. 
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indifferent action and morally contingent acts. 37 Both indif-
ferent and contingently moral acts are considered as actually 
good or evil only "per aliud"--that is, by being caused by an 
action which is good or evil "in se." 
Some actions are called good or evil by intrinsic denom-
ination or "in ~. 1138 Now Ockham considers acts such as "to 
wish to pray," which is conformed to Right Reason and the divine 
precept and which intends to honor God, as intrinsically good. 
A volitional act which is contrary to Right Reason and the divine 
commandment and which intends an unworthy end, is intrinsically 
evil. The simple act of praying can be morally indifferent, 
intrinsically good or intrinsically evil depending on the reasons 
why the agent prays. "Praying" is the common object of will-acts 
of various moral degrees and of various intentions. When the act 
of praying is produced by the will because it is right, and 
37ouodl., III, q. 13; "Et sic intelligendo 'actum virtuo-
sum' dico secundo, quod sic potest aliquis actus esse virtuosus 
necessario. Quod probo: Quia impossibile est, quod aliquis actus 
contingenter virtuosus, i ta quod i.ndifferenter potest dici virtu-
osus vel vitiosus, fiat determinate virtuosus nisi propter alium 
actum necessario virtuosus. 11 (ed. P. Boehner, Philosophical 
Writing§,, p. 145.) Also see Sent., III, q. 12, E. 
It seems that Ockham means by contingently and indiffer-
ently good and evil acts, those acts which are good or evil "per 
aliud." While intrinsically and necessarily good or evil acts 
are those which are good or evil "in~·" 
38sent., III, q. 12, M; "Quinta distinctio est quod ali-
quis habitus est intrinsece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinsece 
malus et viciosus ... Examplum primi, velle orare propter honorem 
Dei et quia praeceptum est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc., 
Exemplum secundi, velle orare propter vanam gloriam et contra 
praeceptum Dei et contra rectam rationem. 11 
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because of the honor of God, and because the time and place are 
right, then the act of praying is intrinsically good. 
The sources of goodness or evil can be threefold; ex 
~nere, ex circumstantia and ex principio meritorio/9A generical-
ly good or evil act is simply an "imputable" act; that is to say, 
an act of the free will in desiring an apprehended object .£§.!.! be 
good or evi1. 40 Without considering the dictate of Right Reason 
or the proper circumstances, the will spontaneously moves to 
some rationally given object. As a free act of the will, this 
spontaneous act has the genus of moral acts, i.e., it is within 
the power of the will. If the will happens to choose an object 
which is either permitted or commanded by valid moral laws (but 
without a deliberate intent to fulfill those laws), then the act 
39sent., III, q. 12, N; "Sexta distinctio est quod ali-
quis actus est bonus ex genere vel malus, aliquis ex circumstan-
tia, aliquis ex principio meritorio. Exemplum primi quantum ad 
actum bonum ex genere; sicut orare, dare elemosinam, sive velle 
talia facere absolute sine omni circumstantia bona vel mala. 
Exemplum quantum ad actum malum, ut furtum facere, velle forni-
cari absolute sine aliquae circumstantia bona vel mala, de quibus 
dicunt philosophie et sancti quod statim nominata convoluta sunt 
cum malitia. 11 Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 284); and 
Sent., III, q. 11, X. ~~ 
40
ockham does argue against calling an act which is good 
"ex genere" virtuous. "Si dicas quod ostenso aliquo objecto 
dITigibili, sine omni dictamine rationi.s posset voluntas illud 
diligere et iste est bonus moraliter, quia diligit quid dili-
gendum est etc.~ puta, si formetur hoc complexum 'hoc bonum est 
diligibile' et intellectus non assentiat, tune est dubium utrurn 
illa dilectio sit bona moraliter. Respondeo, licet actus ille 
sit bonus ex genere et non sit malus moraliter, tamen non est 
virtuosus quia de ratione actus virtuosi est quod eliciatur con-
formi ter rationi rectae et respectu objecti convenientis et quod 
habens talem actum sit sciens." Sent., III, q. 11, x. Cf. Scot-
us, Quodl., q. 18, n. 6, where Scotus analyzes "generic" and 
"specific" goodness in acts similarly to the analysis of Ockharn. 
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is generically good. If, however, the will spontaneously loves 
an object which is morally forbidden, then that act is generically 
bad. The difference between generically good or evil acts, and 
morally indifferent acts, is whether the object chosen is morally 
commanded, morally forbidden, or subject to no moral obligation. 41 
Ockham does not mean that generically good or evil acts are actu-
ally good or evil. This would mean that a moral agent acts cor-
rectly and virtuously without intending to act correctly--an 
implication which Ockham rejects. Rather, good and evil ~ 
genere should be conceived as the "common object" of will-acts 
which can be actually good or evil depending upon the specific 
determinations which the "common object" receives. 
Actual moral goodness or evil depends upon the circum-
stances (~ circumstantia). Ockham's examples show the dictate 
of Right Reason, the end, the required circumstances of time and 
place and the divine commands as the specific determinants of 
41
we disagree with Othmar Suks, Franciscan Studies, X, 
p. 32, who sees generic goodness or evil as the logical concept 
of a possible act while an indifferent act is actually produced 
within the created will. "An act~ genere is taken as the 
general notion or concept of such good or bad acts which are not 
as yet actualized, while the indifferent act regards the act in 
its actual performance." The previous footnote shows that Ockham 
recognizes that generically good or evil acts can be actual with 
the will. The proper distinction between indifferent acts and 
acts which are good or evil ex genere is the fact that the former 
acts can be rendered good or evil by a different act which is 
intrinsically good or evil, while acts which are generically good 
can be specified as actually good acts within the present moral 
order, while acts which are generically bad cannot be specified 
as actually good stante praecepto guae ~ est. 
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1 dn ·1 42 mora goo ess or evi . The factors by which the agent recog-
nizes the moral right or wrong of a possible act are the criteria 
of time and place, end and dictate of reason. These criteria 
become moral determinants if the will actually produces the act 
which is recognized as potentially good or evil. 
Ockham's discussion of actions which are good ex principio 
meritorio, moves into the realm of extrinsic moral determinants. 43 
The fact that an action is meritorious depends upon the free and 
undetermined will of God who can accept that action as worthy of 
a supernatural reward. Such acceptance is extrinsic to the 
nature of the action caused by the moral agent. 44 When a gener-
ically and specifically good action is produced by the created 
will, while intending to love God by this action, then this action 
is meritorious by God's ordinate power. 45 The meritoriousness 
42sent., III, q. 12, N; "Exemplum secundi [boni vel mali 
ex circumstantia], velle abstinere secundum circumstantias debitas 
et dictatas a recta ratione propter honestatem tanquam propter 
finem vel propter conservationem naturae vel propter alium finem 
quern intenderet purus paganus. Exemplum secundi quantum ad actum 
malum, velle fornicari contra rectam rationem, loco indebito etc., 
et propter libidinem tanquam propter finem." 
43Idem.,"Exemplum tertii [boni ex principio meritorio], 
velle continere secundum rectam rationem et secundum circumstan-
tias et propter honorem divinum, quia talis actus est Deo accep-
tus." 
44Even the act of loving God above all is not meritorious 
of its nature. See Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, C. The love of God 
above all is, however, morally good of its nature. See Quodl., 
III, q. 13 and 14. 
45sent., III, q. 10, I; "Aliae autem virtutes requirunt 
naturaliter tam actum quam habitum in parte sensitiva et generan-
tur ex actibus voluntatis et requirunt caritatem ad hoc, quod 
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of an act, therefore, is the extrinsic determination of divine 
acceptance given to actions which are good "through the circurn-
stances." Such "acceptance" does not affect the nature of the 
created volitive act. 
The degrees and types of moral perfection possessed by 
voluntary acts are distinguished by Ockham on the basis of the 
will's objects. All five degrees of virtuousness, and acts which 
are good ~ circurnstantia, are intrinsically good so that "good" 
is predicated of these acts "in~·" Indifferent acts, acts 
which are good or evil ~ genere, and contingently virtuous or 
wicked acts are called good extrinsically; that is, by causal 
dependence upon an intrinsically virtuous or wicked act. If a 
generically good action is further specified by the proper end 
and circumstances of that act, or if an indifferent act is caused 
by an intrinsically good act, then it is possible to call those 
acts "good" by extrinsic denomination. Notice that the exercise 
of freedom is a factor common to all types of moral acts and to 
all degrees of moral perfection. The rational objects of voli-
tion account for the specific differences. 
Ockham's explanation of contingently and necessarily good 
acts through the Reportatio, Ordinatio, and Quodlibetal Questions 
is not without certain problems of consistency. The major prob-
lem should be indicated before continuing to an analysis of the 
Quodlibet Three, question 13, in which Ockham resolves this 
caus(;:!nt actum meritoriurn; ita qu.od in omni actu meritorio, 
caritas est causa efficiens partiali.s ... " 
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problem. It is Ockham's position, from his earliest treatment 
of moral goodness in the Reportatio, that some activities are 
necessarily good, and not simply contingently good. 46 Somewhat 
later, Ockham offers a proof that some act must be necessarily 
good, else no act would be even contingently good. 47 Since 
Ockham considers a contingently good act as good "per aliud," he 
finds it necessary to terminate the analysis of the causes of 
contingent goodness at some act which is "in se" or intrinsically 
virtuous, or admit an infinite series of causes. For example, 
"to pray" without considering the propriety of praying, is a 
morally contingent act; this act can be good or evil depending 
upon the reasons for which the agent continues to pray. "To 
pray" is simply the common object of will-acts which can be 
morally good or evil. But Ockham also speaks of "praying" as 
intrinsically good when this act is elicited for the sake of 
46Ibid., P-Q. 
47 Sent., III, q. 12, E; "Tertia conclusio quod aliquis 
actus est necessario et intrinsece virtuosus. Hoc probatur quia 
impossibile est quod aliquis actus contingenter virtuosus, sic 
scilicet quod potest dici indifferens viciosus et virtuosus, fiat 
determinate virtuosus propter novitatem alicuius actus non neces-
sario virtuosi, quia per nullum contingenter modo dicto, virtuo-
sum fit alius actus sive denominatur virtuosus; quia si sic, aut 
ille secundus actus qui est contingeter virtuosus per aliquem 
alium actum est necessario viciosus, aut per actum contingenter 
virtuosus. Si primo modo, tune eadem ratione erit standum in 
primo, etiam tune habetur propositum, scilicet, quod in homine 
est aliquis actus qui est necessario virtuosus. Si secundo modo 
erit processus in infinitum vel stabitur ad aliquem actum neces-
sario virtuosus, et sic habetur propositum; sed actus hominis tam 
exteriores quam interiores, puta 'intelligere et vellet secundum 
quod quilibet est actus indifferens sunt contingenter virtuosi. 
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God's honor and according to the dictate of Right Reason and the 
divine command. In this example, "praying" is intrinsically good 
because the will chooses to pray for the honor of God and the 
other required circumstances. Now, this intrinsically good act 
is good ex circumstantia. It is performed in a determinate place, 
at a determinate time, for a definite end and according to a 
definite command of God according to Right Reason. It is con-
ceivable that a different set of circumstances would render this 
act as morally wrong. For example, if I pray at a time when I 
should be working to support my family, if I_ pray in the middle 
of the highway, or if God commands that creatures should not 
pray, then praying might not be intrinsically virtuous. The act 
of praying, therefore, is intrinsically good only within a 
definite set of circumstances. And this is the problem with 
Ockham's exposition so far. Some act must be necessarily good 
or no act would be morally good; however, the intrinsically and 
necessarily good acts which Ockham describes are clearly depend-
ent upon a definite set of changeable circumstances for their 
moral goodness. Thus, it seems to follow that unless Ockham can 
locate an act which is morally good regardless of the circumstanc-
es of time and place and divine commands, then Ockham has not 
established the possibility of a necessarily good act48--nor the 
possibility of any moral action. 
48
ockham even asserts that "there are no circumstances 
regarding an act intrinsically and necessarily virtuous." See 
~., III, q. 12, FFF; "Ad primum argumentum secundae 
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3. The Necessarily Good Act 
In the Quodlibetal Questions, when Ockham again discusses 
the importance of asserting some act as necessarily good, there 
is a subtle but important shift in his treatment of this issue. 
Ockham is now concerned, not with showing that some act of the 
will is good "in~" or intrinsically good; but with showing that 
some act of the will is good whenever it occurs in the human 
will. These are distinct issues. In Quodlibet Three, question 
-
13, Ockham asks, "Whether only an act of the will is necessarily 
virtuous or wicked?" Therein, Ockham explicitly considers the 
problem of reconciling the assertions, first, that some act of 
the will must be morally good whenever it is elicited by the 
created will, and secondly, that God can render any action pos-
sible- for a man to perform as morally obligatory through His 
absolute power. Father Boehner has edited this question and it 
stands as Ockham's most mature statement on the problem of the 
necessarily good act. Ockham's scholars, however, do not agree 
upon the proper interpretation of Quodlibet Three. 
dubitationis, dico quod non sunt circumstantiae respectu actus 
intrinsece et necessario virtuosi; sed sunt objecta secundaria 
respectu illius actus, sed sunt circumstantiae respectu illorum 
actuum sive sint actus voluntatis sive intellectus sive cuius-
cunque alterius potentiae, qui solum sunt virtuosi extrinsece 
secundum guamdam denominationem extrinsecam per conformitatem ad 
actum aliquem intrinsece virtuosus." Also see Quodl., III, q. 14 
for a parallel text. Furthermore, Ockham has not defended the 
fact of a necessarily good act against the absolute power of God. 
Ockham often shows that moral norms could change due to the 
absolute power of God. Thus, a change in the divine command 
would apparently render any action which Ockham asserts as 
intrinsically good, as evil if the divine command should now 
prohibit that act. 
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To Erich Hochstetter, Ockham's argument proves that God 
could not change the moral requirement to "love God above a11. 1149 
Hochstetter sees a development within Ockham's work because the 
earlier Commentary asserts the possibility of a divine command 
to hate God and the creature's conformity, while the thirteenth 
question of Quodlibet Three holds the human fulfillment of this 
command as impossible. Father Boehner holds that "God can com-
mand everything with this power (potentia Dei absoluta) except 
not to obey him. 1150 The divine command to hate God is an onto-
logical and a logical possibility. -That is, the statement "hate 
49Franz. Studien, 32, p. 16; "Das Ganze ist also eine 
blosse theoretische Moglichkeit ohne ethische Konsequenzen. Auch 
hinsichtlich des Gebotes des Gotteshasses ist Ockham im Senten-
zenkommentar, soweit wir schen, noch nicht zu voller Klarheit 
durchgedrungen. Denn dort sagt er noch: 'Deus potest praecipere, 
quod voluntas creata odiat eum. Igitur voluntas creata potest 
hoc facere.' In den Quodlibeta aber hat er die Unmoglichkeit 
dieser Position erkam1t. Denn einem Gebot Gottes folgen heisst 
Gott lieben, weil nur in der Gesinnung der Liebe zu Gott fur Ock-
ham echter Gehorsam moglich ist, wie wir oben dargelegt haben." 
Professor Oberman claims that Hochstetter interprets this "Quod 
libet passage as denying the possibility for God to command some-
body to hate him." The Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 93, n. 
10. But it seems that Hochstetter is claiming only that men could 
not obey the command. 
50Philosophical Writings, p. xlix-1; "However it is well 
known that Ockham admitted that God can command by His absolute 
power that a person should hate Him or at least not love Him. It 
is important to note that this possibility is admitted in the 
purely ontological and logical realm. For in this realm there 
cannot be a contradiction, since it is a fact that creatures can 
command others to hate God; the command, therefore, is a reality, 
considered as a mental or spoken sentence, and every reality has 
God as its primary cause. In the ethical realm, however, an 
antinomy is encountered, the only real antinomy in Ockham's 
philosophy. If God commanded a creature to hate Him or simply 
not to love Him, the creature would be obliged to obey, but it 
could not obey since in obeying it would love Him." 
r 
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God" as a verbal, mental or written sentence is fully possible .• 
The statement "hate God" is not logically self-contradictory 
since it is a meaningful statement. However, the divine command 
would be ethically or psychologically impossible for the creature 
to obey. Thus, an actual command to hate God, if issued by God, 
would constitute an ethical antinomy, i.e., an instance of 
simultaneously valid but contradictory obligations. Erwin Iser-
loh considers a divine command to hate God a contradiction. 51 
Iserloh, however, quotes the Centiloguium in support of his 
interpretation and Father Boehner has offered serious and un-
answered evidence that this work is not an authentic text of 
Ockham. 52 Ernest A. Moody holds that "although there would seem 
to be no patent self-contradiction in supposing that God could 
issue such a command, it would seem to be self-contradictory, and 
hence impossible for God to will that this command be ful-
filled. 1153 Father Lucan Freppert agrees that God might issue 
this command, but he holds that the moral agent "cannot disobey 
5lGnade und Eucharistie., p. 50; "Die nach Bohner im 
Quodlibet von Ockham aufgewiesene psychologische Unmoglichkeit 
ist klarer gesehen vom Verfasser des Centiloguium, allerdings 
sieht der auch einen logischen Widerspruch gegeben. Gott kann 
alles, was keinen Widerspruch in sich schliesst. Den Gotteshass 
befehlen heisst aber, etwas Widerspruchliches anordnen. Denn ein 
Gebot erfullen, heisst verdienstlich handeln. Verdienstliches 
Handeln ist aber Handeln aus Liebe zu Gott. Der Betreffende 
wlirde also Gott hassen aus Liebe zu ihm." 
52collected Articles, pp. 33-42. 
53"William of Ockham," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, p. 316. 
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in this case. 1154 Presupposing the creature's obligation to the 
divine legislator, the command requires both love and hate. 
Father Freppert claims either response is ethically satisfactory. 
In light of these divergent interpretations, it is necessary to 
reconsider Quodlibet Three, question 13. 
When Ockham asserts that "Some act of the will is neces-
sarily virtuous" it is necessary to consider the meaning of 
"necessarily." It can mean that the act exists necessarily--it 
cannot not-exist. This, of course, is not Ockham's meaning since 
every created effect is ontologically contingent; only the 
divine being is metaphysically necessary. There are two accept-
able meanings of "necessary" when referring to a virtuous act: 
first, "it cannot be wicked while the divine commandment stands," 
secondly, "it cannot be caused by the created will unless it be 
virtuous. 1155 These two meanings are obviously distinct yet Ock-
ham considers them as similar. Nevertheless, Ockham offers 
distinct proofs to establish that the same act, namely, the 
54The Basis of Morality ... , pp. 189-190. 
55Quodl., III, q. 13; "Circa affirmativam exponentem dico 
primo, quod de virtute sermonis nullus actus est necessario vir-
tuosus. Hoc probatur: Tum quia nullus actus necessario est, et 
per consequens non est necessario virtuosus. Tum quia quilibet 
actus potest fieri a solo Deo, et per consequens non est neces-
sario virtuosus, quia talis actus non est in potestate volun-
tatis. Tamen aliter potest intelligi actum esse virtuosum, ita 
quod non posset esse vituosus stante divino praecepto. Similiter, 
non potest causari a voluntate creata nisi sit virtuosus. Et sic 
intelligendo 'actum virtuosum' dico secundo, quod sic potest ali-
quis actus esse virtuosus necessario." (Quoted from Philosophical 
Writings, p. 145, since Boehner's edition of this question is 
preferred to the Strasbourg Edition of 1491). 
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altuistic love of God, is virtuous necessarily in either of the 
acceptable meanings of "necessarily." 
The proof that some act "cannot be wicked while the 
divine commandment stands" actually proves that the love of God 
above all is necessarily virtuous even if the divine command does 
not stand. 56 Admitting the possibility that God could command a 
creature to hate Him, Ockham does not believe that a creature 
could obey this command without thereby performing an act of love 
for God by his obedience. The command is neither logically nor 
metaphysically impossible; Ockham affirms the position that he 
had maintained since the Reportatio, that God could issue such 
a command. 57 Thus Iserloh's interpretation does not seem ten-
able. The impossibility associated with this command pertains 
56Ibid., pp. 146-47; "Si dicatur, quod Deus potest prae-
cipere, quad pro aliquo tempore non diligatur ipse, quia potest 
praecipere, quod intellectus sit intentus circa studium et vol-
untas similiter, ut nihil possit illo tempore de Deo cogitare: 
tune volo, quod voluntas tune eliciat actum diligendi Deum, et 
tune aut ille actus est virtuosus--et hoc non potest dici, quia 
elicitur contra praeceptum divinum--aut non est virtuosus, et 
habetur propositum, quod actus diligendi Deurn super omnia non 
sit virtuosus. 
Respondeo: Si Deus posset hoc praecipere, sicut videtur 
quod potest sine contradictione, dico tune, quod voluntas non 
potest pro tune talem actum elicere, quia ex hoc ipso, quod talem 
actum eliceret, Deum diligeret super omnia; et per consequens 
impleret praeceptum divinum: quia hoc est diligere Deum super 
ornniay diligere quidquid Deus vult diligi. Et ex hoc ipso quod 
sic diligeret, non faceret praeceptum divinum per casum, et per 
consequens sic diligendo Deum diligeret et non diligeret, faceret 
praeceptum Dei et non faceret." 
57Not only does Ockham affirm the possibility that God 
could command the odium dei in Sent., IV, q. 14, d; and Sent., 
II, q. 19, O; but as Hochstetter has indicated, Ockham suggests 
that the creature could obey such a command. 
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to the inability of the creature to execute such a command, not 
the divine inability to propose the command. 
If Ockham's ethical theory were simply a case of divine 
positivism or voluntarism, this hypothetical command to hate God 
would not constitute an ethical antinomy. If morality were simp-
ly a question of executing the divine wish, Ockham would not 
appreciate the complexity of this issue which stems from a 
difference between "what" the will elicits and "why" the will 
elicits it. The divine command to hate God means that one 
"common object" of volition ought to be rejected by the human 
will. But the problematic of this command stems from the fact 
that the "principal object" or epd which ought to be chosen by 
the human will is not altered by the commanded odium dei. The 
obligation that the will be orientated "intentionally" toward the 
Greatest Good and the Final End is grounded in the nature of 
things and not positive commands. Moral behavior is not simply 
de facto conformity to the positive commands of an absolute moral 
authority. Rather, it is a question of deliberate and purposeful 
conformity to moral authority. Thus, the divine command to hate 
God requires that human will produce simultaneously an act of 
hate and of love (or obedience) for the same object--this is 
psychologically impossible for the human will to do. God might 
alter the means, but not the e~1d, of the moral order. 
Ockham holds that the human will cannot be obliged moral-
ly to do what it cannot do. A valid moral "ought" entails that 
r 
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the agent "can. 1158 The possibility of God issuing the command 
"hate God" does not render it possible for the agent to execute 
this command. For example, the command "pick yourself up by 
your shoelaces" is possible for God to issue but impossible for 
the human agent to accomplish. Ockham tests the necessarily good 
act, in terms of the dialectic of God's absolute-ordinate power, 
and proves that love-obedience to God remains an essential com-
ponent of virtuous behavior for the Christian regardless of God's 
ability to command the opposite. The love of God is necessarily 
good because the human agent cannot obey a divine mandate to hate 
God without, paradoxically, eliciting an act of love for God. 
If the moral agent cannot fulfill some command (i.e., fulfill 
some command knowingly and voluntarily), then the command is not 
a val-id moral obligation. 
The proof that some act of the will "cannot be caused 
by a created will without being virtuous" turns on the argument -
which Ockham has already mentioned (in Sent., III, q. 12, E) 
that no virtuous act can be asserted unless a necessarily virtu-
ous act is asserted. 59 Ockham now identifies this necessarily 
58sent., III, q. 12, QQ; "Confirmatur, quia ratio ali-
quando errat; tune quaero, aut hoc est in potestate voluntatis 
aut non, si non, non peccat ex ignorantia, quia nu1lus obligatur 
ad impossibile ... 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, A; and .§ent., 
IV, qes. 8-9, E-F. ~~ 
59ouodl., III, q. 13; (Philosophical Writings ..• , pp. 
lli-5-146). "Quod probo: Quia impossibi1e est, quod aliquis actus 
contingenter virtuosus, ita quod indifferenter potest dici vir-
tuosus vel vitiosus, fiat determinate virtuosus nisi propter 
alium actum necessario virtuosum. Hoc probatur : Quia actus 
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contingenter virtuosus, puta actus ambulandi, fit determinate 
virtuosus per conformitatem ad alium actum. Quaero de isto 
secundo actu: aut est necessario virtuosus modo praedicto, et 
habetur propositum, quod est aliquis actus in homine necessario 
virtuosus, aut est contingenter virtuosus, et tune iste fit virtu-
osus determinate per conformitatem ad alium actum virtuosum. Et 
de illo quaerendum est sicut prius. Et erit processus in infini-
tum, vel stabitur ad aliquem actum necessario virtuosum. 
Tertio dico, quod iste actus necessario virtuosus modo 
praedicto est actus voluntatis, quia actus quo diligitur Deus 
super omnia propter se est huiusmodi; nam iste actus sic est 
virtuosus, quod non potest esse vitiosus, nee potest iste actus 
causari a voluntate creata, nisi sit virtuosus: Tum quia quili-
bet pro loco et tempore obligatur ad diligendum Deum super omnia, 
et per consequens, iste actus non potest esse vitiosus; tum quia 
iste actus est primus omnium actuum bonorum. Praeterea, solus 
actus voluntatis est intrinsece laudabilis vel vituperabilis. 
Praeterea, secundum Sanctos nullus actus est laudabi1is vel 
vituperabilis nisi propter intentionem bonam vel malam; intentio 
autem est actus voluntatis; ergo etc." 
A point of clarification is required here. Ockham asserts 
that "everyone is obliged for the place and time to love God above 
all." We have argued that the development of this question over 
Ockham's previous attempts to specify the necessarily good act, 
is that the love of God above all is not intrinsically good be-
cause of a definite but changeable set of circumstances. The 
love of God above all is intrinsically good regardless of changes 
in time, place, or even the divine law. It would be a misinter-
pretation of Ockham, however, to say that the moral agent need 
not consider the dictate of Right Reason, or the time and place, 
in producing a morally good act of love for God. In question 15, 
of Quodlibet Three, .:Ln which Ockham asks: \Vhether the circumstanc-
es of an act, for instance the end, Right Reason, and such things, 
are objects of a virtuous act?, he clarifies the structure of the 
nece'ssarily good act. "Ad istam quaestionem, dico quod a.ctus 
virtuosus est duplex: Unus qui contingenter et indifferenter 
potest esse aliquo modo virtuosus et viciosus; Alius qui sic est 
virtuosus quod non potest esse aliquo modo viciosus. Primus actus 
non habet circumstantiam pro objecto, quia non est virtuosus nee 
viciosus nisi ex assistentia vel carentia actus boni vel male, a 
quo dependet in aliquo genere causae. Et ille actus potest esse 
idem cum circumstantiis talibus et sine. Secundus actus habet pro 
objecto circU.J."TIStantias, · quid probo, quia alias sequerentur duo 
inconvenientia.: Primum quod nullus actus sit intrinsece et neces-
sario virtuosus sed solum contingenter, cuius opposi tum prius pro--
batu..11 est; Sec·undum, quod de actu non meri torio fieret meri torius 
per rationem alicuius materiae naturalis." Ockham's argument con-
cludes that an act cannot be intrinsically virtuous if "non elici-
tur conformiter rectae rationi, quid necessario requiritur ad ac-
tum intrinsece virtuosum." Hence, the change of circumstance can-
not affect the propriety of love for God above all. 
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good act as "the act by wh1ch God is loved more than everything 
else for His sake." This act is not merely good "in se" or 
intrinsically but necessarily good so that "this act cannot be 
caused by the created will without being virtuous." The altuistic 
love of God is necessarily good; first, because regardless of the 
time or place, everyone is obliged to love God, and secondly, 
because this is the "first of all good acts." The moral goodness 
of loving God is not bound by a definite set of circumstances; 
every act performed by the will can be performed virtuously for 
the love of God. There is no time or place in which loving God 
would not be right; there is no "right reason" for not loving 
God. Ockham's assertion that the love of God for His sake is 
the "first of all good acts," is more descriptive than explana-
tory.- Ockham's meaning seems to be that, for a Christian, all 
explanations of morally good acts must ultimately arrive at the 
altuistic love of God as the essential, the necessary and the 
first virtuous act. Only this action has the intrinsic, necessary 
and· immutable goodness required to support a Christian morality. 
Any action which can be performed for an evil intention 
is contingently good. Before the Quodlibetal Questions were com-
posed, Ockham had considered "to will to pray for the honor of 
God and because it is commanded by God according to Right Reason, 
60 
etc.," ns intrinsically good, and "to do something because it 
is cormnanded by God" as necessarily good. 61 However, to pray or 
60 III, 12, M. Sent. , q. 
618 t en . , III, q. 12, E. 
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to obey God can be done by the moral agent for the sake of gain-
ing public acclaim or out of hypocracy. The necessarily and in-
trinsically good act which is described in Quodlibet Three, ques-
tions 13 and 14, brings together the "common object" and the 
"principal object" of volition. The love of God for His sake and 
above all indicates both the act produced and the intention of 
the agent. Thus, Ockham answers the principal objection to his 
position: "Every act of the will can be elicited with an evil 
intention; therefore, every act of the will can be evil" by deny-
ing the premise. "Some act of the will (i.e., the love of God 
for His sake and above all) cannot be elicited with an evil in-
tention.1162 Ockham admits elsewhere that the will can elicit an 
act of love for God with a bad intention. 63 However, the will 
cannot love God above all for His sake with an evil intent since 
the love of God for His sake precludes a selfish motive. The 
''first of all good acts" is a complex action which allows Ockham 
the simultaneous assertions that God can attach a positive 
62
ouodl., III, q. 13; (Philosophical Writings, pp. 144 
and 147) "Utrum solus actus voluntatis sit necessario virtuosus 
vel vitiosus? Quod non: Quia omnis actus voluntatis potest 
elici intentione mala; ergo omnis actus voluntatis potest esse 
malus ... Ad argumentum principale, nego assumptum, quia aliquis 
actus voluntatis nullo modo cum intentione mala potest elici, 
sicut patet ex dictis. 11 
63
sent., II, q. 19, Q; 11 Ad aliud dico quod si odium Dei 
causetur a solo Deo semper esset hoc, propter bonum finem, quia 
Deus ex odio creaturae in nullo damnificatur; sed odire Deum 
propter indebitwn finem est malum et sic est actus creatuae et 
non a solo deo. Illud etiam quid assumit est falsum quod dilectio 
dei sit semper bona propter debitum finem; quia aliquando potest 
esse mala et propter indebitum finem, puta, quando amo Deum amore 
concupiscentiae. 11 
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obligation (negative or affirmative) to any simple action with 
the created will's power and that some (complex) action is nec-
essarily good. 
By asserting the altuistic love of God as necessarily 
good, Ockham affirms the central importance of the end intended 
by the agent as a moral determinant and affirms that a perfect 
love of the Ultimate End is primarily required to order and ar-
range the possibilities of volition as means to the Final End. 64 
Given the ability of God to command a creature to hate Him, Ock-
ham can still maintain that the love of God above all is essen-
tially, morally good every time it occurs in the human will. On 
the other hand, it appears that Christians must derive the moral 
status of all their voluntary acts from this "primary" act. Ock-
ham' s tendency to empirically divide and analyze the components 
of will-acts to determine which are contingently and which neces-
sarily good arrives at only one element which is irreducibly 
64
sent., III, q •. 12, II; "Septima conclusio (est) quod 
v1rtutes theologicae nullum vitium morale compatiuntur. Hoc 
patet quia rectitude circa finem ultimum repugnat omni difformi-
tati circa ea quae sunt ad finem; quia si non, aut illa difform-
i tas procedit ex ignorantia vincibili et tune vincit si potest, 
aliter non est rectitudo circa finem; aut invicibili et tune non 
est culpabilis; aut procedit ex malitia et passione, sive sic 
sive sic, destruitur rectitude circa finem ultimum. Patet enim 
quod si recte diliget Deum, diligit Deum super omnia, quia habet 
autem aliquid vitium, diligit objectum illius plusquam Deum, ista 
non stant simul. Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. i (I, 391); where 
Ockham argues that everything which is an object of volition, 
other than God, ought to be "referred" to God or accepted voli-
tionally for God's sake. Also see Sent., III, q. 12, YY; where 
Ockham explains how every evil can be considered as an instance 
in which the created agent does not love God above all. 
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good--the love of God above all. In causal dependence upon this 
final cause or motive, other objectives of volition can be called 
ngood. 11 
4. Teleology and Deontology 
An area of development apparent in Ockham's moral doctrine 
is the increasing emphasis on "why" the moral agent elicits some 
act, as opposed to "what" the moral agent elicits. Ockham's 
search for a necessarily good act is resolved only by identifying 
the love of God propter ~ as incompatible with evil intentions~ 
This act, in which the object chosen merges with the agent's 
motive in choosing the object, is the "first of all good acts." 
The love of God-in-Himself brings together the "common object" 
of volition and the "principal object"--"what" is chosen and 
"why" it is chosen.· As the "first" of all good acts, the love 
of God above all is the "only" necessarily good act. Every per-
fectly good act of the Christian is either an act of love for 
God above all or causally dependent upon the love of God above 
all. In his early works, Ockham describes a "perfectly circum-
t d i! t . t . . 11 . t 65 . th Q dl'b t 1 s ance ac as in rinsica y vir uous; in e uo i e a 
65sent., III, q. 10, P; "Si enim diligam aliquem hominem 
absolute terminando actum volendi ad illum hominem et non ad ali-
quam circumstantiam bonam vel malam; tune iste actus non est 
bonus vel malus moraliter sed est neuter. Sed tune, stante illo 
actu, eligam alium actu quo volo diligere tantum hominem propter 
Deum. secundum rectam rationem etsecundum omnes alias circumstantias 
requisitas, iste secundus actus est perfecte et intrinsece virtuo-
sus et qui prius fuit indifferens, nunc est virtuosus denomina-
tione extrinseca, quatenus elicitur conformiter actui perfecte 
virtuoso et recto dictamini." The new element which characterizes 
r 
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Questions, he concentrates upon the perfect motive or end in 
acting which cannot be intended by the moral agent without being 
virtuous. 66 Both divine and human laws can change, but Ockham's 
doctrine of the necessary goodness of man's interior and unselfish 
orientation to the Creator is not jeopardized. Legalities are 
subject to flux; the fundamental exigency of morality is stable. 
It is Ockham's mature position that the intention to love 
God above all is intrinsically and necessarily good. God's abso-
lute power to posit moral standards does not alter the fact that 
God is the Greatest Good and therefore, ought to be the Ultimate 
End of human life and activity. The necessarily virtuous act 
gives the permanent orientation of the Christian conscience. 
Psychologically, the premises of a moral deliberation are 
formulated with the apprehension and judgmental assent to some 
object as an end or goal of volition. 67 A statement of the end 
the second act, is that it· is "propter deum" and "secundum rectam 
rationem et secundum omnes alias circumstantias requisitas." How-
ever, Ockham does not identify the "propter deum" as the intrinsi-
cally virtuous element as his does in Quodl., III, q. 13. 
66ouodl., III, q. 15; "Praeterea, probatur quod finis est 
objectum actus virtuosi. Tum quia quando voluntas diligit aliquid 
propter finem, magis diligit finem quia propter quid •.. Tum quia 
si essent duo actus respectu duorum objectorum, quorum unus est 
causa alterius, si illa duo objecta diligeretur unico actu, i11ud 
objectum esset primum cuius actus esset causa alterius quando 
diligerentur distinctis actibus. Sed si quis diligeret finem 
uno actu et illud quid est ad finern alio actu; actus respectu 
finis esset causa actus illius quid est ad finem ..• Ad secundum 
dubium, dico quod finis est objectum principale actus virtuosi 
intrinsece, et hoc, quia dilectio finis principaliter intenditur. 11 
67sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 290); " •.. Circa primum dico 
quod intellectus practicus est respectu principiorum practicorum 
et etiam respectu conclusionum practicarum. Et ideo intellectuE 
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to be attained is the major premise of a practical syllogism; 
the means utilized to attain this end are inf erred from the 
nature of the end. 68 Thus, the directive proposition which is 
dictated by Right Reason as the norm and rule of virtuous voli-
tion, originates in the end which is mentally recognized. 
The will, which is the principle of virtuous activity, 
always acts for the sake of an end. 69 The acts of "velle, 11 
11 nolle" and "non-velle" are within the power of the will; the 
will's freedom is the reason for its assent, dissent or indiffer-
ence to a possible good or end. Also, the will is responsible 
for accepting or rejecting objects according to three (and only 
three) possible aspects: an end-in-itself which is loved 
greatest, an end-in-itself which is simply loved, and an end 
which is loved for the sake of another. 70 On the part of the 
practicus est respectu finis, quando scilicet de aliquo fine 
judicatur quod est appetendus vel prosequendus. Et hoc est 
intelligendlun quia est respectu unius complexi quod affirmat 
aliquem finem esse appetendum, et istud est primum principium 
practicum in operando. 11 
68
sent., II, q. 3, 11; "Quinta conclusio (est) quod finis 
est principium in agibilibus quia est medium et causa in syllog-
ismo conclu.dente determinatum medium requiri ad talem finem. 
Exemplum, si enim finis praestitutus a voluntate infirmi sit quod 
sanitas sit acquirenda, et potio sit medium acquirendi sanitatem, 
tune istud medium debet sic syllogistice inferri ex tali fine." 
Also see Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 291). 
69 Sent., Prologue, 
III-;-q:- 10, n. 
q. 10 (I, 291); Sent., III, q. 13, T; 
Sent. , 
-
70sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 374-375); "Circa primum scien-
dum quod a1iquis posset assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntat.is 
dupliciter; vel propter se vel propter aliud •.• Sed quod aliquis 
actus sit non referns posset esse dupliciter; vel quod objectum 
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moral agent, therefore, the recognition of moral standards and 
the volitional execution of moral directives, is unalterably a 
question of the ends of human activity. This, however, says only 
that man is a goal-orientated and purposeful animal. 
Metaphysically, a human being is a "debtor." He owes his 
existence, his life, his activity to an Infinete and Creative 
Being. While a man exists, he is dependent moment to moment on 
the conserving causality of God for his existence. In the same 
way, whatever ontological value or desirableness a creature has 
is dependent upon the divine creativity. All created things are 
good or willable because they are. To be morally right, a man's 
love for created "good" or finite ends ought to reflect their 
dependence on God. Both reason71 and revelation assert that 
finite, experienced things have being and goodness "per Aliud. 11 
Thus, the ends available to human activity are de facto ordered; 
created goods are ordered to the Uncreated Good as effects to 
acceptetur tanquam summum sibi possibile praesentari, hoc est 
tanquam summe diligendum ab ea, vel absolute quod acceptetur et 
absolute assumatur in facultatem voluntatis, nee ut summum nee 
ut non-summum." 
71 Sent., Prologue, q. 12 (I, 364); "Illa tamen quae con-
siderantur--arlletaphysica possunt esse principia ad probandum con-
clusiones practicas de Deo, sicut ex hoc quod Deus est causa 
omnium est summe diligibilis vel honorandus vel aliquid huius-
modi." In spite of the fact that Father Boehner has edited two 
questions of Ockham which contains "proofs" for the existence of 
God, it is still common to read that Ockham denied the possi-
. bility of such demonstrations. See Collected Articles ... , pp. 
399-420. The basis of this proof concerns the impossibility of 
an infinite series of conserving causes and the necessity of every 
production to be conserved in bei.ng while it remains in being. 
r 
cause. The order and priorities of the human will ought to 
reflect this real state of affairs. The rationale for this 
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position is thoroughly Augustinian. Only God should be "enjoyed" 
(~) for his own sake; everything else should be "used (uti) 
for His purposes. 72 "Only God should be loved greatest since He 
is the Greatest Good."73 
The psychology and metaphysic by which Ockham describes 
the human moral condition render final causes critical to ethical 
judgments. This important aspect of Ockham's moral theory is 
often vitiated by the claim that he denies the finality or teleo-
logical connection of the world. 74 Truly, Ockham denies that the 
72sent., I, d. 1, q. 1 (I, 373); "Solo illo utendum quod 
est ad aliud ordinabile et omni illo; sed quidlibet aliud a Deo 
est ordinabile ad Deum, qui est finis omnium, et Deus non est ad 
aliud ordinabilis; ergo etc." See Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 
c. 11, n. 17 (P. L. 42, 982-983), and De doctrIDa christiana, I, 
c. 4, n. 4 (P.-L.:- 34, 20). -
73 ( ) Sent., I, d. I, q. 4 I, 447. 
74Anita Garvens argues at length that Ockham rejects any 
effort to explain morality by finality. Franz. Studien 21, pp. 
249-257. "Die Annahme durchgangiger Zielstrebigkeit aller Natur 
nach ihrem letzten Ziel, nach Erfullung und Vollendung ihres Seins 
in Gott als ihrem ewigen Urbilde, bot der Scholastik die Grund-
lage, sittliches Streben fur moglich und notwendig zu erklaren. 
Eine solche Grundlegung der Ethik ist bei konsequenter WeiterfUh-
rung der Grundgedanken Ockhams nicht moglich, denn ihm f~hlen die 
mataphysischen Voraussetzungen, um auf dem Wege rationaler Deduk-
tion auf eine immanente und notwendig bestimmte Zielstrebigkeit 
aller Natur schliessen zu konnen. So finden sich unter seinen 
Erorterungen keine Versuche, die Finalitat der Welt aus dem Ord-
nungsgedanken zu folgern." (p. 249). For verification, she cites 
the study of H. Becher, "Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweise bei Wil-
helm von Ockham," Scholastik III (.1928), p. 382. In turn, G. de 
Lagarde refers to Garvens' article in agreement, Ockham, la Mor-
ale .•. , pp. 54-55. 
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actions of irrational causes "intend" some end. 75 To act "E.!:£E-
ter finem" is the exclusive privilege of free and rational beings. 
-
But natural causes always produce the same effects given similar 
conditions. The regular and predictable effects of non-conscious 
operations give the moral agent a basis for judging the means 
conducive to his ends and the pragmatic outcome of his own 
physical actions. The natural outcome of human activity is part 
of the "common object" of deliberation and volition. It is man's 
dignity and responsibility, however, that his motives can trans-
cend the effects of his natural powers. The "suitable" end of 
voluntary acts is dictated by Right Reason and becomes the "prin-
cipal object" and chief characteristic of conformed volition. 
Rather than eliminating teleology from morality, Ockham teaches 
that inevitably moral actions have an intrinsic finality. 
To act correctly, the agent must both recognize what is 
obligatory and deliberately fulfill that obligation. The will 
should elicit what is dictated by Right Reason "because it is 
dictated by Right Reason. 1176 Prior to morally good or evil 
75Quodl., IV, q. 2; " •.. non potest sufficienter probari 
vel demonstrari, nee sciri per principia per se nota nee per 
experientiam, quod agens de necessitate naturae agat secundum 
talem causam finalem praestitutam a voluntate. Et hoc quia 
actio talis agentis sine variatione agentis vel passi vel ali-
cuius concurrentis ad actionem nunquam variatur sed semper uni-
formi ter sequitur actio. Et ideo non potest probari q_uod tale 
agens agat propter finem." Also see Summ. in libros .PhysicorUJ!!, 
II, c. 6. 
76sent., III, q. 12, CCC; 11 ••• quia nullus actus est per-
fecte virtuosus nisi voluntas per illum actum velit dictatum a 
recta ratione, propter hoc, quod est dictatum a recta ratione." 
r 
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volition, the mind must recognize an obligation. 77 Whatever the 
reasons for which the Practical Intellect decides and dictates 
some volition, the will should execute each facet of the directive 
precisely because it is morally required. It appears that obli-
gation must be asserted before moral value. Ockham's account of 
the phenomenology of ethical experience thus might suggest the 
classification of "deontological. 11 Indeed, commentators have 
mentioned the "precocious Kantian" in Ockham. 78 Yet the category 
11 deontological" cannot be applied definitely to Ockham's ethic. 
His claims that, a) the dictate of Right Reason must include a 
decision about the suitable end, b) God should be loved because 
He is the Greatest Good, and c) rectitude regarding the ultimate 
end repels any distortion about the means to the ultimate end, 
do not sound like the assertions of a deontologist. A definitive 
classification of either teleological or deontological is as 
tenuous as the strict application of the categories of rational-
ism or voluntarism. This ambivalence requires a close look at 
Ockham's theory of moral value. 
77sent., II, q. 19, P; 11 ••• sed Deus ad nullum actum caus-
andum obligatur. Ideo, quemlibet actum absolutum potest sine 
omni malo culpae causare et ejus oppositum; et ideo sicut potest 
causare totaliter actum diligendi (Deum) sine bonitate vel mali-
tia morali--quia bonitas moralis et malitia connotant quod agens 
obligatur ad illum actum vel ejus oppositurn--ita potest totaliter 
causare acturn odiendi Deum si.ne omni mali tia morali propter eam-
dem causam. 11 Also see Sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; Sent., IV, q. 9, 
S and Sent., I, d. 42, q. 1, H. 
78cf. Ernest A. Moody, The ~ncyc1opedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. 5: pp. 315-316; and James K. McDonnell, Religion and Ethics 
.:...:..:..' pp. 138-141. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONCEPT OF MORAL GOOD 
It is somewhat common to read that moral goodness for 
1 Ockham is determined extrinsically and positively by God. The 
good is what God commands; the evil is what He prohibits. This 
interpretation gives the prescriptive and descriptive import of 
moral language to divine discretion. Morality becomes the ex-
trinsic assessment of human volition. Goodness derives from 
God's contingent approval rather than the nature of the act-in-
itself. The typical argument proceeds: If God could change the 
obligation presently associated with any simple action within 
man's power, then moral value is external to the nature of every 
human action. It is curiously difficult, however, to produce 
ex1)lici t texts to establish Ockham' s definition of "good." Leon 
Baudry thinks that Ockham's ethic fits the interpretive model of 
1cf. Anita Garvens, Franz. Studien, 21, p. 248; "Hierzu 
muss vorweggenommen werden, was erst die Darlegu...~g seiner mater-
ial-ethischen Lehren deutlich aufweisen wird, dass namlich die 
Begriffe Gut und Bose von Ockham positivistisch bestimmt werden 
dadurch, dass er sie lediglich als Ausdruck momentaner Entschei-
dungen des gottlichen Willens betrachtet, der die letzte Norm des 
sittlichen Handelns darstellt. 11 Similar positions are maintained 
by J"oseph Lortz, "Einleitung, 11 Gnade und Eucharistie ... , (bei 
Erwin Iserloh), p. XXXVI; Konstanty Michalski, "Les Courants 
Ph.ilosophi.que a Oxford et ~ Pari~ pendant le XIVe Siecle," in La 
Philo_E!_c:.phie ~ xrve Siecle: Six Etudes ( Opuscula Philosophica, 
Vol. I: Frankfurt; Minerva GIVIBH, 1969), p. 11; G. de Lagarde, 
Qckhcgg. ba Morale ... , p. 55; and Vernon J. Bourke, History of 
Ethics, Vol. I, p. 155. 
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divine voluntarism but he admits that explicit definitions of 
moral goodness cannot be found to include in his Lexigue philoso-
phigue de Guillaume d'Ockham. 2 We propose to re-examine this 
issue by considering the doctrines of "rectitude," moral evil, 
and the meaning of moral good. Our study maintains a sharp 
distinction between "moral" and "meritorious" goods: the dis-
tinction is Ockham's and argues strongly against the voluntaristic 
and extrinsic conception of moral value. 
The discussion of Ockham's value theory has been post-
poned to this final chapter for a number of reasons, but mainly 
to show the need to re-open the question in spite of the "majori-
ty opinion." Chapter I indicated Ockham's effort to contain all 
actual good and evil within the created will. Chapter II argued 
that the nature of an intellectual dictate is to regulate the 
will's freedom. Thus, certain moral norms--the will ought to 
conform itself to Right Reason--are necessarily true "without 
any precept of a superior." Chapter III studied the legislative 
power of the divine will and noticed the primacy of God's com-
mands among the determinants of morality. God could posit a 
moral obligation regarding all simple acts within man's power. 
Chapter IV revealed that at least one complex action, the love 
of God above all, is n~cessarily good regardless of divine man-
dates to the contrary. These chapters should indicate the com-
plexities involved in tracing Ockham's notion of moral goodness. 
2Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1958, p. 32; "Guillau."lle ne donne 
pas, a ma connaissance de definition du bien moral." 
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As prima facie evidence that Ockham does not hold an extrinsic 
or positivistic conception of moral value, consider that Ockham 
criticizes Duns Scotus for just such a position. 
1. Moral Rectitude 
It is helpful to remember the Subtle Doctor's position 
on "rectitude." As in so many cases, Ockham's own position 
developed in contrast to the doctrine of Duns Scotus. Scotus 
defines the goodness of an act as the integrity of all those 
things which the right reason of the agent judges to be required 
for that act or the agent. 3 Scotus lists the circumstances of 
an act as the object, end, mode, time and place; when these 
circumstances are agreeable or proper in terms of the agent's 
nature, his producing potency and the essence of the act pro-
4 duced, then the agent has caused a morally good act. When one 
or more circumstances are "unsuitable" so that the complex rela-
tionship becomes improper, then that act is morally bad. Scotus' 
position on moral goodness, therefore, involves the relationships 
possessed by an act of the will. The same volitional act could 
be morally good or evil depending on its extrinsic relationships. 
For example, the same act such as "walking to church" could be 
3scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 40, q. unica, n. 3; Quodl., 
18, n. 4. 
4 Scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 40, q. unica, n. 3; Quodl., 
18, nos. 5-6; see Comm. Ox., I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 2; where Scotus 
affirms the "relational 11 character of moral goodness. "Bonitas 
moralis in actu non dicit nisi relationem. 11 (Waddings-Vives ed.; 
v' 947). 
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good and then evil because the agent's motive for walking to 
church is first proper and later improper. According to Ockham, 
Scotus' position asserts that "rectitude" and "difformity" are 
extrinsic determinations or relationships possessed by voluntary 
acts. 
On at least five occasions, Ockham argues against this 
position of Scotus 1 • 5 Ockham's own answer to the question, What 
is moral rectitude?, is contrasted to the Scotistic position. 
In one sense, Ockham's disagreement with Scotus about the nature 
of rectitude results from Ockham's different metaphysical stance. 
Denying the reality of relationships as substances distinct from 
the related objects, O~kham must relegate the traditional quali-
ties of a relationship to the "relata" themselves. In another 
sense, however, Ockham's argument with Scotus is more verbal 
than substantive. Both Scotus and Ockham agree that the circum-
stances and objects of a will-act are moral determinants; they 
differ regarding the manner in which the situation and objects 
function as moral determinants. For Ockham, the circumstances 
and objects of an intended action are together apprehended by 
reason and constitute the rule or moral standard to which volition 
ought to conform. 6 The apprehension of all the pertinent, 
5 Sent., III, q. 15, D; Sent., III, q. 12, XX; Sent., III, 
q. 13, E;-OU:Odl., I, q. 20; Sent., III,q. 10, H, P, and Q. Ock-
ham refers to Scotus' doctrine in Quodl., III, q. 14, without 
indicating the position he rejects as that of Scotus. 
6sent., III, q. 10, N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae 
actus voluntatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus, ita quod 
finis j_n omni actu est objectum principale sicut prius patui t; 
r 
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situational factors--the end, time, place, etc.,--is the total 
object of a will-act and gives the will-act its specific nature. 7 
Acts of the agent's will are distinguishable on the basis of what 
is willed; a change in volitive objects entails a corresponding 
change in the nature of the will-act. Ockham's general disagree-
ment with Scotus, therefore, results from Ockham's insistence 
that the objects and circumstances of volition are intrinsic and 
internal determinants of moral goodness. 
While Ockham's metaphysic takes issue with Duns Scotus 
on the substantial reality of relationships, their sharpest 
aliae circumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu 
illius actus. 11 Sent., III, q. 12, CCC; "Ad secundum dubium, dico 
quod tam finis quam recta ratio et omnes aliae circumstantiae 
sunt objecta partialia secundaria actus virtuosi. Cuius ratio 
est, quia est aliquis actus voluntatis qui est intrinsece et 
necessario virtuosus stante ordinatione divina quae nunc est, 
et nullo modo contingenter virtuosus. Nunc autem si illa quae 
dicuntur circumstantiae non sunt objecta actus virtuosi, nullus 
actus voluntatis esset necessario et intrinsece virtuosus, sed 
solum extrinsece et contingenter; cuius oppositum prius probatum 
est." 
7ockham teaches that the same potency can produce speci-
fically different acts because of specifically different objects 
of that potency. Sent., III, q. 12, D; "Secunda conclusio est 
quod respectu objectorum distinctorum specie, sunt actus distinc-
ti specie. Hoc patet, quia aliter non potest probari distinctio 
specifica actuum, quia si illi essent ejusdem speciei, multo 
magis actus respectu objectorum ejusdem speciei essent ejusdem 
speciei; et sic omnes actus essent ejusdem speciei. 11 In ethical 
theory, Ockham's position that: (a) the circumstances are par-
tial objects of the will-act and (b) the object to which the will 
moves is responsible for the specific nature of that will-act, 
substantiates Ockham's claims that the circumstances of an in-
tended act affect the moral nature of that act. "Si quaeras 
unde actus habet bonitatem suam vel malitiam? Dico quod ab 
eidem a quibus habet substantiam actus; quia ab objecto communi 
et omnibus circumstantiis tanquam a causis multis partialibus, 
quae omnes simul positae, faciunt unam causam totalem." Sent., 
III, q. 10, P-Q. Also see Sent., III, q. 12, CCC. 
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conflict in ethics concerns the extrinsic-intrinsic status of 
rectitude or goodness. For Ockham the goodness or evilness of 
a voluntary act is not distinct from the substance of that act. 8 
Consequences which are totally unacceptable for Ockham result 
from asserting that moral goodness is a relational and extrinsic 
quality possessed by will-acts. 
For one thing, the same act can be first morally indif-
ferent and then intrinsically good according to Scotus. 9 Sub~ 
stantially the same will-act could be both morally indifferent 
and morally good because of changing relationships. For example, 
a person could perform the act of walking to church spontaneously 
and without consideration for the rightness or wrongness of that 
8
sent., III, q. 10, P; "Hoc substantia actus est haec 
bonitas actus; et similiter de actu vitioso, haec substantia 
actus est haec malitia actus." Quodl., III, q. 14; "Ad istam 
quaestionem (i.e., Utrum rectitudo actus et difformitas differ-
ant a substantia actus?), dico quod nunquam actus et sua rectitudo 
differunt, quia omnis actus aut est rectus essentialiter aut per 
denominationem extrinsecam. Si primo modo, tune substantia actus 
est sua rectitudo quid patet ex hoc, quia impossibile est quod 
talis actus sit a voluntate creata nisi sit rectus. Si secundo 
modo, tune iste actus dicitur rectus, quia causatur vel contina-
tur ab actu essentialiter virtuoso--ad cuius conformitatem dicitur 
actus rectus. 11 Also see Sent., III, q. 12, YY. 
9sent., III, q. 12, XX; "Ad primum istorum, respondit 
Johannes in 'principio' de materia caritatis et 'secundo,' ubi 
quaerit utrum aliquis actus voluntatis sit indifferens et in 
Quotlibet ubi quaeri t utrum act1 ''..> dilectionis naturalis et meri-
toriae sint e~lusdem speciei ( Oc · · ""lm refers to Scotus' Comm. Ox., 
I, d. 17, q. 6; Comm. Ox., II, 40, q. unica; and Quodlibetales 
Quaestiones, 17), et dici t quoc ·:am habi tus quam actus voluntatis 
pot.est esse indifferens sicut quod idem habitus abstinentiae 
generatus solet inesse naturae cuiusmodi actus solum est actus 
naturalis; pot.est postea per coexistentiam act.us prudentiae esse 
intrinsece bonus." 
,. 
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act. Later, the agent might continue that act of walking because 
he now judges that walking to church is right and obligatory. 
For Scotus, this example indicates that an indifferent act can 
become intrinsically good through the "co-existence," or relation 
to, prudence. Ockham rejects this analysis because, first, it 
asserts that morally good acts can occur without being volu..~tary 
or deliberately chosen by the will and secondly, it asserts that 
a non-virtuous act of intellectual prudence can render another 
non-virtuous act as morally virtuous. 1° For Ockham, the act of 
walking to church spontaneously is not substantially or by nature 
the same act as walking to church deliberately to fulfill an 
obligation. Furthermore, the same act could be first a natural 
act, then morally good, and finally meritorious according to 
Scotus. 11 The change from natural (non-voluntary), to morally 
-lOidem.; "Contra primum, impossibile est quod de actu non 
viruoso fiat virtuosus per aliquem actum pure naturalem qui nullo 
modo est in voluntatis potestate; quia propter talem nullus lauda-
tur vel vituperatur, ex guo solum est actus naturalis. Sed actus 
prudentiae secundum eum ('Scotum) et secundum veritatem, est solum 
actus naturalis et nullo modo in potestate nostra plusquam actus 
videndi. Igitur, impossibile est quod actus voluntatis indiffer-
ens et non virtuosus fiat virtuosus per solam coexistentiam 
prudentiae. Praeterea, nunquam de actu intrinsece non virtuoso 
potest fieri virtuosus nisi per actum intrinsece virtuosum, et 
non solum extrinsece et contingenter; quia aliter esset processus 
in infinitum sicut patet supra. Sed sicut supra dictum est, 
solus actus voluntatis est intrinsece virtuosus vel viciosus, et 
nullu.s alius nisi extrinseca denominatione, ... quia impossibile 
est quod aliquis actus voluntatis non bonus fiat bonus propter 
solum actwn prudentiae." Also see Quodl., III, q. 15; where Ock-
ham repeats this criticism of Scotus. --
11Idem., "Secundo (Scotus) dicit in Quotlibet quod idem 
actns non solum specie sed numero, [in]differens potest esse sic 
quod erit solum primo aetus naturalis, nee laudabilis nee vitu-
perab:i.lis, et postea manens omnino idem nrnnero, potest esse 
r 
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good, to meritoriously good can occur without any substantial 
change in the nature of some act. Ockham rejects this position 
of Scotus' because it asserts that, without a positive and essen-
tial change in the nature of an action, the act can change from 
non-voluntary to voluntary. 12 
Ockham hopes to avoid and remedy the problems he finds 
in the Scotistic analysis of moral goodness, by considering the 
circumstances and objects of a voluntary act as intrinsic moral 
determinants. The rectitude of an action is not its "proper" 
relationship; "the rectitude of an act is not a quality of the 
act nor its accident, therefore, it is the substance of the act. 1113 
"If you ask, from where an act has its goodness or evil?--I say, 
from those causes by which the act has substance, because by the 
common object and all the circumstances, just as by many partial 
14 causes which, all asserted together, make one total cause." 
Ockham agrees with Scotus that often goodness is ex circumstantia; 
virtuosus et moraliter bonus et tertio, idem manens, actus potest 
esse meritorius; quia secundum eum (Scotum) moralis bonitas vel 
meritoria non addit super substantiam actus nisi quosdam respec-
tus ad circumstantias actus vel tantum unum respectum ad rationem 
rectam plene dictatem de circumstantiis, et ille respectus secun-
dum eum oritur ex natura rei. 11 
12Ibid., YY; "Quantum ad secundum quod dicit Johannes, 
dico quod j_mpossibile est quod quicunque actus sit primo natural-
is et indi:.fferens so1um, et postea intrinsece bonus moraliter vel 
meritorie; et hoc propter transitum de contradictorio in contra-
dictorium; qui non potest salvari· sine novo actu voluntatis, sic 
patui t pr:i.us." 
13 Quodl., III, q. 14. 
11+ Sent., III, q. 10, P-Q. See above, note 7. 
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but according to Ockham the situational facto~s affect the nature 
and not simply the relationship of voluntary acts. Interestingly, 
Ockham objects to the formula "rectitude is relationship" because 
it renders the moral order completely "relative"--a charge often 
advanced against Ockham himself. 
Although goodness is the substance of certain will-acts, 
Ockham's ethic should not be considered a "natural law" theory, 
at least not a Thomistic or a Scotistic doctrine of Natural Law. 
The claim that the substance of a will act is its rectitude must 
be balanced by the assertion that God can separate created will-
acts from any moral status. The individual being of any act, its 
absolutum ~' can be present in the human will without entail-
ing moral goodness or evi1. 15 Neither the love of God above all 
nor the murderous hate of one's neighbor have a moral status 
because they exist, or because they conform or conflict with an 
ideal conception of human nature. God could totally produce love 
for Himself in the created will: a madman could hate his neigh-
bor. In both cases, the proper causes of morality are deficient. 
Hence, Ockham's position that rectitude is the substance of 
15 Sent., II, q. 19, F; "Deus potest omne absolutum causare 
sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus 
odiendi De1nn quantum ad esse absolutum in eo non est idem cum 
difformitate et malitia in actu; ergo, Deus potest causare quic-
quid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi, non causando 
ali.quam di:fformi tatem vel mali tiam in actu ... " Here the "esse 
absolutum" or.absolute being of an act signifies the positive 
nature of that act as distinct from its causes. This phrase, 
probably taken from Scotus, Quodlibet 17, n. 6 (XXVI, 202), is 
rendered as the "simple nature 11 of an act, signifying the act 
gu~ subsistent rather than gua effect. 
r 
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will-acts must be carefully interpreted. The nature of voluntary 
acts can be good in ~' but not good per ~· "Goodness" signifies 
volitive actions and their created causes. 
2. Moral Evil 
Ockham's debate with Duns Scotus has its interpretive 
problems. The Venerable Inceptor claims that rectitude is not 
a quality or accident attending will-acts, but the substance of 
volitive actions. By nature, virtuous acts differ from non-moral 
or immoral acts because virtuous acts include all the pertinent 
moral determinants. On the other hand, Ockham claims that God 
can separate the substance of any action from moral goodness or 
evil. This position seems to imply that the substantive will-
act and its rectitude are not identical. Since Ockham did define 
"moral evil, 1116 we can unravel parts of this problem through a 
16
sent., II, qes. 4-5, H; 11 Malum nihil aliud est quam 
facere aliquid ad cujus oppositurn faciendum aliquis obligatur. 11 
In the absence of an explicit definition of "moral good" in Ock-
ham' s texts, Baudry composes a definition of moral good--"le 
bien moral consiste a faire ce qu'on est tenu de faire"--in con-
trast to the given definition of moral evil. It does not seem 
inconsistent with Ockham's principles to consider this definition 
as ad mentem Ockham. However, Professor Baudry holds that this 
definition must be understood as a facet of Ockham's "voluntarism" 
or "subjectivism." "Il faut bien comprendre la port~e de cette 
definition. Comme Dieu n'est soumis a aucune obligation, le bien 
tel qu'on vient de le definir n'existe pas pour lui. Dieu ne 
veut pas tel ou tel acte, parce qu'il est bon, parce que sa bonte 
intrinseque l'imposerait a son intelligence et a sa volont~, il 
est bon parce qu'il le veut, parce qu'il le prescrit. (I S. d. 
43, q~ l; IV, q. 8 et 9 E; III, q. 12 YY). La definition que 
Guillaume donne du mal moral et cons~cutivement celle qu'il au-
rait donnee du bien moral, doivent etre mises en rapport avec ce 
qu'on appelle son volontarisme et, dans une certaine mesure, avec 
ce qu'on nomme aujourd'hui le subjectivisme moral." Cf. Lexigue 
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systematic study of "malum. 11 "Evil is nothing else than to do 
something when one is obliged to its opposite." 
Probably the earliest treatment of moral evil by Ockham 
is found in Sent., II, question 5. Ockham asks, "Whether God is 
a natural or a free agent?" In answering this question Ockham 
raises a related issue--"How does evil exist and not be caused 
by God (.!l2,!! .§:. Deo)?" Ockham replies that evil is not a "produci-
ble thing. 1117 Surely, Ockham recognizes that a moral agent can 
produce an evil act; a human will can do wrong. Thus, the state-
ment that "evil is not a producible thing" must be understood to 
assert that "evil is not a substance or an individual being which 
exists independently." Ockham describes evil as "nothing else 
than to do something while one is obliged to its opposite." 
Since God is not necessitated or obliged to produce any action, 
He can not produce or create something which is contrary to His 
Philosophique, pp. 32-33. The charge_ of divine voluntarism and 
moral subjectivism are strange bedfellows when these classifica-
tions come to rest in a single moral system. At any rate, to 
define moral evil as an action contrary to one's obligation and 
to define moral good as an action which fulfills one's obliga-
tion is not, at face value, a statement of moral voluntarism or 
subjectivism. 
17 Sent., II, q. 5, H; 11 Sed hie sunt dubia. Primum, quo-
modo malum est et non a Deo? Quia videtur quod sit eadem causam; 
reducere mala ad primum malum sicut bona ad primum bonum. Et sic 
erunt duae causae primae--una bona alia mala sicut dixerunt Mani-
chaei. Sed istud dubium bene procederet si malum esset res 
factibilis, quid falsum est, quia malum nihil aliud est quam 
facere aliquid ad cuius oppositum faciendum aliquis obligatur, 
quae obligatio non cadit in Deum, quia ille ad nihil faciendum 
obligatur; nee praesupponitur malitia in causa, quae sit causam 
malitiae effectus, sed malitia effectus est causa malitiae in 
ca.usa. 11 
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obligation, i.e., something evil. Thus, Ockham answers his 
immediate question by maintaining that God causes, at least 
partially, everything which exists. But since God is not sub-
ject to any moral obligation, He cannot produce an evil effect. 
Ockham objects, in this initial treatment, to "reifying" 
or substantizing moral evil. Everything real--every individual 
18 
substance and quality--is metaphysically good. Moral evil 
indicates a metaphysically good act which is produced in viola-
tion of the agent's moral duty. The presence of moral evil, 
therefore, does not require a "principle of darkness" or a 
Manichean "evilness" as the source of evil in the world. Indeed, 
it is incorrect to speak of an evil cause before an effect con-
trary to one's obligation has been produced. 
Moral evil is not a singular thing but can be described 
as a voluntary effect which ought not to have been produced by 
the agent. Similarly, Ockham will object to "imagining" that 
moral goodness is a thing. 19 Moral evil or moral goodness are 
incorrectly conceived as real qualities or as distinct beings. 
18As Ockham explicitly says in the Ordinatio, Sent., I, 
d. 17, q. 1, Q; "Quod aliquis potest esse secundum se charus 
etiam si nihil habet sibi inherens nee habuit, quia ipsum secun-
dum se est bonum nee est aliquid positivum nisi sit bonum; ideo 
potest sine omni tali esse objectum voluntatis et dilectionis." 
Also Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Ad argumentum principale, dico quod 
laudabile accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo pro omni natura quae 
est bona sive sit creata sive increata." 
19sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Unde omnes istae ymaginationes 
quae dicunt quod 'rectitudo' in actu addit aliquid supra actum 
absolutum vel respectivum false sunt; quia nihil aliud est quam 
ipsemet actus, et ideo carere rectitudine in actu est carere tali 
actu." 
r 
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The terms "evil" and "good" can be truly predicated of certain 
human acts. They cannot truly exist as distinct beings. 
In question 19, of book II, the Reportatio considers the 
question, "Whether an evil angel is always producing an evil act 
(21! actu malo)?" Ockham answers in the affirmative: a devil is 
always in the state of sin because God will not concur with the 
devil in rejecting evil or causing a good act. However, God is 
not responsible for the evil actions of the devils even though 
H . d d t . . . bl 20 s . is non-concurrence ren ers any goo ac ion impossi e. ince 
God is "not a debtor," He is not bound by any moral obligation. 
That man is a "debtor" is Ockham's rather pithy explanation of 
why a human being remains subject to moral obligations. 
Unfortunately, Ockham does not explain the meaning of 
"debtor" which often occurs in his argument that God cannot sin 
and that a human agent can. One probable conjecture would be 
that "debtor" indicates a certain lack of freedom in acting. Not 
yet beatified, the viator is not free from the "servitude of 
20
sent., II, q. 19, G-H; "Aliter potest dici et reddi 
causa obstinationis malorum; et hoc supposito quod Deus concurrat 
ad omncm actionem creaturae ad minus sicut causa partialis, tune 
potest dici quod Deus concurrit cum voluntate creata ad causandum 
actum odii et non vult concurrere cum angelo malo ad causandum 
actum bonum, puta, dilectionem Dei; et quia sic concurrit ad 
unum et non ad aliud, ideo potest dici obstinatus quia non potest 
elicere aliquem actum bonum. Si dicas quod tune Deus peccat et 
est malus quia non vult concurrere ad actum bonum. Respondeo, 
nunquam peccat homo nisi quia tenetur facere quid non facit vel 
quia fa:cit quid non debet facere; per ista sit homo debitor. 
Deus autem nulli tenetur nee obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo 
non potest facere quid non debet facere, nee potest non facere 
quid debet facere. 11 Also see Sent., IV, q. 3, q. 
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guilt," "the servitude of misery," or the "servitude of punish-
ment.1121 Perfect freedom, such as God possesses, does not imply 
the ability to sin, 22 or the liability of guilt in His actions. 
Ultimately, the limitation of man's freedom flows from his 
ontological dependence. The human agent owes his existence to 
God so that the gift of being and life render man a "debtor." 
In a similar manner, a man is socially dependent upon the civil 
authority and spiritually dependent upon the church. Each 
benefit establishes a corresponding duty: Omni benefactori est 
21
sent., II, q. 19, R; "Ad aliud dico quod libertas acci-
pitur quinque modis; uno modo ut opponitur servituti culpae, 
secundo ut opponitur servituti miseriae, tertio ut opponitur 
servituti penae, quarto ut opponitur coactioni, quinto modo ut 
opponitur immutabilitati. Quantum ad primam, secundam et tertiam, 
libertates, non est libertas in angelo malo, quia non est liber 
respectu peccati nee respectu miseriae nee respectu penae ... 11 
Ockham's statements about the lack of freedom or liberty in the 
bad angels can be applied to viatores with the exception of Christ 
and the mother of Christ. Cf. Sent._, I, d. 41, q. 1, G; Sent., 
III, q. 13, T. Also see Sent., I, d. 1, q. 6, (I,501); where 
Ockham makes similar distinctions about the nature of "liberty," 
and shows that a rational creature does not have that liberty 
which 11 opponi tur servi tu ti culpae vel servi tu ti penae. 11 .. Tradi-
tionally, the liberty from necessity, guilt and misery corres-
pond to man's freedom according to nature, grace and glory in St. 
Augustine and Peter Lombard. See St. Bonaventure, Sent., II~ d. 
25, part 1, q. 1 (Vol. II, 594: Qpera Omnia; Quaracchi, 1885). 
22sent., IV, q. 14, E; "Ad primum istorum, concedo quod 
(posse peccare) non est libertas nee pars libertatis, quia si 
sic, tune cuicumque competeret libertas ei competeret posse pec-
care, et per consequens Deus posset peccare, et similiter beatus, 
quod est falsum. Dico, igitur, quod libertas et posse peccare 
se habent sicut superius et inferius, ita quod quicunque potest 
peccare habet libertatem et non e contra. Et causa est, quia 
potens peccare habet libertatem et contingentiam respectu illorum 
actuum in quibus consistit peccatum, sed nee Deus nee beatus 
habet libertatem respecu talium sed respectu aliorum in quibus 
non est peccatum." Also see Sent., I, d. 10, q. 2, K. 
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benefaciendum. 23 The common stem of the noun "debitor" (one who 
owes something) and the verb "debet" (one ought to do something) 
perhaps adds credibility to this conjecture. 
In this question Ockham describes "sin" in the same man-
ner in which he previously defined "evil," namely, as a violation 
of one's obligation. For a Christian agent within the present 
dispensation there is no sharp distinction between acts done 
evilly and acts done sinfully. If a person violates his con-
science, he thereby acts contrary to the divine precept. 24 The 
divine commands establish valid moral laws for the human agent. 
Within the ordained moral order, a person sins by producing a 
morally wrong act and causes a meritorious act when producing a 
perfectly virtuous act. Strictly speaking, however, the terms 
"sin"_ and "moral evil" have different connotations. Guilt occurs 
simultaneously with violation of one's conscience, but the eter-
nal or temporal punishment signified by the term "si:d'does not. 25 
23This moral norm is often asserted by Ockham as known 
evidently through experience. Cf. Sent., III, q. 12, H. 
24sent., III, q. 13, C; "Impossibile est quod aliquis 
actus voluntatis elicitus contra conscientiam et contra dictamen 
ration.is sive rectum sive erroneum sit virtuosus; patet de con-
scientia recta quia talis eliceretur contra preceptum divinum et 
voluntatem divinam volentem divinam volentem talem actum elicere 
conformiter rationi rectae. 11 
25Anita Garvens attempts to reduce Ockham's notion of 
good and evil to "positive" good and evil, i.e., to what is com-
manded or prohibited by God. "Wesentlich filr das sittliche Han-
deln des Menschen ist nicht der Inhalt seines Tuns, sondern die 
Anpassung an den gottlichen Willen und dessen Erfullung, der 
seinerseits nicht an bestirnrnte reale sittliche Sachverhalte 
gebunden ist." Franz. Studien, 21, p. 265. Garvens goes on to 
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One more issue requires mention from question nineteen. 
Ockham asserts that the "absolute being" of any act can be sep-
arated from the difformity and wickedness which might accompany 
that act. 26 By "absolute being," Ockham seems to mean the 
say that the only real meaning of "sin" is the punishment which 
follows some human acts (pp. 360-371). It is undeniable that 
some moral evil and good can be reduced to divine prohibitions 
and commands. Ockham recognizes valid human and divine laws which 
oblige the moral agent concerning things which are "nee bona sunt 
nee mala, nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore cuius 
est leges statuere." (Quodl., II, q. 14) But "positive" evil and 
good is only part of the story. Ockham also recognizes acts which 
are "natus esse bonus moraliter ex se"--these intrinsic goods will 
be discussed shortly. Regarding Professor Garvens second point, 
that sin means only the punishment which accrues to certain acts, 
it is best to simply consider Ockham's own statements. 11 Ad aliud 
dico quod Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest alicui infligere 
penam sine culpa praecedente, sed illa pena tune non potest dici 
punitio quia istud nomen cannotat peccatum praecedens; sicut enim 
in brutis est pena sine peccato praevio. Tamen, de facto de pot-
entia sua ordinata, Deus non infligit penam sine culpa praecedente 
vel in punitio ut est in nobis vel in alio ut in Christo cui pena 
fuit inflicta propter peccata nostra." Sent., II, q. 19, U. One 
cannot argue validly, therefore, that "he sinned, thus he will be 
punished necessarily" nor that "he is punished thus he must have 
sin.'Yled. 11 Ockham removes the "freedom from misery and punishment" 
from man's competence; the "freedom from guilt" remains subject 
to the created will of viators. That God might choose not to pun-
ish a sinner does not mean he was not a sinner, i.e., guilty. 
The basic mistake of identifying moral evil with "sin," or moral 
good with "meritorious act, 11 is the oversight of Ockham's strong 
assertion that a human agent can perform morally evil and morally 
good acts 11~ puris naturalibus," but no human agent can sin or 
merit salvation"~ puris naturalibus." Human acts can be evil 
or good by nature, but no human act by nature results in eternal 
punishment or eternal reward. 
26 Sent., II, q. 19, F; "Deus potest omne absolutum causare 
sine omni alio quid non est idem cum illo absoluto; sed actus 
odiendi Deum quantum ad esse absolutum in eo, non est idem cum 
difformitate et malitia in actu, ergo, Deus potest causare quic-
quid absolutum est in actu odiendi Deum vel nolendi, non causando 
aliquam difformitatem vel malitiam in actu, ergo etc ..• Item non 
minus, posset separari difformitas ab odio Dei quam bonitas moral-
is a dilectione Dei; sed dilectio Dei in angelo beato posset 
separari a bonitate morali et meritoria." 
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positive nature of some act as actualizing the volitional potency 
and inhering within the human soul. The will, when it desires 
some object, produces a volition which subsists within the soul 
as an accidental form. Each action, considered as a real quality 
of the human soul, is metaphysically good. The substance of any 
action producible by the human agent can be separated from the 
moral determinations of "evil" or "good." Thus, if God were the 
total cause of the act of hating God or loving God, that action 
of hate or love would not be morally significant. Again, if an 
insane person were to elicit an act of hate for God, then the 
"absolute being" of that hate would be without moral evil. In-
variably, moral evil is the result of a voluntary and rational 
cause which deliberately chooses to produce this effect contrary 
to what ought to be produced. Thus, the terms "evil" or "good" 
never refer exclusively to what is done, i.e., the absolute 
being of the effect, but necessarily include a reference to the 
causes of that effect, i.e., a cause which is obliged not to pro-
duce or obliged to produc·e that effect. 27 
27Ibid., P; "Ad aliud dico quod aliquis actus ab una 
causa potest fieri bene, et si fiat ab alia (causa) non potest 
fieri nisi male, et tota ratio est quia una causa obligatur ad 
actum oppositum et alia non. Sic est in propositio, voluntas 
creata obligatur ex praecepto divino ad diligendum Deum et ideo 
stante illo precepto, non potest bene odire Deum nee causare ac-
tum odiendi, sed necessario male causat malitia moris, et hoc 
quia obligatur ex precepto divino ad actum oppositum, nee stante 
primo praecepto, potest sibi Deus oppositum precipere. Sed Deus 
ad nullum actum causandum obligatur, ideo quemlibet actum absolu-
tum posset sine omni malo culpae causare et ejus oppositum, et 
ideo sicut posset causare totaliter actum diligendi sine bonitate 
vel malitia morali, QUIA BONITAS MORALIS ET MALICIA CONNOTANT QUOD 
r 
In book three of the Reportatio, question 10, Ockham 
raises two issues; first, the origins of an act's evilness or 
goodness, and secondly, the content of evil and good actions. 
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Two questions are formulated: "From where does an act have its 
goodness or evilness?" and "What does the goodness or wickedness 
of an act add to the substance of a morally indifferent act?" 
Pertaining to the first question, Ockham claims that the 
evilness of an action comes from the same causes which produce 
the substance of the act. 28 The "common object," the end, the 
dictate of Right Reason, and the circumstances--together these 
factors constitute the total object of volition. As the object 
of volition these factors establish the specific nature of the 
will-act. The fact that a moral agent produces some action while 
consciously rejecting his duty, is reflected by the nature of 
action produced. Ockham criticizes Duns Scotus for teaching that 
moral goodness is an "aspect (respectum) of conformity to all the 
circumstances" added to the substance of an act. 29 According to 
AGENS OBLIGATUR AD ILLUM ACTUM VEL EJUS OPPOSITUM; ita posset 
totaliter causare actum odiendi Deum sine omni malitia morali 
propter eandem causam, quia ad nullum actum causandum obligatur." 
Notice that the text in capitals approximates the definition 
given as conjecture by Professor Baudry. See above, note 16. 
28
sent., III, q. 10, Q; "Si quaeras, Unde actus habet 
bonitatem suam vel malitia? Dico quod ab eisdum a quibus habet 
substantiam actus, quia ab objecto communi et omnibus circum-
stantiis tanquam a causis multis partialibus, quae omnes simul 
positae faciunt unam causam totalem. 11 
29Ibid., P; "Ex istis patet quid bonitas vel malitia ad-
dit super substantiam actus, quia aliter est dicendum secundum 
istam viam (Ockham) et aliter secundum viam Johannis. Nam 
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Ockham, Scotus' view makes moral goodness or evil a "something" 
which is extrinsic to the nature of voluntary acts. Ockham, on 
the other hand, teaches that the objects and circumstances of 
the will-act are causes which partially cause the substance of 
will-act. Thus, "this substance of the act is this goodness of 
the act and likewise, concerning a wicked act, this substance of 
the act is this wickedness of the act." Moral evil, therefore, 
depends upon the same cause on which the substance of the act 
depends. 
Ockham's answer to his second question--what does the 
goodness or wickedness of an act add to the substance of a moral-
ly indifferent act?--depends upon the answer just given to the 
first question. Moral goodness or evil adds nothing to an act 
which. is distinct from the substance of that act. "Evil" or 
Johannes ponit quod substantia actus virtuosi et vitiosi posset 
esse eadem, sed dicitur esse virtuosus propter conformitatem ad 
circumstantias requisitas, quas non ponit esse objecta partialia 
actus virtuosi et vitiosi. Ideo, per eum, bonitas addit super 
substantiam actus respectum conformitatis ad omnes circumstanitas. 
Quaere eum. Sed secundum istam viam, quae ponit quod omnes cir-
cumstanitae requisitae ad actum sunt causae immediatae partiales 
necessario requisitae ad actum perfecte virtuosum, actus virtuo-
sus et vitiosus se habent ad actum in communi sicut haec albedo 
ad albedinem in communi. Et sicut haec albedo est de se haec et 
non per aliquid extrinsecum sibi, ita actus virtuosus qui primo 
est virtuosus et de se imputabilis est de se formaliter et intrin-
sece virtuosus; quia haec substantia actus est haec bonitas act-
us. Et similiter de actu vitioso, haec substantia actus est 
haec militia actus, et ab istis duobus posset abstrahi conceptus 
actus in communi, sicut ab haec albedine et ista, posset abstrah.i 
conceptus albedinis. 11 Professor Oberman unfortunately attributes 
the position of Scotus to Ockham when the Venerable Inceptor 
actually claims that the substance of virtuous and wicked acts 
are never identical. Harvard Theological Review, 53, p. 68. 
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"good" is predicated intrinsically, i.e., of the nature, of 
certain volitional acts. Evilness or goodness is not a positive 
entity or relationship added to the substance of intrinsically 
moral actions. But some actions, such as walking or eating or 
reading, are morally indifferent; that is, some actions are not 
11 de ~ imputabilis" or "de se formaliter et intrinsece" virtuous 
or wicked. If I walk to fulfill an obligation and out of love 
for God, then the act of walking is extrinsically good. If I 
walk to avoid my moral duty, then the act of walking is extrin-
sically bad. The moral status of indifferent acts is extrinsic--
"walking" can be good or evil depending on the intrinsic goodness 
or evilness of the reason why an agent walks. Actions which are 
good or bad because they serve or execute an intrinsically good 
or bad action, do not receive anything "absolute, positive or 
relative (respectivum) distinct from that (indifferent) action. 1130 
Ockham treats the difference between intrinsically and 
extrinsically moral acts by means of different connotations. The 
principal denotion of "good" or "evil," when predicated intrinsi-
cally, is a substantive will-act. The principle significance of 
30Ibid., Q; "Si autem quaeras, Quid addit bonitas actus 
vel malitia super substantiam actus quid dicitur bonus saltem 
denominatione quaedam extrinseca, puta, actus partis sensitivae 
et similiter actus voluntatis. Dico quod nihil absolutum, posi-
tivum vel respectivum distinctum ab illo actu quod habet esse in 
illo actu per quamcunque causam; sed tamen est bonitas illa nomen 
vel conceptus connotativus significans principaliter illum actum 
sic neutrum, connotans actum voluntatis perfecte virtuosum et 
rectam rationem quibus conformiter elicitur. Ideo, denominatur 
virtuosus talis actus denominatione extrinseca. 11 Also see Quodl .. 
I, q. 20, where Ockham disputes Scotus' position on this issue. · 
11 good" or "evil," when predicated extrinsically, is a morally 
indifferent act which could be a voluntary or a nonvoluntary 
act. 31 But when predicated intrinsically or extrinsically, 
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"good" and "evil" always connote the causes of the action which 
is principally signified. Thus, the objects and circumstances 
of an action as apprehended rationally and the voluntary choice 
of the total object are connoted by good or evil when predicated 
intrinsically. When predicated extrinsically, good or evil con-
note an intrinsically good or evil action as the cause of the 
morally indifferent effect. In either case, the moral values 
attributed to certain acts connote the causes of the acts. 32 An 
31In contrast to St. Thomas, and in agreement with Duns 
Scotus, Ockham is emphatic that voluntary acts can be morally 
indifferent. See St. Thomas, Summ. Theol., I-II, q. 18, art. 9; 
Scotus, Comm. Ox., II, d. 41, q. unica. Ockham argues that 
voluntary acts can be morally indifferent, because the human 
agent can spontaneously elicit some act. Ockham does not con-
sider an act to be morally good or evil unless the agent deliber-
ately and intentionally fulfills or violates his obligation. See 
Sent., III, q. 10, 0 and Q. 
32The function of connotative terms within Ockham's phil-
osophy is aptly expressed by E. A. Moody. 11 The frequent charge 
that Ockham atomized the world by refusing to recognize relations 
as real entities distinct from substances and qualities fails to 
take accou..~t of the fact that the connotative terms relate the 
individuals by implying factual conditions by which the objects 
are tied together in an existential sense--something which cam1ot 
be done by treating relations as entities distinct from their 
relata and, in effect, as just another class of substances." 
"William of Ockham, 11 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul 
Edwards, Vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 
1967), pp. 311-312. Ockham's treatment of moral evil and good 
show the correctness of Professor Moody's observation. The moral 
status of an action derives from the nexus or order of created 
cause and effect; nothing besides this nexus is signified by the 
term "good" or "evil," when predicated in a moral sense. 
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effect of the volitional potency is real because of its causes; 
a voluntary effect is really good or really evil because of the 
same causes by which the effect exists. 
To simply desire an object produces a morally indiffer-
ent act. The actualization of the volitional power causes an 
"absolute being"--a real effect within the will. This will-act 
is good in a metaphysical sense, but this "absolute being" is not 
good or evil in a moral sense. The moral terminology which des-
cribes the real effects of the created will always connotes the 
causes of that voluntary effect. Thus, Ockham denies that the 
morality of an act is an addition to, or a subtraction from, the 
"absolute being" of some action. 33 A change in the objects and 
circumstances of a will-act changes the causes of a will-act and 
33sent., III, q. 10, O; "Respondeo, quod idem numero 
(actus) non potest esse primo indifferens et post intrinsece 
bonus vel malus; et dicitur ille actus intrinsece bonus vel malus 
cui primo convenit laus vel vituperium et cui primo est impredi-
camentabilis, quia ille actus voluntatis est indifferens qui 
elicitur circa objectum conveniens tali actui sine, tamen, cir-
cumstantiis requisitis ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus--puta, si 
diligam aliquem hominem non propter aliquern finem bonum vel malum, 
nee secundum rectam rationem nee contra, nee loco nee tempore 
determinato nee non, et ita de aliis circumstantiis virtuosis et 
vitiosis--iste actus non esset bonus moraliter nee malus, sed 
neuter et indifferens. Ad hoc, igitur, quod fiat bonus vel malus 
oportet eum circumstionari circumstantiis virtuosis vel vitiosis; 
puta, quod voluntas diligat illum hominem propter finem talem et 
tempore determinato et sic de aliis. Sed sic diligendo, habet 
actum aliud, sicut dictum est prius, ergo et aliud actum volun-
tatis. Cum circumstantiae non sint nisi objecta partialia actus 
virtuosi, ad quorum variationem, variatur necessario actus; et 
propter eandem causam, non potest aliquis actus voluntatis primo 
esse virtuosus intrinsece et post vitiosus--idem dico actus num-
ero--quia non potest esse mutatio nisi per mutationem circumstan-
tiarum, puta, quia actus nunc est bene circumstantionatus et 
post male, et hoc non potest esse sine mutatione actus. 11 
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thereby, changes the nature of the will-act. When Ockham asserts 
that the moral goodness or evilness of an action, does not add 
or subtract some ontological component or relationship to the 
action, he does not imply that the nature of a morally good act 
is identical with the nature of a morally evil act. For example, 
the act of loving God above all is morally good; the act of 
loving God for personal gain or selfishly, is morally evil; 
these acts of loving God are specifically different. 34 Evil and 
good, in a moral sense, cannot be predicated of the same act. 
One final question from the Reportatio, namely question 
nine of Book IV, must be considered. Ockham raises the question; 
Whether grace and virtues are infused in any penitent through 
the sacrament of penence? In the course of his answer, Ockham 
treats a related problem; What is mortal sin? His answer to 
this second question is pertinent to the discussion of moral 
evil. 
Ockham begins his description of "mortal sin" by analyzing 
the grammatical or logical status of sin as a connotative rather 
than an absolute term. The term "mortal sin" has no "quid rei" 
34Ibid., N; "Respondeo, omnes circumstantiae actus volun-
tatis sunt objecta partialia illius actus, ita quod finis in 
omni actu est ob,jectum principale sicut prius patuit, aliae cir-
cumstantiae sunt objecta secundaria partialia respectu illius 
actus. Exemplum, si enim ad hoc, quod actus voluntatis quo ali-
quis vult orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur de nec-
essitate istae circumstantiae; quia velit orare propter honorern 
Dei secundum rectum dictamen rationis in tempore statute, puta 
die dominico, in loco determinate, puta in ecclesia; tune iste 
actus sic virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro objecto principali, 
actum orandi pro objecto comrnuni, rectam rationem, diem domini-
cum et ecclesiam pro objectis secundariis et partialibus. 
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but only "quid nominis. 1135 Sin has no real definition (quid rei); 
only absolute terms which stand for one thing and ref er wholly 
and exclusively to that one thing have a real definition. 36 
"Mortal sin" has a nominal definition (quid nominis) which ex-
plains the meaning of the connotative term "sin" by explaining 
the multiple items signified by the term. The nominal definition 
of "mortal sin" is "some act of commission or omission because 
of which one is obliged to eternal punishment. 11 That "sin" can 
signify an act of commission or omission indicates a greater 
precision on Ockham's part in describing moral evil. In Ockham's 
first study of "moral evil," he was satisfied to say that "evil 
is nothing other than to do something while one is obliged to do 
its opposite." Now Ockham distinguishes between evil which re-
sults from "doing something" and from "not doing something." The 
distinction shows an appreciation of affirmative as well as nega-
tive obligations; and a greater sensitivity to the signification 
and connotations of the term "evil.n 
Ockham's reasons for claiming that "sin" is a connotative 
term are a collective argument against considering evil as an 
ontological entity or as some type of subsistent reality. There 
35sent., IV, q. 8-9, C; "Quantum ad primum dico quod 
peccatum mortale non habet quid rei, sed tantum quid nominis quia 
nihil unum reaJ.e dieit nee positivum nee privativum vel negati-
vum; sed dieit multa non habentia aliquam unitatem, nee per se 
nee per aecidens. Unde potest dici quod secundum quid nominis 
est aliquem eommisisse aliquem aetum vel omisisse propter quern 
obligatur ad penam eternam. 11 
7.:6 
:; Cf. Chap·ter I, Note 34. 
292 
is no existent "sinfulness" which is distinct from other exist-
ents. Sin is "not a being because it is not precisely some one 
thing or simultaneously many things, but it is one name or con-
cept signifying or meaning many things--it can even be called 
'nothing 1 • 1137 Everything real and positive signified by the 
term "sin" can be asserted without necessarily asserting an in-
stance of sin. God can perform immediately every action which 
He usually performs through the causality of created agents, yet 
God cannot sin. "Mortal sin is not a real, positive 'something,' 
nor a being of reason; nevertheless, according to its nominal 
definition it includes many positive (beings), because it in-
eludes an act, and a potency, and a future punishment. Thus, 
that someone sins mortally is only to produce or to omit some 
act through which one is ordered to eternal punishment. 1138 
Ockham's analysis of "sin" cannot be simply equated with 
his notion of moral evil. Morally good or evil actions are not 
37sent., IV, q. 9, S; "Et ideo quando quaeritur, Quid est 
peccatum?, dicendum est quod non habet quid rei sed tantum quid 
nom1n1s. Ideo non debet concedi quod est ens reale nee rationis 
sed bene in diffinitione ejus exprimente quid nominis ponuntur 
multa realia et ideo sic potest concedi quod non est ens quia non 
est aliqua res una praecise, nee multae res simul, sed est unum 
nomen vel conceptus significans vel importans plures res--potest 
etiam dici 'nihil,' quia omne positivum quid est in peccato pos-
set poni per Deum, sicut per causam totalem in voluntate hominis 
et tamen non dicitur peccatum." 
38Ibid., R; "Ad primum istorum dico quod peccatum mortale 
non est aliquid positivum reale nee ens rationis; tamen secundum 
suum quid nominis includit multa positiva, quia actum et potentiam 
et pen.am futuram, quia aliquem peccare mortaliter non est aliud 
nisi facere aliquem actum vel omittere propter quern ordinatur ad 
penam aeternam. 11 
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necessarily meritorious or damnable acts. Ockham is careful to 
defend the freedom of God to eternally reward or punish a crea-
ture's behavior. 39 On the other hand, the reasons which Ockham 
offers for asserting that "sin" is a connotative and not an 
absolute concept, also explain why "evil" and "good" are connota-
tive concepts. 
These four questions of the Reportatio contain the main 
elements of Ockham's thought on moral evil. Ockham does not 
seem to alter this initial analysis of evil. Certain facets of 
Ockham's doctrine are clear. First, he rejects any attempt to 
substantize moral evil as a metaphysical entity (substance, 
quality or relation). Secondly, he rejects any attempt to con-
sider "evil" or "good" as absolute concepts which signify exclu-
sively one thing, one privation or one relationship. Thirdly, 
the concept of "moral evil" signifies primarily the substance of 
a voluntary act and secondarily the causes of that will-act. 
Finally, he asserts that the concept of moral evil must connote 
causes which recognize and contradict a moral obligation. Insur-
mountable problems will arise if Ockham's logical analysis of 
the concepts of "evil" and "good" are confused with his meta-
physical treatment of these issues. For example, moral evil is 
39rn paragraphs "c" and "s" of question 8--9, Ockham as-
serts that sin does not necessarily imply a future punishment, 
nor does a punishment inflicted upon a creature by God imply a 
previous sin. Nor is an eternal reward automatically the conse-
quent of a morally good act. Sent., IV, q. 3, Q; "Si aliquis 
d.iligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera llio accepta, potest eum 
Deus annihilare sine aliqua injuria, ita sibi post talia opera 
potest non dare vitam aeternam sed penam aeternam sine injuria." 
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not other than the substance of certain will-acts ( ..• haec sub-
stantia actus est haec malitia act~l; and yet moral evil is not 
a substance nor an accident. Again, Ockham surely does not mean 
that moral evil is a fantasy or unreal, and yet he asserts that 
"sin"--a type of moral evil--can be called "nihil. 11 Such prob-
lems are false: the~ result from confusing the distinct questions 
of significance and the signified. 
Two further points require mention before moving to 
Ockham's doctrine of moral goodness. First, the notion of moral 
evil connotes the free and deliberate violation of one's obliga-
tion. Ockham also expresses this connotation as "against the 
40 dictate of Right Reason." The "logical advantage" of the latter 
40
sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 292-293); "Autem omnis talis 
operatic possit dici praxis, videtur, qui.a omnis actio quae est 
in potestate nostra posset esse virtuosa vel vitiosa; sed omnis 
talis est praxis ... Ista autem praxis dividitur in praxim virtuo-
sam et vitiosam, quia utraque istarum est in potestate nostra. 
Praxis autem virtuosa posset sic describi: Praxis virtuosa est 
operatic existens in potestate voluntatis, nata elici conformiter 
rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit recta. Prima conditio patet, quia 
nulla operatio quae non est existens in potestate voluntatis est 
virtuosa sed magis naturalis. Secunda conditio patet secundum 
Philosophum, VI Ethicorum, electo recta--et per consequens nee 
aliqua operatio recta--non est sine recta ratione, quia non est 
major ratio de una operatione quam de alia. Praxis autem vitiosa 
est operatio existens in posteste voluntatis, nata elici difform--
iter rationi rectae, vel conformiter rationi erroneae et falsae. 
Prima conditio patet, quia aliter non esset imputabilis, quia 
i.llud quod non est in potestate voluntatis mullo modo est imput-
abile. Secunda conditio patet, quia omne malum elicitum potest 
esse dictatum non esse eliciendum." This text should disprove a 
rather common charge that, for Ockham, no act is good or evil 
"~ §_£ 11 , or "in se." Cf. de Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie 
Medievale, p. 185; Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in 
Theorz and Practice, 3rd ed. (St. Louis, c. V. Mosby Co., 1963), 
p. 15 ; Stephen Tornay, Ockham, p. 75. Ockham is not adverse to 
speaking about acts "natus esse bonus moraliter ~ ~" (Sent., 
295 
expression is its clarity. "Obligation" is itself a connotative 
term whose nominal definition involves diverse referents. The 
dictate of Right Reason, however, is a specific act which inheres 
subjectively in the mind and whose natural function is to regu-
late or oblige the will's freedom. What is against one's judg-
ment of Right Reason is thereby against one's moral obligation. 
Secondly, the meaning of "sin" must be distinguished from that 
of "evil." The temporal, finite actions of man cannot possess 
an inherent and necessary relationship to eternal punishment. 
Sin connotes the disapproval of God--the extrinsic determination 
that certain forbidden actions will be punished by damnation. 
Ockham can talk about moral evil without speaking of sinful acts. 
Ex puris naturalibus--through normal human powers--the agent might 
violate his moral obligation and reject the dictate of Right 
Reason. "Sin" carries the added connotation that this moral 
evil will be punished eternally. 
3. The Meaning of Moral Good 
In both the Reportatio and the Quotlibetal Questions, 
Ockham states that the "rectitude" or moral goodness of an act 
is not distinct from the substance of that act. 41 The "rectitude" 
III, q. 10, M); he can discuss moral good and evil without re-
ferring to the divine will (Sent., II, q. 19, P). What Ockham 
does assert is that the "absolute being of any action which the 
human will can produce is morally indifferent. Without a cause 
which is subject to moral obligation and capable of recognizing 
moral obligation, it is impossible to produce moral acts. 
41
see Quodl., III, q. 14; Sent., III, q. 12, YY; "Unde 
omnes istae ymaginationes quae dicunt quod rectitudo in actu 
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of an act is not some addition--either a positive or a relational 
entity--to the substance of an act. Rather, "what" the term 
primarily signifies is the substance of some will-act and not 
something distinct from that act. After examining Ockham's 
doctrine of moral evil, it is tempting to say that his conception 
of moral good could be described as "a will-act which is produced 
freely and in conformity to Right Reason." The metaphysically 
good is simply what is willable; every being is a possible object 
of volition and is thus willable. 42 Moral good is what is will-
able according to Right Reason or according ~o one's obligation. 
Indeed, this description seems to be implied by Ockham throughout 
the Commentary .2!! the "Sentences" and the Quotlibetal Questions 
in spite of the fact that Ockham does not explicitly offer to 
define "moral good." 
The problem with Ockham's doctrine of moral goodness 
stems from two texts in which he considers the nominal definition 
of metaphysical goodness as "a being desirable according to 
Right Reason. 1143 Clearly, the meaning of good, when used as a 
addit aliquid supra actum absolutum vel respectivum, falsae sunt, 
quia nihil aliud est quam ipsemet actus." 
42For Ockham's description of metaphysical good as "the 
willable" or "that which can be desired by the will," see Sent., 
II~ q. 26, O; Sent., III, q. 13, S; Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 
23). 
43sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321); "Ideo dico quod pas-
siones entis non sunt aliqua talis a parte rei, sed tantum sunt 
quidam conceptus importantes illud idem et omnia illa quae im-
portat conceptus entis, connotando aliquod ens determinatum in 
aliquo. Et ideo ens debet poni in definitione indicante quid 
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transcendental predicate, can be expressed without the connotation 
of Right Reason. 44 The fact that every being is willable renders 
every being "good" in a metaphysical sense. How can Ockham con-
sider "a being desirable according to Right Reason" as a descrip-
tion of a "property of being" when his exposition elsewhere 
strongly suggests that this definition applies to moral goodness? 
A number of possible interpretations of these two texts 
can be offered, but the ambiguity cannot be explained away. First, 
it can be said that every real thing expresses both the will of 
God and a right reason of God. 45 Simply by the fact that some-
thing exists, it is willed by God and conformed to the right 
reason of God. Secondly, God could command that any being be 
loved by the created will so that every being could be willed 
according to the Right Reason of the creature. Thirdly, Ockham 
may consider these definitions--"good is a being desirable by the 
nominis cuiuscunque passionis ipsius entis: ut si exprimatur 
quid nominis boni, debet dici quod'bonum est ens appetibile a 
voluntate' vel aliquid tale, vel 'bonum est ens appetibile sec-
undum rectam rationem, ' vel aliqua talis oratio debet exprimi in 
qua ponitur ens in recto et aliquid aliud in obliquo. Et eodem 
modo bonitas debet dici 'entitas sic vel sic appetibilis a vol-
untate' vel aliquid consimile. 11 Also see Summ. Log., I, 10. 
44In fact, Ockham does define "good" as a transcendental 
predicate without including the notion of Right Reason within 
the definition. See Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1 (II, 23). 
45In Sent., I, d. 41, q. 1, A and K; Ockham asserts that 
every volition of God is, by that fact, an act of right reason. 
A distinction between acts of volition and reason, or a moral 
requirement that acts of right reason precede acts of volition, 
would destroy the simplicity of the divine person according to 
Ockham's position. This text is quoted above, Chapter III, n. 36. 
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will" and "good is a being desirable according to Right Reason"--
as interchangeable because "good" in either a metaphysical and 
a moral sense is connotative. Neither use of the term signifies 
something distinct from the being itself. Ockham cautions 
against considering the properties of being as "in some way 
distinct from being. 1146 Just as Ockham criticizes Scotus for 
teaching that moral goodness is an additio"n to a will-act (the 
addition of suitable relationships), so Ockham rejects Scotus' 
position that the concept of metaphysical goodness is an addition 
to the concept of being. 
In the context of a discussion of the "properties of 
being," Ockham twice gives a definition of "good" as "a being 
46
sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321); "Ad rationes probantes 
quod ens non dicitur quidditative de passionibus; dico quod pro-
cedunt ex falsa imaginatione. Imaginatur enim ac si passio esset 
aliquid simplex a parte rei de quo non praedicatur ens quiddita-
tive, ita quod bonitas esset a parte rei aliquo modo distincta 
ab entitate, et nee entitas includeret bonitatem nee esset forma-
liter bonitas, nee e converso. Et hoc simpliciter reputo falsurn, 
quia nulla talis distinctio est ponenda in creaturis. 11 
This assertion by Ockham answers Scotus' position on the 
properties of being, which Ockham understands to be: "Secundo 
dicunt 'quod ens non est univocurn dictum in quid de differentiis 
ultimis nee de passionibus propriis entis' ... De passionibus en-
tis probant idem dupliciter: 'Primo sic; Passio per se secundo 
rnodo predicatur de subjecto, primo Posteriorurn; ergo subjecturn 
ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additurn, ex eodem primo, 
et septimo Metaphysica. Igitur ens in ratione suae passionis 
cadit ut additurn' ... 11 Ibid., p. 297. See Allan B. Wolter's ex-
cellent study of Scotus'PQsition on the transcendentals. The 
Transcendentals §:pd Thej_r Function in the Metaphysics of Duns ,,.. 
Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1940), 
pp. 119-127. See Scotus, Quodl., 18, n. Lt; where Scotus discusses 
the difference between essential goodness (metaphysical good) and 
secondary goodness (natural and moral good). 
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desirable according to Right Reason." De facto, or within the 
present moral order, not every being is to be willed according 
to Right Reason. Acts of hate for God, theft, adultery--these 
acts cannot be willed according to Right Reason "stante divino 
praecepto." Hence, it seems warranted to accept this definition 
as a description of moral goodness. When the context indicates 
clearly that Ockham is considering moral goodness, Ockham often 
approximates this definition--"a being willable according to 
Right Reason." 
1) To worship strange Gods is evil. We will assert 
that the intellect dictates that this is evil 
because then it is really and apparently evil; 
because only this do I call really and apparently 
good or evil--what is judged by the intellect 
good or evil.47 
2) If you ask, however, what does the goodness or 
malice of an act add beyond the substance of an 
act which is called good at least by a certain 
extrinsic denomination? .•• Goodness is that 
connotative term or concept signifying princi-
pally that act, thus indifferent, and connoting 
a perfectly virtuous act of the will and Right4 Reason, in conformity to which is is elicited. 8 
3) Thus, the rectitude of an action is not other 
than the act itself which ought to be chosen 
according to Right Reason.49 
47sent., III, q. 13, S; "Hoc solurn voco realiter appar-
enter bonurn vel malurn, quid judicatur ab intellectu bonurn vel 
malurn, et si judicetur ab intellectu recto non errante esse tale, 
tune nc:n solum est apparenter bonum. vel malurn sed realiter quia 
sic dictat intellectus esse, sicut est in re. 11 
48 Sent., III, q. 10, Q. See above, note 30. 
49Quodl., III, q. 14; 11 ••• ideo rectitudo actus non est 
aliud quam ipse actus qui debi te elici tur secundurn rectam ration-· 
em. " 
r 
4) No act is morally good or virtuous unless the 
act of willing determines for itself to follow 
Right Reason or is caused by such volition; 
for example, to will to honor the father or 
continue the father's honor because I wish to 
do what Right Reason dictates.50 
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The logical analysis of "good" reveals that it is a con-
notative concept. "Goodness" means a nexus of volitional effect, 
volitive cause and intellectual dictate. The term "good" is 
predicated correctly of a substantive will-act with reference to 
its distinct causes, freedom and reason. Separated from its 
history or causes, the volition is separated from its moral 
status. The root meaning of this concept does not signify the 
divine will either directly or indirectly. If God's causality 
is substituted for the created will in producing a finite voli-
tion, then the meaning of "moral good" is lost. To be sure, 
Ockham could define the good as the creature's obligation fulfill-
ment or conformity to divine precepts. But obligation and con-
formity must be dictated by Right Reason and executed freely 
"because it is dictated by Right Reason." Invariably, therefore~ 
moral goodness means the substantive will-act with its free and 
rational causes. 
Ocl~ham gives a shorthand definition of moral good and 
evil as conformity to obligation or rejection of obligation. 51 
50_Quod1., III, q. 14; 11 ••• nullus actus est inoraliter 
bonus vel yj_rtuosus nisi sibi assistat actus volendi sequi rectam 
rationem ve1 quia causatur a tali velle; puta, velle honorare 
patrem vel continuare honorem quia volo quid recta ratio dictat. 11 
5lE._g., Sent., II, q. 5, H; Sent., II, q. 19, P; Sent., 
IV, q. 9, S; Se~t., I, d. 47, q. 1, D. 
r 
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He often speaks about moral obligation, but we find no text in 
which Ockham explicitly defines moral obligation. Ockham implies 
that obligation is a type of necessity. The term "necessity" is 
used advisedly since, strictly speaking, the will cannot be nee-
essitated by anything or anyone while producing an imputable 
act. But if the will is to act rightly, then it must execute 
the dictates of Right Reason. It is hypothetically necessary 
for the will to conform to Right Reason in order to produce a 
good action, although the will is not under any absolute necessity 
to produce a good action. Because recta ratio includes directives 
which are divinely revealed and directives which are known nat-
urally, it is clear that the will is subject to two types of 
rule or obligation. First, the will must produce certain acts 
because those actions are conditionally necessary for salvation, 52 
that is to say, certain acts are obligatory because God has 
"posited" a reward or punishment regarding the performance of 
such acts. Ockham often mentions positive obligations which 
imply a consequent reward or punishment; 53 but he never asserts 
52sent., I, d. 48, q. 1, H; "Ad secundurn dicendurn quod 
non conformans se voluntati divinae pro loco et tempore pro quo 
tenetur de necessitate salutis~ peccat mortaliter." Also see 
Sent., Prologue, q. 10 (I, 299J; An Princeps, c. 7 (Manchester 
ed., Vol. I, 257); Sent., IV, q. 3, T. 
53sent., IV, q. 3, E; "Peccatum actuale non dicit aliud 
quam actum aliquem absolutum praeteritum per quern quis obligatur 
ad penam ... similiter illa 'obligatio' non di.cit aliquid absolutum 
in anima distinctum ab actu et habi tu nee respectum realem, quj_a 
suus terminus non est. Igitur tantum respectum rationis si sit 
aliquis respectus." Also see Sent., IV, q. 9, E; Sent., II, 
q. 19, P; Sent., I, d. 42, q. 1, H; Sent., II, q. 5, H. This 
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that the only basis of moral obligation is a divine command.54 
Secondly, the will is obliged to follow the natural dictates of 
Right Reason. Ockham makes only cursory statements about natural 
or non-positive obligations. However, Ockham does assert that 
"as if by nature" things are ordered to certain ends. 55 Con-
sequently, the natural dictates of Right Reason are obligatory 
or necessary as the condition for "all things being agreeably 
ordered." Thus, whether moral obligation is determined on the 
basis of revealed evidence or natural evidence, it is the dictate 
of Right Reason which recognizes the end as it ought to be at-
tained and conveys this "ought" to the will. Ockham's formal 
quotation indicates that "obligation" is a co1motative term. 
Obligation is not some absolute or individual being, nor is it 
a real relation or respect. Consequently, "obligation" must 
have a nominal definition (quid nominis). A positive obligation 
or- good connotes the will of God accepting some action as re-
wardable. 
54In fact, Ockham explicitly recognizes the presence of 
obligations which are not derived from the divine commands. 
"Quia semper peccat voluntas peccato commissionis quando elicit 
aliquem actum ad cuius oppositum obligatur per praeceptum divi-
num vel ordinationem divinam vel alio modo obligatur ad opposi-
tum et nunquam aliter peccat. 11 Sent., III, q. 13, M. Also see 
Sent., III, q. 12, YY, in finem. 
55sent., Prologue, q. 11 (I, 309); "Ad omnes auctoritates 
respondeo quod procedunt de fine qui secundum rectam rationem-
sal tem ut in pluribus-debet intendi si omnia essent convenienter 
ordinata, et ideo quasi ex natura sua habet quod sit ordinabilis 
ad talem finem. Si tamen non actualiter intendatur, non est vere 
et proprie causa finalis. 11 A non-Christian experiences moral 
obligations and recognizes moral goods without accepting the 
scriptural commands. See Sent., IV, q. 3, S; Sent., III, q. 10, 
I, in which Ockham discusses the difference between non-Christian 
and Christian virtues in terms of natural or supernatural ends, 
or in terms of natural or revealed motives for certain types of 
behavior. 
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description of moral goodness as "a being willable according to 
Right Reason," indicates the character of every actually good act 
and every possibly good act, while remaining open to the positive 
or evident determination of particular goods. 
The logic of "good" depends upon Ockham's metaphysical 
stance and reflects certain "authorities" whom Ockham accepts 
regarding the nature of goodness. Ockham holds that only sub-
stances and accidents are real beings. 56 Obviously, "good" does 
not subsist as do trees and animals; nor is good a real accident 
which inheres in a substance as do heat and whiteness. Goodness 
does not add anything positive to a being. 57 "Good" is said or 
predicated; it does not subsist in the extra-mental world. 
56 Summ. Tot. Log., I, c. 49 (ed. Boehner, p. 141); "Prae-
ter res absolutas, scilicet substantias et qualitate, nulla res 
est imaginabilis." Also see Quodl., I, q. 18; Sent., I, d. 30, 
q. 3, c. 
57Quodl., III, q. 14; "Rectitudo actus non est qualitas 
actus, nee accidens ejus, ergo est substantia actus. Ad istam 
quaestionem, dico quod nunquam actus et sua rectitude differunt, 
quia omnis actus aut est rectus essentialiter aut per denomina-
tionem exrinsecam. Si primo modo tune substantia actus est sua 
rectitudo, quid patet ex hoc, quia impossibile est quod talis 
actus sit a voluntate creata nisi sit rectus, Si secundo modo, 
tune iste actus dicitur rectus, quia causatur vel continuatur ab 
actu essentialiter virutoso, ad cuius conformitatem dicitur actus 
rectus. Sed propter talem causalitatem vel conformitatem, nihil 
positivum recipuit actus exterior." Also see Quodl., I, q. 20; 
and Sent., III, q. 10, Q. When Ockham asserts that"rectitudo" 
is not a quality of an act, rather it is the substance of an 
act, he means that "bonus" is predicated of the substance of an 
action •. The goodness which inheres in an essentially good ac-
tion is caused by the same acts which cause the substance of the 
act; namely, an act of Right Reason and an act of the will. Ock-
ham does not mean that "rectitudo" exists as an independent 
thing as is clear in the following footnote. 
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Because goodness is not an absolute or a positive entity, it 
"inheres" in a thing by being predicated of it. For example, 
"truth" inheres in a proposition by being predi.cated of that 
sentence. The same statement--I am sitting--is true and false 
at different times but in each case the statement itself is 
exactly the same. Likewise, the same physical action--going to 
church--can be successively and extrinsically good and bad de-
pending on the agent's intention. The reason that "good" is a 
connotative term rather than an absolute term, therefore, is the 
metaphysical position that "goodness" is a mode of being and not 
an entitative quality of being. Moral goodness is a determina-
tion of being predicated because of the volitive and intellectual 
causes of that being. This determination asserts no entity be-
yond the real effect of the created will and Right Reason. 
Ockham refers his notion of "good" to the precedents 
within the thought of St. Augustine and Aristotle. St. Augustine 
maintained that every nature--whether created or uncreated--is 
praiseworthy and good. 59 This is a Christian outlook, in which 
58sent., Prologue, q. 9 (I, 240); "Non potest dici secun-
do modo; quia nunquam potest causare conceptum rei nisi causet 
notitiam rei. Sed non est causa notitiae, sicut probatum est, 
ergo nee conceptus. Nee potest dici primo modo, quia non semper 
passiones illae sunt res absolutae realiter distinctae, secundum 
istos, quia 'creativum, 1 'verum,' 'bonum' et huiusmodi sunt pas-
siones aliquorum, et tamen non sunt res ab eis distinctae. 11 See 
also Sent., I, d. 2, q. 9 (II, 321), where Ockham makes the same 
point in refuting the position of Duns Scotus. 
59ouodl., VI, q. 2; "Ad argumentum principale, dico quod 
'laudabile' accipitur multipiciter. Uno modo, pro omni natura 
quae est bona sive sit creata sive increata. Sic loquitur 
the Infinite Being is the Supreme Good and consequently, all 
finite beings share in the goodness of the First Cause. The 
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transcendental or metaphysical definition of "good," therefore, 
is authorized by Augustine. Aristotle speaks about the moral 
connotation of "good. 1160 Goodness can signify the means to the 
unqualified, final end or it can signify an action within human 
powers which deserves praise or blame. 
In the Reportatio, Ockham divides the meaning of "good" 
into; (a) an honest and delectable good, and (b) that which is 
willable. 61 In this early work, Ockham is sensitive to the 
various connotations of the word good. Partially, Ockham's care-
fulness in avoiding equivocations about the term good results 
from his notion of the will's freedom. Ockham does not think 
Augustinus, iii De Libero Arbitrio, dicit 'Si laudatur rationalis 
creatura, quae facta est, nemo dubitat laudandum esse qui fecit. 111 
Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, Q. 
60Quodl., VI, q. 2; "Alio modo dicitur cuius bonitas 
ordinatur ad aliquem alium actum, et sic dicitur primo Ethicorum, 
quod optimorum non est laus. Tertio modo dicitur ut opponitur 
vituperabili, et sic est aliquod bonum existens in nostra potest-
ate dignum retributione et laude. 11 
61
sent., III, q. 13, S; 11 Ad tertium dico quod bonum acci-
pitur dupliciter; uno modo ut dividitur in bonum honestum et 
delectabile, alio modo bonum est idem quid volitum vel accipitur 
pro omni illo quid est volibile. Et eodem modo malum accipitur 
dupliciter ut opponitur bono primo modo dicto vel ut accipitur 
pro aliquo quid est nolibile vel nolitum. Accipiendo bonum primo 
modo et malum prout opponitur bono primo modo, sic dico quod 
voluntas potest velle malum quid nee est bonum realiter nee ap-
parenter, et potest nolle bonum quid nee est malum realiter nee 
apparenter. Prima pars istius conclusionis pa.tet, quia aliter 
sequeretur quod nee posset mereri nee demereri committendo circa 
quidcunque objectum malum realiter et dictatum a recta ratione 
esse tale." 
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that the will must choose an object under the aspect of a good 
(sub ratione boni). A person always wills what is willable; but 
the experience of moral guilt and wrong-doing shows that a person 
can will something sub ratione mali. Everything actual or pos-
sible can be willed; but not everything should be willed in a 
given situation. Metaphysical good asserts only that a being is 
willable; that everything can be an object of the will's love. 
Moral good and evil assert the will's love of objects dictated 
or prescribed by Right Reason. For Ockham, the will's freedom 
requires the capacity to deliberat~ly and single-mindedly accept 
or reject the directive of Right Reason, to fulfill or repudiate 
its obligation. 
The association between the divine will and moral good 
involves four facets. First, every moral use of human freedom 
requires the co-efficiency of the First Cause. Created good and 
evil do not exist by necessity; if they obtain then God is co-
agent. Secondly, the dictate of Right Reason must recognize the 
moral force of divine commands to be objectively correct. Know-
ing that God exists and prescribes some action is reason enough 
for Right Reason to dictate that action. Here those who claim 
that Ockham makes divine precepts the meaning of moral good have 
qualified support for their interpretation. No natural criteria 
of goodness should be preferred to a meaningful and "fulfillable" 
divine command. Right Reason cannot dictate contrary acts simul-
taneously but, on the basis of novel revelation, might dictate 
contrary actions successively. Thirdly, precluding any positive 
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law and obligation to guide the exercise of human freedom, the 
moral agent should direct his volition to the Greatest Good. God 
ought to be the final cause of moral behavior even though a 
revealed mandate forbids the love of God. Finally--and extrinsic 
to the nature of morally good actions--God accepts some actions 
as meritorious or con.duci ve to eternal life. It must be empha-
sized that Ockham speaks of moral good as independent of meritori-
62 
ousness; moral good refers to the substance of created will-acts 
while meritorious connotes the divine evaluation of those will-
acts. Salvation and beatitude are free gifts of God but morality 
62
sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, E; "Verumtamen, illum actum esse 
meritorium non est in potestate naturae humanae, sive habeat 
charitatem sive non habeat, sed est in libera Dei acceptatione; 
ita quod sive charitas insit animae sive non insit et actu elici-
to adhuc, est in postestate Dei acceptare illum actum tanquam 
meritorium vel non acceptare. 11 Also see Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, Q. 
It does not seem inconsistent with Ockham'S'""exposition of damn-
able or meritorious acts to maintain that God could impose eternal 
punishment or eternal reward upon any act of man--even acts done 
unconsciously or undeliberately. However, Ockham strongly sug-
gests that only actions done voluntarily and knowingly are accept-
ed by God as worthy of eternal pain or reward. See Quodl., VI, 
q. l; Sent., I, d. 17, q. 11, C; Sent., IV, q. 8-9, Z, in finem. 
Ockham implies that morally good orevil actions can be-Super-
naturally meritorious or punishable. For example, a meri tor:Lous 
action is a morally good action which is produced out of love 
for God. "Nullus actus non meritorius-posset dici de novo (actu) 
meritorius, quae non continuatur et causatur ex amore Dei. Simi-
liter, nullus actus est moraliter bonus vel virtuosus nisi sibi 
assistat actus volendi sequi rectam rationem vel quia causatur 
a tali velle, puta, velle honorare patrem vel continuare honorem 
quia volo facere quid recta ratio dictat." Quodl., III, q. 14. 
Within the present moral order (stante divino precepto), charity 
is a necessary condition or cause of meritorious action. But 
actions which are morally good can be produced without charity. 
t•In omni actu meritorio, caritas est causa efficiens partialis, 
tamen virtus potest esse moralis sufficiens quantum ad moralitatem 
naturalem, si habeat circumstantias debitas tali virtuti secundum 
naturam, sicut philosophi fuerunt virtuosi sine omni caritate, 
sed actwn meritorium non possunt habere sine caritate. 11 Sent., 
III, q. 10, I. 
r 
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is within the normal competence of human nature. 
Ockham separates the moral order from the economy of 
salvation. Since St. Augustine's doctrinal battle with Pelagius 
the Scholastics commonly held that grace was required for moral 
rectitude. 63 Ockham steps outside this tradition and was promptly 
accused of Pelagianism. 64 Partly, his motives were to maintain 
the created will's "freedom of opposites." The will whose natural 
powers were incapable of producing good or evil would not possess 
freedom in Ockham's estimate. Another reason involves the divine 
will. God's freedom and the contingent operation of His ordained 
will prohibit discussion of moral goodness as necessarily pro-
ductive of beatitude. Ockham sees the possibility of a moral life 
ending in total annihilation as well as salvation. 65 This vision 
63cf. De Correptione et Gratia, II (P.L., 4L~, 917). St. 
Thomas holds the same opinion in Summ. Theol., I-II, q. 109, 
art. 2. D. Odon Lottin indicates how another "Nominalist," Peter 
Abelard, was condemned at the Council of Sens for claiming that 
free will was sufficient for moral goodness. Psychologie et 
Morale ... , I, pp. 23-25. 
64
see the studies of Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the 
Pela ains (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, New 
Series 5: Cambridge, University Press, 1957), and Hieko A. 
Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, A Fourteenth Century 
Augustinian (Utrecht, 1957). The papal commission at Avignon 
charged that this position "sapit heresim Pelagianam." See 
Pelzer, Revue d'Histoire eccesiastigue, 18, p. 251. The asser-
tion that moral good is within the natural powers of the human 
will is not, however, endemic to "Nominalism." Gregory of Rimini 
says: "Homo non potest absque speciali Dei auxilio facere aliquem 
actum moralem non culpabilem, igitur homo non potest absque spec-
iali auxilio Dei facere alig_uem actum morali ter born . lm." Sent. , 
II, d. 26-29, q. 1, art. 1 \Venice, 1522), f. 93v. 
65sent., IV, q. 3, Q; 11 ••• sicut Deus creat creaturam 
quamlibet exrnera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest 
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requires that morality carry its own exigencies. Eternal life 
cannot be offered as the inevitable consequent or ulterior motive 
of moral behavior. Rather, the will should fulfill the obligation 
dictated by Right Reason precisely and exactly because it is 
dictated by Right Reason. Hence, Ockham announces the ironic 
partnership of God's absolute power and the "birth of the lay 
spirit" (G. de Lagarde), "a natural and rational ethic" (P. Vig-
naux), "the moral autonomy and freedom of man" (H. Oberman). The 
created will and Right Reason are the sufficient and essential 
causes of moral good; meritorious actions require the causal 
action of infused charity or divine acceptance. The created love 
for God above all is always morally good by nature, but never 
't . d t 66 meri orious e na ura. 
To be sure, there is an "ordained" harmony between the 
order of morals and grace. Those actions presently prescribed 
by God in the Decalogue agree with the natural evidence available 
to the Practical Intellect. God's ordained will now rewards the 
performance of moral actions done for God's sake. 67 "Grace builds 
facere de creatura quicquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis 
diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta, potest eum 
Deus annihilare sine aliqua injuria; its sibi post talia opera 
potest non dare vitam aeternam sed penam aeternam sine injuria. 
Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, et ideo quicquid 
facit nobis ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod Deus 
facit aliquid, juste factum est. Exemplum, Christus nunquam pec-
cavit, et tamen fuit punitus gravissime usque ad mortem.u 
66 Sent., I, d. 17, q. 1, K. See the valuable study of 
Paul Vignaux, Justification et Predestination .•• , pp. 121-126. 
67sent., I, d. 17, q. 2, D; "Deus voluntarie et libere 
acceptat b'Oi1Wii motum voluntatis tanquam meritorium quando elicitur 
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on nature"--in the sense that the connotation of causative 
charity or divine acceptance is added to the notion of "moral 
good" to produce the concept of "meritorious." But the agreement 
between criteria of moral and meritorious activity is factual 
rather than necessary. 
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this doctrine of 
moral good with what Ockham said about the specific nature of 
intrinsically good actions. Moral goodness is defined by its 
essential causes of will and Right Reason. The concept is predi-
cated about a substantive will-act as dependent upon the will 
freely conformed to the obligation enunciated and dictated by 
Right Reason. Ockham's prolonged debate with Duns Scotus means 
to show that morally good actions are intrinsically (in se) and 
specifically distinct from indifferent or evil actions. Yet 
Ockham also claims that God could produce, as immediate and total 
cause, any action within the powers of man without thereby pro-
ducing a moral action. Not subject to any obligation, God could 
perform those actions which would be evil and sinful for creatures 
without acting evilly. The coherence of these two assertions 
goes begging. If God cannot conform to a moral obligation since 
He is nobody's "debtor," how could He singularly produce the same 
specific nature of the creature's actions which are so conformed? 
ab habente charitatem ..• 11 Also see Quodl., I, q. 20; and Sent., 
III, q. 12, K. The conceptual structure of moral good as con-
noting the causes of will and Right Reason, and of meritorious 
good as connoting the will, Right Reason and charity as suggested 
by Erich Hochstetter, Franz. Studien, 32, 11-12. 
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If the created will and Right Reason produce volitions which are 
intrinsically and essentially good, why must the term "good" con-
note causes which are separable and distinct from that volition? 
We find no answers, only Ockham's concern to maintain: a) God's 
capacity to produce directly every metaphysical entity which He 
now produces through secondary causes, and b) the partial causes-
objects of volition effect the metaphysical nature of that 
volition. 
One thing is clear. This "structural" definition of moral 
good gives the rational principles of morality a formal character. 
As the notion of "moral good" connotes its essential cause.s, so 
the various virtues signify volition conformed to prudence or 
Right Reason concerning the passions. 
'Virtuous' and 'wicked' are connotative names and 
signify the act itself, not absolutely, but by con-
noting with this act the activity of the will and 
prudence. And when something connoted is lacking, 
such an act is not called 'virtuous. 1 68 
The content of Ockham's virtue-terminology invariably includes 
the essential causes of moral goodness--the created will and Right 
Reason. The principles formulated with this terminology, however, 
68
sent., III, q. 13, F; 11 ••• 'virtuosum' et 'vitiosum' 
sunt nomina connotativa et significant ipsum actum non absolute, 
sed. connotando cum hoc acti vi tatem volunta·tis et prudentiae. Et 
quando deficit aliquid connotatum non dicitur talis actus vi.rtu-
osus. 11 J. K. McDonnell, Religion and Ethics.~, 110-111+, 140-144, 
comments that the "generic descriptions" which Ockham offers for 
the virtues are not very useful in recognizing or observing speci-
fic instances of these virtues. While agreeing with this inter-
pretation in general, we maintain that the basic or generic 
significance of value terms is the created will and Right Reason, 
not the divine will as Mr. McDonnell proposes. 
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cannot distinguish ~ priori between honest and dishonest actions, 
i.e., acts conformed and contrary to Right Reason's dictate. 
The truth of these principles is secure against any novel legis-
lation by God but their educative value is minimal. That "hon-
est," "justice," "conformity to Right Reason," and "moral good" 
are obligatory becomes a matter of definition. Divine commands 
to "do what is dishonest" or to "act contrary to Right Reason" 
are possible as mental, verbal or written statements, but they 
would be meaningless or logically contradictory. A generic 
definition of moral goodness allows for formal ethical principles 
which organize the agent's deliberations. It provides a stable 
framework for morality with necessarily true directives. At the 
same time, this definition recognizes God's prerogative to affix 
a negative or positive obligation to any simple action within 
man's power. 
CHAPTER VI 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
An element of moral positivism seems to be endemic to 
Christian ethics. The recognition of moral laws, which are 
established and validated by the free decisions of the Creator, 
comes with a commitment to the truth of biblical revelation. 
Scripture contains laws regarding actions neither good nor evil 
in themselves such as the rites of circumcision and baptism. The 
Bible relates instances in which natural laws were either dis-
pensed, clarified, determined or countermanded by God--depending 
on whJch exigesis is accepted--such as the divine command that 
Abraham kill his innocent son or that Osse marry an adulteress. 
How to reconcile the prerogatives of the Creator within the moral 
order with the exigencies of naturally known morality was one 
facet of thr: Scholastic effort to relate faith and reason. The 
frontier between "positive" and "natural" law shifted often in 
proportion to individual's estimates of the nature, stability 
and extent of these various types of moral laws. 
Within the development of Medieval Philosophy, the most 
impressive aspect of Ocl~ham's ethic is the bold treatment of God's 
omnipotence within the moral order. 1Ihe possibility of divine 
commands to kill, lie, steal and hate God is seriously raised by 
OckhB.m. Ockham' s speculation about God's absolute power to 
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cormnand acts of fornication, adultery and "odium Dei" has received 
the concentration of many scholars as the central feature of his 
ethical system. Consequently, Ockhamism has been considered as 
an "extreme" position in the history of Scholastic ethical 
theory--a "pure" system of divine voluntarism. Perhaps the first 
instance of divine positivism or voluntarism. 1 
Yet we have Ockham's own opinion that moral doctrine in-
eludes more than divine commands. 
One should know that moral doctrine has many parts, 
of which one is positive and the other non-positive. 
Human positive science is that which contains human 
and divine laws which oblige someone to accomplish 
or avoid those things which are neither good nor 
evil unless because they are commanded or prohibited 
by a superior capable of establishing and deciding 
laws. Non-positive moral science is that which 
directs human acts without any command of a superi-
or; just as principles known per se or known through 
experience direct thus, that namely, 'Everything 
honest is to be done,' and 'Everything dishonest 
is to be avoided,' etc., about which Aristotle 
speaks in moral philosophy.2 
The interpretive problem, therefore, is to determine how 
Ockham reconciles his far-reaching conception of God's legislative 
authority with the Aristotelian requirements for a moral science. 
~-· ....... ------------------------------
1
cf. Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1958), p. 289; "Morality for the first time lay simply 
with God's arbitrary decree; with God and His will synonymous 
there 8ould be no way of judging right or wrong other than by 
the decrees of His will." Also, A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law. 
An Histcr.ica~ SllrVIT (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1955'),p-:-69; 
and Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 15~?. 
".) 
LQuodl., II, q. 14. See Introduction, note 9 . Hereafte:r, 
texts quoted within the preceding chapters will be indicated by 
chapter number (Roman numeral) and footnote number. 
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The Venerable Inceptor admits diverse components within his 
ethical theory. Norms, determinants, evidence and values fit 
into the general categories of either "positive" or "non-posi-
tive. 11 Our conclusions are brief; they mean to identify the 
major features of each category and show their relationship. 
The arguments for these conclusions rest mainly in the preceding 
chapters. 
Positive Elements 
Norms. The divine will and its contingent legislation 
represents a circumstance of special importance to the created 
moral agent. 3 After recognizing through faith the revealed word 
of God in Scripture, the rational creature ought to conform to 
the mandates therein. Furthermore, men ought to affirm God's 
freedom in establishing norms of behavior for His creatures. In 
particular and extraordinary cases, God might order actions which 
are now inconsistent with natural and revealed general standards. 
(Principal Objection) God commanded the children of 
Israel to plunder the Egyptians; 
therefore, He commanded theft. 
But theft is evil; therefore, 
He commanded evil ... 
(Ockham's Response) To the first principal argument, 
it is clear that to plunder the 
Egyptians was not evil but good. 
Thus, God did not command evil 
by ordering them to rob the 
Egyptians, nor did the children 
of Israel sin by plundering--
3 III, 9. 
except those who robbed in the 
wrong spirit by not obeying 4 precisely the divine command. 
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The claim was not uncommon within Scholasticism that God, 
the creator of the world, could redistribute the goods of the 
world. The enlargement of God's moral authority occurs with 
Ockham's unprecedented assertion that a divine command could 
require hate for God. Ockham sees no necessary connection or 
formal repugnance between the Uncreated Cause and any created 
effect. God is a spectator, not a participant in the moral order. 
Simple hate for God is not by nature evil or repellant to the 
Creator: insane persons or God Himself could cause this volition 
without moral guilt. The simple love for God is not by nature 
good or conducive to happiness: people can love God selfishly 
(i.e.,~ amore concupiscentiae). Ockham holds that every 
simple act within the power of man's will (i.e., any volitive 
effect specified by a single object) could be subject to a nega-
tive or affirmative obligation through divine law. He demands 
recognition of the complex objects and situational factors which 
necessarily accompany volitions which are truly moral. 
4sent., I, d. 47, q. 1, A, G; 11 ••• praecepit filiis Israel 
spoliare Egyptios; ergo, praecepit furturn. Sed furtum est malum; 
ergo, praecepit malum ... Ad primum principale, patet quod spoli-
are Egyptios non fuit malum sed bonum. Et ideo Deus praecipiendo 
spoliare Egyptios non praecepit malum nee filii Israel peccaver-
unt spoliando nisi illi qui malo animo non praecise obediendo 
divino pracepto spoliaverunt." 
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Valid moral laws must respect the capacities and possi-
bilities of human nature and the norms of logical coherence.5 
When expressed as directive propositions by the Practical Intel-
lect, the divine commands must be conceptually consistent and 
signify something "do-able." These minimal requirements perhaps 
reduce to one. What cannot be done voluntarily cannot be a 
matter of obligation or morality. This primary standard of 
validity for moral laws pertains to both the positive and non-
positive variety. An additional criterion must be applied to 
purely positive norms: every simple action subject to a positive 
positive obligation must be "do-able" while respecting the source 
of that obligation. Positive laws presuppose the authority of 
the legislator; certain actions are valued because they are com-
mantled by "a superior capable of establishing and deciding laws." 
The fulfillment of positive obligations requires the proper 
intention or motivation towards a principle of obligation which 
is distinct from the nature of the action commanded. Here a 
unique problem arises. What if God commanded the creature to 
hate Him? The simple hate for God is within the power of the 
created will and thus Ockham admits in principle that this action 
could be subject to a positive obligation. But in this one case 
the motive for obedience would be "formally repugnant" to the 
obedient act; one would be obliged to hate God because of love 
for God. Everything other than God could be loved or hated by 
5111, 15; and III, 53. 
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the created will for God's sake without any formal or psychologi-
cal contradiction. 6 Hence, while Ockham extends the realm of 
positive law to every act within the created will's power, the 
hate of God cannot be done virtuously. In this case, the meta-
physical or natural possibilities of the human will are not co-
extensive with its moral possibilities. 7 
Scholasticism was largely the endeavor of theologians. 
Ockham no less than St. Thomas or Duns Scotus considered himself 
first and foremost a theologian. Vitalized by belief in God as 
the Greatest Good and the Ultimate End, his moral theory dwells 
on the peculiarities of Christian behavior. Scripture contains 
certain mandates and rather than explicate the natural evidence 
and rational warrant for these revealed directives, Ockham is 
satisfied to say they express God's will for men. As Father 
6
sent., III, q. 12, YY-AAA; "Si quaeras utrum conversio 
ad Deum actu caritativo et aversio ab Eo actu odiendi Eum opponi-
tur formaliter. Dicendum est quod sic, quia d:Lligere Deum supra 
011111.:La et odire Deum sunt actus contrarii. Si quaeras de conver-
sione ad Deurn actu caritativo et conversione actu quo diligitur 
creatura quam Deus non vult diligi, puta actum fornicandi. Sic 
non repugnant illi naturali ter et formali ter .inter se, sed compat-
iuntur se in eodem quantum est ex natura actuum. Sed solum 
repugnant per causam extrinsecam, puta per Deum ordinantem talem 
creaturam nullo modo a. voluntate creatura diligi .•. Si lex 
statuta removeretur, jam isti actus diligendi compaterentur se 
in eodem." Also see Sent., II, q. 19, F. 
7 I Q d- II 14 0 khr ' ~ · 11 ] 11 "h n uo l.. , . , q. , c am cJetines mora .s a.s uman 
acts which are controlled by the vd.11 absolutely;" or in a strict 
sense as "acts subject to the power of will according to the 
natural dictate of reason and ac8ording to the other circumstanc-
es." Cf. Introduction, note 9 . God's moral authority is as 
extensive as the first meaning. But hate for God cannot be 
elici.ted within the strict sense of moral activity. 
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Philotheus Boehner indicates, 8 Ockham envisions morality within 
the context of interpersonal relationships rather than rule by 
impersonal nature. The possibility of changes in the content of 
moral obligation is Scripturally demanded (e.g., the case of 
Abraham and Osee) and promotes the fundamental motive to please 
God when used pedagogically. Ockham never teaches that all moral 
norms derive their validity "ex praecepto superioris:" there are 
many universal directives whose validity is not relative to divine 
decree. Perfect virtue requires, however, that Christian agents 
value every created thing--even moral rules--as means to the 
Uncreated Good. 
Values. According to Ockham, some actions are morally 
good only because God commands them. This can be understood 
about rites such as baptism, or particular duties such as Abraham 
refeived. Ockham appreciates the (remote) possibility that God 
might attach an obligation to performing any simple action within 
the agent's power--except the act of hating or disobeying God. 
•ro love God above all is intrinsically and necessarily good in 
spite of changing circumstances or divine commands to the con-
trary. As corollary, Ockham proposes that no physical or mental 
act, and no simple or non-complex act of volition, has a proper 
goodness or evilness by its nature. 
8collected Articles ... , p. 153; "Ockham bases his ethics 
on one Personal principle, on God who is most powerful, most good 
and most wise and most just." 
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This description of the positive norms and values in 
Ockham's ethical doctrine is one side of the coin. Ockham thinks 
these positions can fit within the framework of an Aristotelian 
moral science. Concern for the divine prerogatives is a constant 
polarity of Ockham's moral teaching. The positive or voluntaris-
tic features of his doctrine raise serious doubts for many critics 
that Ockham could consistently maintain any demonstrative and 
rationally based knowledge about the moral order. The burden of 
proof rests with those who claim that the divine will is not 
Ockham's last word in ethics. 9 
Non-Positive Elements 
Norms. A novel understanding of "recta ratio" supports 
Ockham's claim of a "scientific" ethic. Right reason can desig-
nate any true directive proposition--this is its traditional 
significance. But Ockham also means by Right Reason a non-
propositional act of the intellect--a simple act of assent to 
the apprehended directive or "right reason." Not a proposition 
itself, Right Reason cannot stand in logical contradiction to 
any directive. Practical assent or Right Reason is the psycho-
logical mechanism which renders the consideration of behavioral 
9various commentators have suggested that moral positiv-
isn is not an accurate classification of Ockham's moral doctrine, 
but without indicating how positivism and rationalism are related. 
Cf'. Helmar ~runghens, Ockham im Lichte der neueren Forschung 
(Berlin, Hamburg; Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1968), p. 253; Paul 
Vignaux, "Nom.inalism," D.T.C., 11, c. 771; and Othmar Suk, n~rhe 
Connection of virtues According to Ockham," Franciscan Studies 
10 (1950), pp. 29-30. 
321 
ends as normative for volition. To assent that "this is to be 
done" conveys an obligation or imperative beyond the assessment 
of truth. Regardless of the objective truth of a moral direc-
tive, the will is not obliged until the intellect recognizes or 
assents to its truth. This un-traditional sense of "recta ratio" 
is either included within the meaning of necessary moral rules 
or is presupposed by them. Inevitably, Right Reason and volitive 
freedom produce moral activity; these aspects of human nature 
become the basic moral "facts" upon which moral science is based. 
Certain principles of morality organize deliberation 
about one's duty. These principles are known per seas neces-
sarily true independent of any will-act, human or divine, Ock-
ham mentions: Everything honest is to be done. Everything dis-
honest is to be avoided, The will ought to be conformed to Right 
Reason, All blameworthy evil is to be avoided. 10 These and 
other universal norms11 structure moral decisions and connect 
all virtuous actions as common principles. The truth of these 
directives is known by means of the constitutive concepts. It 
would be possible, but logically contradictory and unfulfillable, 
for God to command, "Act contrary to Right Reason" or "Do what 
is dishonest." The very meaning of Right Reason and honesty 
indicates an obligation of conformity and performance for the 
crea.ted will. It remains true that the will ought to conform 
lOI . d t· 11."t"f'O UC ion, 
11Iv, 23. 
note 9 . 
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to Right Reason however one's positive obligations change through 
divine command. The natural function of Right Reason involves 
the determination and dictation of one's obligation. Whether 
natural evidence or divine commands warrant the judgment that 
"this ought to be done," the assent of Right Reason is the 
standard of virtuous will-acts. Ockham reasons that it would be 
impossible for moral agents to conform to rules about which they 
are (inculpably) ignorant. Believing that God is the Greatest 
Good who commands this particular act, Right Reason assents 
naturally and automatically that "this is to be done." Not 
believing in God, the judgments of the Practical Intellect remain 
autonomous and authoritative even while rejecting God's positive 
laws. 
Ockham's redefinition of "recta ratio" stands in harmony 
with God's legislative authority; at the same time it explains 
why Ockhamism could foster a "lay spirit" and division between 
_theological and natural ethics. The dictate of Right Reason 
carries a moral exigency; the agent should voluntarily conform 
to the intellect's dictate "because it is dictated. 1112 It pro-
vides Ockham with a solution for the perplexing problem of the 
evidence and experiential foundation for moral values. Assent 
to a direc-cive proposition has the natural function of recogniz-
ing, affirming and dictating an obligation. The judgment of 
practical truth asserts a personal duty. In constructing moral 
12II 83 84. 
' ' . 
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laws with this conception of "recta ratio," Ockham asserts only 
a fact, but a psychological fact whose natural function is to 
establish a norm for volition. 
The non-positive rules of morality which are necessarily 
true signify only the structure or framework of moral activity. 
Science concerns the universal for Ockham as well as for Aris-
totle; the Venerable Inceptor locates universality in the signi-
fication of concepts and words rather than in extra-mental things. 
Hence, the principles of demonstrative knowledge about ethics 
concern concepts. These principles are formally or analytically 
true; the constitutive concepts are connected necessarily by the 
verb "ought" because one term of the proposition invariably 
connotes or signifies the obliging dictate of Right Reason. The 
rationally n,ecessary rules of morality signify the essential 
causes of moral activity--narnely, the Will as conformed to Right 
Reason's assent. Certain principles explicitly assert the 
"ethical order" of causes, e.g., The will ought to conform itself 
to Hight Reason; others designate implicitly the causality of 
human freedom and Practical Intellect, e.g., Everything honest 
is to be done. Such directives offer generic descriptions of 
human moral response. They cannot divide the range of possible 
volitions into .§. priori categories of "conform.Ed to Right Reason" 
or "contrary to Right Reason." Asserting only the structure of 
mora.1 behav:Lor, they cannot contradict any positive content or 
determination of right and wrong. 
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Values. Ockham's basic description of moral good is 
"that which can be willed and loved according to Right Reason. 1113 
This meaning can absorb any "positive goods" since the will of 
God is respected by the "honest use of reason." Ockham is em-
phatic that actual moral value inheres in, or is predicated of, 
the created will. Subject to no obligation, the divine agent 
never produces a moral value when operating as total cause. As 
legislator, God might attach positive obligations to certain 
actions but the causes and consequently the meaning of "moral 
good" involves the created will and intellectual dictate. 
It is necessary to distinguish between moral and meritori-
ous good in Ockham's thought. Morality is within man's natural 
powers, salvation or merit is not. Some actions are motivated 
by th~ infused habit of charity and acceptable to God; but no 
created effect necessitates the divine will to grant eternal life. 
Reward or punishment is extrinsic to the nature of human acts. 
The love of God above all is morally good by nature but not con-
ducive to beatitude by nature. Too often, commentators have 
described Ockham's doctrine of "meritorious" (and extrinsic) good 
as his final word in value theory. But Ockham clearly holds that 
moraJ good and evil are intrinsically different by nature, and 
specJ.:fice.lly different in predication. Characteristic of Ockham's 
theory <-lr8 the positions: a) that the simple nature of every 
human action is morally indifferent, and b) that actions called 
13 v. 47, 48, 49, 50, 68. 
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good have a complex nature deriving from the various circumstances 
and objects which are corporately dictated by Right Reason. These 
positions enable Ockham to distinguish fact and value; they also 
allow for God's prerogative to attach a positive obligation to 
every simple act (except hate for God) producible by men. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Ockham has no ethical system which can be classified as 
voluntarism, positivism, rationalism, subjectivism or formalism. 
These categories are all accurate to a degree and, for that 
reason, imprecise. Human knowledge about morals possesses no 
formal or systematic unity based upon a single subject, a specif-
ic type of evidence or one common principle. Our knowledge is 
simply a collection of logically compatible propositions which 
deal directly or indirectly with human operations. Based upon 
different sources of evidence, Ockham divides moral doctrine 
into the general classes of positive and non-positive. The har-
mony between these parts is not organic; it is simply the absence 
of mutual contradiction. 
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